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ABSTRACT
The protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities ('PIF'), as a political/legal endeavour 
presents unique features. Firstly it is central to the 
future of the Communities; increasingly it has been 
perceived as an essential ingredient to preserve the 
credibility of the 'European Project'. Secondly it has 
opened up a penal-administrative space at EC level, which 
many regard as a fore-runner to a European Criminal Legal 
Space - a vision fraught with difficulties. 
Notwithstanding the high profile of 'PIF', on the whole 
progress in fraud control has been uneven, due to the 
sectoral approach adopted. On the expenditure side of the 
budget, the most regulated area remains the part of the 
EAGGF-Guarantee Section Fund, whilst Structural Funds 
remain fairly un-policed. Of late it has been recognized 
that procurement fraud, involving the corruption of 
officials who work with Structural Funds, is rife in many 
Member States, and legislative solutions have been sought 
at EC level. On the income side of the budget, the 
control of VAT fraud rests mainly with the Member States. 
Other duties have become increasingly difficult to 
collect in view of the near-collapse of the transit 
system: solutions advocated include the computerisation 
of the transit system and various improvements in 
Customs' modi operandi. All Member States have 
experienced difficulties in recovering EC funds obtained 
through irregularities: a case study is offered, which 
compares the British and Danish approaches to the 
recovery of EC funds. In relation to VAT and excise 
regimes, the organisation of Customs, and recovery of 
funds, greater integration would be more effective that 
Commission supervision of the Member States.
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INTRODUCTION
'Fraua omnia corrumplt' (Julius Caesar)
There are three reasons why the protection of the 
financial interests of the European Communities should 
concern and interest all European citizens. Firstly, 
whether employed or not, they are tax payers and 
indirectly contribute to the budget. The protection of 
the financial interests of the European Communities is 
therefore a legitimate concern. Every year the Member 
States now pay the equivalent of between 4% to 5% of 
their GNPs into the Community budget.1 Although this 
constitutes a relatively small contribution in percentage 
terms, the political significance of the EC budget2 
should not be underestimated. It exists to give 
expression to common policies, and to implement jointly 
agreed programmes, which both are an integral part of the 
European Project. Yet every year a proportion3 of the EC 
budget is misappropriated, through frauds and 
irregularities which increasingly involve more than one 
jurisdiction. Costly irregularities cast a shadow over 
the prospect for further integration (and enlargement), 
and raise political and legal issues for 'euro-sceptics' 
and 'euro-philes' alike.
1 European Court of Auditors (1995) The European Court of 
Auditors, Auditing the finances of the European Union, June, 
page 13.
2 Total estimated appropriations for 1997 show a grand 
total of 89 186 million ECU. In November 1996 one ECU was 
worth 57 pence.
3 Reported frauds entered into the Commission IRENE 
database point to a percentage of 1% to 3% of the budget being 
misappropriated, whilst much higher estimates have been 
ventured, to take into account unreported irregularities.
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Secondly, the sharing of competencies between the 
Communities and the Member States is generally a delicate 
matter, due to the absence of clear principles in the 
Treaty for the allocation of regulatory powers.4 In no 
other area maybe is the balance more delicate than in 
matters relating to the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities, where the budget 
is the Communities', yet the enforcement the Member 
States'. Ambiguity starts with the budget itself. The 
Member states are responsible for the collecting and 
making available of resources to the Community. They are 
also responsible for spending over 80% of the same 
budget. Yet the Commission is responsible for the 
implementation of the budget in accordance with the 
principles of sound financial management.5 Furthermore 
the Community has no criminal jurisdiction, and relies 
entirely on the Member States for the protection of EC 
funds. Such an arrangement does not correspond to any of 
the models of public financing, and of protection of 
public funds we already know well.6 This means that there 
has been no blueprint for the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities. As a unique 
creative experiment in post-national rule making, it 
continues to be controversial.
Thirdly, in a political space that is neither wholly 
federal nor inter-governmental, there haW been 
persisting concern about uneven and ineffective 
enforcement of EC law at national level. Fundamental
4 On this point, see Weatherill, S (1995) Implementation 
as a constitutional issue, in Implementing EC law in the 
United Kingdom: Structures for indirect rules, ed: T. 
Daintith, IALS London, Chancery Law Pubs, 325-360.
5 Articles 201 and 205 EC; Article 22(1), first 
subparagraph of the Financial Regulation.
6 Such arrangements include those evident in centralised 
states, federal governments or international organisations.
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issues concerning Member States' attachment to common 
goals and trust continue to be raised. In the field of 
the protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities, there has been specific concerns over the 
assimilation of EC funds with national funds, but also, 
more fundamentally, over the adequacy of national 
measures in a single market, in a world where formal, 
informal and criminal economies are increasingly seen as 
converging. The difficulty in preventing and sanctioning 
frauds affecting the EC budget, and in recovering funds, 
cannot be underestimated. The evolution of the informal 
economy, and its links with international organised crime 
make these tasks particularly challenging.7 Here both 
Naylor8 and Van Duyne9 help to understand the 
development, and extent of the 'organised crime'10 
phenomenon in question. They find it useful to start with
7 See for example newspaper article: 'Criminal gangs 
exploit Union's single market', in European Voice 14 November 
1996, page 4.
8 Naylor#/ R (1996) From underworld to underground 
enterprise crime, 'informal sector' business and the public 
policy response, Crime, Law and Social Change, volume 24, 
number 2, 79-150.
9 Van Duyne, P (1996) The phantom and threat of organised 
crime in Crime, Law and Social Change, volume 24, number 4, 
341-377.
10 Most definitions of organised crime seem to be 
culturally specific, and range from the minimalist (a crime 
which involves more than one perpetrator) , to the very 
detailed (involving particular mafias or syndicates making 
routine use of violence and intimidation). For this purpose, I 
am adopting Fijnaut's general definition of organised crime in 
Europe as involving 'professional criminals [who] distinguish 
themselves not only by the efficient and business-like way in 
which they commit certain crimes, but also by the close 
relations they have amongst themselves' ( cf. Fijnaut, C 
(1991) Organized crime and anti-organized crime efforts in 
western Europe: An overview, in Organized crime and its 
containment, a transatlantic initiative, eds C. Fijnaut and J. 
Jacobs, Kluwer). For our purpose, the definition has the 
benefit of being sufficiently wide, and of not taking violence 
to be a major definitional determinant.
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a distinction between two broad categories of economic 
crime: (i) the 'unambiguously criminal', which is dealt 
with by police measures and (ii) the (equally, if not 
more difficult to detect) 'otherwise legal', where 
enterprises deal with legal goods or services in illegal 
ways. The second sector is presumed to be much larger.
Its existence is usually imputed to too much (and/or too 
complex) regulation, and it is seen as fundamentally a 
problem for the political authorities to solve. Looking 
at this separation between a crime market where goods are 
illegal, and a crime market where legal goods and 
services are handled in illegal ways, it seems at first 
that frauds and irregularities affecting the EC budget 
fall within the second category, in the 'price-wedge' 
market described by Van Duyne,11 where the regulation of 
taxes, excises and EU subsidies are flouted. However neat 
this theoretical separation may seem at first sight, we 
shall see that in practice it flounders. The boundary 
between the two sectors has become blurred, making the 
task of both legislators and enforcers more difficult.
For these reasons the author argues simply that an 
approach which focuses on reducing opportunities for 
fraud and corruption should be prioritised. This means, 
inter alia, completing the single market.
The focus of this work is on the institutional response, 
and the evolution of Community control, although it also 
contains a national study on the recovery of unwarranted 
payments. Although much of the literature on the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities has hitherto focused on the CAP,12 little has
11 Ibid, page 356.
12 See for example Tiedemann, K (1975) La fraude dans le 
domaine des subventions: Crime et politique criminelle, Revue 
de droit p£nal et de criminologie, 129-140; Dannecker, G (ed) 
(1993) Combatting subsidy fraud in the EC area,
Bundesanzeifer, Koln; Norton, D (1986) Smuggling under the 
CAP: Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, Journal of
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been written on, for example (i) large scale transit 
fraud, (ii) procurement fraud affecting the Structural 
Funds, (iii) the recovery of EC funds, (iv) corruption 
affecting the EC budget - nor has VAT fraud been much 
discussed in the context of the EC budget. The present 
work goes some way towards addressing these gaps, 
although it often raises more questions than it solves.
The protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities has progressed in leaps and bounds since 
1995, which means that by the time this work is examined, 
it may already be somewhat out of date. It should, 
however, reflect developments at least until the summer 
of 1996. This work does not claim to be comprehensive.
For a start, it deals with the control of fraud affecting 
European Community finances, rather than European Union 
finances. This is because, notwithstanding new Treaty 
provisions,13 the position of expenditure incurred under 
the second and third pillars has not been clarified yet. 
Furthermore not all expenditure, or loans are audited by 
the European Court of Auditors (a situation they would 
like to see remedied, see chapter 2) and as a result are 
not open to scrutiny. A study of GNP national 
contributions has not been included, although the author 
is aware of the present controversy over the lack of 
uniformity in the Member States' calculations of their 
contributions, and this omission should not be 
interpreted as a belief that generally speaking, national 
treasuries are beyond reproach in their handling of EC 
funds. The control of frauds affecting Community 
Initiatives (which are part of the Structural Funds),
Common Market Studies, 32, 3, 319-342; Harding, C (1982) The 
European Communities and control of criminal business 
activities, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
April, 246-262.
13 Article 199 EC.
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deserved more thorough treatment, but would have required 
a period of research at the Commission itself. It is 
unfortunate therefore that the author was age-barred from 
doing a 'stage' at DG XX or UCLAF. Because this work 
focuses on Community control, it does not address in 
detail issues of mutual assistance in criminal justice 
matters, which, in any case have been the subject of 
recent and extensive studies, to which the author would 
be able to add little.14 Lastly, because it dwells on 
control, the work is unashamedly 'top-down', although it 
deals with some of the issues relating to the rights of 
operators in chapters 2 and 4, and incorporates 
operators' views in chapter 3.
The structure is in four parts. Part I introduces the 
subject with a panoramic view of the evolution of control 
(chapter 1) and outlines the role of the European 
institutions, without going into the intricacies of 
budgetary control but taking into account proposed 
institutional reforms (chapter 2). Part II offers a more 
detailed account of Community control of income fraud 
(chapter 3) and expenditure fraud, focusing on intra­
community expenditure (chapter 4). Part III (chapter 5) 
is a study of the recovery of EC funds in the United 
Kingdom, which ends with a comparison of the main 
features of its system with Denmark. Part IV is concerned 
with the widening of the debate. Chapter 6 deals with 
various aspects of corruption. Chapter 7 deals with the 
possible future contours of enforcement upon enlargement
14 See for example Van den Wyngaert, C (1996) Etude espace 
judiciaire europeen, groupe thematique no 2 R&gles de 
competence et extra-territorialite, May; AERPE Luxembourg 
(1995) La protection du budget communautaire et 1'assistance 
entre etats, May; also Manacorda, S (1995) La criminality 
economique internationale: Un premier bilan des instruments de 
politique criminelle, Le Trimestre du Monde, premier trimestre 
(Dossier Mafias et criminality transnationale) , pp 59-81.
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to central and eastern Europe. Chapter 8 discusses the 
legal space and, in particular, the ambitious proposal 
for a Corpus Juris, which has been particularly motivated 
by considerations around the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities. However the work 
concludes by emphasizing the potential for fraud 
prevention through economic and fiscal integration, 
including measures to complete the single market.
Clearly this work would not have been possible without 
the support of my supervisor, Professor Leonard Leigh. I 
could not have wished for a better supervisor. Many 
British and EC officials kindly agreed to be interviewed, 
and their names are listed in appendix D. Contacts were 
made possible through the UK Association of Lawyers for 
the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European 
Communities (ALPFIEC), which, like sister organisations 
in each of the Member States, receives a (modest) grant 
from DG XX (European Commission Directorate General for 
Financial Control). DG XX also finances conferences which 
are ideal fora for students of EC fraud and related 
matters, so at no time did the author feel marginalised.
7
8
PARTI.
EVOLUTION OF CONTROL AND INSTITUTIONS’ ROLES
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CHAPTER 1. EVOLUTION OF CONTROL: A PANORAMIC VIEW
1.1. Background; the Common Agricultural Policy
The setting up of a Common Market in the 1950s by the six 
founding Member States of the European Community meant 
the replacement of individual marketing structures with 
individual agricultural products by a Community marketing 
structure.15 This in turn meant the establishment of a 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP henceforth) and a common 
price system for which the Community took financial 
responsibility. The objectives of the CAP were laid down 
in the Treaty of Rome and were to raise agricultural 
productivity, to ensure a fair standard of living to the 
agricultural community, to stabilize markets, to assure 
availability of supplies and to ensure that supplies 
reach consumers at reasonable prices.16
Although the CAP has made the Community self-sufficient 
in food supplies, the cost has been high. Every year most 
of the overall budget of the EC has been spent on 
maintaining the CAP, which has aptly been described by 
Lasok and Bridge as 'a hungry sacred cow ... leaving 
little for the development of other well-deserving 
policies'.17 Since 1978, the European Court of Auditors 
annual reports show that the Guarantee Section of the 
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF 
henceforth), which is concerned with the support of 
prices for agricultural products, although declining in 
overall percentage, still forms the main part of EC
15 Lasok, D and Bridge, J (1991) Law and institutions of 
the European Communities, Butterworths, London, page 482.
16 Article 39 EEC; see also Harrop, J (1989) The political 
economy of integration in the European Community, Gower, page 
69; Usher, J (1988) Legal aspects of Agriculture in the 
European Community, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 35-40.
17 Lasok and Bridge, op cit, page 489.
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budget expenditure (see table 1.1.).
Table 1.1.
EC Budget and EAGGF Guarantee Section appropriations
Financial year EC expenditure* EAGGF Guarantee 
as % of total**
1977 9,584 74
1978 12,302 70
1979 14,447 72
1980 16,182 71
1981 19,986 58
1982 23,260 57
1983 26,533 60
1984 29,264 62
1985 30,616 65
1986 36,052 61
1987 37,452 61
1988 45,344 61
1989 46,426 60
1990 49,208 54
1991 59,369 55
1992 63,907 52
1993 70,408 52
Notes to table 1.1.
* EC expenditure is cited as million UA (Unit of Account) 
until 1977; million EUA (European Unit of Account) from 
1978 to 1980; million ECU (European Currency Unit) from 1 
January 1981.
** Sources: Court of Auditors' Annual Reports, 1977-1993. 
The figures under 'total EC budget' are the 
appropriations for commitment found in the seventeen 
Court of Auditors' reports for the financial years in 
question, but have been rounded up. The EAGGF Guarantee 
Section expenditure is from the same source, shown here 
as percentage of total budget. It has been rounded up to 
nearest million.
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Frauds and irregularities affecting the Guarantee Section 
of the EAGGF have been widely reported and discussed, 
particularly in the context of exports of agricultural 
products and market intervention (see chapter 4 on 
expenditure fraud). Although the Commission is 
responsible for the integrity of the budget, the European 
Community has no criminal jurisdiction as such, so it is 
the responsibility of the Member States to investigate 
and to prosecute frauds and irregularities affecting the 
EC budget, to recover funds when necessary and to pay 
them back into the common purse. In December 1994, the 
Council stated in a resolution
[C]riminal provisions protecting the Communities' 
financial interests already exist in many areas in 
the Member States; there are wide variations, 
however, as to what constitutes an offence 
there are also gaps which may be affecting 
cooperation between Member States.
As a rule, Member States tend to think that their own 
national system of handling fraud affecting the Community 
budget is more effective than their neighbours.18 Since 
the 1960s the nature of enforcement has evolved. Much of 
the fraud control measures taken at EC level have taken 
place against a background of a rapid succession of 
enlargements (and a corresponding increase in the size 
and complexity of the CAP), and budgetary crises (hence 
the need to find ways to reduce the CAP). It is within 
this paradox that enforcement efforts, which until 
recently almost entirely focused on the CAP, must be 
located. The reality is, that although fraud has always 
existed, fraud enforcement has not always been high on 
the political agenda. Historically, four phases can be
18 Passas, N (1993) Milking consumers and taxpayers: Farm 
frauds in the European Community, Temple University, mimeoed 
text, page 19.
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distinguished, which are briefly outlined below.
1.2. First (latent) phase: benian nealect
Although there are indications that the price 
equalisation and compensation schemes under Articles 55 
and 62 ECSC gave rise to fraud as early as the late 
1950s,19 and that the early CAP was also affected,20 the 
1960s and 1970s were characterized by weak enforcement or 
'benign neglect'.
After 1962 the CAP gradually extended to cover all 
agricultural products. It was a time of expansion and 
growth, at least until 1973, when co-incidentally the 
first accessions took place. It was not until the late 
1970s that the first steps were taken by the Community 
institutions to try and increase budgetary control, and 
in the process to protect the financial interests of the 
Community.
The first CAP regulations21 established a common price 
system for cereals and regulated trade with third
19 Case 23/59 FERAM v High Authority (1959) ECR 245 J.O 
(1958) 22 reported in Harding, C (1982) The European Community 
and control of criminal business activities, International 
Comparative Law Quarterly, page 250; also verbal testimony by 
Professor K. Tiedemann to the House of Lords in 1989, to the 
effect that the checks carried out on the steel industries in 
the 1960s 'revealed that one third in that type of subsidised 
group was fictitious' (House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities fraud against the Community, Session 
1988-89, 5th report, page 88).
20 Tiedemann, K (1975) La fraude dans le domaine des 
subventions: Criminologie et politique criminelle, Revue de 
Droit Penal et de Criminologie, 1975/76 edition, 137-139 in 
particular.
21 Council Regulations 25/62 JO 1962 p. 991 establishing 
the EAGGF; 19/62 JO 1962 p. 933 for the gradual organisation 
of the markets in cereals.
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countries. In the 1960s and 1970s the CAP gradually 
extended to cover most agricultural products, including 
fish. Structural and guidance measures, however, were not 
implemented until the mid 1970s. The years 1960-73 have 
been described as an era of unprecedented growth and of 
GNP convergence within the Community.22 It may be that 
the post-war consensus and economic growth helped to 
buttress the phasing-in of the CAP without too many 
questions being asked about its eventual size. At this 
stage of expansion of the CAP, anti-fraud enforcement did 
not appear to be an urgent priority for the Member 
States, nor Community institutions. Political concern was 
limited and media interest scant.
After 1973 the rate of growth of GNP in the EC fell from 
4.8% to 2.5% between 1973 and 197923 and a pattern on 
unequal development set in following the accession of 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. This change of 
pattern coincided with the oil crisis. Indeed Tulkens24 
remarked that fraud became an issue around the time when 
economic disparities began to emerge between the Member 
States. In 1976 a draft convention for the protection of 
the financial interests of the Community was rejected by 
the Member States. As far as the Commission was concerned 
'[d]uring the sixties and the seventies [it] had its 
hands full with obtaining and delimiting its powers and 
with fleshing out and consolidating them.23 In fact,
22 Dunford, M (1994) Winners and losers, the new map of 
economic inequality in the European Union, European Urban and 
Regional Studies 1(2):95-114; Laffan, B (1992) Integration and 
cooperation in Europe, Routledge.
23 Laffan op.cit. page 102.
24 Tulkens, F (1994) Les fraudes communautaires: Un 
observatoire penal europeen in Deviance et Society, Vol XVIII 
number 2, page 219.
25 Vervaele, J (1992) Fraud against the Community: The 
need for European fraud legislation, Deventer, Kluwer, page 
15.
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until the Court of Auditors was created in 1977 to work 
alongside Parliament in order to improve budgetary 
control, there was no institutional mechanism to advise 
on budgetary control or to review anti-fraud measures.
It also seems that the secondary legislation of the day 
had little impact. For example, Directive 77/43526 left 
up to the Member States the scope and frequency of CAP 
inspections. There was no common definition of fraud and 
the Court of Auditors somewhat ambiguously opted for the 
word irregularity, 'which does not presuppose the 
establishment of an unlawful intention and does not, 
therefore as strongly as the word fraud, require 
irrefutable proof'.27
1.3. Second (transitional) phase: control coordination
The 1980s were a time of constant quarrels over the 
budget,28 when budgetary crises were increasingly blamed 
on the CAP and the costs of exports and surpluses in 
particular, were found to be 'largely responsible for the 
acute financial crisis of the Community'.29 In 1980 the 
European Parliament refused to ratify the proposed budget 
until CAP expenditure, inter alia, was revised. From 1983 
onwards the Community had difficulties balancing the 
books: the upwards trend in expenditure at Community 
level was occurring in a climate of fiscal restraint in
26 Council Directive 77/435 OJ (1977) L 172/17 on scrutiny 
by the Member States of transactions forming part of the 
system of financing by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF.
27 Kok, C (1989) The Court of Auditors of the European 
Communities: The other European Court in Luxembourg, Common 
Market Law Review (26) page 360.
28 Shackleton, M (1991) Budgetary policy in transition in 
L. Hurwitz and C Lequesne (eds) The State of the EC, Lynne 
Rienner Pubs, Colorado, page 65.
29 Levy, R (1991) 1992: Towards better budgetary control 
in the EC? Corruption and Reform (6) page 289.
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the Member States. These successive budgetary crises have 
to be put in the context of the accession of three new 
predominantly agricultural, poorer (in EC terms) 
countries: Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. 
German re-unification in 1989 also contributed to 
budgetary de-stabilization.30 Meanwhile the budget more 
than trebled. The period between 1985 and 1992 also 
corresponds to a peak in legislative activity in the lead 
up to the single market.31 It is also the time when crime 
prevention measures began to be incorporated into 
economic regulation, in order to compensate for the 
anticipated effects of the single market.32
During this period, the Commission in particular started 
to take a much more active role in the supervision and 
the detection of fraud, particularly of Guarantee Section 
fraud (although the same funds7 share of the budget 
starts to decrease, see table 1.1.). Directives were 
found wanting for the propose of enforcing an anti-fraud 
strategy which included increased scrutiny, so 
regulations began to be used more frequently. Unless they 
are absolutely unambiguous and precise, directives have 
to be transcribed into the laws of the Member States, 
which takes time, and requires political will. The repeal 
of Directive 77/43533 in favour of Council Regulation
30 Shackelton, M op. cit.
31 Burns, T (1996) Better lawmaking? An evaluation of the 
law reform in the European Community, W G Hart Legal Workshop, 
July 1996.
32 Dorn, N and White, S (1996) Beyond 'pillars and 
'passerelle' debates: The European Union's emerging crime 
prevention space, Legal Issues of European Integration, 
forthcoming.
33 OJ (1977) L 172/17.
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4045/8934 is a case in point. The Regulation explicitly 
requests Member States to submit their inspection 
programmes to the Commission for approval (Article 10) 
and requires scrutiny visits to be carried out on all 
targeted schemes.
In 1988 UCLAF35 was created in order to coordinate 
efforts to tackle fraud. All fraud prevention operations 
extending beyond the responsibility of a single 
directorate were to be prepared and monitored by UCLAF.
So in this second phase, a 'secondary crime control 
space'36 was established in the Community. That is to say 
the Community acquired limited powers and personnel to 
oversee the control efforts of individual Member States, 
which they did mostly in respect to CAP expenditure.
1.4. Third (active! phase: from administration to 
punishment?
Since the late 1980s enforcement has been stepped up. The 
principle of assimilation was established, as well as the 
right of the Commission to introduce administrative 
penalties of a punitive nature. In brief the 
administrative-control space of the 1980s has become the 
administrative-penal space of the 1990s. Fraud control 
generally acquired an 'actuarial' flavour and
34 Council Regulation 4045/89 OJ (1989) L 388/18 on 
scrutiny by Member States of transactions forming part of the 
system of financing by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF.
35 See Decision of 20 November 1987 SEC(87) 572.
36 Vervaele, J (1994) Fraude communautaire et sauvegarde 
du droit communautaire: Vers un droit penal europeen, Deviance 
et Society, Vol XVIII number 2, 201-210.
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institutional powers were reinforced. The emphasis of 
control began to shift from CAP expenditure to 
procurement fraud affecting the Structural Funds, and the 
collecting of revenue, in particular import duties. 
However this shift has yet to be significantly reflected 
in the allocation of anti-fraud appropriations at 
Commission level, as illustrated in table 1.2.
Table 1.2.
Anti-fraud appropriations - comparative table for 1994, 
1995 and 1996 financial year (in thousand ECU)
Budget areas Budget
Reference
1994 1995 1996
EAGGF Guarantee 
Section
B1360 86,000
(62%)
85,000
(66%)
44,000
(51%)
CAP B2 31,000
(22%)
32,500
(25%)
28,500
(33%)
Customs/
indirect
taxation
B5 15,800
(11%)
3,000
(4%)
3,200
(4%)
Coordination (not
coded)
(zero) 5,000
(4%)
99,200
(11%)
Structural 
Funds (inc. 
Cohesion Funds)
B2-150
B2-301
1,050
(1%)
2,700
(0.5%)
1,050
(1%)
Training
(various)
A 5,289
(4%)
4,418
(3%)
(zero)
TOTAL 139,139
(100%)
132,618
(100%)
86,670
(100%)
Note to table 1.2.
Sources: European Commission reports on the fight against 
fraud for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995.
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2.4.2. Assimilation
Given that the Member States deal with domestic fraud 
differently, shouldn't they at least treat fraud and 
irregularities affecting the common purse on par with 
those affecting domestic finance? The question was asked 
in the 'Greek maize' case37 and the European Court of 
Justice ruled that
....Whilst the choice of penalties remains within 
their discretion, they [the Member States] must 
ensure in particular that infringements of Community 
law are penalized under conditions, both procedural 
and substantive, which are analogous to those 
applicable to infringements of national law of a 
similar nature and importance and which, in any 
event, make the penalty effective, proportionate ad 
dissuasive. Moreover, the national authorities must 
proceed, with respect to infringements of Community 
law, with the same diligence as that which they 
bring to bear in implementing corresponding national 
laws.
Thus the principle whereby crimes affecting the Community 
budget had to evoke as serious a response as those 
affecting the national budget was articulated for the 
first time. The principle was later enshrined in Article 
209a of the Treaty on European Union signed at 
Maastricht. The first paragraph of Article 209a states 
that the Member States must take 'the same measures to 
counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the 
Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their 
won financial interests'.
The case has two serious implications. Firstly, as
37 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece ECR [1989] 2965.
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Delmas-Marty pointed out in 1994, there are no reliable 
means of finding out whether the principle has been 
respected or not in the Member States.38 That is to say 
it is difficult to gauge the extent to which Member 
States have dealt with frauds and irregularities 
affecting the EC budget on an equal footing with frauds 
and irregularities affecting the national purse, least a 
test be devised for that purpose.
Secondly De Moor39 noted in 1992, that even if the 
stipulations of the Court in the 'Greek maize' case were 
strictly followed, very significant discrepancies would 
remain as between Member States in the protection 
afforded to the Community interests. This is because the 
definition of what constitutes an offence against the 
Community interests is determined according to the 
provisions of national laws, which vary greatly in their 
approach to Community fraud. Furthermore sanctions 
provided in the Member States may not be effective, 
proportional or dissuasive.
It became clear that to get an adequate system for 
preventing and sanctioning fraud against the Community a 
twin-track strategy would have to be pursued. Firstly the 
control and sanctioning power of the EC had to be 
increased to ensure minimum sanctions, without prejudice 
to any other criminal sanctions the Member states may 
wish to impose in addition. Secondly national provision,
38 Delmas-Marty, M (1994) Rapport Final - Etude 
comparative des dispositions legislatives, reglementaires des 
etats membres relatives aux agissements frauduleux commis au 
prejudice du budget communautaire in rapport de synthese, 
etude sur les systemes de sanctions communautaires, SEC 
1994(93), OOPEC page 1172.
39 De Moor, L (1992) The legal protection of the financial 
interests of the European Community, in EC fraud ed J. Van der 
Hulst, Kluwer.
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sanctions and practices had to be approximated.40 In 
relation to the former, the question thus began to be 
asked about the Communities', and in particular the 
Commission's power to impose sanctions.
^ 1.4.2. The Commission's power to punish
In the field of competition, the Commission already has a 
power to impose fines under Articles 65 and 66 ECSC41 and 
of Article 87 EEC.42 These provisions, however, make no 
reference to the Community budget. In 1991 the Theato 
Report43 argued, inter alia, that Article 172 EC implied 
that the Council had a general power to include penalties 
in its regulations. This power was to be later confirmed 
by the case law of the European Court of Justice.
The Commission started to introduce sanctions in sectoral 
regulations, as part of its implementing powers. It did 
so with increasing frequency: 'ten times in 1988, 
seventeen in 1989, more than 30 in 1990 and as a standard 
practice thereafter'.44 In 1992 The European Court of
40 See Vervaele, J (1992) Subsidy fraud, in EC fraud ed J. 
Van der Hulst, Kluwer.
41 Article 65(5) authorizes the High Authority to impose 
fines or periodic penalty payments for a breach of the rules. 
Article 66(6) lays down a scale of fines from 3% to 15% of the 
value of the assets acquired.
42 Regulations and Directives can be adopted in order to 
ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Articles 
85(1) and 86 EEC by making provision for fines and periodic 
penalty payments.
43 European Parliament (1991) Report of the Committee on 
budgetary control on the legal protection of the European 
Community's financial interests, rapporteur Diemut Theato,
MEP.
44 Heine, J (1994) Community penalties in agriculture and 
fisheries: legislative activity in the Commission, in The 
legal protection of the financial interests of the Community: 
Progress and prospects since the Brussels seminar of 1989, 
OOPEC, page 18.
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Justice gave a ruling in Germany v Commission45 which 
clarified the power of the Community in general, and the 
Commission in particular to introduce sanctions with a 
punitive, rather than a purely remedial or compensatory 
character, in the exercise of its powers to enact 
regulations for the common organisation of agricultural 
markets. In this context the Court recalled its ruling in 
Koster46 to the effect that the imposition of penalties 
came within the Commission's powers if the Council had 
not reserved such powers to itself. The penalties laid 
down by Community law are meant to be enforced by the 
national authorities and not (as it the case in area of 
competition) by the Community institutions themselves.
This, in turn raised the question as to the nature of the 
sanctions to be applied in the Member States. In the 
early 1990s, one of the burning issues raised was whether 
the Commission had any power to impose particular 
criminal sanctions to be applied in the Member States in 
order to protect the financial interests of the European 
Communities.
Community law as it stands does not give the Community 
the power to lay down criminal penalties, although 
Articles 100 and 100A enable the Council to adopt 
measures for the approximation of the measures laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. Article 100A has been 
used, for example, as the legal basis for the Money 
Laundering Directive,47 which resulted in Member States
45 Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR 1-5383.
46 Case 25/70 Einfuhr-und Voratsstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel v Koster, Berodt & Co, preliminary ruling ECR 
[1970] 1161.
47 Council Directive 91/308 OJ (1991) L 166/77.
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setting up rules aimed at their financial and credit 
institutions, and creating specific offences. The more 
contentious Article 235 EC also allows the Council to 
take appropriate measures when the Treaty has not 
provided the necessary powers for doing so.
Generally the regulation of financial crime falls into 
the penal-administrative sphere, which means that the 
distinction between criminal and administrative penalties 
is blurred. The European Court of Justice has hitherto 
not been drawn into ruling on the exact nature of 
Community sanctions. However it ruled in Konecke, that 
what mattered was that the penalty, whatever its label, 
ensured the effective implementation of the regulation in 
question, and that it be imposed on a 'clear and 
unambiguous legal basis.'48
The third phase of anti-fraud enforcement is also the 
time when surveillance is organised, and modern 
techniques are used to control fraud.
1.4.3. Actuarial measures
Increasingly in the third phase measures with a strong 
actuarial flavour were incorporated into regulations and 
surveillance became an important feature of enforcement, 
with the help of funds made available to the Member 
States specifically for the financing of remote sensing 
equipment and surveillance operations.49 Detailed 
information has to be provided to the Commission on
48 Case 117/83 Konecke GmbH and Co KG v Bundesanstalt fiir 
Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1984] ECR 3291, para. 11.
49 European Commission (1994) Protecting the financial 
interests of the European Community the fight against fraud 
1993 Annual Report, OOPEC.
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detected cases of irregularities.50 Under Regulation 
4045/89,51 for example, Member States must carry out an 
audit control programme on all traders in receipt of 
EAGGF funds. Risk analysis and targeting are methods 
increasingly used by the Member States' authorities 
responsible for enforcement, such as the Intervention 
Board for Agricultural Produce in the United Kingdom.
Risk analysis involves the collecting and analysis of 
financial data, histories of irregularities and 
investigations and scrutiny visits.52 Application of the 
technique of risk analysis together with a systems audit, 
makes it possible to confine inspections to sensitive 
areas and to 'high risk' operations and/or recipients, 
identifying those control structures in the Member States 
which ought to be strengthened.53 In 1994 the Commission 
issued a further Regulation (3122/94)54 laying down the 
exact criteria (with regards to products receiving 
refunds) according to which high risk sectors could be 
targeted. Sectors vary from Member State to Member State. 
In the UK, for example in 1995 milk quotas, beef and 
cereals were targeted sectors for enforcement. Finance 
was made available to Member States implementing these 
measures, through Regulation 307/9l,55 which provided for
50 Article 3(1) Council Regulation 595/91 OJ (1991) L 
67/11.
51 OJ (1989) L 388/18, op.cit.
52 Intervention Board Anti-Fraud Unit (1994) 1993 Annual 
Report.
53 EC (1994) op.cit.
54 Commission Regulation 3122/94 OJ (1994) L 330/31 
laying down criteria for risk analysis as regards agricultural 
products receiving refunds.
55 Council Regulation 307/91 OJ (1991) L 37/5 on 
reinforcing the monitoring of certain expenditure chargeable 
to the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF. Article 2 specifies 
that the Community's financial contribution towards the 
remuneration of supplementary agents and equipment shall be 
50% for the first three years and 25% for the fourth and fifth
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additional funds to be made available for the control of 
a number of high risk areas for five years. Regulation 
4045/8956 provided for funds to be made available for the 
training of scrutiny officers and the setting up of 
computer systems to carry out the scrutiny programme.
In 1990 for the first time minima were set for the 
inspection of goods in the Member States: Council 
Regulation 386/9057 imposed a duty on Member States to 
inspect 5% of all goods presented for export.
1.4.4. The uneven nature of control in the third phase
The stepping up of enforcement against EC fraud in the 
third phase fell mostly upon the EAGGF Guarantee Section 
Fund. Member States were still reluctant to establish 
control systems for Structural Funds identical to those 
in place to protect the Guarantee Section Fund. In July 
1993 the Council adopted six Structural Funds 
regulations58 to strengthen the principles of 
concentration, partnership, programming and 
additionality. This had the effect of bringing Structural 
Funds fraud enforcement into a phase corresponding to the 
second control-coordination phase described earlier with 
respect to the EAGGF Guarantee Section Fund. This is 
because reinforced partnership means closer collaboration 
between the Commission and all the relevant authorities
years.
56 op.cit.
57 OJ (1990) L 42.
58 Council Regulations 2080/93 (FIFG Regulation) OJ (1993) 
L 130/1, 2081/93 (Framework Regulation) OJ (1993) L 193/5, 
2082/93 (Coordination Regulation) OJ (1993) L 193/20, 2083/93 
(ERDF Regulation) OJ (1993) L 193/24, 2084/94 (ESF Regulation) 
OJ (1993) L 193/39 and 2085/93 (EAGGF- Guidance Section 
Regulation) OJ (1993) L 193/44.
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at national, regional or local level. Reinforced 
programming59 means that Member States had to start 
submitting detailed programming documents, complete with 
specific objectives to be attained, and detailed 
financial tables showing national and Community finance. 
Finally, in view of prior difficulties in implementing 
the additionality60 principle, the revised Coordination 
Regulation stipulated that each Member State had to 
maintain, in the whole of the territory concerned, its 
public structural or comparable expenditure at least at 
the same level as in the previous programming period, 
taking into account, however, 'the macro economic 
circumstances in which the funding takes place' - this 
last concept being rather difficult to unwrap. The Member 
States also acquired a duty to provide the financial 
information needed to verify additionality when 
submitting plans and-regularly during the implementation 
of the Community Support Frameworks.
The principle of co-financing is considered to be an 
important tool in the control of fraud. It is felt that 
Member States have more incentive to prevent and 
prosecute fraud when a proportion of purely national 
finance is directly involved in the projects. However 
specific problems remain, which are explored in chapter 
4.
59 The last subparagraph in Article 5(2) of Regulation 
4253/88 foresees that in order to simplify and to speed up 
programming procedures, Member States may submit in a Single 
Programming Document (SPD) the information required for the 
regional and social conversion plan referred to in Article 
9(8) of Regulation 2052/88 and information required in Article 
14(2) of Regulation 4253/88.
60 The principle of additionality means that Community 
assistance should complement the contributions of the Member 
State rather than reducing them. For a discussion on the 
application of additionality in the Member States see White, S 
and Dorn, N (1996) EC fraud, subsidiarity and prospects for 
the IGC: A regional dimension? in European Urban and Regional 
Studies, 3(3) 262-266.
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As far as the control of income fraud is concerned, this 
remained a neglected area (see chapter 3) until more 
ambitious plans were formulated for the protection of the 
financial interests of the Community.
1.5. Fourth (ambitious) phase
The approach to fraud control, until the mid 1990s has 
been described as 'atomistic'61 or 'fragmentary'62. In 
addition to possibly encouraging the possibility of 
displacement in criminal activities, the sector by sector 
approach has the drawback of adding to the complexity of 
the regulatory environment. This 'atomistic' response to 
fraud was felt to be inadequate. The main elements of the 
contemporaneous 'ambitious' phase are the stepping up of 
cooperation, the integration of control, the 
reinforcement of Commission powers of inspection and a 
recognition of the international and of the organised 
crime dimension of fraud and corruption, and of their 
money laundering implications.
1.5.1. The stepping up of cooperation
In 1994 the cooperation between Member States and 
Commission was stepped up. The Commission set up an 
advisory committee for the coordination of fraud 
prevention, consisting of two representatives working 
alongside anti-fraud services in each of the Member 
States. In November 1994 the Commission also set up a
61 See for example Marin, J-C (1994) Legal protection of 
the Community's financial interests: Experience and prospects 
since the Brussels seminar of 1989, in Legal protection of the 
Community's financial interests: Experience and prospects 
since the Brussels seminar of 1989, Oak Tree Press, Dublin, pp 
204-207. [Both book and article have the same title]
62 Darras, M (1992) Le Parlement Europeen et la protection 
juridique des int€rets financiers de la Communaut&
Europeenne, in EC fraud, ed J. Van der Hulst, Kluwer.
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freephone service, to encourage the reporting of fraud 
and set aside 200,000 ECU to reward informants. According 
to the Commission, payments to informants are relatively 
modest and correspond to the value of the information, 
and each informant is checked against an independent 
source before being paid. Unlike the situation which now 
prevails in the competition field, participating 
informants who are guilty of fraud enjoy no privileges, 
and cannot expect a lighter fine. The freephone service 
has proved successful. In addition, the 'Black List' 
Regulation places duties on Member States to notify the 
Commission (who in turn notifies other Member States) and 
under certain circumstances, to exclude traders from 
funding for periods of up to five years. The political 
significance of the Regulation is very considerable since 
it establishes a Community system requiring Member States 
to circulate information on certain operators and to 
adopt preventive measures. The potential of blacklisting 
to damage traders' interests should not be 
underestimated, although it must be remembered that it is 
confined, in the 'Black List' Regulation, to cases of 
irregularities exceeding 100 000 ECU over a one-year 
period (see chapter 4).
1.5.2. Integration of control
Several instruments have been put forward, but not all 
are in force at the time of writing. Taken together, they 
represent a giant step forward, in that they seek to 
reduce control disparities between sectors (through 
'horizontal' first pillar instruments, which cut across 
most sectors of the budget), and disparities between the 
Member States' criminalisation of EC fraud (through third 
pillar instruments).
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Council Regulation 2988/95: harmonisation of 
administrative sanctions
In 1995 a significant step forward was taken. A 
'horizontal' Regulation on the protection of the European 
Communities' financial interests63 (or 'PiF'64 
Regulation) was adopted under Article 235, which framed 
the whole range of Community sanctions and established 
rules for the interface of national criminal laws and 
Community administrative sanctions.
The 'PIF' Regulation (see appendix B) sets out a legal 
framework for Community administrative sanctions. It 
starts by giving the Member States a common definition of 
'irregularity'. Irregularity in this context means any 
infringement of Community law resulting from an act or 
omission by an economic operator, which has, or would 
have, the effect of prejudicing the general budget of the 
Communities or budgets managed by them, either by 
reducing or losing revenues accruing from own resources 
collected directly on behalf of the Communities, or by an 
unjustified item of expenditure.65 'Resources collected 
directly on behalf of the Communities' excludes VAT, a 
small proportion of which only comes indirectly into the 
budget of the Communities. For the purpose of applying 
the Regulation, criminal proceedings may be regarded as 
having been completed where the competent national 
authority and the person concerned have come to an 
arrangement.66
63 Council Regulation 2988/95 OJ (1995) L 312/1.
64 From the French 'Protection des Interets Financiers'.
65 Article 1(2) of Council Regulation 2988/95 OJ (1995) L 
312/1.
66 Eleventh Preamble of the 'PIF' Regulation, OJ (1995) L 
312/1.
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The Regulation also lists Community sanctions available 
to national authorities for intentional irregularities.67 
These vary from the payment of an administrative fine to 
a loss of security or deposit.68 Such sanctions may be 
suspended if criminal proceedings have been initiated 
against the person concerned in connection with the same 
facts.69 A limitation period of four years is set for 
proceedings.70 In its third title, the Regulation adopt 
general rules for checks, whether they be performed by 
the Member States, or the Communities' institutions. In 
its third title, concerned with checks, it refers to more 
detailed provisions concerning on-the-spot checks and 
inspections to be adopted discreetly.71
'PIF' Convention: harmonisation of criminal sanctions
The 1976 project72 for a Convention on the Protection of 
Community Financial Interests of the European Communities 
was resurrected in the early 1990s. The final text was 
agreed in July 1995 under the French Presidency of the 
Council, and published in the Official Journal in
67 Article 5 of 'PIF' Regulation OJ (1995) L 312/1.
68 Article 5(1) (a) and (f) of 'PIF' Regulation OJ (1995) L 
312/1.
69 Article 6(1) "of 'PIF' Regulation OJ (1995) L 312/1.
70 Article 3(1) of 'PIF' Regulation OJ (1995) L 312/1.
71 See Article 10 of 'PIF' Regulation OJ (1995) L 312/1.
72 See Draft for a Treaty amending the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities so as to permit the 
adoption of common rules on the protection under criminal law 
of the financial interests of the Communities and the 
prosecution of infringements of the provisions of those 
Treaties and amending the Treaty establishing a Single Council 
and a Single Commission of the European Communities so as to 
permit the adoption of common rules on the liability and 
protection under Criminal Law of Officials and other Servants 
of the European Communities, OJ C (1976) 222.
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November 1995.73 It has yet to be ratified. The
Convention defines the concept of fraud affecting the EC
budget, lays an obligation on the Member States to 
provide criminal penalties in cases of serious fraud, 
including custody for cases involving over 50,000 ECU. 
The signatories will also have to make provisions in 
their national laws for heads of businesses to be 
declared criminally liable in case of fraud. It lays a 
duty on the Member States to cooperate in deciding which 
State will prosecute. This requirement has in view the 
'centralisation' of prosecution in a single Member State 
where possible. Furthermore, Member States will have a 
duty to transmit to the Commission the text of the 
provisions transposing into their domestic law the
obligations imposed on them under the provisions of this
Convention. The European Court of Justice has 
jurisdiction to decide on disputes between Member States 
if no solution is found within six months.
On the spot checks Regulation: Commission powers 
reinforced
A Regulation concerning on-the-Spot Checks and 
Inspections, was adopted but is not yet in force.74
The proposed Regulation75 concerning on-the-Spot Checks
73 Convention on the Protection of the European 
Communities' Financial Interests OJ (1995) C 316/48.
74 See European Commission Secretariat General UCLAF 
(1995) Proposal for Council Regulation concerning on-the-spot 
checks and inspections by the Commission for the detection of 
frauds and irregularities detrimental to the financial 
interests of the European Communities SEC(95)915Final.
75 See UCLAF (1995) Proposal for Council Regulation 
concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections by the 
Commission for the detection of frauds and irregularities 
detrimental to the financial interests of the European 
Communities, SEC(95\09151; also General Secretariat of the 
Council DG FII (1996) amended draft for the subgroup on
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and Inspections by the Commission for the detection of 
frauds and irregularities detrimental to the financial 
interests of the European Communities authorizes the 
Commission to send Commission officials to carry out on- 
the-spot checks at central, regional or local level on 
any economic operator directly or indirectly receiving a 
financial benefit from the European Communities. The 
Regulation also defines the powers and duties of the 
Commission controllers. Officials of the Member State may 
take part in the inspections. The Commission may ask 
officials of Member States other than that on whose 
territory inspections and checks are being performed to 
take part in them. The Commission may also resort to 
outside bodies to provide technical help.76 All 
information collected is covered by the rule of 
confidentiality and the Community's provisions on data 
protection.77 It is envisaged that this regulation should 
help to speed up the investigation of complex 
transnational cases.
[The] entry into force of the Regulation should make 
the beginning of a new phase of Community 
legislation designed to define more clearly the 
Community's powers of inquiry at sectoral level, 
through new regulations or the refinement of 
existing regulations.78
protection of financial interests, 30 April. The vote which 
was meant to take place on 3 June 1996 was delayed because of 
the British non-cooperation stance over the British beef 
crisis, but in July 1996 the Commission hoped that the
Regulation could still be agreed before the end of 1996.
76 Article 4(3) of proposed on-the-spot checks Regulation.
77 Article 6(1) of proposed on-the-spot checks Regulation.
78 European Parliament (1996) Report (Consultation 
Procedure) on the proposal concerning on-the-sport checks and 
inspections by the Commission for the detection of frauds and 
irregularities detrimental to the financial interests of the
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The Regulation reinforces the Commission's existing 
powers of inspection, and some Member States believe that 
this places the Commission at the limit, or beyond its 
powers of direct intervention in the Member States. 
Notwithstanding the extension of inspection powers 
proposed in the Regulation, checks will continue to rest 
and depend on the principle of cooperation with national 
agencies and officials.
Protocols to the 'PIF' Convention
Two protocols have been added to the 'PIF' Convention. 
They deal respectively with money laundering and judicial 
cooperation and with the corruption of EC and national 
officials, in cases involving EC funds.
A proposition for a protocol to the 'PIF' Convention was 
adopted by the Commission in December 1995. It deals with 
money laundering and judicial cooperation. It lays out 
the responsibility of legal persons, criminalised the 
laundering of fraud profits. It gives detailed rules for 
direct judicial cooperation and for determining which 
Member state takes the lead role for prosecution of 
transnational frauds. It lays out the competence of the 
European Court of Justice.
As the emphasis of control shifted to trade rather than 
farming, corrupt practices were increasingly highlighted 
in cases. For example, procurement frauds affecting the 
Structural Funds, and the evasion of duties were often 
carried with the connivance of officials. An anti­
corruption protocol was added to the 'PIF' Convention. A 
more ambitious instrument, an anti-corruption convention 
still under discussion in 1997, proposes to extend the 
measures contained in the Protocol, whether the financial
European Communities, rapporteur: Diemut Theato, MEP, April.
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interests of the European Communities are involved or 
not. These measures are examined in detail in chapter 6, 
which deals specifically with the fight against 
corruption.
1.5.3. Conclusion
In the 1980s it became apparent that the fast-enlarging 
Community budget attracted commensurate fraud, so 
measures to counter fraud affecting the EC budget were 
increasingly incorporated into sectoral regulations.
These sectoral regulations place duties on the Member 
States to take appropriate measures to prevent 
irregularities, such as surveillance or checks based on 
risk analysis, but also to report certain irregularities 
and recover funds.79 For instance a 1995 sectoral 
regulation agreed on the basis of Article 43, the 'Black 
List'80 Regulation, targets traders claiming from the 
EAGGF Guarantee Section.
One effect of this sectoral approach has been that more 
attention has been paid to policing certain sectors of 
the EC budget than to others. On the income side of the 
budget, Member States are likely to carry on resisting 
any Commission interference with their sovereign right to 
raise taxes.
The unevenness of the control space was finally addressed
79 Council Regulations 729/70 OJ (1970) L 94; 283/72 OJ 
(1972) 36; 595/91 OJ (1991) L 67; 4253/88 OJ (1988) 1 374; 
Commission Regulation 1681/94 OJ (1994) L 178; Council 
Regulation 1164/94 OJ (1994) L 130; Commission Regulation 
1831/94 OJ (1994) L 191.
80 Council Regulation 1469/95 OJ (1995) L 145/1 
implemented by Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996) L 
3*02/15.
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through the 'PIF' Regulation,81 which confirmed the 
effectiveness of this system of penalties already in 
place for the Common Agricultural Policy and drew on the 
impetus provided by the Council's call for the 
introduction of Community administrative penalties in 
areas other than agriculture.82 Due to the near-collapse 
of the transit system, attention began to shift more 
noticeably to traders unlawfully claiming refunds or 
evading duties and the computerisation of the transit 
system was planned. However it is noticeable that anti­
fraud appropriations dropped significantly in 1996. The 
financing for the central development of the 
computerization of the transit system, for example (under 
B5) was greatly reduced during the course of the 1996 
budgetary procedure, casting doubts as to whether the 
system will be operational in 1998 as originally 
planned.83 Thus budgetary considerations continue to play 
a key role in the fight against fraud.
81 Council Regulation 2988/95 OJ (1995) L 312/1 on the 
protection of the European Communities' financial interests.
82 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1995, COM(96) 173, page 11.
83 European Commission (1996) Rapport Interm€diaire sur le 
transit, SEC(96) 1739, Annex V.
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CHAPTER 2. THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD
2.1. Powers and responsibilities, agenda for change
As part of the consultation process leading to the IGC, 
the institutions have taken the opportunity, inter alia, 
to highlight some of the conundra, and difficulties they 
experience in relation to the protection of EC finance. 
They have, at times been able to make very specific 
proposals for change (see for example the European Court 
of Auditors). This chapter considers the existing powers 
and responsibilities of the institutions with respect to 
fraud control, (without going into the intricacies of the 
budgetary process itself) and discusses the agenda for 
change arising from the work carried out in preparation 
for the IGC.84
2.2. The Commission
The Commission is the executive organ of the 
Communities,85 and also its budgetary authority.86 Its 
duties go beyond mere implementation of legislation, 
since it can make legislative proposals on its own 
initiative. Its power is however circumscribed,87 since 
it may not make any proposals with appreciable budgetary 
implications unless it can guarantee that the proposal 
could be financed within the limits of the revenue 
available.
84 See also White, S (1995) Reflections on the IGC and the 
protection of the financial interests of the EC in AGON, 
number 10, 10-13.
85 Article 155 EC.
86 Articles 203(3) EC and 205 EC.
87 Article 201A EC.
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Unlike a national, or a federal executive, the Commission 
has no tax-raising powers. The Member States are 
responsible for the collecting and making available of 
their GNP and VAT contributions, as well as Customs and 
other duties to the Community budget. Furthermore the 
Commission only spends a small proportion of the budget 
directly. The Member States are responsible for the 
collecting and making available of revenue, and also for 
most of the budget expenditure.The Commission also 
depends on the Member States for the protection of the 
financial interests of the European Communities, and has 
endeavoured to find out how such protection works in 
practice.88 In this the work of the national associations 
of lawyers for the protection of the financial interests 
of the European Communities,89 with their journal AGON 
acting as a conduit for discussion and information, must 
be noted.
The Commission works closely with its budgetary control 
'partners' (Council and European Parliament) through the 
budgetary control committee. The relationship of the
88 A series of reports have been commissioned by D-G XX 
(Financial Control) in each Member State, followed by 
synthesis reports: for example, in 1993, report of the study 
on the systems of administrative and criminal penalties of the 
Member States and general principles applicable to Community 
penalties SEC(93) 1172 (Known as the 'Delmas-Marty Report'); 
in 1995 Comparative analysis of the reports supplied by the 
Member States on national measures taken to combat 
wastefulness and the misuse of Community resources, November; 
also in 1995, report on Whistle blowing, fraud and the 
European Union (synthesis carried out by Public Concern at 
Work); in 1996, La transaction dans l'Union Europeenne, 
rapport de synthese (Known as 'Labayle Report').
89 The first association was constituted in Italy in 
October 1990, and by 1993 all Member States had an 
association. See also De Moor, L (1993) The Associations of 
Lawyers for the Protection of the Financial Interests of the 
European Community (Speech to the founding symposium of the 
European Criminal Law), in Europaische Einiging und 
Europaisches Strafrecht, ed U. Sieber, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
Bonn, 29-33.
38
Commission with the European Court of Auditors, often in 
the past strained by long drawn-out contradictory 
procedures,90 has now improved.
2.2.1. IGC agenda
The position of the Commission in relation to the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities, it suggests in its IGC report, remains 
paradoxical on two grounds.91 Firstly, at the moment 
Council measures to control expenditure and combat fraud 
require an unanimous vote,92 whereas a qualified majority 
is enough to act as the budgetary authority and determine 
expenditure and revenue levels.93 This means that 
potentially one Member State can veto a measure aiming to 
protect the financial interests of the European 
Communities, whilst no such possibility exists in the 
determination of revenue or expenditure. Secondly, the 
Commission alone is responsible for budget execution,94 
whereas the management of expenditure is mostly 
decentralised.
Notwithstanding the paradoxical position the Commission 
finds itself in, it has been able to improve the
90 This procedure involves audit letters and reports being 
sent to the auditee with a request for a written reply within 
a given time-limit. The reply may be preceded by bilateral 
discussions in order to clarify any matters in dispute. In 
keeping with this practice, the Annual Report of the ECA 
includes responses from the institutions.
91 See European Commission (1995) Preparation CIG 1996 
contribution du Conseil, information aux delegations 
exterieures de la Commission, info-note number 20/95, May; 
also European Commission (1995) SEC (95) 731 Final, Report on 
the operation of the Treaty of the European Union, May.
92 For example under Article 235 EC and 209 EC.
93 Article 203 EC.
94 Articles 205 EC and 201a EC.
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coordination of its anti-fraud work through the work of 
UCLAF and COCOLAF.
2.2.2. The work of UCLAF
Since 1988 the Commission has been assisted in its fight 
against fraud by UCLAF (the coordinating unit for the 
fight against fraud), set up in order to replace the 
inter-service group responsible for on-the-spot checks 
which was attached to DG XX (Financial Control)• The 
unit's main aim when it came into existence was to 
coordinate anti-fraud policy and effort within the 
Commission. To emphasize the general broad-based nature 
of its duties, it was decided to place UCLAF within the 
Secretariat General of the Commission rather than within 
an existing Directorate-General.95 The majority of the 
130 UCLAF personnel have been employed, in their 
respective Member States, in Customs, Police services 
with responsibility for financial crime, national audit 
offices, agricultural ministries' verification 
departments, etc.96
UCLAF is responsible in the Commission for all aspects of 
the fight against fraud affecting the budget. It is split 
into six divisions, dealing respectively with 
legislation, intelligence gathering, Structural Funds,
Own Resources, and two separate divisions handling 
agriculture. Its operational mission is primarily to 
support the Member States where they need co-ordination 
with other Member States and the relevant services of the 
Commission. UCLAF fulfils its mission mainly by
95 See Knudsen, B (1994) Global programme of the European 
Community's fight against fraud, in The legal protection of 
the financial interests of the Community: Progress and 
prospects since the Brussels seminar of 1989, Oak Tree Press, 
Dublin, pp 247-251.
96 See European Commission, UCLAF (1996) 17 questions on 
fraud, February.
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investigation into suspected fraud cases with the aim of 
both establishing the sums at risk to be recovered and 
preparing a case suitable for submission to public 
prosecutors in the Member States. Such cases are entered 
into UCLAF's IRENE database and now number over 20,000.97 
Whilst UCLAF has the power to request that investigations 
be carried out by the competent services of the Member 
States involved, it may also take the lead in an 
investigation, while maintaining co-operation with the 
Member States concerned. This course of action is taken 
when the investigation cannot be carried out effectively 
without coordination with other Member States; for 
example, where elements of an important fraudulent 
operation appear to exist in various Member States 
simultaneously, or where evidence has to be obtained 
outside the Community. UCLAF also takes part in bringing 
forward legislative proposals which tighten legislative 
loopholes, seek equivalent treatment of EU fraud at both 
the administrative and criminal level, and give the 
Commission the power to undertake on-the-spot controls.
2.2.3. COCOLAF
In 1994 an advisory Committee for the coordination of 
fraud prevention was set up under Article 209a.98 The 
Commission consults the Committee, made up of two 
representatives from each Member states, on matters 
relating to the prevention and the prosecution of fraud 
affecting the EC budget. This can be seen as an addition 
to the 'sectoral' Committee approach adopted hitherto, 
and thus an attempt to deal with the protection of the 
financial interests of the European Communities cross­
sector ially.
97 See newspaper article: 'Commission fraudbusters hot on 
the scent of misused Union funds' (feature) in European Voice, 
10-16 October 1996, page 19.
98 Commission decision 94/140 OJ L 61/27.
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2.3. The European Court of Auditors
In view of the key role played by the European Court of 
Auditors in highlighting financial mismanagement and 
fraud, a slightly longer section is dedicated to its role 
and agenda for change.
2.3.1. Duties and powers
The creation in 1977 of a Court of Auditors, with 
specific responsibility for the external audit99 of 
Community revenue and expenditure, followed from the 
creation of an autonomous budget of the European 
Communities, separate from those of the Member States, 
and managed by the European Institutions.100 Since the 
implementation of the Treaty on European Union, the now 
re-named European Court of Auditors (ECA henceforth) 
occupies the rank of European Institution together with 
the Commission, Council, the Court of Justice and the 
European Parliament.101 This means, inter alia, that the 
ECA now has the power to defend its own opinions against 
other Community institutions in law. It acts as an 
external, independent auditor of European public
99 An external audit is carried out by a body which is 
external to and independent of the auditee, the purpose being 
to give an opinion on and report on the accounts and the 
financial statements, the regularity and legality of 
operations, and/or the financial management (Everard, P and 
Wolter, D (1989) Glossary Selection of terms and expressions 
used in the external audit of the public sector, OOPEC).
100 The Court of Auditors of the European Communities (now 
European Court of Auditors) was created by the Treaty of 22 
July 1975, signed in Brussels, but did not become operational 
until 25 October 1977 when it took over from the EEC and 
Euratom Audit Board and from the ECSC Auditor.
101 Article 4 EC.
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finances. The ECA is a collegiate body102 without 
judicial, or decision-making powers.103 Notwithstanding 
these institutional constraints, it has been coined as 
'the financial conscience' of the Union104 and more 
colourfully by the media as 'the watchdog snapping at the 
heels of the institutions'.105 As such it acts as a 
catalyst in the fight against waste and fraud. The ECA's 
institutional presence, however, is felt mostly through 
its reports and opinions,106 and as such its power is one 
of persuasion in relation to the Commission in 
particular.
Generally speaking, the ECA has a duty to assist the 
European Parliament and the Council in exercising their 
powers of control over the implementation of the 
budget,107 a task carried out mainly within the procedure 
for the discharge in respect of the implementation of the 
budget.108 This includes submitting observations, 
particularly in the form of Special Reports, on specific 
questions and delivering opinions at the request of one 
of the other institutions of the Community.109 The ECA
102 Article 188c(4) EC, third indent replacing Article 206b 
(3) EEC states that ' It [The Court] shall adopt its annual 
reports, special reports or opinions by a majority of its 
members.'
103 See Bugnot, P (1982) La cour des comptes des 
communautes europeennes Premier bilan, in Revue du Marche 
Commun, 609-623.
104 Court of Auditors (1995), po. cit. pp 8-12.
105 See newspaper article: 'Watchdog snapping at the heels 
of the institutions' in European Voice, 10-16 October 1996, 
page 19.
106 The most important of these is the Annual Report, 
published in the Official Journal in November each year.
107 Article 188c (4) EC, fourth subparagraph.
108 Article 206(1) EC.
109 Article 188c(4) EC, second subparagraph.
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draws up an Annual Report after the close of each 
financial year, which is forwarded to the other 
institutions of the Community and is published, together 
with the replies of these institutions, in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities.110 The nature of the 
ECA's role and responsibilities point to a natural 
alliance with the European Parliament, and a constant 
dialogue with the Commission, whose responsibility it is 
to maintain budgetary discipline in accordance with the 
principle of sound financial management and to implement 
the budget.111
It has been suggested that the powers of the ECA, which 
have already helped to improve Community financial 
procedures, have only marginally changed since 1977.112 
Be that as it may, the bulk of the work undertaken by the 
ECA has increased in line with the budget. At present it 
employs some 250 staff to audit revenue and expenditure 
representing approximately 4-5% of the total budgets of 
all the Member States.113 The European budget alone has 
been multiplied by a factor of 2.7 in ten years, rising 
from 28 800 million ECU in 1985 to 79 800 million ECU in
110 Article 188c (4) EC, first subparagraph.
111 Articles 201 and 205 EC; Article 22(1), first 
subparagraph of the Financial Regulation.
112 Church, J and Phinnemore, P (1994) European Union and 
European Community A handbook and Commentary on the post- 
Maastricht Treaties, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 292-294.
113 European Court of Auditors (1995) The European Court of 
Auditors Auditing the finances of the European Union, June, p 
13.
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1995.114 The ECA carries out the audit115 which is based 
on records, and if necessary, performed on the spot at 
the institutions of the Communities and in the Member 
States.116 It examines the accounts of all revenue and 
expenditure of all bodies set up by the Community for 
legality and correctness in so far as the relevant 
constituent instrument does not preclude such 
examination.117 It also examines whether financial 
management has been sound.118
The Treaty on European Union has added one new element to 
the ECA's tasks. It is now required to provide the 
European Parliament and the Council with a Statement of 
Assurance (SOA or DAS) as to the reliability of the 
accounts and the legality and regularity of the 
underlying transactions.119 The specific role of the ECA 
in testing the integrity of financial systems takes even 
more importance in the light of this new duty. The first
114 English version of the Report by the Court of Auditors 
to the 'Reflection Group' on the operation of the Treaty on 
European Union, May 1995, page 2.
115 Article 188a EC.
116 Article 188c (3) EC, first subparagraph.
117 Article 188c (1) EC, first subparagraph. The principle 
bodies audited on this basis are: the general budget of the 
Union and of the EEA, Community loans and borrowings, the 
Euratom Supply Agency, the European Centre for the Development 
of Vocational Training in Berlin, the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in Dublin, 
the European Schools, JET (Joint European Torus - research 
project on thermonuclear fusion), the EAC (European 
Association for Cooperation).
118 Article 188c(2) EC, first subparagraph; Article 2 of 
the Financial Regulation states that the budget appropriations 
must be used in accordance with the principles of sound 
financial management, and in particular those of economy and 
cost-effectiveness. Quantified objectives must be identified 
and the progress of their realization monitored.
119 Article 188c(1) EC, second subparagraph.
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SOA120 was delivered in November 1995 and found that the 
accounts for 1994 accurately reflected the revenue and 
expenditure, as well as the financial situation, of the 
Union, although their informative value should be 
improved. However it was not possible to give an 
assurance that all chargeable imports had actually been 
declared and had yielded the corresponding revenue. With 
regards to the expenditure part of the budget, there were 
too many errors in the transactions underlying the 
payments entered in the accounts for the court to be able 
to be able to give a positive global assurance of their 
legality/regularity. This, one would assume, sets the 
tone for future SOAs.
In the introduction to its 1993 Annual Report, the ECA 
points out that many of the problems it identified in 
accounting and financial management in 1983 had not yet 
been overcome. The ECA deplored that the development of 
Community activities had not been accompanied, either in 
the Commission or in the Member States, by a commensurate 
development of the necessary financial management. 
Furthermore, control systems and insufficient resources, 
both in quantity and in quality, had been allocated to 
ensuring the best use of public money.121 As a rule, it 
seems that the follow up of reports has been largely 
unsatisfactory,122 and that the ECA's influence has left 
something to be desired.
120 European Court of Auditors (1995) Statement of 
Assurance concerning activities financed from the general 
budget for the financial year 1994.
121 Court of Auditors Annual Report for the 1993 financial 
year, see supra, page 5.
122 See O'Keefe, D (1994) The Court of Auditors, in 
Institutional dynamics of European integration Essays in 
honour of Henry G. Schermers, Volume II, eds. D. Curtin and T. 
Heukels, Martinus Nijhoff Pubs, page 183.
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2.3.2. The ECA's consultative role
The present system distinguishes between compulsory and 
optional consultation. Under Article 209 EC, the ECA must 
be consulted during the legislative process, with respect 
to financial regulations - when they specify a procedure 
to be adopted for establishing the budget and for 
presenting and auditing accounts123 when the methods and 
procedures with regards to cash payments are being 
determined,124 and finally when rules convening the 
responsibility of financial controllers, authorizing 
officers, and concerning appropriate arrangements for 
inspection are concerned.125 These are, in fact, quite 
limited circumstances obliging the other institutions of 
the Union to consult the ECA.
The ECA may be consulted on matters not covered under 
Article 209. Under Article 188c(4) EC the ECA may, at any 
time, submit observations, particularly in the form of 
special reports, on specific questions and deliver 
opinions at the request of one of the institutions of the 
Community.126 These special reports usually record the 
audit results obtained in specific management areas. In 
fact it looks as if only moderate use is made of the 
option to seek an opinion from the ECA. Out of 66 
opinions produced between 1977 and 1990, 48 were produced 
under Article 209 (the compulsory procedure) and only 18
123 Article 209(a) EC.
124 Article 209 (b) EC.
125 Article 209(c) EC.
126 Article 206a (4) EEC, second subparagraph was replaced 
by Article 188c (4) EC, second subparagraph. The phrase 
'particularly in the form of special reports' was added to the 
latter for clarification.
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under Article 206a EEC (the optional procedure) .127 The 
ECA also produces reports sui generis.
Sitting rather uncertainly between those circumstances 
when other Community bodies must consult the ECA and 
those when they may, there has arisen an intermediate 
category of uncertain obligation, which perhaps we may 
call good intentions. For example, an agreement had been 
concluded between the Commission and the ECA, whereby the 
European Commission undertook, firstly, to propose that 
the Council should consult the ECA regarding any 
proposals which have a significant effect on the 
financial and budgetary mechanisms of the Communities 
and, secondly, to consult the ECA with regard to any 
similar measures within the scope of its own powers. But, 
according to Strasser, it seems that this agreement has 
had hardly any effect.128 As a result the ECA was not 
asked for an opinion on the draft Regulation on the 
protection of the Community's financial interests.129 
Undeterred, the ECA produced an opinion in February 
1995.130 This opinion was not, however, published in the 
Official Journal. It is not surprising that, in its 
submissions to the IGC Reflection Group, the ECA asked 
for the compulsory procedure to be extended to any draft 
legislation which affects the Community's budgetary and 
financial mechanisms, particularly if they involve 
financial control.
127 See Strasser, D (1991) The finances of Europe, p 277.
128 Strasser, D (1991) The finances of Europe, p 277.
129 Council Regulation 2988/95 OJ L 312/1 on the 
protection of the European Communities' financial interests.
130 Observations de la Cour des Comptes sur la proposition 
de reglement (CE, EURATOM) relatif & la protection des 
int€rets financiers des Communautes ainsi que sur une 
proposition d'acte portant etablissement de la convention 
relative a la protection des interets financiers des 
Communautes (document COM (94) 214 final du 15 Juin 1994), 
February 1995.
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2.3 .3 . Budgetary control
The ECA objects to basic principles of financial control 
being flouted. The principles of separation of roles in 
financial control, and the principle of budgetary unity 
in particular have an important role to play in fraud 
(and corruption) prevention. The separation of roles 
means that the different roles of the various financial 
officers managing the funds be clearly defined and 
mutually exclusive. The principle of budgetary unity 
requires that all financial transactions concerning a 
public body be brought into a single document known as 
its budget, which is then voted on by its budgetary 
authority.131 Some attention is now paid to these 
principles and to their importance for the development of 
a Union whose activities, rather than being criminogenic, 
must be transparent, democratic, and cost-effective.
(i) Principle of separation of roles in internal 
control132
One basic principle of financial control is that the 
management of funds be kept separate from the monitoring 
of their utilization. This basic principle of financial 
control is flouted when this function of independent 
surveillance is carried out by the same department whose 
expenditure is to be scrutinized.
131 Article 199 EC; Article 4 of the Financial Regulation; 
also Schmitt, V (1988) Dix ans de travaux de la cour des 
comptes europeenne Essai de typologie pp 282-283; Strasser, 
1991, The finances of Europe p 42.
132 Internal control is defined as 'all the procedures and 
means making it possible to comply with the budget and the 
rules in force, to safeguard assets, ensure the accuracy and 
reliability of accounting data and facilitate management 
decisions, in particular by making financial information 
available at the appropriate time.' (Everard, P and Wolter, D 
(1989) Glossary Selection of terms and expressions used in the 
external audit of the public sector, OOPEC).
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In relation to the European budget this means that the 
duties of the authorizing officer, financial controller 
and accounting officer are mutually incompatible.133 The 
authorizing officer alone is empowered to enter into 
commitments regarding expenditure, to establish 
entitlements to be collected and issue recovery orders 
and payment orders.134 Each institution has an accounting 
officer, who is responsible for the collection of revenue 
and the payment of expenditure135 The accounting officer 
alone is empowered to manage moneys and other assets and 
is responsible for their safekeeping. The financial 
controller is responsible for monitoring the commitment 
and authorization of all expenditure and the 
establishment and collection of all revenue. The 
financial controller acts as ' internal auditor9 and is 
thus responsible for monitoring the commitment and 
authorization of all expenditure and the establishment 
and collection of all revenue.136
Title V of the Financial Regulation only offers vague 
definitions of the roles of financial officers. However 
Article 126 of the Regulation requires that '[I]n 
consultation with the European Parliament and the Council 
and after the other institutions have delivered their 
opinions, the Commission shall adopt implementing 
measures for this Financial Regulation.' This requirement 
is reiterated in Article 209(c) EC: '[T]he Council [...] 
shall [....] lay down rules concerning the responsibility 
of financial controllers, authorizing officers and 
accounting officers, and concerning appropriate 
arrangements for inspection.'
133 Article 21, fourth subparagraph of the Financial 
Regulation.
134 Article 21 of the Financial Regulation.
135 Article 25 of the Financial Regulation.
136 Article 24 of the Financial Regulation.
50
Although they have been hailed as a priority by the ECA 
for several years,137 such implementing rules have yet to 
be agreed. As a result there sometimes occurs a 
'slippage' in the separation of functions within the 
system of internal financial control. The financial 
controller gives an ex-ante approval to the authorizing 
officer. This prior approval all too often has the effect 
of encouraging the authorizing officer to offer his 
subsequent approval. Although the financial controller 
has the power138 to submit an expert report to his 
institution (in particular with relation to the principle 
of sound management), he may be, as the ECA observes, 
naturally reluctant to do this in respect of expenditure 
for which he has already granted ex-ante approval. As a 
rule, the ECA has been very critical of internal 
financial control. In some cases, it reports a lack of 
rigour. It notes that in 1993 advance payments were made 
by the Commission on a quasi-automatic basis and on the 
basis of very superficial checks,139 without proper 
examination of the underlying transactions.140 
Furthermore in 1992 the Commission granted financial 
assistance for the organization of 20 scientific 
conferences concerned with the coordination of projects 
in the Member States. In two cases, it even made 'advance 
payments' even though the conferences in question has 
ended several weeks earlier. Despite the fact that in 
five cases those who received the advance payments failed 
to submit their final accounts, this failure did not
137 See for example Lelong, P (1989) La cour des comptes 
des communautes europeennes: Sa mission, son bilan, 1'Europe 
en formation, number 274, pp 35-44.
138 Article 40 of Regulation 3418/93 laying down 
implementing procedures for the Financial Regulation.
139 Court of Auditors Annual Report for the 1993 financial 
year, OJ (1994) C 327, p 164, 9.6.
140 ibid, 9.6.
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elicit any reaction from the Commission.141 They may also 
be carried out without the necessary, complementary, 
external audit. In 1993 the Commission adopted a plan of 
action in order to improve the quality of the European 
Development Fund's financial management, which hitherto 
did not come under the ambit of the ECA. The reasons 
advanced by the Commission for excluding Development Fund 
from the external audit of the ECA was that the 
Directorate-General for Development Aid had built up a 
satisfactory financial control system of its own. The ECA 
opposed this view, because it found it to be 
contradictory to the principle of separation of functions 
(found in Article 21 of the Financial Regulation). The 
Directorate-General for Development Aid had not only 
assumed sole responsibility for financial control, but 
also for accounting. On examination of the EDF's 
financial management, the ECA found that there were many 
operations whose eligibility was questionable. The 
Commission was not able, for example, to identify the 
various transactions accounting for a sum of at least 2,5 
million ECU.142 The ECA concluded that a body appointed 
by the institution should make an investigation to 
determine how far individuals were liable in the 
Commission's departments.143 But in the absence of a 
disciplinary framework defining liability, this may be 
difficult.
(ii) Principle of budgetary unity
If the separation of functions has an important role to 
play in preventing corruption, the principle of budgetary 
unity helps to ensure the equally important democratic 
accountability and transparency in Community finance.
141 ibid, 11.38(e).
142 ibid, p 271.
143 Ibid, pp 284-285, 15.117-15.126.
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In 1967 the budgets of the three communities were 
merged.144 This helped to bring about the observance of 
the principle of budgetary unity, which requires that all 
financial transactions concerning a public body should be 
brought into a single document known as its budget, which 
is then voted on by its budgetary authority.145 The ECA 
examines the accounts of all bodies set up by the 
Community only in so far as the relevant constituent 
instrument does not preclude such examination,146 so it 
is not the case at the moment that all the Community's 
revenues and expenditure appears in the budget. Thus, 
there remain important exceptions to the principle of 
budgetary unity.147 For example, in its Annual Report for 
the financial year 1993,148 the ECA points out that in 
the context of several contracts signed with the Council 
of Europe in Strasbourg (about 1,5 Million ECU), the 
Commission agreed to subordinate the ECA's audit rights 
to the provisions of the Financial Regulation of the 
Council of Europe and only to authorize them to be 
exercised via the Council of Europe's Audit Committee. 
Situations of this sort undermine the audit powers of the 
ECA as laid down in the Treaty and given concrete
144 See Article 20 of the Treaty signed in Brussels on 
April 1965, and which came into force on 1 July 1967 (known as 
the Merger Treaty) as amended by Article 10 of the Treaty of 
Luxembourg. The EEC budget, the operational budget of the EAEC 
and the administrative budget of the ECSC were merged into a 
single budget.
145 Article 199 EC; Article 4 of the Financial Regulation; 
also Schmitt, V (1988) Dix ans de travaux de la cour des 
comptes europeenne, pp 282-283; Strasser, 1991, The finances 
of Europe p 42.
146 Article 188c (1) EC.
147 See for example Strasser, D (1991) The finances of 
Europe, pp 44-47.
148 Court of Auditors Annual Report for the 1993 financial 
year, OJ (1994) C 327, page 254, 14.90 on cooperation with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
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expression, in the case in point, in Article 87, fifth 
subparagraph of the Financial Regulation, which states 
that 'the grant of Community funds to beneficiaries 
outside the institutions shall be subject to an audit 
being carried out by the ECA on the utilization of the 
amounts granted'. This has lead the ECA to argue that it 
should be entitled to audit all revenue and expenditure 
managed on behalf of the Community.149 At present Article 
188c(3) EC does not cover the inspection of records in 
institutions which are independent from the Member States 
and were not set up by the Communities (for example, the 
European Investment Bank)150 or bodies set up by and 
managing funds for the Communities, but whose constituent 
instrument does not provide for control by the ECA (for 
example, the International Olive Oil Council). Within the 
context of the 1996 IGC, the ECA has proposed that the 
same Article be amended so as to include them (see part 
iv).151 In addition the field of application of the ECA's
149 Court of Auditors report for the IGC, op.cit., p 4.
150 Articles 198d and 198e EC; also Protocol annexed to the 
Treaty on European Union, 1992. The EIB's task is to 
contribute to the balanced and steady development of the 
common market in the interests of the Community. It does this 
by granting loans and giving guarantees which facilitate the 
financing of projects. This includes projects in less- 
developed regions, modernisation or development projects and 
projects of common interest in several Member States. It also 
facilitates the financing of investment programmes in 
conjunction with assistance from the structural funds and 
other Community financial instruments.
151 The proposed amended text reads (emphasis added) : 'The 
audit shall be based on records and, if necessary, performed 
on the spot in the other institutions of the Community, on the 
premises of any body which manages revenue and/or expenditure 
on behalf of the Community and in the Member States.' The rest 
of the subparagraph remains unchanged, whilst the next 
subparagraph reads: 'The other institutions of the Community, 
any body that manages revenue and/or expenditure on behalf of 
the Community and the national audit bodies or, if these do 
not have the necessary powers, the competent national 
departments, shall forward to the Court of Auditors, at its 
request, any document or information necessary to carry out
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audit powers should be clarified in areas which are not, 
or are only partly, covered by the 1992 Treaty on 
European Union. The ECA is now required to audit 
expenditure incurred under the second and the third 
pillars and which is chargeable to the budget of the 
European Communities.132 It has also been asked to audit 
expenditure chargeable to the Member States on a sliding 
scale basis (for example the EUROPOL budget) so it argues 
that these new duties should be acknowledged. It 
therefore suggests that it should be included under 
Article E EC, together with the other institutions.153 In 
order to consolidate its auditing powers, the ECA argues 
that it should have access to the European Court of 
Justice for rulings on disputes arising from its lack of 
access to records. Although access to records must be a 
sine qua non of auditing, such access has occasionally 
been refused to the ECA (by the Commission, the Member 
States or private concerns) which is then unable to 
appeal against the decision.134 Although other European 
institutions and their financial personnel have access to 
the Court of Justice, the ECA has no such access if 
disputes arise in the performance of its auditing duties. 
To guarantee the ECA access to the Court of Justice would
its task'. Article 188c(3) EC does not explicitly cover access 
to the records of private beneficiaries.
132 Article J.ll, paragraph 2, first sub-paragraph and 
Article K 8, paragraph 2, second sub-paragraph, first indent.
133 The proposed amended Article E EC reads (emphasis 
added): 'The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission 
(...) the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors shall 
exercise their powers under the conditions and for the 
purposes provided for, on the one hand, by the provisions of 
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the 
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying and supplementing them 
and, on the other hand, by the other provisions of this 
Treaty.'
134 Article 188c (3) EC.
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entail two additions to the Treaty.155
This state of affairs has lead the ECA to prioritise 
budgetary unity within the framework of the 1996 IGC: 
'The Court should be automatically entitled to audit all 
revenue and expenditure managed on behalf of the 
Community'156 - so that no Community income or 
expenditure be outside the reach of democratic control.
2.4. The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice (ECJ henceforth) ensures 
that the law is observed in the interpretation and 
application of the EC Treaty. The Treaty on European 
Union broke new ground by giving the ECJ the power to 
fine Member States that fail to comply with its 
judgements [Article 171(2)], but it excluded the new 
fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP 
henceforth) and Justice and Internal Affairs (JHA 
henceforth), save when conventions adopted by the Member 
States make provision for it. Within the consultation 
process of the IGC, the Court has made a few suggestions 
which are relevant to the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities.
155 The proposed additions to the Treaty read as follows. 
Article 280(a) EC: 'The Court of Justice shall have 
jurisdiction in disputes concerning such rights and 
prerogatives as have been conferred on the Court of Auditors 
by this Treaty'. Article 188c (5): 'Any infringement of the 
rights and prerogatives of the Court of Auditors may be placed 
by the latter before the Court of Justice. If the Court of 
Justice finds that an infringement has occurred, the persons 
responsible shall take such steps as may be necessary to 
comply with the Court of Justice's ruling'.
156 See supra, Court of Auditors report for the IGC, 1995,
P 4.
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The ECJ contribution157 to the Reflection process prior 
to the IGC stresses the need for a uniform application of 
the law throughout the Union but notes that, under 
Article L, it has no competence to decide cases in the 
field of Justice and Internal Affairs. A recent case 
confirms that it has no competence to interpret Article 
B.158 According to the findings of the ECJ, there is at 
present no way of obtaining a ruling on certain 
constitutional matters.
The ECJ contribution was written in early June 1995, that 
is to say, before the Regulation and the convention for 
the protection of the financial interests were agreed. It 
therefore looked back to an earlier convention, 
concerning the Simplified Extradition Procedure. This, 
the first Convention to be signed under the third pillar, 
did not grant the Court any competency in dispute 
resolution. But things have moved on since then, with 
four new conventions on third pillar matters being signed 
in June 1995. The present author suggests that, of these, 
the Convention on the Protection of the Communities' 
financial interests may be seen as a breakthrough. It 
grants the Court the competence to interpret the 
provisions of the Convention by way of preliminary 
rulings, and to determine disputes arising out of the 
operation of the Convention, on application from a Member 
State or the Commission, when disputes have not been 
settled within six months.159
Surprisingly, there are few key rulings in the area of 
the protection of the financial interests of the European
157 European Court of Justice (1995) Rapport de la Cour de 
Justice sur certains aspects de 1'application du Traits sur
1'Union Europeenne, May.
158 Case C-167/94 Grau Gomis, judgement of 7 April 1995,
nyr.
159 Article 8 of 'PIF' Convention, OJ (1995) C 316/48.
57
Communities. Commission v Greece160 has crystallised 
Member States' duties and competence with regards to the 
application of sanctions, and Germany v Commission161 has 
clarified the competence of EC institutions in imposing 
sanctions. The jurisprudence has also clarified the 
rights of operators when Community sanctions are 
involved.
2.4.1. Member States' duties and competence
According to Article 5 EC, Member States have a duty to 
take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaty. This has been 
compared to the German doctrine of 'Bundestreuepflicht' 
or duty of loyalty. 162In particular, when governments of 
the Member States make decisions, they must be in 
accordance with the rule imposing on Member States and 
the Community institutions mutual duties of sincere 
cooperation.163 Those requirements include the 
'obligation of general diligence',164 as specifically 
embodied in Article 8(1) and (2) of Council Regulation 
729/70 with regard to the financing of the CAP, according 
to which Member States must (i) satisfy themselves that 
transactions financed by the Fund are actually carried 
out and are executed correctly, (ii) prevent and deal 
with irregularities and (iii) recover sums lost as a
160 68/88 Commission v Greece ECR [1989] 2965.
161 Ibid.
162 Contantinesco, V (1987) L'article 5 CEE, de la bonne 
foi a la loyaute communautaire Du droit international au droit 
de 1'integration, in Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore, eds: F. 
Capotorti, C-D Ehlermann, J.Frohwein, F. Jacobs, R. Joliet, T. 
Koopmans, R. Kovar, pp 97-115.
163 See 230/81 Luxembourg v European Parliament ('seat' 
case) [1983] ECR 255, at 37.
164 Case C—34/89 Italy v Commission ECR [1990] I 3603, at
12.
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result of irregularities or negligence.
As part of this duty of diligence, the Member States must 
initiate any proceedings under administrative, fiscal or 
civil law for the collection or recovery of duties or 
levies which have been fraudulently evaded or for 
damages.165 In the Amsterdam Bulb case166 the European 
Court of Justice ruled that 'In the absence of any 
provisions in the Community rules providing for specific 
sanctions to be imposed on individuals for a failure to 
observe those rules, the Member States are competent to 
adopt such sanctions as appear to them to be 
appropriate'. In Hansen167 the Court ruled that 
'...[W]hilst the choice of penalties remains within their 
discretion, [the Member States] must ensure in particular 
that infringements of Community law are penalized under 
conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are 
analogous to those applicable to infringements of 
national law of a similar nature and importance and 
which, in any event, make the penalty effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.168 And, to drive the point 
home the Court added: '... [I]t continues169 to be the 
task of the Member States to undertake prosecutions and 
proceedings for the purpose of the system of levies and 
refunds and to continue170 to take steps to this end vis-
165 Case C-352/92 Milchwerke Koln/Wuppertal EG v 
Hauptzollamt Koln-Rheinau [1994] ECR I -3385, at 23.
166 Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb BV v Produktschaap voor 
Siergerwassen [1977] ECR 137, [1977] 2 CMLR 218.
167 Case 148/77 Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg [1978] ECR 
1787; [1979] 1 CMLR 604.
168 Ibid, at 2, second paragraph.
169 Author's emphasis.
170 Ibid.
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a-vis the parties involved.'171
Assimilation remains a problem in some Member States, 
where the legal system has yet to be adapted.172 It just 
means that a Member State may extend its (sometimes 
fairly ineffective) ways of tackling economic crime EC 
funds. Predictably the question of the Commission's 
normative competence to impose sanctions appears in the 
jurisprudence of the Court, and it did in Germany v 
Commission.
2.4.2. Commission competence
The Community's power to create penalties to be imposed 
by national authorities and necessary for the effective 
application of the rules in the sphere of the CAP, based 
on Articles 40(3) and 43(2) EC, has repeatedly been 
recognised by the Court,173 be it in the form of a 
requirement to refund a benefit unduly received,174 the 
loss of security equivalent to that benefit,175 or the 
forfeiture of a security.176 In Germany v Commission,177
171 Ibid, at 16.
172 See for example Courakis, N (1996) Greece: Coping with 
EU fraud, Journal of Financial Crime, Volume 4, number 1, pp 
78-84.
173 Cases 357/88 Oberhausener v BALM [1990] ECR 1669; 25/70 
EVGF v Koster, ECR [1970] 1161.
174 Case 288/85 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Plange 
Kraftfutterwerke [1987] ECR 611.
175 Case C-199/90 Italtrade v AIMA [1990] ECR I- 5545.
176 Cases 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v 
Einfuhr-und Vorratstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] 
ECR 1125; 137/85 Maizena v BALM [1987] ECR 4587, at 12; C- 
155/89 Philipp Brothers [1990] ECR 1-3265, at 40; C-199/90 
Italtrade v AIMA [1991] ECR 1-5545, at 10; 122/78 Buitoni v 
FORMA [1979] ECR 677; Man (Sugar) v IBAP [1985] ECR 2889.
177 Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] 1-5385.
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the Court went one step further and held that exclusion 
from a scheme within the CAP came within the implementing 
powers which the Council may delegate to the Commission 
under Articles 145 and 155 EC. This is because penalties 
such as a surcharge on the reimbursement with interests 
of a subsidy paid, or exclusion for a certain period of a 
trader from a subsidies scheme are measures intended to 
the CAP and the proper financial management of the 
Community funds designated for their attainment.
Following the ruling in Germany v Commission,178 which 
established Community competence to impose penal- 
administrative sanctions, two questions arose in relation 
to the Community's powers to impose sanctions. The first 
concerns its competence to impose sanctions beyond the 
CAP (i.e to other parts of the EC budget), and the second 
relates to its competence to impose penal, rather than 
purely administrative, sanctions.
The 'PIF' Regulation179 now extends the Community's 
competence to impose penalties beyond the sphere of the 
CAP.180 This means that the Community now has competence 
to impose the types of penalties enumerated in Article 5 
of the 'PIF' Regulation (ranging from fines to loss of 
deposit) to other parts of the budget. This now makes it 
possible, for example, to extend a specific regime of 
penalties to affect the collection of import duties, 
which as we shall see is badly affected by fraud.
With regards to the Community's competence to impose 
penal sanctions, the Court has consistently declined to 
be drawn into the distinction between penal sanctions
178 C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR 1-5383.
179 Council Regulation 2988/95 OJ (1995) L 312/1 on the 
protection of the European Communities' financial interests.
180 Ibid, 12th preamble.
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(the sole preserve of the Member States) and 
administrative sanctions (where the Community has a 
normative competence). Administrative sanctions apply 
without prejudice to criminal sanctions imposed in the 
Member States. The fact that fraud is due to the 
negligence of a producer, is not sufficient to invest the 
sanction with a penal character, given that fraud, and 
even more so negligence, is as much a concept of the 
civil as of the criminal law.181
2.4.3. Rights of operators
Penalties such as fines are imposed under both criminal 
and civil/administrative law in the Member States. In 
criminal law, the defendant's behaviour is the main issue 
in court, whilst in administrative decisions what is at 
stake is the legitimacy of the decision.
Administrative sanctions have increasingly been 
incorporated into regulations since a landmark case,182 
which acknowledged the Commission's power to introduce 
penalties with a punitive, rather than merely remedial or 
compensatory character into regulations. Such penalties 
are not meant to replace criminal proceedings in the 
Member States, but rather they set minimal sanctions to 
be applied, irrespective of criminal proceedings.
The question has arisen as to whether or not increasing 
the share of administrative penalties against 
reprehensible behaviour does not tilt the balance of 
powers in favour of the executive.183 At the national
181 Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission, at 16.
182 Case 240/90 Commission v Germany ECR (1992) I 5383.
183 De Doelder, H (1994) The enforcement of economic 
legislation, in Administrative law application and enforcement 
of Community law in The Netherlands, ed J. Vervaele, Kluwer, 
pp 133-142.
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level, although there have been studies concerned with 
the change of relationships between the judiciary and the 
legislature, little has been formulated on the 
consequences for the rule of law resulting from such a 
shift of judicial functions from the judiciary to the 
executive. Administrative sanctions do not automatically 
fall under the ambit of Article 6(1) ECHR.
In the Konecke184 and Maizena185 cases, the Court ruled 
that 'a penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be 
imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal 
basis.' Furthermore, a penalty must not be 
retroactive.186 It must be appropriate and necessary and 
proportionate to the objectives to be attained,187 and 
must only be applied after the person concerned has had 
an opportunity to make known their views.188 The 
requirement of judicial control also applies to 
administrative decisions.189 According to
184 Case 117/83 Konecke v Balm [1984] ECR 3291.
185 Maizena v BALM [1987] ECR 4587.
186 Case 63/83 R v Kirk ECR [1984] 2689, at 22: '[T]he 
principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive 
effect is one which is common to all the legal orders of the 
Member States and is enshrined in Article 7 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as fundamental right; it takes its place among the 
general principles of law whose observance is ensured by the 
Court of Justice.'
187 Cases C—319/90 Pressler v Germany [1992] ECR 1-203, at 
12; C-326/88 Anklagemyndigheden v Hansen [1990] ECR 1-2911; 
15/83 Denkavit [1984] ECR 2171; 122/78 Buitoni v Forma [1979] 
ECR 677; 66/82 Fromengais v Forma [1983] ECR 395.
188 Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche v Commission (vitamins) 
[1979] ECR 461.
189 Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR 1651 
at 18.
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Schockweiler,190 the requirement of judicial control 
should apply, particularly when sanctions are involved.
But there has been more uncertainty whether the principle 
of equality of arms derived from Article 6(1) ECHR 
applies in administrative proceedings of a penal nature. 
The Court of First Instance has ruled that companies 
involved in antitrust proceedings, where the Community 
has the power to impose penalties directly, have a right 
to defend themselves,191 since the European Court of 
Justice has a duty to ensure that the procedural 
safeguards granted by ECHR are respected within the 
Community's legal order.192 This clarifies matters as far 
as competition hearings are concerned,193 but what of 
administrative proceedings conducted in the Member States 
themselves, and which have for their objective the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities? There may be three (related) levels of 
difficulties in this area. Firstly, the case law of the 
Court of Human Rights is far from unequivocal as to 
whether penal-administrative sanctions should attract the 
same guarantees under 6(1) as criminal sanctions do. 
Secondly, learned commentators have argued that, because
190 Schockweiler, F (1995) La repression des infractions au 
droit communautaire dans la jurisprudence de la Cour, La 
protection du budget communautaire et 1'assistance entre 
etats, in Proceeds of Luxembourg Conference, 12 May 1995, 
Luxembourg ARPE.
191 Case T—36/91, I Cl, judgment of 29 June 195, nyr.2
192 See cases C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR 2925; also 46 and 
227/87 Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859.
193 See Van Der Woude (1996) Hearing officers and EC 
antitrust procedures The art of making subjective procedures 
more objective, Common Market Law Review, 33, 531-546.
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the Community itself has not acceded to ECHR,194 the 
Member States could conceivably 'find themselves in a 
situation in which they are required to take actions 
according to Community law which the ECHR forbids'.195 
This sounds rather far-fetched in view of the present 
incorporation of human rights into Community law, but it 
must be conceded that De Doelder may well have a point, 
since the implementation of the 'Black List' Regulation 
has come very close to creating such problems in the UK 
(see chapter 4). Thirdly, national administrative 
proceedings in general do not automatically ensure 
fulfilment of the same guarantees.196 De Doelder has 
summarized the situation thus
The 'message' of both courts [ECJ and ECHR] is 
therefore not the same: the Court of Luxembourg 
gives Member States the task of imposing certain 
predetermined sanctions, while the Court in 
Strasbourg speaks in terms of 'reasonabless' and 
'fairness'. The States are caught between two fires 
without a right-of-way rule.197
2.4.4. Cooperation
The duty of 'sincere cooperation' must extend the
194 In Opinion 2/94 CMLR [1996] 2 CMLR 265, the ECJ 
subsequently opined that as Community law stands, the 
Community had no competence to accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.
195 Vermeulen, B (1994) The issue of fundamental rights in 
the administrative application and enforcement of Community 
law, in Administrative law application and enforcement of 
Community law in the Netherlands, Kluwer, page 47.
196 De Doelder, H (1994) The enforcement of economic 
legislation, in Administrative law application and enforcement 
of Community law in the Netherlands, ed. J. Vervaele, Kluwer, 
page 141.
197 Ibid, page 141.
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Commission checks which are carried out in the Member 
States. This means that Commission officials have access 
to the same premises and to the same documents as 
national officials.198 With respect to access to 
evidence, the Commission can be assimilated to the 
national authorities. National rules limiting access 
therefore also apply to the Commission. When the 
Commission has autonomous powers of inspection, national 
authorities have a duty to assist.199 Member States also 
have a duty to cooperate with their national authorities 
by communicating information which is necessary for 
ensuring that Community law is applied.200 This duty is 
mutual, and the Commission also has a duty to cooperate 
with national authorities:
... [T]his duty of sincere cooperation is of 
particular importance vis-a-vis the judicial 
authorities of the Member States who are responsible 
for ensuring that Community law is applied and 
respected in the national legal system.201
This requirement was added by the Treaty on European 
Union to the EEC Treaty:
198 See case 267/78 Commission v Italy ECR [1980] 31; also 
Article 6(4) of Council Regulation 595/91 OJ (1991) L 67/11.
199 Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission 
[1989] ECR 2859, at 4 second paragraph '....If the 
undertakings concerned oppose the Commission's investigation, 
its officials may, on the basis of Article 14(6) of Regulation 
17 and without the cooperation of the undertakings, search for 
any information necessary for the investigation with the 
assistance of the authorities, which are required to afford 
them the assistance necessary for the performance of their 
duties. Although such assistance is required only if the 
undertaking expresses its opposition, it may also be requested 
as a precautionary measures, in order to overcome any 
opposition on the part of the undertaking.'
200 C—9/89 Spain v Council [1990] ECR 1383.
201 Case C-2/8 Imm. J.J. Zwartveld and others [1990] ECR I- 
3365, at 1.
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Without prejudice to other provisions of this 
Treaty, Member States shall coordinate their action 
aimed at protecting the financial interests of the 
Community against fraud. To this end they shall 
organize, with the help of the Commission close and 
regular cooperation between the competent 
departments of their administrations. (Article 209a, 
second paragraph).
2.5. The Council
The Council has a general duty to enact legislation, and 
indeed most laws are enacted by Council.
Under Article 209 EC, the Council acts unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament and obtaining the opinion of the 
Court of Auditors. Like the Commission and the European 
Parliament, it has budgetary duties. It makes financial 
regulations specifying the procedure to be adopted for 
establishment and implementation of the budget and for 
presenting and auditing accounts. It also determines the 
modalities for the payment of Own Resources into the 
budget. These tasks are carried out through the Budget 
Committee, which in turn reports to COREPER.202 
Importantly, it also lays down the rules concerning the 
responsibility of financial controllers, authorizing 
officers and accounting officers, and concerning 
appropriate arrangements for inspection.
2.6. The European Parliament
Generally, the European Parliament's power over the 
budget as a whole are limited. It does, however, have the 
right to reject the budget as a whole. But if it rejects
202 Comit& des Representants Permanents; Committee of 
Permanent Representatives.
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the budget, the Community can continue to spend at the 
same monthly rate as in the previous year.203 It is also 
responsible for granting discharge for the whole budget. 
204The EP only refused discharge once in November 1984, 
when it refused discharge for the 1982 financial year.The 
Treaty on European Union strengthened the role of the EP 
by giving it power to demand information from the 
Commission about its execution of financial control, and 
by requiring the Commission to act on the EP's 
observations.205 The EP has the right to dismiss the 
Commission by a two-thirds majority,206 thus ensuring 
that the Commission pays a great deal of attention to its 
views. The EP generally wants to play a greater 
institutional role and this is reflected in its IGC 
proposals.
The European Parliament's IGC proposals207 can be divided 
between general concerns, those relating to budgetary 
control, those concerning other institutions and others.
2.5.1. General concerns
Generally the EP argues that it should have equal status 
with the Council in all fields of EU legislative and 
budgetary competence.
- Its role should be reinforced in those areas where 
there is currently inadequate scrutiny at European level,
203 Article 204 EC.
204 Article 206 EC.
205 Article 206 EC.
206 Article 144 EC.
207 European Commission (1995) Preparation CIG 1996 
Contribution du Parlement Europeen, information aux 
delegations ext€rieures de la Commission, info-note number 
26/95, May.
for example in Justice and Internal Affairs. It stresses 
that the unanimity requirement has lead to delays and to 
ineffective legislation in the past, and that 
consequently further extension of qualified majority 
voting is required if the EU is to function effectively. 
However for certain areas of particular sensitivity, 
unanimity will remain necessary, i.e Treaty 
amendment,'constitutional decisions' (enlargement, own 
resources, uniform electoral system) and Article 235.
- Public access to EU documents should be greatly 
improved.
- The Union's powers in the agricultural sector largely 
evade the direct scrutiny of national parliaments and 
must be subject to greater democratic control by the 
European Parliament; in fact, responsibility for 
agricultural markets and prices policy, and thus for farm 
incomes policy, has long been outside the control of 
national parliaments.
- The democratic principle of the final adoption of the 
budget by the European Parliament must be maintained.
- Finally, the Treaty should be revised to permit tougher 
measures to be taken to combat fraud and other 
infringements of EU law, to permit wider-ranging 
investigations within the Member States (by means, for 
example, of a reinforced Article 138c) and to enable 
dissuasive penal and administrative sanctions to be 
imposed at EU level (with an article to permit 
harmonization directives in the area of relevant criminal 
law, and specifically obliging Member States to apply 
effective, proportionate, harmonised and deterrent 
penalties for breach of Community law).
2.5.2. Budgetary control
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The EP finds Budgetary legislation confusing and asks 
that it be rationalised to distinguish between Own 
Resources decisions, financial regulation and budgetary 
discipline. Multi-annual financial programming should be 
incorporated into the Treaty. The income of the EIB 
should be treated as a Own Resource of the Community. The 
Union,s budget should be the sole instrument for the 
realising the Union's objectives. The unity of the budget 
should be established, the Union budget incorporating the 
European Development Fund and CFSP and JHA expenditure 
and Community borrowing and lending.
The budgetary procedure should be simplified, more 
transparent and effective; the Commission's draft budget 
proposals should be the basis for the European 
Parliament's first reading.208
The distinction between compulsory and non compulsory 
expenditures should be abolished within a defined period; 
the European Parliament should be an equal partner for 
all expenditure.
2.5.3. Proposals concerning other institutions
The competence of the ECJ should be extended to areas 
relating to Justice and Internal Affairs and those 
covered by the Schengen agreement. The conditions for 
referring matters to the ECJ should be enlarged so that 
each institution of the Union should have the possibility 
(in addition to the means of redress in Article 173) of 
bringing an action in the Court where it considers that 
its rights have been infringed by the failure on the part 
of another institution or a Member State to fulfil a 
Treaty obligation.
208 European Commission (1995) Tableau comparatif des 
contributions du Conseil, de la Commission, du P.E, info-note 
number 32/95, May.
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2.5.4. Other proposals
The EP proposes that when the Council is acting in its 
legislative capacity, its proceedings should be public 
and its agenda binding. The ECA should play its proper 
role in all the areas of EU activity.
2.5.5. The meaning of the EP agenda
The EP strongly supports the Commission in its efforts to 
control fraud affecting the budget. It even goes as far 
as recommending the constitutionalisation of the powers 
of the Commission checks in the Member States, and to 
harmonise criminal laws. On budgetary unity, it reflects 
the ECA's views (see above). Generally, the EP wishes to 
have equal access to all parts of the budget, in order to 
establish better accountability for the tax payer. This 
forward-looking agenda has it roots in the early concern 
the EP has shown in fraud control, and in its increasing 
involvement in matters relating to it.
2.5.5. The EP and fraud control
Historically, the European Parliament first showed 
concern over the protection of the Financial Interests of 
the European Communities in 1973, and subsequently 
through a number of reports.209 It also supported the 
1976 proposal for a convention, which was subsequently 
shelved. At that time, the 1977 de Keersmaker report210 
had already highlighted the need for sanctions, and in 
particular the need to ensure that Community fraud be 
given due consideration in the national laws of the 
Member States. In 1991 the Theato report reiterated the
209 De Keersmaeker Report (1977) EP document 531/76; Gabert 
Report (1984) EP document 1-1346/83; Guermeur Report 1987) EP 
document A2-251/86; Dankert Report (1989) EP Document A2- 
20/89; Theato Report (1991), EP document A3-0250/91.
210 Ibid.
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same concerns and deplored the fact that little progress 
had been made in that direction.
Of late, the EP's scrutiny of the Structural funds in 
particular, has increased. Whilst respecting the division 
of rule between the institutions as laid down by the 
Treaty, the revised Structural Funds legislation of 
1993211 provides for a greater involvement of Parliament 
in the implementation of Community structural measures 
and as a result entails:
- forwarding to Parliament lists of the areas concerned 
in respect of Objectives 2 and 5b, the development plans 
submitted by the Member States, the Community Support 
Frameworks and the texts of the implementing regulations 
concerning monitoring and publicity.
- Notifying Parliament of the Community initiatives 
before their adoption, in order to enable the Commission 
to take note of Parliament's requests before each 
initiative
- providing regular and detailed information on the 
implementation of the funds.
(i) The budgetary control committee
Since 1973 the European Parliament (EP henceforth) has 
had a committee of sub-committee for budgetary control. 
The Committee's powers were determined by Parliament on 
19 May 1983 and subsequently amended on 26 July 1989. The 
Committee is competent to examine, inter alia, the 
conditions of appropriations,the financing mechanisms and
211 See Articles 9(3), lib(4) , 16 of Council Regulation 
2081/93 OJ (1993) L 193/5 (Framework Regulation) and Articles 
10, 11, 23, 26(5), 32(2) of Council Regulation 2082/93 OJ 
(1993) L 193/30 (Coordination Regulation).
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the administrative structures for putting them into 
effect, through a study of the cases of fraud and 
irregularity. Every quarter it reviews cases of fraud 
which are of interest. The Committee gives opinions on 
request or on its own initiative, to the parliamentary 
committees and other bodies of Parliament on matters 
within the field of budgetary control. Its busiest period 
is at the time of the discharge of the budget, at the 
beginning of every autumn. The committee, acting like the 
proverbial grit in the oyster, has been actively pressing 
the Commission to come up with credible strategies to 
fight fraud, the Council to pronounce on proposals for 
legislation, and has worked to improve communication 
strategies with the European Court of Auditors.212
(ii) The temporary Committee of Inquiry213
With fraud being high on the EP's agenda, it is not 
wholly surprising that the first Committee of Inquiry, 
set up under Article 138C EC, should be dedicated to it. 
The EP decided in 1995 that the subject of the inquiry 
should be to consider allegations of offences committed 
or of maladministration under the Community Transit 
System.214 The TCI is due to report in January 1997 at
212 See European Parliament (1993) Rapport de la Commission 
du Contrdle Budgetaire sur les relations entre les organes de 
contrdle de budget communautaire, rapporteur John Tomlinson, 
A3-0320.
213 On the setting up of the Committee and the necessary 
changes to the rules of procedure, see the following European 
Parlement reports: (1993) Les commissions parlementaires 
d'enquete des etats membres de la CE, W3; (1994) Commission de 
reglement, de la verification des pouvoirs et des immunitds,
PE 210.750; (1995), PE 212.084; (1995) Document de travail PE 
211.818; (1995) Rapport PE 210.700; also Boyron, S (1995) Un 
pouvoir de contrdle confirme: Les commissions temporaires 
d'enquete, report to the Commission Institutionnelle; Boyron,
S (1995) Les commissions temporaires et les adaptations 
reglementaires necessaires, ditto.
214 Decision 96/C 7/01 OJ (1996) C 7.
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the earliest,215 and its work programme has included 
gathering evidence from all quarters (national Customs 
authorities, freight forwarders, national permanent 
representatives, commissioners, the International Chamber 
of Commerce, etc.)* It will be interesting to see whether 
as a result of the inquiry, the Commission's anti-fraud 
programme is amended.
2.7. Discussion
the main function of the Commission, and in particular DG 
XX (Financial Control) has been to raise awareness, to 
make proposals, and to put forward implementing measures 
for existing secondary legislation. However, because the 
Commission's legislative proposals have to be adopted by 
an anonymous vote, they have often been shelved for long 
periods (e.g the 'PIF' Convention). Occasionally, the 
Commission's implementing efforts have seemed over- 
zealous to the Member States, as in the of the Code of 
Conduct attached to Council Regulation 4253/88,216 which 
was subsequently annulled by the European Court of 
Justice (see chapter 4). Whether the handicap provided by 
the unanimity requirement is remedied through 
constitutional reform remains an open question at the 
moment. In this the EP's suggestion that certain powers 
of the Commission (in the field of inspection and 
harmonisation of criminal laws) be constitutionalised, 
and that qualified majority be extended to more areas 
pays lip service to the Commission.
But what are we to think of the ECA's quite detailed 
proposals, which are technical in as much as they deal 
with budgetary control, but nevertheless go to the heart
215 According to the Rules of Procedure two three months 
extension are possible.
216 OJ (1988) L 374/1.
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of the problem? The ECA is playing an increasingly 
important role in the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities. Cynics might see 
in the ECA proposals merely an instance of a more general 
tendency for Community institutions to extend their 
powers. Be that as it may, specific proposals seem hard 
to fault - for example the need for all bodies handling 
EU funds to be subjected to an external audit must be 
heeded. A role for the Court of Auditors in 
investigations, an acknowledgement of its role under 
second and third pillars, and the possibility of appeal 
to the ECJ should also be given serious consideration.
The request that the ECA be consulted in the legislative 
process when anti-fraud legislation is considered is 
difficult to rebut, yet may fail to gain a hearing, 
amongst the cacophony of other, more politically-visible 
issues projected for debate at the Inter-Governmental 
Conference.
If anything, pre-IGC reports should help to open up the 
discussion on fraud prevention through sound financial 
management, epitomised by the SEM 2000217 initiative. The 
initiative218 has already examined the possibility of 
extending the clearance of accounts procedure to the non- 
compulsory part of the budget, and has come to the 
conclusion that a new clearance procedure should be 
created for own resources.
217 SEM 2000 is the acronym for the programme to improver 
financial management launched by the Commission in January 
1995. Its full name is Sound and Efficient Financial 
Management, SEM 2000.
218 See for example European Parliament, Budgetary Control 
Committee (1996) SEM 2000 Working document Rationalising 
controls Preventing fraud, PE 219.146; European Parliament, 
Budgetary Control Committee (1996) SEM 2000 Working document 
evaluation, PE 218.773; European Parliament, Budgetary Control 
Committee (1996) SEM 2000 Working document, Defining a 
methodological approach.
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This signals the beginning of an era in which financial 
management promises to play a more dominant role in the 
fight against fraud.
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PART n.
THE CONTROL OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE FRAUD
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CHAPTER 3. THE CONTROL OF FRAUD AFFECTING EC REVENUE
This chapter focuses on the control of fraud affecting 
traditional own resources (3.2.) and VAT-based own 
resources (3.3.), which are collected and controlled by 
the Member States themselves. First their respective 
history is examined briefly, and examples of fraud are 
given. This is followed by an expose of the Community 
control framework and Member States' responses. Proposed 
solutions are examined thereafter. The last part of the 
chapter (3.4.) deals with recent developments and 
prospects for improvement of the protection of the 
financial interests of the European Communities. Readers 
should note that the question of recovery of EC revenue 
has not been dealt with in any depth in this chapter, 
since a detailed case study has been included separately 
in part III.
3.1. Introduction; own resources
Community revenues are referred to as 'own resources'. 
This technically is a misnomer since the Community 
resources are collected by the Member States, and 
subsequently made available to the European Communities, 
as we shall see. The Council Decision of 21 April 1970 
gave the Community for the first time 'financial autonomy 
through fiscal power',219 by establishing a system of 
'own resources' under Articles 201 and—17-3 EEC. At first 
own resources consisted of VAT, Customs duties and 
agricultural and sugar levies. In 1989 the own resources 
system was changed in order to accommodate a proportion 
of national GNPs, thus creating a regime of EC revenue 
raising which was felt to be more equitable. Decision
219 See Strasser, D (1991) The finances of Europe, OOPEC, 
page 85.
79
88/376220 was closely followed by Council Regulations 
1552/89221 and 1553/89222 laying down rules for the 
implementation of the amended regime. The regime was 
finally enshrined in the EEC Treaty when 201 EEC was 
amended by the Treaty on European Union to read:
Without prejudice to other revenue, the budget shall 
be financed wholly from own resources. The Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament, shall 
lay down provisions relating to the system of own 
resources of the Community, which it shall recommend 
to the Member States for adoption in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements. 
(Article 201 EC)
In the absence of a Community tax-collecting authority223 
the system of 'own resources' means that Member States 
must make available to the Community budget a small 
proportion of their VAT and GNP, as well as various 
levies and duties. Levies, premiums, supplementary or 
compensatory amounts, additional amounts of items and 
other duties established at present or in the future by 
the institutions of the Communities in respect of trade 
with non-member counties, within the framework of the CAP 
and any other contributions and other duties established 
within the common organisation of the markets in sugar 
have been described by the Commission as 'traditional own
220 Council Decision 88/376 OJ (1988) L 185/24 on the 
Communities' own resources.
221 Council Regulation 1552/89 OJ (1989) L 155/1 
implementing Decision 88/376 on the system of the Communities' 
own resources.
222 Council Regulation 1553/89 OJ (1989) L 155/9 on the 
definitive uniform arrangements for the collection of own 
resources accruing from value added tax.
223 Article 8(1) of Council Decision 88/376, supra.
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resources' in order to distinguish them from (VAT-based) 
own resources. The payment of traditional own resources 
into the EC budget derives from the application of the 
Common Customs Tariff224 (CCT) to the Customs value of 
goods imported from third countries. It is to traditional 
own resources that we turn first.
3.2. Fraud and traditional own resources
Revenue frauds are prevalent in particular in the area of 
agricultural and Customs levies. The administration of 
sugar levies, however, is held to be relatively 
straightforward and leaves little scope for 
exploitation.225 Agricultural levies and Customs duties 
are collected by the Member States' Customs authorities 
from traders importing goods into the Community. Fraud 
occurs when a trader evades paying duty to the Customs 
authorities by, for example, misleading the authorities 
about the source of the goods, or the nature of the 
product he is transporting. The Common Customs Tariff 
alone contains over 4,000 product codes,226 so the scope 
for fraud (and error!) due to misdescription alone is 
vast. It is generally acknowledged that inward transits 
(i.e imports to the Community) are more susceptible to
224 Council Regulation 950/68 [1968] I OJ Spec. Ed. 275.
The CCT was established even before the dated provided for in
the Treaty (1 January 1970), namely on 1 July 1968. The
combined nomenclature of the system, which is based on the
Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (Council 
Regulation 2658/87 OJ (1987) L 256), is reviewed annually.
225 Sherlock, A and Harding, C (1991) Controlling fraud 
within the European Community, European Law Review 16:20-36, 
page 22.
226 'For processed goods, a further 932 product codes 
exist, 1,416 recipes and 14,000 non-standard recipes'. See 
Leigh, L and Smith, A (1991) Some observations on European 
fraud laws and their reform with reference to the EEC, 
Corruption and reform 6: 267-284, page 268.
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fraud than outward transits (exports)
Levies and duties are designed to bring the prices of 
imported goods to the level of Community prices. The 
product's country of origin does not generally affect the 
size of the levy. However, the system is complicated by 
preferential arrangements such as the Generalised Scheme 
of Tariff Preferences,228 which allows goods from certain 
developing countries discounts on levies and duties. 
Imports from third countries are regulated by Council 
Regulations 32S5/94229 and 519/94.230 The Regulation 
includes a simplification and standardisation of the 
import formalities to be fulfilled by importers when 
surveillance or safeguard measures are applied.
3.2.1. Fraud cases
In external transit frauds goods are sometimes released 
onto the Community market qua Community goods, in order 
to evade duties (see cases 3 and 4). In all cases the 
correct determination of origin, following Article 24 of 
the Community Customs Code231 and the jurisprudence of 
the Court232 is of crucial importance to the integrity of
227 European Parliament (1996) Committee of Inquiry into 
the Community Transit System Response from the Irish Permanent 
Representation to the European Union, April, page 2.
228 The GSP was first adopted by the Community in 1971.
229 Council Regulation 3285/94 OJ (1994) L 349/53.
230 Council Regulation 519/94 OJ (1994) L 67/89. The 
countries listed in the Regulation includes countries whose 
economies are in transition towards a market economy, except 
where the Community has entered into an Association Agreement 
[] or a free trade agreement with the country concerned.
231 Council Regulation 2913/92 OJ L 302/1.
232 Disputes over the origin of goods have often arisen in 
relation to fish and shell fish, for example in case 100/84 
Commission v United Kingdom [1985] ECR 170 and more recently 
in joined cases C-153/94 and C-204/94 Faroe Seafood ruling of
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Community revenue, as illustrated by the four cases 
below.
Case 1: False Community origin: dairy products
In 1994 Spanish Customs found that certain companies had 
been purchasing dairy products from the Czech and Slovak 
Republics and releasing them onto the Community market 
with a false Spanish Customs' declaration. As a result 
some 15.7 million ECU of duties were evaded.233
Case 2: False preferential origin: bicycles from 
Vietnam234
In 1995 the Commission235 found that all the components 
used to make over 520 000 bicycles which were 
subsequently released onto the Community market (in 
particular the UK, Belgium, Germany and Denmark), did not 
actually originate from Vietnam, but from China and Hong 
Kong. The certificates of preferential origin from the 
Vietnamese authorities were therefore incorrect and the 
Customs duties evaded ran to 6.85 million ECU. In view of 
the circumstances in which the products were assembled,
14 May 1996, nyr; or in relation to products acquiring added 
value through processes of manufacture, for example cases 
49/76 tfberseehandel v Handelskammer Hamburg [1977] ECR 41,
34/78 and 114/78 Yoshida [1979] ECR 115 and 151; 162/83 Cousin 
[1983] ECR 1101, C-26/88 Brother International v HZA Giessen 
[1989] ECR 4253.
233 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests the fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1995 COM(96) 173, page 51.
234 See also newspaper article '"Mafia gangs involved" in 1 
billion pounds EU frauds', in Guardian 9 May 1996, page 10.
235 Under Article 15b of Council Regulation 945/87 amending 
Regulation 1468/81 OJ (1987) L 90/3, the Commission may carry 
out administrative and investigative missions in third 
countries in coordination and close cooperation with the 
competent authorities if the Member States.
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anti-dumping duties totalling 9.78 million may also be 
payable.236
Case 3: External transit fraud: sugar
In 1994 the German authorities informed the Commission 
about a case of fraud involving the dispatch of sugar 
originating in the Czech Republic and Poland to Morocco 
and Angola in transit through the Community. The goods, 
transported under the TIR system, were in fact released 
in Spain and Portugal, after Customs documents with 
forged stamps were presented. Evaded duties amount to 9 
million ECU.237
Case 4: External transit fraud: beef
Beef from Argentina was unloaded in Rotterdam and placed 
under the external Community transit arrangements for 
carriage to Croatia. Forged Italian Customs documents 
were presented in Nice, and the beef was subsequently 
released onto the Italian market. Some 700 tonnes of beef 
were involved and the duty evaded totalled around 3 
million ECU.238
Fraud in the EU transit forms an important part of the 
fraud with Customs duties. In contravention of transit 
arrangements, goods are not presented at the Customs 
office of expected destination. Instead, they are 
released onto the Community market without payment of the 
duties and other taxes which are due. Alternatively, 
Customs documents certifying the presentation of goods at 
the office of destination, or guarantees are forged,
236 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests, the fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1995 COM (96) 173, page 62.
237 Ibid, page 54.
238 Ibid, page 55.
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using stolen or counterfeit stamps. Up to now there has 
been no way of cross-checking the authenticity of Customs 
stamps. At the moment itineraries are not binding,239 so 
it is possible for cargoes to get 'lost' in this way. In 
the 'Greek Maize' case240 for example, maize originating 
from (the then) Yugoslavia was presented to the Belgian 
authorities, complete with false declaration of origin 
from Greece. The fraud had been carried out with the 
complicity of some Greek senior civil servants - hence 
the relevance of the fight against corruption in 
order to protect EC revenue (see chapter 6 on 
corruption).
The practices mentioned above (non-reporting, forgery of 
certificates) are particularly lucrative to the fraudster 
when the goods are, as the Commission describes them, 
'sensitive'.241 Sensitive goods fall into two categories. 
Firstly, some goods are sensitive because they attract a 
high level of indirect taxation, for example tobacco or 
alcohol. A single container load of cigarettes, for 
example, can attract duties and taxes of approximately 1 
million ECU. This situation has prompted some 
commentators to suggest that cigarette smuggling was now 
more lucrative, and certainly less risky than illegal 
drug smuggling. Other sensitive, or high-risk goods 
attract high levels of subsidy or refund under the CAP 
(see chapter 3). Since the opening up of the borders to 
central and Eastern Europe in particular, the transit of 
sensitive products seems to have been targeted by
239 See for example European Parliament Committee of 
Inquiry into the Community Transit System (1996) Contribution 
submitted by the Danish Freight Forwarders Association in 
Copenhagen, March, at point 12.
240 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece ECR (1989) 2965.
241 White, S (1996) The transit system in crisis: Argument 
for European Customs? Irish Journal of European Law, vol 2, pp 
225-237.
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criminal networks.242
3.2.2. Transit in the EU and beyond
Since the completion of the single market in 1993, under 
the Community Transit System, all goods transported 
within the Customs territory of the Community have been 
treated as Community goods unless demonstrated 
otherwise.243 This has had the effect of eliminating 
Customs formalities on such goods whilst on the territory 
of the Community. The Common Transit System, an extension 
of the Community Transit System to EFTA countries244 
(Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), will include 22 
participants after the Visegrad245 countries (Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak republic) join 
in July 1996,246 in the first stage of an extension to
242 European Commission (1995) Fraud in the transit 
procedure, solutions foreseen and perspectives for the future, 
COM(95) 108 page 5; also Rump, J (1993) The legal protection 
of the Community's financial interests as seen by Customs 
investigators in Germany, in The legal protection of the 
financial interests of the Community: Progress and prospects
since the Brussels seminar of 1989, OOPEC pp 133-138.
243 Commission Regulation 1214/92 OJ L (1992) 132/1 on 
provisions for the implementation of the Community transit 
procedure and for certain simplifications of that procedure.
244 Convention on a common transit procedure, OJ (1987) L 
226/1.
245 In February 1991 at Visegrad, in Hungary, the leaders 
of Hungary, Poland and what was then Czechoslovakia met to 
discuss their approach to European integration. They 
confirmed their wish for 'total integration into the European 
political, economic, security and legislative order' and 
agreed to cooperate in their progressive achievement of such 
integration.
246 Commission Decision 1/95 OJ (1996) L 117/13 of the EC- 
EFTA joint Committee on Common Transit concerning invitations 
to the Republic of Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic to accede to the Convention of 20 May 1987 on a 
common transit procedure.
86
central and eastern Europe.247 Another transit regime 
also exists for countries outside the Common Transit 
System and which are signatories of the TIR 
Convention.248 Fifty eight countries world-wide are 
currently signatories of this convention, including all 
EU Member States taken both individually, and as the 
European Union.249
Main features of transit
The Common Transit System works according to a relatively 
simple principle. It allows for the suspension of duties 
and other charges during transit within the Common 
Transit territory, for goods coming from or going to 
third countries. The goods must be produced intact at the 
Customs office of destination within a prescribed time 
limit. This means that Customs controls are concentrated 
at the office of destination. The office of destination 
is therefore where most of the information on the 
consignment is, or should be, available. In practice, the 
procedure starts with the presentation of goods and the 
validation of a transit document at the Customs office of 
departure. One copy of the document250 is kept there.
When the goods arrive at destination, the Customs 
authorities carry out the necessary controls, note the 
outcome on the document and return a copy to the office 
of departure. According to Article 96 of the Community
247 See Council Resolution OJ C (1995) 327/2 on the 
computerisation of customs transit systems, 11th preamble.
248 Customs Convention on the International Transport of 
Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets signed in Geneva, 1975.
249 Council Regulation 2112/78 OJ (1978) L 252. 
Implementing provisions for the TIR Convention and the 
Community Transit System are now both included in the 
Community Customs Code OJ (1992) L 302 and OJ (1993) L 253.
250 Commission Regulation 2453/92 OJ (1992) L 249/1 
implementing Council Regulation 717/91 concerning the Single 
Administrative Document.
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Customs Code,251 the 'principal' (usually the forwarding 
agent) is responsible for ensuring that the goods are 
presented at the office of destination. If he fails to do 
so, a Customs debt is incurred. Guarantees may be lodged 
in order to ensure the collection of duties and other 
charges in the event of irregularities. The most common 
type of guarantee is the comprehensive guarantee,252 
which allows its holder to carry out an unlimited number 
of transit operations, involving any Community Customs 
office.253
The TIR system works on similar lines. It enables road 
hauliers to seal their vehicles in the country of origin, 
travel across national frontiers without interference, 
and have all Customs clearance and documentation 
processed at the final delivery point. It does this 
through a system of 'carnets'. A system of guarantees is 
also in place, with a flat-rate guarantee of $50,000 
applying to each journey.254 The TIR system is 
administered centrally in Geneva by the IRU 
(International Road Transport Union) and operates through 
a chain of Guaranteeing Associations, which are normally 
national trade associations representing freight movers 
and/or the industry generally. Most associations have a 
dual function in that they guarantee to meet claims by 
their own national Customs authorities where these arise 
from irregularities in the use of carnets, irrespective
251 Community Customs Code, op. cit.
252 European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into the 
Community Transit System (1996) Progress Report number one, 
rapporteur: Mr Edward Kellett-Bowman, March, mimeoed text, 
page 7.
253 Article 360 of Commission Regulation 2454/93 OJ (1993) 
L 253 implementing the Community Customs Code.
254 European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into the 
Community Transit System (1996) Revised note on the TIR 
carnets and the 'Community' and 'Common' Transit procedures, 
March.
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of the nationality of the carrier or the origin of the 
carnet. At the same time the majority of Associations 
also issue carnets to their own national members. 
According to the IRU, some three million TIR carnets are 
now issued per year, 70% of which are issued in Eastern 
Europe.235 Table 3.1. compares the main features of TIR 
and Common/Community transit.
Table 3.1.
TIR/Common Transit procedures: main differences
TIR COMMON/COMMUNITY TRANSIT
58 member countries 15 EU Member States + EFTA 
+ Visegrad countries
Single numerically 
identified document issued 
and administered centrally
T1/T2 forms
Managed by IRU and national 
affiliated authorities
Managed by Customs
2.3 million carnets issued 
annually
18 million documents 
issued annually
Guarantee arranged through 
IRU - Carnet holder 
responsible (usually 
transporter)
Principal responsible for 
guarantee (but usually 
indemnity arranged by 
national association)
Obligatory approval of 
vehicles
No approval of vehicles
Obligatory sealing of 
vehicles
No obligatory sealing of 
vehicles
TIR plate identifies 
vehicle
No specific identification
Period of transit fixed by 
transporter
Period of transit fixed by 
office of departure: 
normally 8 days
Note to table 3.1.
Source: reproduced with adaptations from European 
Parliament Committee of Inquiry into the Community
255 European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into the 
Community Transit System (1996) Hearing with Commissioners 
Mario Monti and Anita Gradin, 26 March.
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Transit System (1996) Revised note on the TIR carnets and 
the Community and Common Transit procedures, 18 March, PE 
216.559, page 4.
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The Community Transit System was originally put in place 
in a Community of six members, three of which (the 
Benelux countries) already had a Customs union. Since 
then the Community has grown and the number of trade 
transactions has increased enormously, to the point where 
Customs have been unable to cope with the sheer volume of 
administrative formalities. One important aspect 
affecting Customs' ability to respond is that the 
abolition of internal frontiers has tended to lead to a 
reduction in the number of Customs personnel, and in 
funding for equipment. This has had a 'disarming' effect 
on Customs, with morale running particularly low in some 
regions.
Not unlike the Common Transit System, the TIR system too 
has acquired new contracting parties, and in particular 
countries from the ex-Soviet block, with weak and 
disorganised Customs administrations.256 In such an 
environment, Customs services often fail to investigate 
suspected cases of frauds and irregularities and do 
little more than submit claims under the (flawed) 
guarantee system when irregularities (see below). The TIR 
system guarantee chain is at present receiving 500 
Customs claims per day.
3.2.3. Community Control framework
Council Regulation 1552/S9257 lays down the rules for 
implementing Decision 8S/376258 on the system of the 
Communities' own resources. This Regulation supersedes 
Council Regulation 2891/77. It lays down rules for the
256 See European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into the 
Community Transit System (1996) Contribution by Jean Duquesne, 
president of ODASCE, Paris.
257 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
258 OJ (1988) L 185/24.
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making available of traditional own resources, but also 
for the reporting of irregularities and the recovery of 
sums due. It empowers the Commission to carry out joint 
checks with the national competent authorities, or to 
carry their own on-the-spot checks. Council Regulation 
1552/89259 was amended in 1993260 and 1994,261 mainly in 
order to tighten up the arrangements whereby the Member 
States make available to the Commission the own resources 
assigned to the Community.
(i) Notification, keeping of records, crediting to 
Communities' account
Regulation 1552/89262 first establishes a framework for 
the establishment of amounts payable to the EC budget. 
According to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation 
1552/89,263 the own resources that are to be made 
available to the Community are established entitlements 
which have been collected or for which securities have 
been provided. These entitlements are entered by the 
Member States into 'A' accounts kept in the Treasury of 
each Member State.264 Entitlements not entered in the 
accounts because they have not yet been recovered and no 
security has been provided must be shown in separate 'B' 
accounts. However some Member States have been slow in 
establishing this system.
259 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
260 Council Regulation 3464/93 OJ (1993) L 317.
261 Council Regulation 2729/94 OJ (1994) L 293.
262 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
263 Ibid.
264 Article 2(1) of Council Regulation 1552/89.
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(ii) Reporting fraud
The situation prior to the adoption of Council Regulation 
1552/89265 was one where Member States could communicate 
to the Commission 'information of particular interest' 
under Council Regulation 1468/81, which deals with mutual 
assistance. This had resulted in scant reporting and 
difficulties in accounting for own resources.266 From 
first January 1990 each Member State has had to submit to 
the Commission a brief half-yearly report on any fraud or 
irregularity involving an amount exceeding 10 000 ECU 
stating the measures adopted in order to prevent the 
recurrence of cases of fraud and irregularities.267 Yet 
the Commission wishes more detailed reporting. It has 
submitted proposals to improve the present quality of 
reports by amending Regulation 1552/89.268 The amendment 
would have the effect of strengthening the present system 
of documentary checks and thus provide additional 
information.269
(iii) Checks
Joint inspections were the first form of Community 
inspection to be introduced by the Commission, and to be
265 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
266 House of Lords (1989) Select Committee on the European 
Communities fraud against the Community session 1988-89 fifth 
report, HMSO, page 12.
267 Article 6 (3) second subparagraph of Council Regulation 
1552/89.
268 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
269 European Commission (1993) Report of the Committee of 
Budgets on the Commission Proposal to the Council for amending 
Council Regulation 1552/89, November; European Commission 
(1994) Report from the Commission on the functioning of the 
inspection arrangements for traditional own resources,
January, COM(93) 691.
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carried out in accordance with Council Regulation 
165/74.270 The distinguishing feature of joint 
inspections is that the prime responsibility for carrying 
out the inspection (i.e. fixing the dates, and purpose) 
rests with the Member States. The choice of site of 
inspection rests with the Member State concerned. Article 
18 of Council Regulation 1552/89271 provides that the 
Member States must carry out checks and enquiries 
concerning the establishment and the making available of 
own resources, and any additional checks requested by the 
Commission.
The Commission can also conduct its own on-the-spot 
checks.272 But the conditions under which the Commission 
may carry out those checks are severely restricted: the 
Commission must notify the Member State in advance, 
specifying the reasons, so that, for the sake of 
efficiency, the Member State in question can appoint its 
own officials to participate in the checks. As for the 
nature of such checks, the Commission found in 1992 that 
'in 1991 most man-days of inspectors were spent in 
monitoring the introduction of the B accounts [separate 
accounts for uncollected debts] in the Member States'.273 
A later Commission report274 (1994) shows that the areas
270 Council Regulation 165/74 OJ (1974) L 20/1 determining 
the powers and obligations of officials appointed by the 
authorities of the Member States.
271 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
272 Article 12 of Council Regulation 1552/89.
273 European Commission (1992) Report on the application of 
Council Regulation 1552/89 implementing Decision 88/376 on he 
system of the Communities' own resources, December, COM (92) 
530, OOPEC.
274 European Commission (1994) Report on the functioning of 
the inspection arrangements for traditional own resources, 
January, COM(93) 691.
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covered in its on-the-spot inspections carried out 
between 1990 and 1992 were as follows.
Table 3.2.
On the spot inspections carried out by the Commission in
1990, 1991 and 1992.
1990
Inward processing 29%
Presentation at Customs - release into free 
circulation of fishery products
29%
Separate accounts 14%
Imports of cattle from Eastern Europe - Community 
transit
14%
Postal traffic 14%
Total 100%
Separate accounts
1991
92%
Special destination 8%
Total 100%
1992
Imports under preferential agreements 56%
Sugar and isoglucose levies 33%
Imports of cattle from Eastern Europe 14%
Total 100%
Note to table 3.2
Source: European Commission (1994) Report on the 
application of the inspection arrangements for 
Traditional Own Resources, COM(93) 691.
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It has been an on-going concern of the Commission that 
the national authorities responsible for the collection 
of own resources should be able to produce to authorized 
Commission officials the documents substantiating the own 
resources collected.275 Access to documents has 
occasionally proved problematic to the Commission. In 
case 267/78,276 the Court found that a Member State may 
not contest the Commission's power to exercise its 
supervision as soon as the Communities' Own Resources 
have been established by the competent national 
authorities. However rules which in the national systems 
of criminal law prevent the communication to certain 
persons of documents in criminal proceedings may be 
relied upon against the Commission.
Article 20 of Council Regulation 1552/89277 sets up the 
Advisory Committee consisting of representatives from the 
Member States and the Commission. One of the aims of the 
Committee is to examine and discuss the problems raised 
in inspection reports. The procedure is designed to 
ensure equal treatment for the Member States, at least 
for those affected by the issues concerned. Following 
discussion in the Committee, the Commission adopts its 
final position and informs the Member State concerned 
accordingly.
(iv) Mutual assistance in administrative matters 
Council Regulation 1468/81278 lays down rules for mutual
275 Amended proposal for a Council Regulation amending 
Council Regulation 1552/89, COM(94) 458, OJ (1994) C 382/6.
276 Case 267/78 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 31.
277 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
278 Council Regulation 1468/81 OJ (1981) L 144/1 on mutual 
assistance between the administrative authorities of the 
Member States and cooperation between the latter and the 
Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on
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assistance and cooperation with the Commission in 
agricultural and Customs matters. Council Regulation 
945/87 amending Regulation 1468/81 allows the Commission 
to carry out 'Community administrative and investigative 
missions in third countries in coordination and close 
cooperation with the competent authorities of the Member 
States'.279 In practice these regulations and the Naples 
Convention of 1967280 are sometimes used simultaneously 
when third countries are involved. According to Article 
209 EC, which was added to the EEC Treaty by the Treaty 
on European Union, Member States should take the same 
measures to combat fraud prejudicial to the financial 
interests of the Community (see Chapter 1). Also
Without prejudice to other provisions in this 
Treaty, Member States should co-ordinate action 
aimed at protecting the Community's financial 
interests against fraud. To this end, they should 
organise, with the assistance of the Commission, 
close and regular collaboration between the 
competent services in their administrations.
In the synthesis report regarding measures to combat 
wastefulness and the misuse of Community resources in the 
Member States,281 the author concluded that cooperation
customs or agricultural matters.
279 Article 15b of Council Regulation 945/87 amending 
Regulation 1468/81.
280 The Naples Convention of 1967 was concluded between the 
six original EC Member States and later extended to the other 
Member States, still with the exception of Portugal. The 
Convention also covers judicial assistance to a certain 
extent.
281 European Commission (1995) Protection of the 
Community's financial interests, Synthesis Document of the 
comparative analysis of the reports supplied by the Member 
States on national measures taken to combat wastefulness and 
the misuse of Community resources, COM(95) 556.
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instruments were not ignored by the Member States, who 
found this type of cooperation satisfactory. This 
assertion is supported by the European Court of Auditors. 
The number of cases involving Customs fraud and 
irregularities that have been the subject of exchange of 
information under Regulation 1468/81 between the 
Commission and the Member States has risen from 33 in 
1988 to 534 in 1994 (114 cases were new in 1994). The 
Commission estimated that the total amount of traditional 
own resources at stake in these cases was more than 600 
million ECU as of 31 December 1994 - the equivalent of 2% 
of net traditional own resources collected that year.282 
However response times remain slow. Differences of all 
kinds (administrative, legal, technical) hamper the 
movement of information between Member States. A number 
of suggestions were made by the Member States in order to 
improve this state of affairs. In particular the need for 
a basic requirement for rapid information on 
transnational fraud emerged from the 'wastefulness' 
report mentioned earlier,283 since fraud rarely developed 
in isolation in one country.
There are several instruments on Customs co-operation 
included in various treaties between the Community and 
its Member States and third countries: the Treaty on the 
European Economic Area, association Treaties with central 
and eastern European countries284 and treaties on co-
282 European Court of Auditors Annual Report for the 
financial year 1994 OJ (1995) C 303, page 25.
283 European Commission (1995) Comparative analysis of the 
reports supplied by the Member States on national measures 
taken to combat wastefulness and the misuse of Community 
resources, November.
284 The European Agreements with the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria entered into force on 1 
February 1995, thus extending mutual assistance in the customs 
field beyond the confines of the Community.
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operation with other third states.285 These instruments 
are relevant for the prevention and detection of EC 
fraud, and it is expected that they will lead to more 
information being exchanged. Now is the time to think of 
a monitoring system that measures the effectiveness of 
such cooperation agreements.286
3.2.4. An 'immature' regulatory framework?
Clearly, until recently the regulatory framework has 
focused mainly on the making available of the correct 
amount of resources, rather than the fight against fraud. 
Council Regulation 1552/89287 introduced Commission on- 
the-spot checks, and has upgraded mutual assistance 
requirements. However on-the-spot checks remain limited 
in scope, and mutual assistance slow.
It is only in 1994 that a new GSP system was conceived, 
which allowed for the temporary withdrawal of preferences 
in cases of fraud or lack of administrative cooperation 
from the beneficiary country in checking certificates of 
origin. In December 1995 Council Regulation 298S/95288 on 
the protection of the Community's financial interests was 
adopted. The Regulation has the effect, inter alia, of
285 In 1995 instruments containing protocols on mutual 
assistance in the customs field were initialled or signed with 
Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, Slovenia, and the trans-caucasian 
republics. Interim agreements were also signed with Belarus, 
Kyrgystan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Negotiations are 
continuing with the Faroes, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, South 
Africa, the United States, Canada and South Korea. Lastly, the 
Customs Union with Turkey, which entered into force on 1 
January 1996, also includes a protocol on mutual assistance in 
Customs matters.
286 Schutte, J (1995) Administrative and judicial co­
operation in the fight EC fraud, in The Dutch approach in 
tackling EC fraud, eds M.S. Groenhuijsen and M.I.Veldt, pp 
127-134.
287 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
288 OJ (1995) L 312.
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extending to traditional own resources the Commission's 
approach to administrative penalties already in place for 
the Common Agricultural Policy (see chapters 1 and 3), 
and which the Court of Justice has consistently 
upheld.289 One of the Regulation's main features is the 
list of penalties, which can already be found in earlier 
CAP (sectoral) regulations. It also gives a much-awaited 
definition of irregularity in the context of EC fraud.
The main strength of the Regulation is to set a basic 
legal framework for the formulation of uniform 
administrative penalties with the same force throughout 
the Union. The penalties can be set for fraud relating to 
any area of Community policy where they are required and 
for which there is a legal basis (except VAT-based own 
resources). The need to set up a system of sanctions has 
been highlighted by the Commission.290 Another horizontal 
regulation under consideration is a Council Regulation 
concerning on the spot checks and inspections by the 
Commission for the detection of frauds and irregularities 
detrimental to the financial interests of the European 
Communities.291 This Regulation would empower the 
Commission to ask officials of Member States other than 
that on whose territory inspections and checks are being 
performed to take part in them. The Commission would also 
be able to call on outside bodies to provide technical 
help to perform inspections. These officials or nominated 
bodies would work closely with the national authorities. 
This proposal has met with considerable resistance from
289 Cases 240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR 1-5383 and 
104/94 Cereal Italia Sri, judgement of 12 October 1995, nyr.
290 European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into the 
Community Transit System (1996) Hearing with commissioners 
Mario Monti and Anita Gradin, March, page 20.
291 European Commission (1995) Proposal for a Council 
Regulation concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections by 
the Commission for the detection of frauds and irregularities 
detrimental to the financial interests of the European 
Communities, SEC (95) 9151 Final.
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certain Member States' governments, who have complained 
about the 'multiplicity of controls' and have invoked 
subsidiarity against its adoption.292
Nevertheless both horizontal instruments are particularly 
important in the field of fraud control for traditional 
own resources. This is because Community control has 
tended to lag behind other areas, particularly those 
concerned with the CAP. However the widening of the 
Commission's inspection powers is delicate, since it 
involves a degree of interference with national tax- 
raising authorities.
Guarantees: scope for reform
At the moment, about 18 million transit declarations (in 
quadruplicate) per year are processed manually by Customs 
under the Common Transit System293 and 2.3 million TIR 
carnets are issued every year, also manually. As a result 
Customs authorities have found it increasingly difficult 
to cope with the sheer volume of work, and, not 
surprisingly, have accumulated a backlog. With the 
extension of Common Transit to the Visegrad countries, 
the pressure on the system can only increase. Criticisms 
of the administration of the present system have already
292 Myard, J (1996) Combattre la fraude: Un defi pour les 
quinze Rapport d'information depose par la delegation de 
l'Assemblee Nationale pour 1'Union Europ§enne sur la 
proposition de reglement du conseil relatif aux contrdles et 
verifications sur place de la Commission aux fins de la 
constatation des fraudes et irregularites portant atteinte aux 
interets financiers des communautes Europeennes, French 
National Assembly Publications Kiosk.
293 European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into the 
Community Transit System (1996) Contribution from FENEX, 
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Expeditie en Logostiek insake 
communautair douanevervoer, Rotterdam, May, page 4.
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been voiced by the European Court of Auditors294 and by 
the Commission.293 These criticisms seem to fall broadly 
under two categories. Firstly they highlight poor 
administration of the system generally. Secondly they 
note failure by the Member States to notify and to 
recover sums due. The two categories are briefly examined 
below.
Generally speaking, the Commission296 finds that Customs 
authorities in the Member States do not appear to give 
sufficient priority to transit controls. This means that 
investigations are not always carried out with the 
urgency required. Operators must present goods and 
documents to the Customs office of destination within 
certain time limits.297 However, in practice, these time 
limits do not appear to be respected In addition, there 
is failure to impose penalties where the time limits are 
also not respected.
The late presentation to the Customs office of departure 
of the copy to be returned results in an accumulation of 
uncleared documents. In some cases, delays in 
transferring documentation between Customs offices seem 
so great that it would be impossible to respect the time 
limits laid down by Community legislation without a major 
effort to clear the backlog, bearing in mind the 
accumulated delays.
The two main criticisms in this area are that the amounts
294 Court of Auditors Annual Report for 1994, OJ (1995) C 
303, 1.45 - 1.89; also previously Court of Auditors for 1987, 
OJ (1988) C 316, 3-17 et seq.
295 European Commission (1995) op.cit.
296 European Commission (1995) op.cit.
297 Twenty days in the case of air transport and 45 days in 
the case of sea transport.
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recovered on the basis of Regulation 1552/89298 are very 
small and that only a few cases notified on the basis of 
the Regulation are subject to legal proceedings.
Three comments can be made in relation to the dearth of 
court proceedings, which according to the Commission, 
only number 22 out of 1000 cases. Firstly, the 
difficulties involved in getting different jurisdictions, 
and/or administrations to cooperate, in what is still 
basically a collection of national-territorial judicial 
spaces, should not be underestimated. Initiatives to 
improve cooperation have already been launched by the 
Commission. Secondly, the impact of insolvencies should 
not be overlooked, nor the relative ease with which 
economic operators —  in some jurisdictions —  can be 
discharged of their financial obligations, or 
alternatively just 'disappear' and 'resurrect'. In 
understanding this, a comparative analysis of the Member 
States' insolvency regimes might help to assess the 
situation better. Thirdly, a recent study commissioned by 
the Commission's Directorate of Financial Control and 
carried out in each of the Member States has shown that 
extra-judicial settlements were commonplace, particularly 
in Northern Member States.299 It follows that the number 
of court cases may not be even an approximate indicator 
of the effort exerted in order to recover funds, so in 
future the Commission may need to refine this particular 
indicator.
In some circumstances, recovery may be hindered by
298 Council Regulation 1552/89 OJ L (1989) 155/1 
implementing Decision 88/376 on the system of the Communities' 
Own Resources.
299 See Labayle, H (1996) La transaction dans 1'Union 
Europeenne (Synthesis report for the studies carried out in 
the fifteen Members States concerning the settlement of fraud 
in cases affecting the EC budget), OOPEC.
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specific aspects of the regulatory framework.300 In 
particular, there are shortcomings in the rules 
concerning guarantees and connected with the time limit 
of three years imposed by the Customs Code.301
The rules concerning guarantees
One way in which the authorities can recover duties and 
charges, in the event of an irregularity, is through 
guarantees (securities) ,302 which can be provided either 
by a cash deposit, or through a guarantor. Guarantees can 
apply on a fixed-rate basis, for a single operation, or 
be comprehensive. In some cases, securities are optional, 
that is to say required at the discretion of the Customs 
authorities in so far as they consider that a Customs 
debt which has been or may be incurred is not certain to 
be paid within the prescribed period. But in practice, 
Customs sometimes fail to demand guarantees when 
sensitive or high-risk goods are involved, or guarantees 
are sometimes insufficient to cover any debt which might 
be incurred.303 '[T]oo often, Customs administrations 
have been too slow to take action and have allowed 
guarantees to be unduly liberated or have failed to act 
against the Principal or against the other parties 
involved. /304
300 See European Commission (1995) Report on the recovery 
of Traditional Own Resources in cases of fraud and 
irregularities, September, C0M(95) 398 Final, pp 10-11.
301 Article 218(3) and 221(3) of the Customs Code, 2913/92 
OJ L (1992) 302.
302 Articles 189-200 of the Community Customs Code; also 
Council Regulation 3712/92 OJ L 378/15.
303 European Commission (1994) Report on the functioning of 
the inspection arrangements for traditional own resources,
COM(93) 691.
304 European Parliament TCI (1996), written statement of 
Commissioner Liikanen, op.cit.
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Particular problems arise in connection with the 
'comprehensive' guarantee. A comprehensive guarantee 
document allows the holder to carry out an unlimited 
number of transit operations by road simultaneously. It 
is therefore the most flexible arrangement for traders, 
since it allows a series of operations by the same 
principal over a period of time. The amount of the 
guarantee is calculated according to a percentage of the 
import duties and other charges payable on the goods 
carried under the transit system on average during a week 
of the preceding year. The percentage varies according to 
the degree of risk involved. One criticism of this 
procedure is that there is no monitoring of the balance 
not yet committed or available. As a result, a 
comprehensive guarantee is often used to cover fresh 
transit operations although part or even all of the 
amount concerned has already been committed to cover non­
discharged operations or operations under inquiry.305 
Member States may request an authorization from the 
Commission to ban comprehensive guarantees for certain 
exceptional risk products,306 but in 1996 this 
possibility had only been used on two occasions. In 1995 
the Commission adopted a Decision307 authorizing the 
Customs administration in Spain to take specific measures 
to forbid temporarily the use of the comprehensive 
guarantee for external community transit operations 
involving cigarettes. In 1996 another Decision308 was
305 European parliament Committee of Inquiry into the 
Community Transit System (1996) Reply from the Court of 
Auditors, March, page 5.
306 Article 360 Commission Regulation 2454/93, see supra.
307 Commission Decision 95/521 OJ (1995) L 299/24 adopting 
specific measures to temporarily prohibit use of the 
comprehensive guarantee for certain transit procedures.
308 Commission Decision 96/37 OJ (1996) L 10/44 adopting 
specific measures to temporarily prohibit use of the 
comprehensive guarantee for certain transit procedures.
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adopted authorizing Germany to forbid temporarily the use 
of comprehensive guarantees for external Community 
transit for a list of goods such as bovine animals, 
frozen bovine meat, dairy products and oils, bananas and 
plaintains, cereals and meslin, rye, sugar, undenaturated 
ethyl alcohol of 80% vol or higher and spirits, liqueurs 
and other spirituous beverages.
Principals, (who are usually the freight forwarders 
themselves) according to some representations made to the 
European Parliament, often lose both cargo and 
security.309 That is because in the absence of fixed 
itineraries, it is impossible for the Customs authorities 
to establish where the irregularity took place. The 
guarantee is often the only realistic chance of 
recovering lost revenue. As a result guarantors can find 
themselves responsible for a Customs debt, when in fact a 
third party is responsible for the fraud committed. In a 
communication of February 1996, the Commission noted the 
general reluctance of Customs to take action against 
debtors other than the principal.
The predicament of principals can be worse when high-risk 
goods are involved. Securities, in the case of 'high-risk 
goods such as cigarettes, were thought at one stage to be 
too low. In 1994, a 'special carnet' was established in 
the TIR system, requiring higher guarantees for alcohol 
and tobacco products. This measure backfired because, as 
a result of this increase, insurance companies are now 
refusing to insure such cargoes. Consequently the 
national associations and International Road Transport 
Union have now stopped the supply of carnets. 
Notwithstanding this near-collapse of the system, the 
Commission still insists that higher guarantees are part
309 European parliament Committee of Inquiry into the 
Community Transit System (1996) Contribution submitted by the 
Bundesverband Spedition und Lagerei e.V., Bonn, March, mimeoed 
text; also from the Freight Transport Association, United 
Kingdom, March, mimeoed text.
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of the answer to the transit crisis. But if one lesson 
has to be learned from the position of insurance 
companies, it is that commercial enterprise will not 
buttress an ailing system.
Another feature of the guarantee system is that if all 
goes well, the guarantor is released from his obligations 
twelve months after the date of registration of transit 
declaration. After three years the guarantor is 
automatically discharged if he has not been informed of 
the amount for which he is liable.310
In practice Customs authorities often wait for 9 months 
or more to have elapsed before issuing the principal with 
a notification of non-discharge. The Court of Auditors 
found that some Customs authorities even waited until the 
end of the three year period after which, under Article 
221(3) of the Customs Code, Customs debts cease to be 
enforceable, before they attempted to recover the 
guarantee.311 As a consequence a percentage of claims are 
time-barred.
Delays of several months are frequent in all the Member 
States, at the different stages of both the mutual 
assistance and the recovery procedures. The lack of 
procedures for coordination of recovery between the 
Member States contributes to this state of affairs. In 
complicated cases, there are signs that the three year 
time limit may be too short. Furthermore, Member States 
do not interpret this deadline in a consistent manner. In 
several Member States, national laws make provision for 
an extension of that period. This is not however the case 
in Denmark and the United Kingdom.
310 Commission Regulation 2454/93 OJ (1993) L 253, Articles 
359-379.
311 European Court of Auditors Annual Report for 1994, 
op.cit., page 28 and page 34.
107
3.2.5. Solutions foreseen
The solutions foreseen by the Commission can be divided 
into medium-term and long-term measures. Short term 
solutions include measures aimed at improving and 
strengthening transit legislation, and improving the 
detection of fraud. Long term solutions include the 
computerisation of the transit system, and a timetable 
has been established for the cental development of this 
project (see table 3.3.).
Table 3.3.
Computerization of transit system: implementation, 
timetable and cost for central development
PHASES PERIOD TASKS PROJECTED 
COST (ECU)
phase 0 1993-94 feasibility
study
1 153 774
phase 1 1994-97 development of 
system
specification
4 133 774
phase 2 1998-99 implementation 
and extension
10 526 000
phase 3 from 99 operation and 
maintenance
n/k
Note to table 3.3.
Source: European Commission (1996) Rapport Intermediaire 
sur le transit, SEC(96)1739 annex V, page 5.
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Medium term measures advocated are:-
(a) the introduction of the necessary flexibility to 
forbid throughout the Union the use of the comprehensive 
guarantee for those sensitive goods which present high 
risks of fraud;
(b) the introduction of an expedited procedure for 
returning and discharging transit documents concerning 
sensitive products, possibly including special 
identification of these documents;
(c) prohibiting a change of office of destination for 
sensitive goods (or at least allowing a change only on 
fulfilment of conditions which would enable the transport 
operation to be monitored);
(d) the drawing up of binding itineraries;
(e) the reduction of the time-limits and stages provided 
for under the inquiry procedure;
(f) the strengthening of the special Task Group set up by 
the Commission's Anti-Fraud Unit, UCLAF, charged in 
cooperation with Member States with taking all 
appropriate measures in the operational frameworks 
necessary to combat fraud in this sector.
(g) fuller involvement of economic operators in action to 
defeat fraud, (including clear legal provisions to create 
a shared financial responsibility for transporters); and
(h) strengthening administrative and operational 
cooperation with countries neighbouring the European 
Union.
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Longer-term measures
As far as longer term measures are concerned, 
computerisation of the transit system has been put 
forward. This would mean that consignment details would
be entered at departure. Those details would be
transmitted electronically over an international network, 
to an office of destination in another country. The 
system would provide inquiry procedures for consignments 
which had not been discharged within the time allowed for 
their movement. Additionally, the system would be used 
for a better management of the system of guarantees, and 
risk analysis techniques would be applied to particular
consignments. It is understood that such a system would
have to be backed up by a number of physical controls at 
offices of destination. The system is not expected to be 
finalised before 1998 at the earliest.
3.2.6. Responses from the Council and the European 
Parliament
In its Resolution312 of November 1995 the Council agreed 
that computerisation of transit systems was the most 
important measure in the medium term to alleviate the 
serious problems currently affecting the system and that 
achieving it must be accorded absolute priority. It also 
called upon the Commission to proceed with work within 
its competence related to the same computerisation and 
called upon the Member States to allocate resources to 
the project in order to make it operational by 1998. 
Finally it called upon the Member States and the 
Commission to cooperate closely and coordinate their 
efforts with a view to attaining common objectives, and 
to make use of modern Customs techniques, such as risk-
312 Council Resolution OJ C (1995) 327/2 on the 
computerisation of customs transit systems.
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analysis and audit-based controls.
In December of the same year, the European Parliament 
exercised its right, under Article 138c EC, to set up a 
Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged 
contraventions or maladministration in the implementation 
of Community law.313 According the Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure,314 the temporary315 committee submits to 
Parliament a report on the results of its work, including 
minority opinions if appropriate. The report is due to be 
published in January 1997. It will recommend improvements 
with regard to the detection and prevention of fraud, the 
safeguarding of the Community's economic and financial 
interests and the recovery of sums due.316
3.2.7. A question of integration?
The transit system offers a considerable challenge to the 
integrity of EC revenue. The Commission has put forward 
proposals to deal with the present crisis, which include 
reforms to the regulatory framework in the near future, 
and computerisation of the system in the longer term. The 
Council and the Commission have both pointed out that 
pending the computerisation of transit systems, it is 
essential for up-to-date Customs techniques to be 
applied, in order to improve the operation of current
313 See European Parliament (1995) Request for the setting 
up of a temporary committee of inquiry to consider allegations 
of offences committed or of maladministration under the 
Community Transit System, PE 195.288/9.
314 Under Article 4(3) of the Decision of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 19 April 1995 on 
the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European 
Parliament's right of inquiry, and Rule 136(10) of 
Parliament's Rules of Procedure.
315 Article 136(4) of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure.
314 European Parliament Decision OJ (1996) C7/1 setting up 
a Temporary Committee of Inquiry, at 3.
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procedures. It is to be hoped that meanwhile, these 
measures will go some way towards addressing some of the 
shortcomings in the regulatory framework and thus towards 
stopping the haemorrhage of EC funds, and reassuring the 
tax payer.
Computerisation has been the standard response to 
problems of international control in the past ten years, 
so it is not surprising that it has been advocated in 
this case. The author suggests that this, at best, can 
only be a partial solution.
The present manual system is slow, partly because of the 
sheer volume of work involved, but also because of the 
complexity of the present EC regulatory framework. This 
point has been made repeatedly by the European 
Parliament.317 Complex legislation, unavoidably borne out 
of political compromise, often leads to hesitancy in the 
Member States with regards to implementation. 
Unfortunately the level of complexity is not set to 
lessen with computerisation. Furthermore computerisation 
will not ease the need for more physical checks, for it 
will not, for instance, resolve the problem of fraud by 
means of substitution of goods en route. Nor will it 
improve mutual assistance per se.
In 1990 Delmas-Marty318 found that most EC frauds were 
discovered by Customs authorities and prosecuted as 
absence of declarations or false declarations to the 
authorities. We have seen that these authorities have now 
often been depleted and reorganised after the abolition 
of fiscal frontiers, and in some regions suffer from low
317 European Parliament Committee on Institutional Affairs 
(1996) Working document on measures to combat fraud, 24 
January.
318 Delmas-Marty, M (1990) Droit P€nal des affaires, PUF, 
Paris, page 144ff, second volume.
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morale. Another problem is that, entrusted as they far- 
with the sovereign duty of collecting indirect taxation, 
their outlook has remained 'national-territorial'. But 
how long can it remain so?
The Member States have been accused of not giving enough 
priority to checks. When a consignment does not arrive at 
the office of destination within the agreed limits, the 
onus is placed on the office of destination to 
investigate. Two ingredients seem vital for success: 
'ownership' of the task (i.e. feeling concerned about the 
outcome), and good cooperation networks. These attributes 
are evident in cases where attachments, and cooperative 
efforts between national Customs authorities are already 
taking place (for example France and the UK, The 
Netherlands and France, within the Benelux, as part of 
the Matthaeus Programme,319 and as proposed under Customs 
2000)• In view of the success of these recent 
developments, and bearing in mind the duty of Member 
States to cooperate in order to combat fraudulent 
practices and the forgery of certificates in respect of 
the carriage of goods between Member States,320 the time 
seems ripe to take existing cooperation networks one step 
further.
One way of fostering task ownership amongst Customs, 
would be by creating a European Customs, who would 
properly own the task of protecting the financial 
interests of the European Communities.
In its first progress report, the above mentioned 
European Parliament's Committee of Inquiry asked whether
319 The Matthaeus Programme is a Community Action Programme 
for the training of Customs officials, organised by DG XXI.
320 See Article 3(1) second subparagraph of Council 
Directive 83/643 OJ L (1983) 359/8; Article 16 of Commission 
Regulation 1214/92 OJ L (1992) 132/1; also Council Regulation 
1468/81 OJ 1,(1981) 144/1.
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the existence of fifteen different Customs authorities 
militated against the effective control of the transit 
system. This concern is reflected in the attempts which 
are currently being made to give national Customs 
authorities a more 'European' outlook. It has been 
suggested that, as part of the proposed Customs 2000 
Programme, Customs officers should wear an emblem bearing 
the twelve stars. It is hoped that from this humble 
beginning, a change of orientation may occur. It is a 
moot point whether more cohesiveness would resolve the 
problem of administrative overburden and low morale. It 
is improbable that it would resolve the problem of third 
country civil servants on low pay scales who have to 
supplement their earnings through routine, small scale 
corruption.321 (See chapter on corruption)
More controversial is the proposal for a 'joint European 
Customs academy' which has been proposed in order to 
supplement the training of Customs officers of the Member 
States, as part of the same 'Customs 2000' Action 
programme. This programme is at the time of writing (July 
1996), under discussion.322 This could be the first step 
towards a European Customs Authority - an authority who 
would 'own' the task of recovering EC funds fully.
This type of 'consolidation' exercise is already planned 
in other areas. The 'free movement of judges' is 
something we can now look forward to. This will involve a 
small number (at first) of liaison judges working in
321 See Spinellis, D (1995) The phenomenon of corruption 
and the challenge of good governance, in Proceeds of OECD 
Symposium on corruption and good governance, 13-14 March, page 
12.
322 European parliament (1996) Session document, 
recommendation for second reading on the Common Position 
established by the Council with a view to the adoption of a 
European Parliament and Council Decision adopting a Community 
action programme on Customs (Customs 2000), Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, March.
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Member States other than their own, as required.323 
3.3. Fraud and VAT-based own resources
3.3.2. Background: harmonisation
The proportion of VAT revenues Member States make 
available is small: 1,4% , destined to fall gradually to 
1% by 1999.324 It is not until the budget for 1979 that 
VAT became an 'own resource'325 and it is now the main 
source of EC revenue. VAT fraud affects national revenues 
foremost. Much of the Community control framework deals 
with the correct establishment of own resources per se 
rather than the fight against VAT fraud. Since first 
January 1993 fiscal frontiers have been abolished,326 VAT 
rates have been (somewhat) harmonised and transitional 
arrangements have been in operation, pending a move to 
the definitive system. It has been argued that, by 
pressing ahead with the abolition of frontier controls 
without VAT or excise harmonisation, the Commission did 
in fact relegate the common interest in effective 
collection.327
The original provisions on tax harmonisation in the 
Treaty of Rome (Article 99 EEC) left to the Council to
323 Article 9(2) of Draft Protocol, on the basis of Article 
K.3 supplementary to the Convention on the protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests, SEC (95) 9296 PEN.
324 Article 3 of Council Decision 94/728 OJ (1994) L 293/9 
on the system of the European Communities' own resources.
325 Decision of 21 April 1970 OJ L 94/19; Council 
Regulation 2891/77 OJ (1977) L 336/1; Council Regulation 
2892/77 OJ (1977) 336/8.
326 See written question number 190/93, OJ (1993) C 264/19 
(93/C 264/34) by Sotiris Kostopoulos concerning VAT payments 
after 1 January 1993.
327 Levy, P (1991) 1992: Towards better budgetary control 
in the EC? Corruption and Reform 6: 285-302, page 292.
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consider how taxes could be harmonised in the interest of 
the Common Market. The Single European Act required the 
Council to adopt proposals for the harmonisation of 
legislation regarding turnover taxes and indirect 
taxation, for the purpose of the process of harmonisation 
and functioning of the internal market. The first and 
second VAT directives328 required Member States to 
9 replace their present system of turnover taxes by a 
common system of value added tax'. This goal was 
postponed to 1972 by the third VAT Directive.
The primary purpose of the sixth VAT Directive in 1977 
was to provide a uniform basis of taxation.329 However 
the Directive contained many derogations and left the 
Member States with complete freedom to set their own 
rates of VAT.
The removal of the insulating effect of the fiscal 
frontiers required some harmonisation of rates in order 
to avoid significant diversions of trade due to tax- 
induced price variations.330 Rules were agreed for the 
approximation of VAT rates.331 This meant that from first 
January 1993, rates no lower than 15% were applicable in 
the Member States, although two reduced rates remained 
applicable, neither of which may be lower than 5%, on 
specified categories of goods and services. Higher rates 
were abolished, although zero rates and special reduced 
rates could be retained during the transition period. 
There is, as yet, no uniform rate of VAT in the European 
Union, nor for that matter of excise duties. Standard VAT
328 First VAT Directive 67/227 OJ (1967) L 71 and second 
VAT Directive 67/228 OJ (1967) L 71.
329 Sixth VAT Directive 77/388 OJ (1977) L 145.
330 Farmer, P and Lyal, (1994) EC tax law, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford.
331 Directive 92/77 OJ (1992) 316/1.
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rates still vary between 15% in Luxembourg to 25% in 
Sweden. In addition, the Member States apply increased, 
reduced, super-reduced rates (less than 5%) and 
exemptions according to national policies. This has 
resulted in a number of asymmetrical characterisations332 
(i.e similar economic transactions which are treated in 
different ways by the Member States as far as the 
application of the place of supply is concerned), which 
in turn have lead to distortions in competition, as 
predicted.
3.3.2. The removal of fiscal frontiers: impact on intra- 
Community collection of VAT
As a result of the abolition of fiscal frontiers on 1 
January 1993, the concept of import and export within the 
Community has been replaced by the concept of intra­
community acquisition and supply of goods. The Commission 
proposed a switch to a system under which goods and 
services would be taxed in their country of origin but 
the tax would be redistributed between Member States, 
through a clearing house system. Without such a clearing 
house system exporting Member States (The Netherlands in 
particular) would gain revenue. This has been described 
as the 'origin' system since the tax is collected by (but 
does not accrue to) the Member State of origin. The 
Neumark Report333 noted in 1962, the origin principle 
usually applies in the fields of company tax and personal 
income tax for reasons both of administrative efficiency 
and equity. This contrasts with a system based on the 
'destination' principle where the vendor invoices his 
intra-community supplies to purchasers who are identified
332 Amand, C (1995) The future VAT regime in the European 
Union the opinion of the tax consultants, European Taxation, 
July, 219-222.
333 European Commission (1962) Rapport de Comite Fiscal et 
Financier, OOPEC.
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for VAT in another Member State at a zero rate. It is 
then the purchaser's responsibility to declare the VAT on 
their intra-community acquisitions. The principal case 
for applying the destination principle to VAT rests on 
the need to avoid distortions of competition. That is to 
say, a consumer in country A should always pay a price 
containing the same element of tax, no matter in which 
country the goods have been produced.
Following a lengthy legislative process, the Commission 
decided to retain a modified version of the destination 
system following the abolition of fiscal frontiers. This 
hybrid solution can be found in Directives 91/680334 and 
92 /111.335 These arrangements were still in existence at 
the time of writing (July 1996)• Although the transition 
arrangements are applicable until 31 December 1996, their 
period of application will automatically be extended 
pending the entry into force of definitive arrangements 
based on collection of tax in the country of origin. So 
far, the move to the 'origin' principle has proved highly 
contentious.
3.3.3. Transitional arrangements: problems
As mentioned earlier, the transitional VAT system which 
came into effect at the beginning of 1993 has been 
described as a hybrid.336 Its main features can be 
summarised as follows:
334 Article 28 of Directive 91/680 on the abolition of 
fiscal frontiers OJ (1991) L 376/1.
335 Council Directive 92/111 OJ (1992) OJ L 384/47 amending 
Directive 77/388 and introducing simplification measures with 
regard to value added tax.
336 European Parliament (1995) Options for a definitive VAT 
system, Economic Affairs Series, September, executive summary.
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- As far as most final consumers are concerned, the 
origin principle applies. Once VAT has been paid in 
one Member State, the goods are in free circulation 
throughout the Community.
- In the case of commercial transactions, and also 
of certain sales to final consumers under three
'special regimes' (distance sales; cars, boats, 
planes and sales to exempt bodies) the destination 
principle applies. Traders must keep records of all 
sales to another Member State and all acquisitions 
from other Member States. Every trader must have a 
VAT number, so that sellers are able to check the 
tax status of the customers through VIES (the 
computerised VAT Information Exchange System) .337
In practice, this means that the delivery of goods to 
another member State is exempt from VAT, and that the 
purchase of goods in the Member State of destination is 
subject to VAT, with the tax payable by the purchaser.
The three likeliest types of fraud under such a system 
are (i) the diversion of goods, allegedly sold to a 
trader in another Member State, for illegal sale on the 
domestic market, (ii) the suppression of untaxed 
purchases from traders in other Member States for illicit 
sales in the country of destination and (iii) collusion 
between purchasers and suppliers to suppress intra- 
Community transactions.338 It is the problem of collusion 
between traders in different Member States which seems to 
put the greatest amounts of VAT at risk. Indeed all the 
purchaser has to do to release goods untaxed is to 
suppress the final stage of the transaction
337 Article 6 of Council Regulation 218/92.
338 Levy, R (1991) 1992: Towards better budgetary control 
in the EC? Corruption and Reform 6:285-302, page 293.
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documentation.
3.3.4. Community Control framework
Although Regulation 2891/77339 was repealed and replaced 
by Council Regulation 1552/89,340 Council Regulation 
2892/77 was merely amended by Council Regulation 1553/89, 
which lays down the definitive arrangements for the 
collection of own resources accruing to value added tax. 
As a rule, Member States pay VAT-based own resources 
Member States VAT-based own resources to the Commission 
monthly.341
Under Article 11 of 1553/89 the Commission's checks are 
carried out at the offices of the relevant authorities in 
the Member States. The Commission uses these checks to 
verify that the correct methods are used to centralise 
the basis of assessment and to determine the weighted 
average rate and the total amount of the net VAT revenue 
collected. Council Regulation 165/74342 which determine 
the powers and obligations of officials appointed by the 
Commission also apply to checks relating to VAT 
resources.343
Article 8(2) of Decision 88/376344 stipulates that the 
checks, which are also provided for under Article 18 of
339 Regulation 2891/77 OJ (1977) L 336/1.
340 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
341 Article 10(3) of Council Regulation 1552/89.
342 Regulation 165/74 (1974) L 20/1-3.
343 Article 12(2) of Council Regulation 2982/77 OJ (1977) 
L 336; Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 1553/89 OJ L (1989) 
L 155/9.
344 OJ (1988) L 185/24.
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Council Regulation 1552/89345 are mainly concerned with 
the reliability and effectiveness of national systems and 
procedures for determining the base for own resources 
accruing from VAT and GNP.
Compared to the control framework of the EAGGF Guarantee 
Section Fund, for example, Community control of VAT seems 
slight. Vervaele346 has argued that Member States 
reticence can be explained by the fact that unlike 
agricultural expenditure, failure to collect own 
resources is in principle the responsibility of the 
Member State, which then owes money to the Community. The 
only exception to this case is force majeure.347 Although 
traditional own resources are 100% Community resources, 
only a small proportion of VAT accrues to the Community. 
It follows that it is in the area of VAT that the most 
resistance is likely to be encountered with regards to 
Commission 'interference' in fighting fraud by way of 
extending the penal-administrative sphere that is already 
established in all other sectors, and in the recovery of 
funds.
As mentioned earlier, the transitional VAT system 
involves goods leaving one Member State without payment 
of VAT. It therefore relies on the full cooperation of 
all operators involved and in cases of suspected 
irregularities, on good communication channels between 
the Member States' competent authorities. Council 
Regulation 218/92 replaces Directive 79/1070348 extending 
the application of Directive 77/799 on administrative co­
operation in the field of taxation. Council Regulation
345 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
346 Vervaele, J (1994) La fraude communautaire et le droit 
p€nal europeen des affaires, PUF, Paris.
347 Article 17(2) of Regulation 2892/77 OJ (1977) L 336/8.
348 Directive 79/1070 OJ (1979) L 331/8.
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218/92 introduced the VIES (VAT Information Exchange 
System),U9 The Regulation lays down rules for computer- 
based information exchange between Member States 
concerning the intra-Community movement of goods. This is 
to ensure that intra-Community supplies and movements of 
goods are properly registered for VAT in the Member 
States of destination.
One criticism of the Regulation is that it only makes 
provision for the very minimum of requirements with 
regards to exchange of information. It makes no provision 
for automatic exchange of information for certain 
categories of transactions where there may be loss of 
revenue. Information has to be requested and 'the 
requested authority shall provide the information as 
quickly as possible and in any event no more than three 
months after receipt of the request'.350
3.3.5. Collection and tax debt policies in the Member 
States
The administrative procedures, material resources and 
human resources dedicated to the collection and control 
of VAT vary greatly in the individual Member States, as 
do procedures for remitting, or writing off the tax. In 
addition the Member States vary in their individual 
approach to debt settlement. For example, some Member 
States have a 'bargaining' system of tax settlement, 
whilst others do not. Remission involves the decision to 
waive, either wholly or partially an amount of payable 
tax. Under Article 22(9) of Directive 77/388, the Member 
States may exempt taxable persons from payment of VAT 
where the amount in question is insignificant. National
349 Council Regulation 218/92 on administrative cooperation 
in the field of indirect taxation (VAT) OJ (1992) L 24/1.
350 Article 5(1) of Council Regulation 218/92.
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legislation applies in determining in which cases 
remission may occur. For example Denmark, The Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom have legislation which authorizes 
the remission of tax debts. Greece and Italy only have 
measures having equivalent effect, whilst Belgium Spain 
and France have no such provision. As for writing off 
(the cancelling of part or whole of the tax payable in 
the accounts by the relevant administration), it occurs 
in all the Member States when a debtor has disappeared or 
when a forced recovery procedure has not succeeded, but 
in varying proportions. The European Court of Auditors 
found that the variability of such an accounting 
procedure did have an impact on net revenue 
collected - from very little in Belgium to 4% in the new 
German Lender. Taking data obtained in eight of the 
Member States, it estimated the amount concerned to be 
around 3 400 million ECU (which had not been included in 
the calculation of the Community own resource base) .3S1
Prosecution
The Member States have important responsibilities in the 
area of fraud affecting the EC budget. They must take 
'the same measures to counter fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the Community as they take to 
counter fraud affecting their own financial 
interests'.352 Clearly the principle of assimilation so 
described, is not an issue when it comes to collecting 
national income, a small proportion of which becomes 'own 
resources'. The problem is that although fiscal frontiers 
have been abolished, the Member States retain very 
different approaches to tax evasion/fraud.
351 Court of Auditors Annual Report (1993) OJ C 327, 1.61 
et seq.
352 Article 209a EC.
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Consequences for fraud control
The cumulation of the system's main features, such as the 
non-harmonisation of VAT regimes, the nature of the 
transitional system itself, the minimalist character of 
the present mutual assistance requirements, and the 
different prosecution policies produce an environment 
where revenue can easily be lost to the Member States and 
the Community. Indeed it has been recognised that the 
present shortfall in revenues in some of the Member 
States could partly be the result of opportunities for 
fraud offered by the present tax regime.353
The impact of the non-harmonisation of VAT regimes 
(rates, collection, remission and write-offs practices) 
should not be underestimated. At the very least it has a 
distorting effect:
The Commission agrees with the Court that the 
current diversity of national approaches could 
result in inequality of treatment of taxpayers and 
distortions of competition and could also impair the 
proper collection of the VAT own resource. It 
therefore undertakes to look closely at the matter 
in conjunction with the Member States, with a view 
to arriving at a uniform approach [...]354
The nature of the transitional system itself means that 
the possibility exists for operators to acquire goods 
without paying VAT in order not to account for subsequent 
transactions. With minimalist mutual assistance 
requirements, the investigating authorities in the Member 
States are often left with a cold paper trail, if any at
353 See newspaper article 'Value Added Tax EU may offer 
fraud opportunities' in Financial Times 14/15 September 1996, 
page 4.
354 Court of Auditors (1993) Annual Report for 1992, page 
296 at 1.45. (second paragraph).
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all.
The differing approaches to the prosecution of VAT 
evasion or fraud within the Union also creates 'zones of 
leniency', which have been likened, more dramatically, to 
'internal fiscal havens' by Caraccioli.355 Cumulatively, 
this diversity helps to create an uneven control space, 
which a skilled operator can take advantage of.
[Knowledgeable] economic operators would be led to 
choose fictitious domiciles for their businesses 
with an aim to setting up evasive or avoidance-type 
operations in those [Member States] that best suit 
them.356
Over fifty percent of the EC budget comes from a 
proportion of the Member States' VAT. Each Member State 
has a unique constellation of VAT rate, collection and 
remission procedures and prosecution policies. Some of 
these constellations create potential 'internal tax 
havens' within the single market. The author argues that 
an effective strategy to protect the finances of the 
Community requires (i) the harmonisation of some of the 
collection procedures, (ii) improved mutual assistance 
and (iii) the setting of some minimum standards of
355 Caraccioli, I (1995) Vers un droit fiscal europ€en, 
paper given at a Conference on the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Community, Dublin 1-2 June; also 
Caraccioli, I (1995) Verso un diritto penal tributario 
europeo, II Fisco, 26/95, 6660-6663 and Caraccioli (1995) 
L'importanza del dirito penale tributario in ambito europeo,
II Fisco, 30/95, 7525-7526.
356 Caraccioli, I (1995) Vers un droit fiscal europ6en, 
paper given at a Conference on the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Community, Dublin 1-2 June, page 6, 
author's translation.
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prosecution throughout the Community.357
3.3.6. Perspectives: indefinite postponement of the 
definitive system?
It had been envisaged that at the end of 1996 the 
transitional system would give way to a system where VAT 
is paid at source, i.e in the Member States in which 
goods originate. In a 'State of origin' system VAT is 
deductible in the Member State of destination. This, 
according to the German Ministry of Finance, would take 
us closer to 'a single market [where it is] just as easy 
to deliver from Cologne to Paris as from Cologne to 
Munich'.358 Powerful arguments for a swift move to the 
definitive system have been made anew in 1996. Firstly, 
the present 'destination' VAT has been found to be 
unsatisfactory as an equitable 'own resource'. This is 
because despite the provisions in the sixth Directive, 
VAT has always been challenged as a foundation for 
equitable national contributions to Community 
expenditure. Since imports are included, but not exports, 
it penalises countries with trade deficits. More 
seriously, it does not take account of variations in the 
proportion of national economies that are VAT-registered. 
This was clearly recognised by the Community itself when, 
in 1992, it brought into being the GNP-related 'fourth 
resource' and reduced the maximum VAT rate from 1.4% to 
1%. Since total contributions are now governed by a GNP 
ceiling, the case for a separate VAT element is not now 
obvious.
357 See note 125.
358 Bundesministerium der Finanzen (1994) Formulation of 
the definitive scheme for imposing turnover tax on the intra 
Community trade in goods and services and for a functional 
clearing procedure,Federal Ministry of Finance, Bonn, page 
110.
126
Secondly, it has been argued in a report from DGXXI that 
one of the drawbacks of the destination system presently 
in operation, with its tangle of complex administration 
procedures, is that it opens the door to tax fraud and so 
reduces the overall tax take of governments359 and hence 
their fiscal power.360 It has also been argued elsewhere 
that to omit accounting for intra-Community transactions 
would be potentially less attractive in the definitive 
system, since this would result in the non-deductibility 
of the input tax.361 Furthermore the effect on the 
revenue departments of Member States, if transactions are 
not reported, would be less severe under the final system 
as compared to the transition period, since at lest the 
non-deducted input tax is collected.362
However the differences in VAT rates between Member 
States would continue to create problems under the origin 
principle. There are currently 27 different VAT rates in 
the Community (plus exempt supplies), which would greatly 
complicate the deduction of input tax by purchasers. The 
multiplicity of reduced rates and derogations, and the 
selection and definitions of categories to which a 
reduced rates can apply, are the main problems.
359 See Bridges, M (1996) Tax evasion A crime in itself: 
The relationship with money laundering, Journal of Financial 
Crime, Volume 4, number 2, pp 161-168; also newspaper article: 
'Labour voices fears over VAT', Financial Times, November 11 
1996, page 11. According to the article: "In 1995-96 VAT 
receipts were about £5 bn lower than projected [...] a related 
reason for this fall has been the a cut in staffing levels at 
Customs".
360 See newspaper article: 'Monti sets out radical plan 
for VAT shake-up' in European Voice, 20-26 June 1996, page 1.
361 Raponi, D (1996) L'I.V.A comunitaria: Le tappe per il 
passagio al regime definitivo, paper given at a conference 
held in Venice and entitled L'I.V.A e l'Unione Europea,
Frodi, controlli, sanzioni, 24 February.
362 See Terra, J and Wattel, P (1992) European Tax Law, 
Kluwer, chapter on mutual assistance.
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The new system requires a 'clearing house' to avoid the 
swelling of tax revenues in exporting Member States. 
However the setting up of a clearing system has proved a 
major stumbling block in moving on to the 'State of 
Origin' system and the implementation of the definitive 
system had been postponed for what seemed to be an 
indefinite period.363 The Commission has now presented a 
proposal364 for a Directive amending the sixth Directive, 
which would have the effect of fixing the minimum and 
maximum rates at 15% and 25% respectively, for the period 
from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 1998. At present 
Member States must apply a standard VAT rate of not less 
than 15%, with no upper limit. This harmonisation is part 
of a programme to culminate in a common clearing system 
by mid 1998, closely followed by the definitive system. 
Goals to be achieved by the end of 1996 include, inter 
alia, measures to improve the collection of taxes and the 
cooperation between Member State administrations.
3.4. Protecting EC revenue against fraud: the future
According to UCLAF,365 from cases reported the 
Commission, it is known that up to two per cent of the EU 
budget (of over 70 billion ECU in 1995) is subject to 
fraud and irregularities. There is, as far as the 
irregularities affecting the EC budget are concerned, a 
belief that they occur mostly on the expenditure side, 
for example with regards to subsidies to farmers and 
exporters. But the reality is that irregularities 
involving larger amounts also exist on the 'income' side 
of the budget. In fact in 1994 the cost of reported
363 See newspaper article: 'Senior EU tax official faces 
sack in VAT row' in Financial Times, 27 October 1995, page 22.
364 VAT - proposed change to standard-rate system, European 
Commission Press Release IP/95/1437, 20 December 1995.
365 Unite de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti Fraude, the 
Commission's anti-fraud coordination unit, Directorate F.
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irregularities amounted to 3,4% of the traditional own 
resources budget (import duties) • 366 One of the main 
areas under attack is that of Community transit, where 
the guarantee system is faltering. Of the 12 000 cases 
reported by the Member States between 1991 and 1995, 120 
(1% of the total) by themselves accounted for 50% of the 
total budgetary impact. Fraud cases involving organized 
crime are few and far between, but their effect on the 
budget is considerable: out the 273 cases under 
investigation coordinated by the Commission, 20% involved 
sums of more than 100 000 ECU, and in half of them the 
amounts involved were more than 1 million ECU.367 It is 
no wonder therefore that the transit system has been 
repeatedly described as 'in deep crisis' and 'near 
collapse'. The scale of fraud demonstrates that illegal 
transactions are no longer isolated cases. They 
illustrate the establishment of a 'grey market' involving 
also the laundering of profits from drug trafficking, the 
provision of funds for the drugs market and the 
progressive contamination of all commercial sectors. 
Generally there is a considerable political impetus to 
deal with this problem at the level of the European 
institutions, since the credibility of the European 
project seems to be implicated (see Chapter 1). But the 
legal, administrative, organisational and technical 
difficulties involved in keeping one step ahead of 
fraudsters should not be underestimated, as I hope the 
present chapter has made clear.
There are hopeful signs that the problem of loss of
366 See Goybert, C (1995) La fraude communautaire: Mythes 
et realites, Revue du March6 Commun, number 388, May, 281-283; 
UCLAF (1996) Seventeen questions on fraud, February, mimeoed 
text, page 1.
367 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interest The fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1995, COM(96) 173, pp 48-49.
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revenue and fraud are being tackled. Transit fraud has 
been put very firmly on the agenda, with a myriad of 
medium-term measures envisaged, and a vast 
computerisation project on the horizon, which is expected 
to be operative by 1998. The Community control framework 
to protect Community revenue is 'immature', compared to 
the framework in place to protect EAGGF Guarantee Section 
expenditure, as the next chapter will demonstrate. Until 
recently the emphasis of Community regulation with 
regards to own resources has been on the making available 
of the correct sums to the Community. It is not until 
1990 that Member States acquired a duty to report frauds 
and irregularities exceeding 10 000 ECU to the 
Commission. In this area of tax raising and levies 
collecting, which is the sole prerogative of the Member 
States, it is difficult for the Commission to make 
proposals which are likely to meet with the approval of 
the Council in particular, least they be confined to the 
improvement of technical matters. That is why an 
embryonic European Customs Authority would be a major 
breakthrough.
It is hoped that the new horizontal instruments will help 
to 'streamline' fraud control at Community level. But it 
is the short term, which, perhaps, should give cause for 
concern. Some parliamentarians have expressed grave 
concerns about the extension of the Common Transit System 
to the Visegrad countries.368 Concerns centre around the 
adequacy of Customs infrastructure and the ability to 
police eastern borders of countries where, historically, 
there has been a fair degree of tolerance of the growth 
of the 'second economy'.369 One question that must be
368 See for example written question E-0275/96, OJ (1996)C 
185/47.
369 Nay lord, R (1996) From underworld to underground 
enterprise crime 'Informal sector' business and the public 
policy response, Crime, Law and Social Change, volume 24,
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raised in this respect is whether EU citizens will 
ultimately have to bear the cost of fraud through their 
GNPs (at the moment any loss of income incurred through 
traditional own resources or VAT is made up through the 
GNP contribution of the Member States). This extra burden 
put on GNPs would mean that the burden would rest, 
ultimately, on the wealthier Member States: a purely 
unplanned form of re-distribution!
In the field of VAT, it is hoped that further 
harmonisation and the change to the definitive system 
will eventually erase some of the opportunities for fraud 
built into the present system. The Commission is also 
looking at the possibility of harmonising some of the VAT 
collection procedures in the Member States - a move which 
some commentators argue is at the very limit, or beyond 
its competence. VAT is excluded from the competence of 
Council Regulation 2988/95, and from the 'PIF'
Convention. VAT seems set to remain an area where the 
Commission has difficulties in asserting any competence 
in terms of fraud control. However the challenge remains 
one of trying to make tax havens created by the different 
VAT constellations less attractive, by means of a 
directive. Much work remains to be done in order to 
protect the financial interests of the European Community 
in this difficult area. Community efforts are likely to 
be resisted in some of the Member States on the grounds 
of interference with sovereign tax-raising powers. 
Finally, it must also be recognised that, within the 
Union, some of the opportunities for fraud are created by 
the uneven nature of integration. Economic integration 
has raced ahead for over forty years, whilst fiscal, 
monetary, political and judicial integration and other 
forms of cooperation, have lagged behind. As long as VAT 
rates are not fully harmonised, and the definitive system
number 2, 79-150, page 85.
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in place, the present danger of collusion between seller 
and buyer in order to avoid VAT will remain.370 The 
extreme variation in excise duty rates also invites 
fraud, particularly in the UK and the Republic of Ireland 
where excise duties represent a higher proportion of 
national revenues.371 The complexity of the EC regulatory 
framework, and the uneven nature of integration, seem set 
to continue posing difficulties for the collection of 
both EC and national revenues.
At community-level there is no doubt that efforts are 
being made to protect the EC budget from loss of revenue, 
although the main responsibility will continue to rest 
with the individual Member States.
370 See White, S (1996) EC fraud- What is VAT? Journal of 
Financial Crime, January, pp 255-259.
371 See Easson, A (1989) The elimination of tax frontiers 
in 1992: One European Market, EUI Florence.
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CHAPTER 4. THE CONTROL OF FRAUD AFFECTING EC EXPENDITURE
This chapter focuses on the control of expenditure fraud, 
that is to say fraud affecting the EAGGF Guidance Section 
Fund (4.1.) and the Structural Funds (4.2.). The 
structure is similar to that of chapter 3, although the 
chapter is, of necessity, longer. In each section the 
origins of the funds are examined briefly and examples of 
fraud are given. The Community's control framework 
follows, together with the latest developments. The last 
part of the chapter (4.3.) offers a summary and deals 
with recent developments and prospects for improvement of 
the protection of the financial interest of the European 
Communities.
4.1. The EAGGF Guarantee Section
Article 40(4) of the EC Treaty expressly provides that, 
in order to enable the common organisations to attain 
their objectives, one or more Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Funds may be set up. As a result the EAGGF 
Guidance and Guarantee Section was established in 1962372 
in order to cover agricultural market support and to 
assist farm modernisation schemes. Under Regulation 
17/64s73 the fund was later split up into a Guarantee 
Section374 which includes (i) expenditure relating to 
refunds on exports to third countries and (ii) 
intervention intended to stabilize the agricultural 
markets, and a Guidance Section (see 3.2.) which includes 
expenditure relating to measures undertaken in order to 
attain the objectives of the CAP set out in Article 39,
372 Council Regulation 25/62, OJ (1962) L 991 (special 
edition 1959-62, page 126.
373 OJ (1964) L 586.
374 Articles 1, 2 and 3 of Council Regulation 729/70 JO 
(1970) L 94/13.
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in particular matters of structural policy.375
4.1.1. EAGGF Guarantee Section fraud
There is a well-established typology of fraud.
Reported frauds under the Guarantee Section include the 
famous carrousels, re-export and classification frauds. A 
carrousel occurs when a good quality product is exported 
from the EU, attracting a high rate of subsidy. The same 
product is then re-imported as a low-quality product, 
thus attracting low duties. Traders may repeatedly 
carousel in and out of the Union until the product is 
unfit for human consumption. In a destination fraud a 
consignment is described, for example as going to a third 
country destination attracting a high subsidy. In fact it 
goes to a destination which should attract a small 
subsidy, or no subsidy at all. Re-export fraud relies on 
goods being brought back within EC borders without 
Customs being aware of it.376 Additionally frauds often 
involve the substitution or alteration of foods, when for 
example goods held in intervention storage are of lower 
quality than declared to the authorities, or disguised. 
Ghosting is also common. In Italy, for example, durum 
wheat stocks were found in 1994 to be 25% smaller than 
those declared. Products exported may also be hazardous 
to health. Another 1994 case involved a consignment of 3 
000 tonnes of beef destined to the former Soviet 
Republics which was found no^  to have been adequately 
sterilised. The sum involved was estimated at 11.5
375 See Usher, J (1988) Legal aspects of agriculture in the 
European Community, Clarendon Press, Oxford, page 104.
376 See for example Ruimschottel, D (1994) The EC budget: 
Ten per cent fraud? EUI Florence; Tutt, N (1989) Europe on a 
fiddle, Helm, London.
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million ECU.377 Examples of imaginative schemes abound 
which nearly always involve the forgery of documents, the 
misclassification or mis-representation of goods,378 and 
the connivance of officials. For example in 1995, an 
Italian olive oil company was investigated for unlawfully 
claiming export refunds through a parent company since 
1990. The olive oil thus exported was 'sweetened', and 
thus did not qualify for aid. The estimated total cost to 
the Community was 4 million ECU.379
4.1.2. EAGGF Guarantee Section Control framework
It is in this area that the most advanced control 
framework can be found. The legislation places 
requirements on the Member States to notify, check and 
recover sums due. These requirements are found in other 
areas of the EC budget and are therefore un-surprising. 
The difference here is that requirements have been 
refined over a longer period, and have become quite 
exacting. The framework also goes well beyond what has 
been attempted in other areas of the budget, with for 
example the 'Black List' Regulation, which is examined 
below in some detail.
(i) Budgetary control
The EAGGF Guarantee Section is subject to the clearance 
of accounts procedure. Under Articles 98 to 104 of the 
Financial Regulation, the EAGGF Guarantee Section budget
377 European Commission (1994) Protecting the financial 
interests of the European Community The fight against fraud, 
OOPEC, pp 28-30.
378 Doig, A and Graham, M (1993) Fraud and the Intervention 
Board, Journal of Asset Protection and Financial Crime, Volume 
1, number 3, 225-233.
379 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report 
1995, COM(96) 173, OOPEC, page 71.
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is implemented in three stages. The first stage is the 
payment of advances to the Member States. The second 
stage is when the payments are charged to each budget 
heading, on the basis of the returns submitted by the 
Member States showing the expenditure incurred. The third 
stage is the clearance of accounts. Article (2)(b) of 
Council Regulation 729/70 makes provision for the 
clearance of accounts. This means that, once a year, the 
Member States send their annual accounts of expenditure, 
as well as all relevant certificates and reports to the 
Commission.380 The clearance account decision then 
determines the amount of expenditure effected in each 
Member State, during the financial year in question, 
which is chargeable to the EAGGF. This decision is 
reached with the help of a committee. This system ensures 
that the Directorate-General for agriculture verifies the 
manner in which the appointed national authorities have 
used the appropriations for the CAP.
(ii) Notification, checks and inspections
The Member States have to provide detailed information on 
cases of irregularities.381 Under Council Regulations 
729/70382 and 595/91,383 the Commission may take part in 
relevant inspections and inquiries by the Member 
States.384 It may also carry out autonomous
380 Article 4 of Commission Regulation 1663/95 OJ (1995) L 
158/6.
381 Articles 3 and 5 of Council Regulation 595/91.
382 OJ (1970) L 94/13.
383 Council Regulation 595/91 OJ (1991) L 67/11 concerning 
irregularities and the recovery of sums wrongly paid in 
connection with the financing of the CAP and the organisation 
of an information system in this field and repealing 
Regulation 283/72.
384 Article 9(2) of Council Regulation 727/70; also Article 
6(1) of Council Regulation 595/91.
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inspections.385 Member States have a duty to carry out 
systematic scrutiny of documents, in order to give the 
best possible assurance of the effectiveness of the 
measures for preventing and detecting irregularities.386 
This applies without prejudice to inspections undertaken 
under Article 9 of Council Regulation 729/70.387 
Regulation 3122/94388 lays down the exact criteria for 
risk analysis as regards products receiving refunds, and 
Council Regulation 307/91389 makes additional funds 
available for the control of a number of high risk areas. 
Council Regulation 386/90390 places a duty on Member 
States to inspect 5% of all goods presented for exports.
With respect to aids to the crop and livestock sectors, 
Council Regulation 3508/92391 establishing an Integrated 
Administration and Control System (IACS) in the Member 
States to replace the hitherto sectoral approach to 
control. This means that the system comprises, in each 
Member State, a computerised data base, an alphanumeric 
identification system for agricultural parcels, a 
harmonised control system and in the livestock sector, a 
system for the identification and recording of animals. 
Commission Regulation 38S7/92392 lays down rules for the 
implementation of IACS. In particular,on-the-spot checks
385 Article 9(1) of Council Regulation 727/70.
386 Article 2 of Council Regulation 4045/89 OJ (1989) L 
388/18.
387 OJ (1970) L 94/13.
388 OJ (1994) L 330/31.
389 OJ (1991) L 37/5.
390 OJ (1990) L 42.
391 Council Regulation 3508/92 OJ (1992) L 355/1.
392 Commission Regulation 3887/92 OJ (1992) L 391/36 laying 
down detailed rules for applying the integrated administration 
and control system for certain community aid schemes (IACS).
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must cover 10% of livestock aid applications and 5% of 
area aid applications.393 Applications subjected to on- 
the-spot checking are selected by the competent authority 
in the Member State on the basis of risk analysis.
(iii) Penalties
Farmers and fishermen
Under IACS, there are time limits for the presentation of 
aid applications and late presentation triggers a cut of 
one percent per working day of delay, and eligibility is 
lost altogether after 20 days.394 If the area determined 
by the authorities is found to be less than that declared
in the ' area' aid application, the aid is reduced. If the
difference is more than 20% of the determined area, no
aid is granted. In the case of a false declaration made
intentionally or as a result of serious negligence, the 
farmer is excluded from the aid scheme for the calendar 
year in question, or from any aid scheme for the 
following calendar year.395 Notwithstanding the ruling of 
the Court in case 240/90,396 in the context of fisheries, 
penalties were at first rejected. Articles 35 and 36 
(relating to penalties) of Council Regulation 2847/93397 
were deleted following difficult Council discussions.
Traders
An exporter who requests a refund in excess of that 
applicable, sees his refund reduced by (a) half the
393 Article 6(3) of Commission Regulation 3887/92, op.cit.
394 Article 8 of Commission Regulation 3887/92.
395 Article 9(2) of Commission Regulation 3887/92.
396 Case C—240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR 1-5383.
397 Council Regulation 2847/93 OJ (1993) L 261/1.
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difference between the refund requested and the refund 
applicable to the actual exportation or (b) twice the 
difference between the refund requested and the refund 
applicable, if the exporter has intentionally supplied 
false information.398 Where the reduction results in a 
negative amount, the exporter shall pay that negative 
amount. Where reimbursement is covered by a security not 
yet released, seizure of that security shall constitute 
recovery of the amounts due. Where the security has been 
released, the beneficiary has to pay the amount of the 
security which would have been forfeit plus interest 
calculated from the date of the release to the day 
preceding the date of payment.399
These penalties apply without prejudice to supplementary 
national penalty arrangements.
(iv) Recovery and Member States' liability
Member States have a duty to recover sums lost as a 
result of irregularities or negligence, and to inform the 
Commission of the measures taken for those purposes and 
in particular of the state of the administrative and 
judicial procedures.400
When the amounts recovered are placed at the Fund's 
disposal, the Member State may retain 20%.401 Article 
8(2) of Council Regulation 729/70402 states that in the
398 Article 11 of Commission Regulation 2945/94 amending 
Regulation 3665/87, OJ (1994) L 310/57.
399 Article 3 of Commission Regulation 2954/94.
400 Article 8(12) of Council Regulation 729/70 OJ (1970) L
94.
401 Article 7(1) of Council Regulation 595/91 OJ (1991) L
67.
402 OJ (1970) L 94/13.
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absence of total recovery, the financial consequences of 
irregularities or negligence must be borne by the 
Community, with the exception of irregularities or 
negligence attributable to administrative authorities or 
other bodies of the Member States. On the question of 
Member States' liability, the European Court of Justice 
has ruled, in this context, that where the incorrect 
application of Community law is attributable to a 
Community institution, the Community should bear the 
financial consequences. In the majority of cases, 
however, the Court has found that the EAGGF was not 
liable for the expenditure, that is to say that the 
Member State had to accept financial responsibility for 
over-spent or missing funds.403
4.1.3. The 'Black List' Regulation
In 1995 the 'Black List' Regulation introduced a system 
for the identification and the communication, between the 
relevant authorities of the Member States, of commercial 
operators who have committed irregularities or against 
whom there are well-founded suspicions, with a view to 
excluding them from the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF. 
The commercial operators targeted are those who, for 
example, claim export refunds or sell intervention 
products. Due respect to the principle of subsidiarity 
means that Member States retain considerable discretion 
with regards to the detailed implementation of this 
Regulation in this sensitive arena, which touches closely 
on the rights of operators. The author examines the scope 
of the Regulation, raises questions concerning the rights 
of operators, discusses selected implementation problems 
and finally examines the two diametrically-opposed 
perceptions of the Regulation.
403 See for example case 18/76 Germany v Commission (EAGGF) 
[1979] ECR 343.
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The 'Black List' Regulation,404 and its implementing 
Regulation,405 which took effect in the Member States on 
1 July 1996 must be put in the wider context of the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities, which has intensified since the late 
1980s.406 In 1995 a Regulation for the Protection of the 
European Communities407 or 'PIF' Regulation came into 
effect. A Convention of the same name408 has yet to be 
ratified. Other measures enhancing scrutiny, or 
developing cooperation, are under discussion.409 The 
level of fraud in the transit system, which allows the 
elimination of Customs formalities within the transit 
areas,410 has reached alarming proportions, with a 
reported figure of over 1 billion ECU of revenue lost
404 Council Regulation 1469/95 OJ (1995) L 145/1 on 
measures to be taken with regard to certain beneficiaries of 
operations financed by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF.
405 Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ L (1996) 102/15.
406 White, S (1995) A variable geometry of enforcement? 
Aspects of European Community budget fraud, Crime, Law and 
Social change 23:235-255, page 240.
407 Council Regulation 2988/95 OJ (1995) L 312/1, on the 
Protection of the European Communities' Financial Interests.
408 Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention 
on the Protection of the European Communities' Financial 
Interests, OJ (1995) C 316/48.
409 In June 1996 the ECOFIN Council agreed in principle a 
Regulation concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections 
by the Commission for the detection of frauds and 
irregularities detrimental to the financial interests of 
the European Communities; two protocols to the 'PIF' 
Convention and an 'Anti-Corruption' Convention have yet 
to be agreed.
410 Commission Regulation 1214/92 OJ (1992) L 132/1 on 
provisions for the implementation of the Community Transit 
procedure and for certain simplifications of that procedure; 
Convention on a Common Transit Procedure OJ (1987) L 226/1; 
Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods 
under Cover of TIR Carnets, 1975.
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through fraud between 1990 and 1995,411 whilst a small 
percentage of operators are responsible for over 80% of 
amounts defrauded. It has been recognised that organised 
criminal networks are now involved.412 The present crisis 
in the transit system has made it more difficult for the 
Member States to discharge some of the specific duties 
connecting with the running of the EAGGF Guarantee 
Section. Member States have a duty to take all the 
measures necessary to ensure that transactions financed 
by the EAGGF Guarantee Section are actually carried out 
and properly executed, and to prevent and follow up 
irregularities.413 A further duty concerns the need to 
check the reliability and probity of operators, as 
highlighted in case 240/90.414
In the circumstances, the prospect of the Member States 
being able to black list certain operators has proved an 
attractive legislative goal, and one the European 
Parliament in particular has pursued vociferously. The 
technique of black listing has been used successfully in 
other areas, in order to deny access to the market to 
economic operators who either failed to conform to 
minimum standards of safety or who made regular use of 
dubious practices.415
411 European Parliament (1996) Temporary Committee of 
Inquiry into the Transit System (1996) Written statement by 
Commissioner Liikanen, March.
412 See newspaper articles: 'EU cheesed off by tax scam', 
Guardian, 23 May 1996, page 3; 'Traffic de cigarettes: 1' Etat 
roul§' in 1'Express, 9 May 1996 page 39; 'Mafia gangs involved 
in £1 billion EU frauds', in Guardian, May 9 1996, page 10.
413 Article 8 of Council Regulation 729/70 OJ (1970) L 
94/13.
414 Case 240/90 Germany v Commission ECR (1992) 1-5383, at 
26, page 5431.
415 See newspaper article: 'A hidden hand of corruption', 
Financial Times, 6 June 1996, page 27.
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The 'Black List' Regulation, which concerns us here, has 
two aims. The first is to make known throughout the 
Community certain fraudulent, or suspected traders who 
are drawing funds from the Guarantee Section of the 
EAGGF. This is achieved through the inclusion of the same 
operators into an EU-wide information system. The second 
aim is to specify measures to be taken to prevent the 
same fraudulent or suspected operators from committing 
further irregularities.416 The measures, which can be 
cumulative, include reinforced checking, suspension of 
payments relating to current operations and exclusion 
from future operations for a period of up to five years. 
The Commission has excluded itself from the field of 
application of the Regulation: only the 'competent 
national authorities of the Member States' are provided 
with information available under the new system. The 
political significance of the Regulation is, however, 
very considerable since it establishes a Community system 
requiring Member States to distribute information on 
certain operators and to adopt preventive measures.
Here the legal basis and scope of the 'Black List' 
Regulation are examined first. The protection of the 
rights of operators is followed by a discussion on the 
potential impact of the Regulation.
(i) Scope of 'Black List' Regulation
The only provision in the Treaty with regards to the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities (Article 209a) was added by the Treaty on 
European Union. It requires the Member States to take the 
same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial
416 The definition of 'irregularity' can be found in 
Article 1(2) of Council Regulation 2988/95 OJ (1995) L 312/1, 
on the Protection of the European Communities' Financial 
Interests, or 'PIF' Regulation.
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interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud 
affecting their own financial interests and has yet to be 
used as a legal basis. Most anti-fraud measures 
nevertheless are found within the first pillar. The legal 
basis for the 7Black List' Regulation, for example, is 
Article 43 EC, which enables the Commission to submit 
proposals for working out and implementing the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Notwithstanding its place in the 
architecture of the Union Treaty, the Regulation 
9 polices9 since its scope extends to measures which can 
have serious economic consequences for traders, as we 
shall see.
Two distinct groups of operators
For practical purposes, operators are divided into two 
distinct groups in the 7Black List7 Regulation. Operators 
7A7 are those who have committed an irregularity or 
irregularities either deliberately or through serious 
negligence and have unjustly benefited from a financial 
advantage, or attempted to benefit therefrom. Operators 
7B7 are those who have been the subject, on the basis of 
established facts, of a preliminary or judicial report by 
the competent authorities of the Member States.417 A 
7preliminary or judicial report7 is defined in the 
implementing Regulation as 7the first written assessment, 
even if only internal, by a competent administrative or 
judicial authority based on concrete facts that an 
irregularity has been committed, deliberately or through 
gross negligence, without prejudice to the possibility of 
this being revived or withdrawn subsequently on the basis 
of developments in the administrative or judicial 
procedure7.418 Operators who have participated in
417 See Article 2(3) of Commission Regulation 745/96 and 
Article 1(2) of Council Regulation 1469/95.
418 Article 1(2) of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996) 
L 102/15.
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committing an irregularity, or who are under a duty to 
take responsibility, or to ensure that it is not 
committed may fall under either category 'A' or 'B'.419 
Member States apply their relevant national legislation 
in order to determine whether an irregularity has ben 
committed or attempted, deliberately or through gross 
negligence.420
Notification
The 'Black List' Regulation targets operators who have 
committed, or are suspected of having committed 
irregularities which involve amounts in excess of 100 000 
ECU, over a period of one year421 starting to run on the 
date on which the first irregularity was committed.422 
The Member States are responsible for implementing 
procedures relating to notification.423 Each Member State 
designates a single competent authority to make and 
receive notifications. The said authority, using a 
standard form, transmits its notifications to the 
Commission, which transmits them to the competent 
authorities of the other Member States.424 As part of the 
notification, the following must be transmitted to the
419 Article 1(4) of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996)
L 102/15.
420 Article 1(5) of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (196) L 
102/15.
421 Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996)
L 102/15.
422 Article 2 of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996) L 
102/15.
423 Article 2(1) of Council regulation 1469/95 OJ (1995) L 
145/1.
424 Article 5(1) of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996)
L 102/15.
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Commission:423 (ii) their category ('A' or 'B'), (iii) 
details of the inquiry (iv) facts leading to measures 
being taken under the 'Black List' Regulation and (v) 
cross-references to notifications already made under 
previous legislation.426
Previously, Member States have interpreted the 
requirement to notify, which can already be found in 
Article 4 of Council Regulation 595/9tf5427 and Article 14 
of Council Regulation 1468/81428 in a 'minimalist' 
manner.429 It is anticipated that the more detailed 
implementation measures contained in the 'Black List' 
Regulation will induce the Member States to identify 
traders. But should a Member State fail to implement 
rules relating to notification, the implementing 
Regulation430 now empowers the Commission to ensure that 
the identification and notification system is implemented
425 Article 5(2) of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996) 
L 102/15.
426 Council Regulation 1468/81 OJ (1981) L 144/1; Council 
Regulation 595/91 OJ (1991) L 67/11; also Council Regulation 
1469/95 (1995) OJ L 145/1.
427 Council Regulation 595/91 OJ (1994) L 67/11 concerning 
irregularities and the recovery of sums wrongly paid in 
connection with the financing of the Common Agricultural 
Policy and the organization of an information system in this 
field and repealing Regulation 283/72.
428 Council Regulation 1461/81 OJ L (1981) L 144/1 on 
mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of 
the Member States and Cooperation between the latter and the 
Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on 
customs or agricultural matters.
429 See articles: 'Parliament wants to increase sanctions 
against fraud in the framework of the CAP', in Europe, 17 
February, 1995, p 10; 'The Council adopts the "Black list" of 
companies that defraud, allocation of preventive community 
means to combat fraud in the EAGGF', in Europe, 26 June 1995,
p 10.
430 Article 2(2) of Commission Regulation 1469/95 OJ (1995) 
L 145/1.
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by the Member State concerned. This provision was entered 
as a request of the European Parliament,431 concerned 
that the Regulation should not be 'vague and toothless'.
Reinforced checking
According to the 'Black List' Regulation, and its 
implementing Regulation, any operator ('A' or 'B') 
presenting a risk of non-reliability may be subjected to 
reinforced checking, with respect to any EAGGF Guarantee 
Section transactions.432 This gives the competent 
authorities 'carte blanche' to increase the level of 
checks when in doubt.
Suspension
The Regulation provides for payments for current 
operations to be suspended, or guarantees to be held 
back.433 This sanction can apply to both categories of 
traders ('A' or 'B').434 The scope of sanction(s) is 
determined on a case by case basis by the competent 
authority, taking due account of the real risks of 
possible further irregularities, as well as the 
following:
(a) the stage of the inquiry being held, depending 
on whether an operator 'A' or operator 'B' is 
involved;
431 See COM (95) 194 Final including the amended proposal.
432 Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996)
L 102/15.
433 Article 3(b) of Council regulation 1469/95 which echoes 
Article 5(d-f) of the 'PIF' Regulation OJ (1995) L 312/1.
434 Article 3(2) of Council Regulation 1469/95 OJ (1995) L 
145/1.
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(b) the volume of his operations within the EAGGF 
field;
(c) the amount of Community funds involved in the 
suspected or established irregularity;
(d) the seriousness of the irregularity according to 
whether it has been committed or attempted, 
deliberately or through gross negligence.435
Exclusion
Exclusions only apply to operators 'A', and to the 
product sector of the EAGGF Guarantee Section in which 
the irregularity has been committed or attempted. 
Exclusions can vary between 6 months to five years and 
are to be determined in the Member States, using the four 
criteria (a-d) above.436
(ii) Rights of operators
The rights of operators have been considered in the 
Regulation with respect to retroactivity, 
confidentiality, data protection, the right to be heard, 
the right to be removed from the black list and 
proport iona1ity.
Exclusion measures may not be applied to irregularities 
before the entry into force of the 'Black List' 
Regulation. Article 5(2) of the implementing Regulation
435 Article 3(3) of Commission Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996) 
L 102/15.
436 Article 3(4) second subparagraph of Commission 
Regulation 745/96 OJ (1996) L 102/15; also Article 5 (d) of 
'PIF' Regulation 2988/95 OJ (1995) L 312/1.
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states that notifications exchanged must be confidential. 
Member States must take all necessary precautions to 
ensure that the information they exchange remains 
confidential and is not sent to persons other than the 
Member States or institutions whose duties require that 
they have access to it, unless the Member State has 
agreed to such disclosure. The relevant provisions laid 
down in the rules on mutual assistance in Customs and 
agricultural matters437 and in Directive 95/46 apply 
mutatis mutandis.438
Article 4(1)(a) of the 'Black List' Regulation stipulates 
that operators have the right to a prior hearing and a 
right of appeal in respect of exclusion and suspension 
where appropriate. A 'prior hearing' in this context 
means an opportunity to offer explanations to the 
authority administering the EAGGF Guarantee Section, not 
access to an independent court. The question of what 
right of appeal traders would have against direct 
Commission measures is also left open.439 This may, in 
time, raise challenges under Article 6(1) and 6(2) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
In the case of a Member State finding that an operator 
had been wrongfully blacklisted, the Commission must be 
informed, and must in turn relay this fact to the other 
Member States, which must in turn immediately inform 
those to whom they had notified these personal data under 
Regulation 1469/95. Clearly transmission involves several 
steps, and re-instatement may be protracted. Furthermore
437 Article 4(2) of Council Regulation 1469/95 OJ (1995) L 
145/1.
438 Directive 95/46 OJ (1995) L 281/31 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
the free movement of such data.
439 See European Parliament (1995) Opinion of the Committee 
on Agriculture and Rural Development for the Committee on 
Budgetary Control, point 1.15, 24 January.
149
the Regulation does not say whether, in case of loss of 
profits due to wrongful black listing or delays involved 
in removing names from the black list, damages would be 
available, and from where. There remains the question of 
whether, in the event of loss of profit or injury to a 
trader, a Member State would have to make damages 
available under Brasserie du Pecheur/ Factortame III.440 
The first of several pre-conditions for the award of 
reparation under the above-mentioned case is that the 
breach of Community law must be attributable to the 
national legislature acting in a field in which it has a 
wide discretion to make legislative choices.441 It is a 
moot point whether put together, the 'Black List' 
Regulation and its implementing Regulation leave the 
Member States a wide discretion to make legislative 
choices, although an element of choice is involved.
Although the 'Black List' Regulation places a duty on the 
Member States to comply with the principle of 
proportionality with respect to the measures it makes 
available and the irregularity, whether it is committed 
or suspected, it may be more difficult to apply the 
principle if traders are already subject to, for example, 
financial penalties under other specific provisions under 
the CAP.442 It must also be remembered that the measures 
contained in the 'Black List' Regulation can be 
cumulative.
In addition to this, authorities who recover extra-
440 C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du PScheur v Germany and 
R V Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame, 
judgement of 5 March 1996, nyr.
441 Author's emphasis.
442 Article 6 of Council regulation 1469/95 OJ (1995) L 
145/1.
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judicially443 (as is more common in most of the northern 
Member States)444 may have to juggle existing 
requirements in order to make black listing possible. For 
example, in the UK it seems that black listing could 
become part of the compounding contract possible under 
Article 152 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 
1979. This means an addition to the 'already astonishing' 
powers of Customs,445 which may give rise to problems of 
proport i ona1ity.
Discussion
Although the Regulation is precise in what it seeks to 
achieve, most of the implementation details are left to 
the competent authorities in the Member States. This 
means that competent authorities are not subjected to a 
'legislative straight jacket', but on the other hand, 
they have to deal with the absence of detailed 
implementing guidelines. This creates a tension at 
implementing level.
For example, when operators 'B' are involved, 
notification is triggered by the first written assessment 
(even if just internal) based on concrete facts that an 
irregularity has been committed either deliberately of 
through gross negligence. Clearly the Member States will 
have various 'trigger points'. It must be noted that 
although the notification of an operator who has been 
convicted of fraud does not raise any particular legal
443 See White, S (1996) Black listing: Three questions, 
AGON number 12, 8-9.
444 Labayle, H (1996) La transaction dans 1'Union 
Europeenne Rapport de synthese ('Labayle Report').
445 'The powers entrusted to Her Majesty's Customs and 
Excise are in themselves astonishing' Forbes, J in R v HM 
Customs and Excise, ex parte Haworth, 17 July 1985.
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problem, the notification of a suspect does raise 
problems, particularly since the level of proof is not 
specified.
The Economic and Social Committee was not slow in 
underlining the seriousness of the injury to an operator 
unjustly identified by a Member State as presenting a 
risk of 'non-reliability'.446 It is likely, therefore, 
that the competent authorities will exercise extreme 
caution before notifying. The length of exclusion, too, 
is at the discretion of the sole competent authority. 
There is no detailed criteria or 'yardstick' to be used 
throughout the Community. Put together, these factors 
alone may lead to an uneven 'black list' enforcement 
area. However in view of the high threshold (100,000 ECU) 
and the small relatively number of notifications 
expected, this may not cause a significant problem within 
the single market.
(iii) Conclusion: black listing, an important step in the 
fight against fraud?
There are two differing perceptions of the 'Black List' 
Regulation. One view is that it is only a superficially 
attractive measure, with limited potential impact on the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities. This is so, it has been argued, because the 
Regulation duplicates existing provisions, particularly 
those now contained in the 'PIF' Regulation, which now 
frames Community sanctions. Secondly, a combination of 
factors may ensure that notifications remain as 
'minimalist' as they were under Regulations 1468/81 and 
595/91: (i) the high pecuniary threshold (100 000 ECU),
446 See Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
measures to be taken in dealing with certain beneficiaries of 
operations financed by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, OJ
(1994) C 393/81, page 82.
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(ii) the need for competent authorities to pay the 
fullest attention to the rights of operators and (iii) 
the (linked) need of competent authorities to exercise 
due caution in order to avoid any possible claims for 
damages. This diminishes the potential impact of the 
Regulation.
Another view is that the Regulation is in fact 'filling 
an important legislative lacuna'. This is because in the 
single market, it has been too easy for unscrupulous 
traders, when they are known or suspected of being 
involved in irregularities by a Customs authority, to 
claim export refunds from other EU Customs authority, 
where they are not suspected. The present prescribed 
level of checks (not less than 5% according to Article 
3(6) of Council Regulation 386/90447 and Commission 
Regulation 2221/95) ,448 and the absence hitherto of a EU- 
wide computerised system to monitor transit have meant 
that the same 'mobile' operators could remain undetected 
by Customs authorities. The Regulation 'sends the right 
message' to traders who, if detected, have much to lose.
The author feels that there is no need at this stage to 
take an unnecessarily pessimistic view of the Regulation. 
As John Tomlinson, MEP, recently pointed out in an 
address to the UK Association of Lawyers for the 
Protection of the Financial Interests of the European 
Communities, the 'freephone' line, established in 1994 in 
all the Member States to encourage informants to report 
fraud affecting the EC budget was also greeted with much
447 Council Regulation 386/90 OJ (1990) L 42 on the 
monitoring carried out at the time of export of agricultural 
products receiving refunds or other amounts.
448 Commission Regulation 2221/95 OJ (1995) L 224 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation 
396/90 as regards physical checks carried out at the time of 
export of agricultural products qualifying for refunds.
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scepticism at first.449 It is now well established and 
proving an invaluable tool in the fight against fraud 
affecting the EC budget. The same fate may await black 
listing.
The 'Black List' Regulation will be subjected to a review 
no later than July 1997.450 It may be that this revision 
process will help to 'iron out' uncertainties and 
ambiguities. If this is the case, black listing may be 
successfully extended to cover Structural Funds, and thus 
help to deal with the equally serious problem of 
procurement fraud451 which is presently affecting them.
4.2. Structural Funds
The tasks of the Structural Funds are defined in Council 
Regulation 2081/93 (Framework Regulation). The European 
Development Fund (ERDF henceforth) finances measures 
aimed at the modernisation of infrastructure, in 
accordance with Article 130c of the EC Treaty.452 Within 
the framework of Article 123 of the EC Treaty, The 
European Social Fund (ESF henceforth) finances various 
measures to combat unemployment.453 The EAGGF Guidance- 
Section promotes rural development in line with the
449 ALPFIEC Conference 16 May 1996, London School of 
Economics.
450 Article 7 of Council Regulation 1469/95 OJ (1995) L 
145/1.
451 White, S and Dorn, N (1996) EC fraud, subsidiarity and 
prospects for the IGC; A regional dimension? European Urban 
and Regional Studies, 1996 3(3) 262-266; also Battistotti, I 
(1995) Protection des Interets financiers et Fonds 
Structurels, seminar paper, Cabinet Bonino Brussels, European 
Commission, March.
452 Article 3(1) of Council Regulation 2081/93 OJ (1993) L 
193/5.
453 Article 3(2) of Council Regulation 2081/93.
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principles set out in Article 39 of the EC Treaty.454 The 
tasks of the Financial Instrument of Fisheries 
Guidance455 (FIFG henceforth) are set out in Articles 1-3 
of Council Regulation 2080/93 in accordance with Article 
43 of the EC Treaty.456 The most recent of the Structural 
Funds is the Cohesion Fund, set up in 1993 under Article 
235 EC to finance key environmental and transport 
infrastructure projects in the four poorest Member States 
- Spain, Portugal Greece and Ireland - whose per capita 
GDP is less than 90% of the EU average. The tasks of the 
Cohesion Fund are set out in Council Regulation 
1164/94.457
The total expenditure on Structural Funds will add up to 
approximately 170 billion ECU between 1994 and 1999 - 
around a third of the overall budget - compared with 64 
billion between 1989 and 1993. Around 90% of the funds 
are paid out to Member States initiatives (national or 
regional initiatives), whilst 9% is spent directly by the 
Community, with a 1% reserve for innovative measures 
(Community initiatives) 458.
454 Article 3(3) of Council Regulation 2081/93.
455 Article 3 (3a) of Council Regulation 2081/93.
456 Council Regulation 2080/93 OJ (193) L 193/1 laying down 
provisions for implementing Regulation 2058/88 as regards the 
financial instrument of fisheries guidance.
457 Council Regulation 1164/94 OJ (1994) L 130, 
establishing a Cohesion Fund and repealing Council Regulation 
792/93 establishing a cohesion financial instrument.
458 Article 11 of Council Regulation 4253/88, as amended by 
Council Regulation 2082/93.
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Table 4.1.
Breakdown of Structural Funds by Objective and by Member 
State (in million ECU)
OBJECTIVESl 
1 2 3+4 5A
1994-1999 —
SB
1995
-1999
C.I.
1994
-1999
TOTAL
730 341 465 191.6 77 N/A 346.8 2,151.4
DK zero 119 301 262.5 54 N/A 117.4 853.9
13,640 1,566 1,942 1,133.8 1,227 2,557 N/A 22,065.8
GR 13,980 zero zero zero zero zero 1,241.9 15,221.9
26,300 2,415 1,843 431.6 664 N/A 3,129.3 34,782.9
2,190 3,773 3,203 1,912.7 2,238 N/A 1,813.1 15,129.8
IRL 5,620 zero zero zero zero N/A 591.4 6,211.4
14,860 1,462 1,715 798.6 901 N/A 2,121.4 21,858
zero 15 23 40 N/A 21.2 105.2
NL 150 650 1,079 159.2 150 N/A 603 2.791.2
13,980 zero zero zero zero N/A 1,127 15,107
UK 2,360 4,580 3,377 439.3 817 N/A 1,782.2 13,355.5
185.5 101 395 388 411 N/A 163.5 1,644.1
FIN zero 183 343 354 194 526.81 171.4 1,772.2
zero 160 520 198 138 280 142.4 1,438.4
Note to table 4.1.
Source: European Voice newspaper, 18-14 July 1996, page 19. 
National and Community initiatives.
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For national initiatives, the Member States, acting in conjunction 
with the regional authorities, submits to the Commission a 
development plan setting out its priorities for action. A 
Community Support framework (CSF) is then negotiated between the 
Commission and the authorities of the Member State which reflects 
Community priority objectives. The Commission then adopts the 
programmes proposed by the Member State. An alternative route is 
for the Member State to submit a Single Programming Document (SPD) 
which brings together priorities and programmes. A single decision 
is then taken by the Commission on the SPD. A far as Community 
initiatives are concerned, the Commission relies on its Green 
Paper and the subsequent guidelines to adopt programmes proposed 
by the Member States. For the period 1994 to 1999, these 
programmes concentrate on seven themes: (i) cross-border 
cooperation (INTERREG);(ii) local development in rural areas 
(LEADER); (iii) support for the most remote regions (REGIS); (iv) 
the integration into working life of women, young people and the 
disadvantaged (EMPLOYMENT); (v) adaptation to industrial change 
(ADAPT, SME, RECHAR, KONVER, RESIDER, RETEX); (vi) urban policy 
(URBAN) and (vii) restructuring the fisheries sector (PESCA)•
4.2.1. Background: Two major reforms
The first reform of the Structural Funds was effected as part of a 
larger political and economic plan to reduce economic disparities 
in anticipation of a single market. The Single European Act 
introduced Title V into the EEC Treaty, which deals with economic 
and social cohesion. Article 13Od in particular requires the 
Commission to submit a proposal to amend the structure and 
operational rules of the Structural Funds. In the 1988 revised 
regulations, the emphasis was put on (i) concentration of 
Structural Funds on priority objectives, (ii) participation or 
partnership with the Member States, (iii) coherence with the 
Member States7 economic policies, (iv) sound financial management 
(v) monitoring involving simplification, surveillance and 
flexibility.
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The Structural Funds were reformed a second time in 1993. In J 
of that year the Council adopted six revised regulations gover 
the Structural Funds. With a budget of 141 billion ECU for a s 
year period, the Structural Funds became the favoured instrume 
to improve economic and social cohesion in the Community. Fir^ 
guiding principles were clarified and reinforced459 to include:
* The concentration460 of measures on six priority objectives (s< 
below) for development.
* Programming,461 which results in multi-annual development 
programmes.
* Partnership,462 which implies the closest cooperation possibl< 
between the Commission and the appropriate authorities at 
national, regional or local level in each Member State for the 
preparatory stage to implementation of the measures.
* Additionality,463 which means that Community assistance
459 See European Commission (1993) Community Structural 
Funds 1994-99, OOPEC, pp 10-25.
460 Reinforced concentration: Articles 1(1,2,3,4,5) 
[priority objectives]; 8(1,2,3) [eligibility of objective 1 
regions]; 9(12,3,4,5,6) [eligibility objective 2 regions]; 
11(1,2,3,4) [eligibility of objective 5b areas]; 12(1,2,3) 
[available resources] and 12(4) [allocation and 
appropriations] of Council regulation 2081/93 (Framework 
Regulation) OJ (1993) L 193/44.
461 Programming: Article 6 of Council Regulation 2081/93 
[period covered and timetable]; Articles 8,9,10, lib of 
Council Regulation 2081/93 and Articles 5,6 and 10 of Council 
Regulation 2081/93 [adjusted procedures]; Article 1 of ERDF 
Regulation 2083/93, Article 1 of ESF Regulation 2084/93, 
Articles 2 and 5 of EAGGF-Guidance Fund 2085/93, Article 3 of 
FIFG Regulation 2080/93 [scope of funds].
462 Partnership: Article 4 of Council Regulation 2081/93.
463 Additionality: Article 9 of Council Regulation 2082/93. 
Each Member State now has to ' maintain, in the whole of the 
territory concerned, its public structural or comparable 
expenditure at least at the same level as in the previous 
programming period, taking into account the macro-economic
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complements the contributions of the Member State rather than 
reducing them. This requires that the Member States maintain 
public spending on each objective at no less than the level 
reached in the preceding period.
Another key principle which is reiterated in the 1993 revised 
Framework Regulation is co-financing.464 The Community 
contribution as a general rule is still not more than 50% of the 
total costs for Objectives 2, 4 and 5b and not more than 75% of 
the total cost for assistance under Objective 1. However Article 
13(3) of the Framework Regulation specifies that, in exceptional 
and duly justified cases, the contribution from the Structural 
Funds in Objective 1 regional in the four Member States concerned 
by the Cohesion Fund may rise to a maximum of 80% of the total 
cost, and to a maximum of 85% of the total cost for the outermost 
regions as well as for the outlying Greek islands which are under 
a handicap as far as distance is concerned.
Objective 1 provides ERD, ESF and EAGGF Guidance Section financial 
assistance465 for regions with a per capita GDP of less than 75% 
of the Union average (almost 70% of total Structural Funds 
allocation goes to designated objective 1 regions). Objective 2 
covers areas suffering from industrial decline where unemployment 
rates are higher than the EU average through the ERDF and ESF. 
Objectives 3 and 4 cover the long-term and young unemployed, and 
workers whose employment prospects are threatened by industrial 
change through the ESF. Objectives 5(a) and 5(b) apply to fragile 
rural areas and farmers and fishermen facing structural changes. 
Objective 5(a) operations are financed through the EAGGF Guidance
circumstances in which the funding take place, as well as a 
number of specific economic circumstances, namely 
privatisations, an unusual level of public structural 
expenditure undertaken in the previous programming period and 
business cycles i the national economy'.
464 Article 13 of Council Regulation 2081/93 OJ (1993) L 
193/5.
465 For correspondence between funds and objectives, see 
Article 2 of Council Regulation 2081/93 OJ (1993) L 193/5.
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Section and FIFG, and 5(b) though the EAGGF Guidance Section, the 
ESF and ERDF. Finally objective 6 was set up to cater for the 
special needs of the Nordic countries when they joined the 
European Union in 1995, and aims to promote employment and 
structural adjustment in areas with an extremely low population 
density, through all the funds.466
Where a form of assistance involves participation under more than 
one Structural Fund and/or more than one other financial 
instrument, it may be implemented in the form of an integrated 
approach.467
The revised regulations thus not only made possible the financing 
of operations in new regions and the co-financing of new 
operations, but also introduced new procedural rules, as we shall 
see.
4.2.1. Fraud and the Structural Funds
Although much has been written about fraud affecting the CAP, and 
in particular the EAGGF Guarantee Section fraud, there is a deart 
of literature on Structural Funds, in spite of the growing number 
of reported irregularities, which must be at least partly related 
to the new requirements placed on Member States by the 1993 
reform.
In 1995, 58% of cases of irregularities notified concerned the 
European Social Fund, 20% the European Regional Fund, 20% the 
EAGGF-Guidance, 2% FIFG and 1% the Cohesion Fund.468 The total
466 Article 52 of Council Decision 95/1 OJ (1995) L 1 
adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new 
Member States to the European Union amending Protocol number 6 
annexed to the Act of Accession (OJ (1994) C 241, page 354.
467 Article 5(5) second subparagraph of Council Regulation 
2081/93 ('Framework Regulation').
468 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1995 COM(96) 173, OOPEC, table 7 page 90.
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financial impact was estimated at 44 million ECU,469 although it 
is not always possible to quantify the exact financial impact. 
Broadly frauds affecting the Structural Funds, whether they affect 
national or Community initiatives, seem to fall into three 
categories: (i) cases where 'phantom' activities are involved (ii) 
cases where funds are used or a different purpose and (iii) 
procurement frauds, when the EC competition rules are breached^. 
Frauds usually involve over-invoicing, falsifying documents and/or 
bribery of officials (see chapter 6 on corruption).
(i) National initiatives
ESF fraud
Community fraud involving vocational training programmes tends to 
be of two types: (i) when the project appears to meet all the 
criteria but its cost has been deliberately inflated, and (ii) 
when false accounts are submitted in order to get approval for a 
non-existent or ineligible project or to obtain more than the 
project actually costs.470
Case 1
Between 1989 and 1993 a Belgian institute received the equivalent 
of 760 000 ECU by way of co-financing for training schemes. The 
Schemes never took place: the instructors mentioned in the files 
were in fact research workers who had never done any teaching.471
Case 2
469 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1995 COM(96) 173, OOPEC, table 5 page 88.
470 Bassi, A (1994) Community frauds upon the ESF: The 
Italian experience, in The legal protection of the financial 
interests of the Community: Progress and prospects since the 
Brussels seminar of 1989, pp 225-238.
471 European Commission (1995) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual report for 
1994, OOPEC, page 51.
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An italian firm received 5 million ECU of ESF between 1985 and 
1992 to train pilots. The students listed were in fact fictitious 
Following an investigation by the Naples Court seven airline 
officials were prosecuted.472
Case 3
The Commission found a number of anomalies in the contract 
management procedure operated by a recipient company in Sardinia. 
Apart from anything else, there was no way of distinguishing 
training costs (if indeed there were any) and salary costs.473
Case 4
In Lisbon, a trade union federation and some of its leaders and 
subcontractors have been prosecuted for diverting ESF and nationa 
subsidies worth 1.5 million ECU. The organisers had presented 
artificially inflated expenditure and had failed to organize 
training courses.474
Case 5
More recently (July 1996) a British university has come under 
scrutiny over 600,000 pounds of ESF, which allegedly had not been 
used to retrain unemployed people, but rather to finance existing 
students.475
ERF fraud
The granting of large regional development contracts can involve
472 European Commission (1995) Protecting the Community's 
financial interest The fight against fraud Annual Report for
1994, page 52.
473 Ibid, page 51.
474 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report for
1995, page 74.
475 Newspaper article: 'EU fraud squad calls on campus', in 
Guardian, 23 July 1996, pp 2 and 3, Education Section.
162
breaches of the EC procurement rules,476 when for example public 
works contracts are granted in exchange for favours.477
Case 6
On scrutinizing the administration of the French Departement of 
Var in 1994-95, the Provence-Alpes Cote d'Azur regional audit body 
discovered over-invoicing involving more that 5 million ECU in 
connection with the supply of equipment to encourage technical 
innovation (ERDF co-financing 38 million ECU under the Renaval 
programme for the conversion of shipbuilding areas from 1990 to 
1993)• The judicial inquiries suggest that local councillors 
received under-the-counter payments totalling at least 0.5 to 1 
million ECU in exchange for falsifying public contracts.478
Guidance Section fraud
Case 7
As a result of an investigation by the magistrates at Reggioi 
Calabria (Italy) carried out in conjunction with a Commission on- 
the-spot investigation in January 1994, it was established that 
serious irregularities extended to olive oil storage and bottling 
facilities at the Calabria regional centre at San Lorenz, as well 
as to the storage centres at Castri and Eboli. The three centres 
had visibly never actually operated, for at both Castri ad Eboli 
buildings were dilapidated, access roads were impassable and 
bottling machinery was neither bolted to the floor nor connected to 
vats. The Commission commenced the procedure for halting 
assistance and recovering sums already paid - approximately 3 
million ECU. It joined partie civile proceedings to the
476 See Article 7(1) of Council Regulation 2081/93 and 
second subparagraph of Article 25(6) of Council Regulation 
2082/93.
477 D'Aubert, F (1994) Main basse sur 1'Europe, pp 181-186 
on the Abruzzo scandal.
478 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual report for 
1995, COM(96) 173, page 75.
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prosecution at San Lorenzo.479
(ii) Community initiative fraud j
Set up in 1990,480 INTERREG is the largest Community Initiative.
It is intended to prepare frontier regions for the completion of 
the single market and aims to solve the specific economic 
development programmes of the Community's internal and external 
border regions. The total Structural Funds contribution to 
INTERREG during the 1989-1993 period was initially estimated at 
800 million ECU. Typical frauds affecting INTERREG481 involve the 
use of INTERREG funds for projects which involve little or no 
inter-regional cooperation.
Case 8
When the Court of Auditors carried out its audit of the INTERREG 
Community initiative between Ireland and the UK, it found that 
only 39 out of the 270 projects of which the OP consisted were of 
a trans-frontier nature and were receiving joint financing from 
two Member States on the basis of this.482
Case 9
In Sardinia, six persons were committed for trial on charges of 
diverting aid granted by the Commission for the construction of ai 
innovative wind-power plant costing an estimated 1.25 million.
Case 10
In 1994, for the first time, the Commission sent a request to
479 European Commission (1995) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual report for 
1994, OOPEC, page 53.
480 Communication C(90) 1562/3 OJ C (1990) 215, Annex 1.
481 See Court of Auditors OJ (1995) C 303 for the 1994 
financial year, 4.61 - 4.72.
482 Court of Auditors OJ (1995) C 303 concerning the 
financial year 1994, at 4.68.
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twelve Member States under Article 209a EC483 in order investigate 
a network of contractors in the tourism field. The use of 
fictitious subcontractors and over-invoicing were two of the means 
used by the networks.484
4.2.3. Structural Funds control framework
According to Article 23 of Council Regulation 4253/88483 Member 
States had to inform the Commission of the measures taken to 
verify that operations had been properly carried out, to prevent 
and to take action against irregularities and to recover any 
amounts lost. This vague requirement was supplemented by a Code of 
Conduct486 requiring Member States, inter alia, to report 
irregularities above 4 000 ECU every four months. This code of 
conduct was subsequently annulled by the European Court of Justice 
in 1991,487 on the grounds that it went beyond the measures 
intended in Article 23(1) of Council Regulation 4253/88.488 This, 
predictably, had a negative impact on Member States' reporting 
activities. At the end of 1992, for example, only two Member
483 The second paragraph of Article 209a reads: 'Without 
prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, Member States 
shall coordinate their action aimed at protecting the 
financial interests of the Community against fraud. To this 
end they shall organize, with the help of the Commission close 
and regular cooperation between the competent departments of 
their administrations.' The implementation of more 
comprehensive cooperation on enforcement to tackle cross- 
border fraud committed by organized crime rings is thus a 
particular aim of Article 209a of the EC Treaty.
484 European Commission (1995) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1994, page 54.
485 OJ (1988) L 374/1.
486 Code of Conduct OJ (1990) C 200/3 on the implementing 
provisions for Article 23(l)of Council Regulation 4253/88 
relating to irregularities, and the organization of an 
information system for irregularities.
487 Case C-303/90 France v Commission judgment of the Court 
of 13 November 1991.
488 OJ (1988) L 374/1.
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States had reported cases with total financial implications of 
approximately 1 million ECU.489 In its Annual Report for the year 
191, the Court of Auditors denounced this state of affairs.490
The same Regulation empowered the Commission to carry 
autonomous491 or associated checks, which involve Commission 
officials taking part in on-the-spot checks carried out by the 
Member States' authorities.492 However it seems that, with scarce 
reporting from the Member States, the Structural Funds remained a 
low inspection priority for the Commission, since no associated 
checks were carried out until 1994.493 But the regulatory 
landscape was to change dramatically after 1993.
After the second reform, the Structural Funds including the 
Cohesion Fund still share the same regulatory framework, which cai 
be found in Council Regulation 2082/93494 (the Coordination
489 European Commission (1992) Report and Action Programme 
for 1993 COM(93) 141, OOPEC, page 10; also European commission
(1995) Protecting the Community's financial interests The 
fight against fraud Annual report 1995, COM(96) 173, OOPEC, 
table 23 page 96.
490 Court of Auditors Annual Report for the financial year 
1991 OJ (1992) C 330, 7.43-7.44.
491 Article 23(2) first and second subparagraphs of Council 
Regulation 4253/88 OJ (1988) L 374/1 laying down provisions 
for implementing Regulation 2052/88 as regards coordination of 
the activities of the different Structural Funds between 
themselves and with the operations of the EIB and the other 
existing financial instruments.
492 Article 23(2) third and fourth subparagraphs of Council 
Regulation 4253/88 OJ (1988) L 374/1.
493 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1995, OOPEC, table 5 page 88.
494 Council Regulation 2082/93 OJ (1993) L 193/20 laying 
down provisions for implementing Regulation 2052/88 as regards 
coordination of the activities of the different Structural 
Funds between themselves and with the operations of the 
European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments.
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Regulation) which amends Council Regulation 4253/88495 and extends 
its provisions to the Cohesion Fund and FIFG. The former 
Regulation 2082/93 lays down rules for financial control (Article 
23), the reduction suspension and cancellation of assistance 
(Article 24) and monitoring, appraisal and evaluation (Articles 25 
and 26) within the framework of partnership, as defined above. 
Articles 23 and 24 in particular herald two significant changes. 
Firstly, there is a move from the 1989 system of control of 
individual projects, towards a regime of control based on 'systems 
audit', which places greater emphasis on controls carried out in 
the Member States. Secondly, there is also more emphasis on the 
role of Member States in managing and controlling funds, in line 
with the recognition that Member States administrations are 
responsible for 80% of expenditure, and also with the principle of 
subsidiarity enshrined in the EEC Treaty by the Treaty on European 
Union signed at Maastricht. As a result of this new approach, 
Commission Regulations 1681/94496 and 1831/94497 (inspired from 
Council Regulation 595/91498 already in force in the EAGGF 
Guarantee Section) were adopted in order to define the duties of 
Member States with respect to irregularities and recovery in more 
detail.
495 OJ (1988) L 374/1.
496 OJ (1994) L 178/47.
497 OJ (1994) 191/9.
498 OJ (191) L 67/11.
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(i) Financial Control
According to Article 24 of Council Regulation 2082/93499 (the 
Coordination Regulation), the Commission may now reduce or suspen 
assistance if an irregularity or significant change affecting the 
nature and conditions for the implementation of the operation or 
measure are revealed. Sums received unduly or to be recovered mus 
be repaid to the Commission.500
(ii) Reporting fraud
Every quarter, Member States have a duty to make a detailed repor 
to the Commission concerning any irregularities involving sums of 
over 4 000 ECU501 (unless expressly required by the Commission) 
which have been the subject of an initial administrative or 
judicial investigations.502 In this context Member States must 
also report, on a quarterly basis, the measures taken to recover 
sums wrongly paid. This includes the reasons for any abandonment 
of recovery procedure or any abandonment of criminal 
prosecutions.503 By the end of 1993, nine out of 12 Member States 
had reported a small number of cases, with a financial impact of 
million ECU.504 But by the end of 1995 194 cases of irregularities 
had been reported in total, with a total financial impact of 44
499 OJ (1993) L 193/20.
500 Article 24(3) of Coordination Regulation.
501 Article 12 of Commission Regulation 1681/94 OJ (1994) L 
178/43, concerning irregularities and the recovery of sums 
wrongly paid in connection with the financing of the 
structural policies and the organisation of an information 
system in this field.
502 Article 3 of Commission Regulation 1681/94 OJ (1994) L 
178/43.
503 Article 5 of Commission Regulation 1681/94 OJ (1994) L 
178/43.
504 European Commission (1995) Protecting the Community's 
financial interest The fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1994, OOPEC, table 3 page 73 and table 4 page 74.
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million ECU.505
(iii) Recovery
Unlike Council Regulation 591/91,506 Council Regulations 
1681/94507 and 1831/94508 make no provisions for a 'reward' for 
national government departments amounting to 20% of sums 
recovered, but they do allow the possibility of amounts recovered 
being entirely reassigned for the benefit of operations or final 
beneficiaries other than those involved in the irregularity, 
subject to the constraints of transparency and budgetary 
discipline.309
(iv) Mutual assistance
When irregularities may have repercussions outside their 
territories or they show a new malpractice, Member States have a 
duty to report to the Commission to the other Member States 
concerned.510
(v) Monitoring
Member States are responsible for the monitoring of the 
assistance. Such monitoring must be carried out by way of jointly 
agreed reporting procedures, sample checks and the establishment
505 European Commission (1996) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report for 
1995, COM(96) 173, OOPEC, table 5 page 88.
506 Article 7 of Council regulation 595/91 OJ (1991) L
67.
507 OJ (1994) L 178/47.
508 OJ (1994) L 191/9.
509 Article 11 of Commission Regulation 1681/94 OJ (1994) L 
178/43.
510 Article 4 of Commission Regulation 1681/94 OJ (1994) L 
178/43.
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of monitoring
committees,511 Furthermore monitoring must be done with the help 
of indicators showing
- the stage reached in the operation and the goals to be attained 
within a given time span,
- the progress achieved on the management side and any related 
problems.512
The Commission and EIB may delegate representatives to the 
monitoring committees, with the agreement of the Member State 
concerned.513
For multi-annual operations, progress reports must be submitted 
every six month, and a final report must be submitted to the 
Commission within six months of completion of the operation.514 
The monitoring committee may adjust the procedure for granting 
assistance. These amendments have to be notified immediately to 
the Commission and to the Member States concerned. They become 
effective as soon as confirmation is received from the Commission 
within a period of 20 working days. Other amendments are decided 
by the Commission, in collaboration with the Member State 
concerned, after the monitoring committee has delivered its 
opinion.515
The Commission is concerned about transparency, and for this 
purpose, and within the context of the application of Community 
rules on the award of public contracts, notices sent to the 
Official Journal for publication must specify those projects for
511 Article 25(1) of Coordinating Regulation.
512 Article 25(2) of Coordinating Regulation.
513 Article 35(3) of Coordinating Regulation.
514 Article 25(4) of Coordinating Regulation.
515 Article 25(5) of Coordinating Regulation.
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which Community assistance has been applied for or granted.516 The 
Commission publishes implementation details in the Official 
Journal.517
(vi) Evaluation
In order to ensure the effectiveness of Community assistance, 
measures taken for structural purposes must be subjected to 
appraisal monitoring and, after their implementation, 
evaluation.518
4.2.4. Evaluation of control framework
Three main criticisms have been levelled at the present system by 
the Commission:
(i) the system is complex and the division of 
responsibilities between the Commission and the Member States 
on financial management and control is not clear.
(ii) The number of initiatives causes confusion.
(iii) The number of committees also causes confusion.
The Commission has suggested that one way of avoiding confusion 
would be to cut down the number of committees involved in the 
process, and to tighten control systems.519 One way of tightening 
controls would be to make the continuing financing of a programme
516 Article 25(6) of Coordinating Regulation.
517 Article 25(7) of Coordinating Regulation.
518 Council Regulation 2052/88 OJ (1988) 185/9 on the 
tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on 
coordination of their activities between themselves and with 
the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other 
existing financial instruments.
519 See Newspaper article 'Venice to duck regional funding 
issue', in European Voice 2-8 May 1996, page 5.
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more strictly conditional upon agreed terms.
The Commission should be stronger and stop paying out money 
if it is not satisfied with the programmes. Under the 
Structural Funds we can say that if something is not changed 
after the first set of payments, we will not hand over the 
remaining funds.520
More fundamental criticism has also been put forward.
(a) The highest proportion of reported fraud concerns the 
ESF. The services subsidised by the ESF tend to be 
intangible, and it can be difficult to monitor progress or 
evaluate the impact of a measure. Generally with respect to 
the ESF and other Structural Funds goals need to be more 
clearly defined.
(b) The task of assessing genuine additionality can be 
complicated - particularly in the case of multiple 
funding.521 Occasionally infra-state issues of subsidiarity 
arise and disputes about the level at which additionality 
should operate (local, regional or national) .522 This means 
that the principle of co-financing may not offer the desired 
safeguard against fraud.
(c) ERDF payments are mainly paid in advance and have had th< 
temporary effect of an advance to national budgets, at least
520 Cf. extract from European Voice newspaper of 9-11 May 
1996 'Gradin demands tougher measures to combat fraud' in 
AGON number 12, June 1996, page 16.
521 See for example European Commission (1994) Report on 
the audit and management and control systems for Structural 
Fund measures in the Member States, SE(94) 1654, page 20.
522 See Fothergill, S(1995) The struggle over European 
funding, Local Government Information Unit, London; also 
White, S (1996) EC fraud, subsidiarity and prospects for the 
IGC: A regional dimension? European Urban and Regional 
Studies, 3(3), 262-266.
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where these advances are not paid out immediately to the 
final recipient. This situation,the Court of Auditors has 
suggested 'does not constitute a guarantee for the best 
possible use of the resources mobilized'.523
The reforms needed in order to fraud-proof Structural Funds 
therefore go beyond the proposed reinforcement of ex ante and ex 
post assessments.
4.2.5. New developments
Member States have been holding back matching funds, which means 
that unclaimed funds have risen from 15 billion ECU in 1993 to 16 
billion ECU by July 1996.524
A series of cooperation protocols have been signed to cooperate on
the control of the use of Structural Funds.
Concern has been expressed over the future of the Structural Funds
in an enlarged union, although decisions on support for regions 
under the Structural Funds after 1999, including the designation 
of eligible areas, will not be made before the beginning of 1998.
523 Court of Auditors OJ C (1995) 303 Annual Report for the 
1994 financial year, at 4.93.
524 Newspaper article 'EU states fail to spend £16 billion 
in regional aid', in Financial Times, 29 July 1996, page 1.
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CHAPTER 5. THE RECOVERY OF UNWARRANTED PAYMENTS
5.1. Introduction
This chapter deals with the recovery of unwarranted payments in 
the UK. Firstly it outlines the responsibilities of the Member 
States in the present budget structure (5.1.). It then goes on to 
examine the modes of recovery available in English law in some 
detail (5.2.). A brief comparison of British and Danish systems 
(5.3.) leads to a concluding discussion on possible improvements 
(5.4.). It is hoped that this chapter, including its brief, but 
necessary comparative element, will have the potential to 
stimulate discussion on ways of improving recovery rates.
At a time when a consensus no longer seems to prevail on the 
'European Project', waste and fraud in the budget of the European 
Communities, more than ever, have the potential to undermine the 
credibility of the Union.525 The United Kingdom has been 
particularly vociferous in demanding improvements in this area, at 
times even urging the Commission to take more steps to combat 
waste and fraud. Since the late 1980s the Commission has been 
highly active in assisting the Member States in the fight against 
fraud affecting the Community budget, as evidenced by a series of 
policies and measures.
The recovery of unwarranted payments, however, is the sole 
responsibility of the Member States. In the words of the 
Commission '[T]he recovery of all income due to the Community 
budget and all Community funds which have been acquired 
fraudulently is a[nother] high priority. Virtually all own
525 See Report by the European Court of Auditors to the 
Reflection Group, May 1995, 3.1 p 8; also speech by Anita 
Gradin, Commissioner with a responsibility for fraud 
prevention, reported in Reuter textline of 30 March 1995; 
speech by Diemut Theato, MEP, Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Control of the European Parliament at the University 
of Urbino, 9 June 1995 reported in AGON, no 10, October 1995.
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resources are collected by the Member States and about 80% of 
Community funds are paid out to the final beneficiary by the 
member States. This is why recovery in the first instance is a 
task for the Member States.526 Such recoveries are effected with 
varying degrees of speed and success throughout the European 
Union. In its Annual report for the 1993 financial year, the 
European Court of Auditors deplored the general 'lack of success 
so far' in that area and stressed the need for urgent attention. 
This view was also shared by the Commission's Directorate for 
financial Control (DG XX), and lead to the commissioning of a 
study in 1995, which focused on each of the Member States' rules 
governing settlements and similar arrangements and their 
application to Community expenditure (the 'settlement' study). Fo; 
the purpose of the study, on which this chapter draws, 
'settlement' was broadly defined by the Commission as 'any act 
whereby the authorities of a Member state exercise a power to 
negotiate and terminate a dispute or state of uncertainty as to 
rights and obligations in the context of procedures for the 
recovery of sums of money or for the imposition of penalties'.527 
The aim of the United Kingdom national study, carried out by the 
present author, was to throw some light on the way the relevant 
United Kingdom authorities recover sums which have been wrongly 
paid by national authorities from EC funds. It paid particular 
attention to extra-judicial settlements since the Commission was 
concerned that extra-judicial settlements in particular lead to 
sub-optimal recoveries.
The first, and probably the most striking feature of the British 
way of settling such matters, is that the three jurisdictions of
526 European Commission (1995) Protecting the Community's 
financial interests The fight against fraud Annual Report 
1994, COM (95) 98, March.
527 European Commission, DG XX (Financial Control) , 1995, 
Methodological note to researchers.
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the United Kingdom528 do not display the same type of 'two phase' 
system commonly found in most other European Union Member 
States.529 Settlements occur either judicially (mostly through the 
civil courts) or extra-judicially through long established 
procedures such as compounding, or setting-off. This 'either-or' 
system is addressed in more detail in 5.2.1.- 5.2.3. Secondly, 
although some of the European Union Member States have centralised 
systems of fraud enforcement and recovery,530 the United Kingdom 
operates through a number of agencies. Their roles and recovery 
policies (when they have been made public) are addressed in 
5.2.4., as well as the particularities of various extra-judicial 
settlement procedures, such as setting-off, compounding and 
writing-off. The effectiveness of such procedures is discussed in
5.2.5. Issues arising from administrative discretion, and of 
redress against administrative decisions are dealt with in 5.2.6.
A brief comparison between the Danish and British systems is 
offered in 5.3, followed by concluding remarks in 5.4.
But first, a brief outline of the EC budget, and of the duties of 
the Member States with regards to the recovery of EC funds may 
prove useful background.
5.1,1. Budget structure
The European budget has been multiplied by a factor of 2.7 in ten
528 This chapter refers to England and Wales, unless 
otherwise stated. The law of Northern Ireland is closely 
modelled on English law, which applies in England and Wales. 
Scots law is markedly different: its legal principles, rules 
and concepts are modelled on both Romanistic and English laws.
529 'The judicial procedure is usually in two stages, the 
first corresponding to the ordinary first instance hearing by 
a judge sitting alone, and the second being an appeal 
procedure of one kind or another'. (Page 16 of the Delmas- 
Marty Report).
530 For example the Guarda di Finanza in Italy, the Office 
G&n£ral de Lutte contre la Delinquance Economique et 
Financiere Organisee in Belgium, and the Office Central pour 
la Repression de la Grande D€liquence Financiere and the 
Office Central de Prevention de la Corruption in France.
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years, rising from 28 800 million ECU in 1985 to 79 800 million | 
ECU in 1995.531 To give an idea of the magnitude of the EC budget, j
it suffices to add that the European Court of Auditors at present\
!audits revenue and expenditure representing approximately 4-5% of j 
the total budgets of all the Member States.532 The structure of 
the budget, however, is relatively simple.
The Union itself has no power to raise taxes, so it is dependent 
on the Member States' contributions for its budget. In 1977 
Council Regulation 2991/77533 established a system of 
'Communities' own resources', which established a basis for the 
Member States' contributions. Contributions from the Member States 
now fall into three broad categories. Firstly over 50% of EC 
revenue comes from a weighted percentage (usually around 1 - 1,4%; 
of the Member States' VAT revenues. This amounted to 38 million 
ECU in 1993 and 36 million ECU in 1994.534 Since 1988 the Member 
States have also made a contribution based on their national 
GNP,535 which constitutes the second largest contribution from the 
Member States. Lastly 'traditional own resources', made up of 
Customs duties, sugar and isoglucose levies and agricultural 
levies, altogether amounted to approximately 20% of total
531 European Court of Auditors (1995) Report to the 
Reflection Group on the operation of the Treaty on European 
Union, May, p 2.
532 European Court of Auditors (1995) The European Court of 
Auditors Auditing the finances of the European Union, June, p 
13, mimeoed text.
533 Council Regulation 2891/77 implementing the Decision of 
21 April 1970 on the replacement of financial contributions 
from Member States by the Communities' Own Resources, OJ 
(1977) L 336/1.
534 European Court of Auditors Annual Report for the 1993 
financial year OJ C (1994) 327, diagram 1: general budget 
1995: estimated revenue; also European Court of Auditors 
Statement of Assurance concerning activities financed from the 
general budget for the financial year 1994, 1995, diagram 1: 
general budget 1994: estimated revenue, November, mimeoed 
text.
535 Article 2 of Council Decision 88/376 OJ L (1988)
185/24.
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estimated revenue in the 1994 financial year. On the expenditure 
side, in 1994, over 52% of the budget was spent on EAGGF Guarantee 
Section Fund, concerned with the support of prices for 
agricultural products, and over 30% on 'structural operations and 
fisheries7 to help the more disadvantaged regions.
Although media reports have tended to focus on irregularities 
affecting subventions to the agricultural sector (i.e. on the 
expenditure side), frauds and irregularities affect all parts of 
the budget.
5.1.2. Frauds and irregularities
In March 1995 the Commission adopted the 1994 Annual report536 by 
its Coordinating Unit for combatting fraud in which it emerges 
that 4,264 cases of irregularities and fraud were detected by the 
Member States and the Commission in 1994, an increase of a third 
on 1993. The amounts involved in these irregularities doubled in 
relation to the previous year and reached 1.032.7 million ECU, 
which constitutes 1,2% of the total budget. It is the area of 
'traditional own resources', i.e the area concerned with the 
collection of import levies, which seems to present a more acute 
problem. Reported irregularities amounted to 3,4% of revenue in 
1993.
Commentators have argued that these figures were only 'the tip of 
the iceberg'. The extent to which one can rely on official 
statistics to measure the extent of crime remains one of the 
classic disputes in criminology.537 The position taken by UCLAF is
536 See Goybert, C (1995) La fraude communautaire: Mythes 
et realites, Revue du Marche Commun et de 1'Union Europ§enne, 
no. 388, May, 281-283.
537 Jupp, D (1989) Methods of criminological research, 
Unwin Hyman, London, p 47-48; also Eglin, P (1987) The dispute 
over the meaning and use of official statistics in the 
explanation of deviance, in J. Hughes, J. Anderson and W. 
Sharrock, Classic disputes in sociology, Allen and Unwin, 
London, p 108-36.
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typically institutionalist: 'There is no evidence that the level 
of frauds on the EU budget is increasing. However, there is a 
steadily increasing trend to discover fraud,[...] which can be 
attributed to initiatives taken by UCLAF to achieve effective 
enforcement and verification efforts on the part of the Member 
States.'538 In this figures and statistics from the Commission 
data bases are useful in as much as they draw our attention to th 
level of reporting and enforcement activity. However, there is no 
doubt that the more irregularities are reported, the more money 
the Member States have to recover in order to pay it back into th< 
common purse. It is to the specific duties of the Member States 
that we turn now.
5.1.3. Duties of Member States
The Member States have a set of duties to fulfil with regards to 
the sanctioning of irregularities. For instance, sanctions must 
guarantee real and effective judicial protection539 and have a 
real deterrent effect.540 Furthermore redress must be available 
against administrative decisions. The remedies themselves must be 
effective. They must not be available under less favourable 
conditions than those applicable to the enforcement of a similar 
right of a domestic nature.541 Remedies must be designed in such a 
way that it is not impossible to exercise the rights the national
538 UCLAF (1995) Anti-fraud coordination in the EU,
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol 3, 2:65- 
74.
539 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, para
23.
540 Case 79/83 Dorit Hartz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH [1984] 
ECR 1921, 1941.
541 See for example cases 33/76 Rewe v 
Landwirtschaftskammer ftir das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, 1997- 
1998; 309/85 Barra v Belgium and the City of Liege [1988] 2 
CMLR 409, 418.
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courts have a duty to protect.542 Finally remedies should not be 
less favourable than those governing the same543 or similar rights 
of action in an internal matter.544 Member States also have 
particular duties with respect to recovery, both on the revenue 
and expenditure sides.
On the revenue side, Council Regulation 2891/77545 requires the 
Member States to establish, enter in the accounts and recover any 
amounts due in cases where fraud or irregularity has been 
established. The Commission's role is to ensure that recovery 
procedures are indeed initiated and completed by national 
authorities so that Member States can be given a discharge when 
their management is satisfactory. If sums are not recoverable 
owing, for example, to bankruptcy or lapse of time, the onus is on 
the Member State to show that it has done everything possible to 
recover them if it is to be exempted from making them available to 
the Community.546 The Regulation also introduced the possibility 
of releasing Member States from the obligation to make amounts 
available for reasons of force majeure. Because of the very 
restrictive interpretation of force majeure by the Court of 
Justice, the Member States have only made use of this possibility 
in very rare occasions since the Regulation entered into force.
In accordance with Article 6(2) (b) of Regulation 1552/89,547 
Member States must, in the quarterly statements which they send to 
the Commission, enter established entitlements that have not yet 
been recovered in a separate 'B' account. These are then
542 Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschaap voor Siegerwassen 
[1976] ECR 2043.
543 Ibid.
544 Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, 3612.
545 Regulation 2891/77, OJ (1977) L 336/1.
546 European Commission (1995) The fight against fraud 
Annual Report for 1994, pp 70-71.
547 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
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incorporated annually into the Commission's balance sheet and 
revenue and expenditure account. However in its report on the 
application of Council Regulation 1552/89548 produced in 1992, the 
Commission remarked that few cases had been reported where amounts 
of more than 10 000 ECU had not been recovered, as required by 
Article 6(3)(2) of the Regulation. The cases involving more than 
10 000 ECU reported by Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom had been the result of bankruptcies where there were no 
assets, the disappearance of debtors or insufficient 
guarantees.549 In its special report accompanying the Statement of 
Assurance for the financial year 1994,550 the European Court of 
Auditors pointed out that 'the separate accounts held by the 
Member States, which serve as the basis for the Commission's data, 
contain numerous errors and omissions, the main one being that 
they are not exhaustive. [...] The checks carried out in various 
Member States revealed a variety of shortcomings in the way the 
separate accounts were kept, particularly in the United Kingdom, 
where, following the audits carried out, the national authorities 
called upon the services concerned to make the necessary 
improvements.' An assurance has now been given by the British 
government that 'B' accounts would be kept in future. This state 
of affairs has made it difficult to quantify amounts yet to be 
recovered in the UK.
The Commission has proposed changes to Regulation 1552/89,551 in
548 OJ (1989) L 155/1.
549 See European Commission (1992) Report on the 
application of Council Regulation 1552/89 implementing 
Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom on the systems of the 
Communities' own resources, COM (92) 530, December.
550 European Court of Auditors (1995) Special Report in 
support of the Statement of Assurance concerning activities 
financed from the general budget for the financial year 1994 
accompanied by the Commission's reply, the Parliament's reply, 
the Court of Justice's reply, the Economic and Social 
Committee's reply and the Committee of the Regions' reply, 
November, OOPEC.
551 See amended proposal for a Council Regulation amending 
Council regulation 1552/89, OJ (1994) C 382/6.
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order to help secure an improvement in the follow up of 
recoveries. The proposed amendment, yet to be agreed by Council 
seeks to achieve the following:
* more effective penalties for delays in making available amounts 
due
* an analysis of the reasons for failure to recover own resources 
- so that criteria can be drawn up defining the financial 
liability of the authorities responsible for collection
* more uniform and comprehensive information on fraud and 
irregularities involving more than 10 000 ECU
* an improvement in the Community's ability to assess the quality 
and results of the recovery and inspection activities of the 
national authorities through comprehensive annual reports 
presented according to a standard model.
On the expenditure side, Council Regulation 729/70552, amended by 
Council Regulation 2048/88353 requires the Member States to 
recover EAGGF sums paid as a result of irregularities or 
negligence, and inform the Commission of the measures taken for 
those purposes and in particular of the state of the 
administrative and judicial procedures. Read literally, this is 
sometimes interpreted by officials to mean that full recovery must 
be pursued in the courts, which would leave little room for 
administrative discretion.
Similar obligations to recover funds exist with respect to 
Structural Funds, in accordance with Council Regulations 
4253/88554 and 2082/93.555 Member States are free, in the absence 
of a remedy expressly provided by the Community measure in 
question, to choose between sanctions available under national
552 OJ 1970 L 94/13.
553 OJ 1988 L 185/1.
554 OJ (1988) L 374/1.
553 OJ (1993) L 193/20.
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law.556 Where the question of sanctions is not dealt with in 
Community measures, then
[P]eriods of limitation, rights of set off, the extent of 
rights or reimbursement of improper charges, payment of j 
interest and so on are matters to be regulated by the 
domestic law of the Member States in whose courts the 
individual right-holder seeks to proceed.557
5.1.4. Recoveries
It is also in the area of traditional own resources that Member 
States seem to have the most difficulties in effecting recoverie 
For the period 1991-1994, a total of 94% of the money obtained 
through irregularities in the traditional own resources sector w 
still to be recovered, as opposed to 83% on the expenditure side 
(see tables 5.1 to 5.4).
In the area of traditional own resources, in the period 1991-199 
the Member States recovered between 0% and 53% of amounts 
outstanding. The United Kingdom notified 22% of cases, but only 
recovered 2% of sums due (see tables 5.3. and 5.4.).
On the expenditure side, and for the same period, the Member 
States recovered between 3% and 66% of unwarranted payments. The 
United Kingdom notified 15% of cases and recovered 41% of sums di 
(see tables 5.1.- 5.2.).
556 Cases 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb BV v Produktshaap voor 
Siegerwassen [1977] ECR 137; 265/78 H Ferweda BV v Produkt 
voor Vee en Vlees [1980] ECR 617.
557 Bourgoin S A and others v Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food [1986] QB 716, 755, per Oliver LJ (dissenting).
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Table 5.1. Communications of Member States on Irregularities,
EA66F Guarantee Section 1991-94*
----  Cases ----
Notif Closed Open 
-ied
----  Amounts in ECU ----
Notified Recovered To be
recovered
B 119 58 61 11 450 737 154 10 715 940
DK 221 175 46 10 503 868 4 908 684 5 595 184
G 546 265 281 66 217 645 12 301 686 53 915 959
EL 327 65 262 86 353 034 58 267 596 28 085 438
P 519 218 301 82 746 803 2 263 922 80 482 881
F 389 254 135 54 252 457 17 282 240 36 970 217
IR 65 48 17 5 507 529 2 137 890 3 369 639
I 955 108 847 560 685 454 35 748 902 524 936 552
NL 428 331 97 22 621 210 11 093 595 11 527 615
P 270 38 232 14 961 534 1 037 472 13 924 062
UK 670 466 204 26 774 056 11 006 035 14 825 247
ALL 4 509 2 026 2 483 942 073 684 156 82 176 784 348 734
Not* to tables 5.1-5.4. Source: European Commission (1995) Protecting the 
Community's financial interests, The fight against fraud, Annual Report 1994, pp 
82-83. Note to table 5.1. Luxembourg had no irregularities to report. Belgium 
and Greece are represented only for the first three quarters of 1994.
Table 5.2. Recovery of Traditional EAGGF Guarantee Section, 1991- 
94 (first tvo quarters of 1994)__________________________________
Cases
notified
Amount
notified
% of amount notified 
recovered to be
recovered
B 3% 1% 6% 94%
DK 5% 1% 47% 53%
D 12% 7% 19% 81%
EL 7% 9% 66% 33%
ES 12% 9% 3% 97%
F 9% 6% 32% 68%
IR 1% 1% 39% 61%
I 21% 60% 6% 94%
NL 9% 2% 49% 51%
P 6% 2% 7% 93%
UK 15% 3% 41% 55%
ALL 100% 100% 17% 83%
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Tabla 5.3. Communications of Member States on Irregularities,
Traditional Own Resources, 1991-94 (first two quarters of 1994)
Not if 
-ied
• Cases ---
Closed Open Notified
Amounts in 
Recovered
ECU
To be 
recovered
B 328 203 125 49 205 846 7 267 239 41 938 607
DK 86 41 45 6 848 827 2 799 554 4 049 273
1 548 115 1 433 171 442 258 7 715 408 163 726 85
EL 66 66 3 223 998 3 223 998
SP 192 15 177 14 051 855 1 025 938 13 025 917
544 535 53 500 248 5 093 467 48 406 781
IR 32 13 19 8 001 875 1 183 211 6 818 664
408 41 367 92 474 916 654 257 91 820 659
85 220 45 417 39 803
NL 44 43 9 513 448 122 232 9 391 216
84 39 45 2 969 940 579 444 2 390 496
UK 961 224 737 92 167 252 1 844 104 90 323 148
ALL 4 295 702 3 593 503 485 683 28 330 271 475 155 412
Table 5.4. Recovery of Traditional Own Resources, 1991-94 (first 
two quarters of 1994)____
Cases
notified
Amount
notified
% of amount notified 
recovered to be
recovered
B 8% 10% 15% 85%
DK 2% 1% 41% 59%
36% 34% 5% 95%
EL 2% 1% 0% 100%
ES 4% 3% 7% 93%
13% 11% 10% 90%
IR 1% 2% 15% 85%
9% 18% 1% 99%
NL
UK
ALL
0%__
1%__
2%__
22%
100%
0%
2%
1%
18%
100%
53%
1%
20%
2%
6%
47%
99%
80%
98%
94%
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The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice offers little 
guidance on what may be an acceptable delay for the recovery 
of a sum owed to the EC budget. A recent case (1992) states 
that Member States have a duty to take steps to rectify 
irregularities promptly, whether time-limits are expressly 
laid down by relevant Community rules or not.558 Although it 
is not clear what the Court meant by 'promptly', it found that 
delays of ten and four years before commencing proceedings 
constituted negligence under Article 8 of Council Regulation 
729/70.559 At the moment delays of several years in recovering 
unwarranted payments seem to be the norm rather than the 
exception throughout the Union.
5.2. Recovering EC funds in the UK: background
In the United Kingdom, for some time, there has been concern 
over the perceived inadequacies of serious fraud trials.560 
This has added momentum to the 'creeping decriminalization' of 
fraud, including revenue fraud. The result has been that 'many 
against whom there is a strong prima facie case of fraud 
negotiate their way out of the criminal justice process'.561 
Civil proceedings, on the other hand tend to be long, complex 
and costly, so amounts are often settled before the hearing.
In contrast, extra-judicial (administrative) recovery has 
consistently been praised as fast, efficient and 
inexpensive.562 This type of recovery is in tune with the 
present government's pragmatic approach to revenue collecting,
558 Case 34/89 Italy v Commission re: olive oil production 
aid [1992] 2 CMLR 797, judgment 7-14, page 274-275.
559 Ibid.
560 See for example Fraud Trials Committee Report chaired 
by Lord Roskill (1986) HMSO, London.
561 Levi, M (1987) Regulating fraud, white-collar crime and 
the criminal process, Tavistock Publications, London, page 
183.
562 See for example Patel v Spence [1976] 1 WLR 1268, 1270 
and A-G v Johnstone (1926) 10 T.C 758.
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and its general concern for cost-effectiveness. This 
preference in turn raises the issue of the availability, and 
effectiveness of remedies against administrative decisions. 
The general features of criminal, civil and extra-judicial 
routes are explored below.
5.2.1. The civil route
Unlike most of its European Union neighbours, the United 
Kingdom has no administrative finance courts. All courts have 
full jurisdiction to decide cases in administrative matters 
and to exercise control over administrative bodies and 
tribunals. As a rule, only courts can impose fines. Another 
feature of the British systems is that civil and criminal 
jurisdictions are separate and distinct.
With some exceptions, the County Court (Sheriff Court in 
Scotland) usually deals with cases involving a debt up to a 
certain amount563 and the High Court (Court of Session in 
Scotland) with debts above that limit.564 It is open to the 
defendant to pay to the court the amount claimed before the 
hearing. If this is done at any time up to the time of the 
hearing, the action is stayed. The court and its 
administration take no part in preparing a case for trial 
other than to make orders and to grant relief but only upon 
the application of a party to the proceedings. Another 
important feature of civil judgments is that they are usually 
awarded irrespective of the debtor's ability to pay.
If the action is for a sum not exceeding £1,000 and when both 
parties agree565 the matter can go to a Small Claims Tribunal 
in the County Court (or Sheriff Court in Scotland). The usual
563 £50,000 in England and Wales.
564 S3 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
565 This limit can be raised to £5,000 when both parties 
are agreeable.
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rules of procedure do not apply and the waiting time for a 
hearing is shorter (usually six to eight weeks)• The 
Intervention Board (see below), for example, has made 
increasing use of this procedure since the increase in upper 
limit. The parties do not have to be represented, and it is 
possible for the State to send a non-legal member of staff to 
the hearing as a representative.566 The award is final 
although an arbitrator can set it aside if, for example, it 
was made in the absence of one of the parties, and a 
reasonable excuse for the absence is provided.
Insolvencies have increased at a vertiginous rate these last 
few years, and must be mentioned as they increasingly affect 
the authorities' ability to recover debts.567 In its first 
Statement of Assurance (for the financial year 1994) the 
European Court of Auditors points out that in one case a 
British company receiving a subsidy in the regional sector had 
gone out of business; neither a manager nor the company's 
accounts were available.568 Generally, in cases of 
insolvency,569 the official receiver (attached to the court)
566 Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (IBAP) : 
authority responsible for the administration of the CAP in the 
United Kingdom.
567 See newspaper article: '4,000 directors thought to be 
serial failures' in Financial Times, 28 October 1996, which 
reads: "Out of 952,432 UK company directors, 37% have been 
associated with one or more [business] failures in the past 
seven years. The number of directors with 10 or more failures 
to their names has climbed four-fold in two year [1994-1996] 
to 4,000. [This is due to] a general increase in criminal and 
fraudulent behaviour in the corporate world. Many of the 4,000 
directors deliberately closed down companies to avoid paying 
debts and then set up new ones, often in a bid to defraud 
customers, suppliers or business partners."
568 European Court of Auditors (1995) Statement of 
Assurance concerning activities financed from the general 
budget for the financial year 1994, page 71.
569 This is far from being an uncommon problem in the UK 
where the number of personal and corporate bankruptcies now 
number around 60,000 a year. This is due to a system where, 
broadly speaking, the advantages of bankruptcy or winding-up
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appoints a trustee or liquidator when there are assets to be 
distributed amongst creditors.570 The trustee is then 
responsible for the distribution of assets amongst creditors 
pari passu, but in strict order of priority. First, the 
expenses of bankruptcy must be paid.571 The costs can consume 
40% of assets, about twice as much as an individual voluntary 
arrangement. The government takes the biggest bite, followed 
by the insolvency practitioner, with lesser amounts by selling 
agents and solicitors.572
Second, preferential debts to a few Crown bodies take 
precedence. They are debts due to the Inland Revenue or 
Customs and Excise, social security contributions, 
contributions to occupational pension schemes, remuneration of 
employees, etc.573
Third, ordinary debts can be settled and, in this, all 
unsecured creditors rank equally. This usually means that each 
of the ordinary creditors receives a dividend expressed as so 
many pence in the pound upon the debt in question. As a rule 
the insolvency process produces minimal returns for ordinary 
unsecured creditors.
Clearly all bodies engaged in the recovery of EC funds are not 
granted the same status with respect to debt recovery, with
(getting rid of creditors) far outweigh the disadvantages 
(temporary disqualification for directorship of a company, for 
example). The leniency of this system has lead to the 'Phoenix 
Syndrome' where bankrupts repeatedly 'resurrect' 'new' 
companies under different names without paying old creditors. 
Some legal commentators talk about 'the bankruptcy of 
bankruptcy' and argue for reforms which allow more 
differentiation between the small domestic debtor and the 
corporate debtor.
570 S324 (1) of the 1986 Insolvency Act.
571 Ibid, S324 (1) of the 1986 Insolvency Act.
572 Graham Report (1994) Report chaired by David Graham, QC 
Insolvency law: An agenda for reform, JUSTICE.
573 Preferential debts are listed in Schedule 6 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986.
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Customs and Excise enjoying an advantage with respect to the 
recovery of VAT. All others are unsecured creditors. One 
criticism of the system is that creditors are not kept 
informed of developments.574
In its 1985 Report, the Civil Justice Review identified the 
main deficiencies of civil justice as being 'delays, cost and 
complexity'. The Heilbron-Hodge Report painted a similar 
picture in 1993 and called for reforms.575 Indeed, it is not 
unusual for recoveries to take over two years, and for costs 
to exceed monies recovered. A recent study estimated that when 
the costs of both sides were combined, they amounted to 125% 
of recoveries in the County Court and between 50 and 75% in 
the High Court.576 This has lead Lord Woolf to comment that 
'the present system provides higher benefits to lawyers than 
to their clients'.577 The 'cost-effectiveness threshold' is 
quite high, whatever the nature of the claim. More recently 
(June 1995) the Woolf Interim Report on the civil justice 
system in England and Wales578 put forward a series of 
recommendations, which in brief include:
o litigation to be divided into fast-track cases (£3,000 
to £10,000) and multi-track cases (more than £10,000); 
o fast-track cases to be subject to a streamlined 
procedure including an abbreviated trial, normally 
restricted to three hours, within 20 to 30 weeks;
574 Ibid.
575 Civil Justice on trial: The case for change.
576 See Slapper, G and Kelly, D (1993) English Legal 
System, Cavendish Publishing, 123-145.
577 Newspaper article 'The Mackay solution' editorial in 
the Financial Times, 29 July 1996, page 15.
578 Woolf Enquiry Team / The Right Honourable the Lord 
Woolf, 1995, Access to Justice: interim report to the Lord 
Chancellor on the civil justice system in England and Wales, 
published by on behalf of the Woolf Enquiry Team, London, 266 
pages, June.
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o sanctions to be imposed by judges in cases where 
lawyers fail to meet strict deadlines; 
o lawyers to take a precise pleading in a statement of 
case;
o judges to be given discretionary powers to allocate the 
burden of costs at the end of the case by reference to 
the conduct of the parties.579
Some of the proposals relate specifically to ' offers to 
settle9 and aim to encourage reasonable and early settlement 
of proceedings:
(1) The present practice of making payment into court 
should be replaced by a system which permits the parties 
to make an offer of settlement.
(2) Offers to settle can be made by a plaintiff as well 
as a defendant.
(3) Offers to settle can relate to individual issues.
(4) Offers to settle can be made before the commencement 
of proceedings.
(5) Offers to settle can result in substantially enhanced 
costs and interest being payable.
(6) The extent of entitlement to costs and interest in 
respect of an offer should be in the court's discretion 
and should depend on the extent of disclosure by the 
parties.
Criticisms of the proposals have been, inter alia, that it 
fails to break the 140 year cycle of making no real inroads on 
cost and delay, and that it augments judges' undirected
579 See Newspaper article 'Woolf report in sheep's 
clothing', in Times of 6 August 1996, page 35.
194
discretion.580
The situation at present is that most civil disputes are 
settled out of court: fever than 10% of cases where a writ is 
issued actually go to court. Notwithstanding this preference 
for out of court settlements, by far the largest number of 
cases dealt with by the County Court still relates to debt 
recovery. Currently the civil courts in England and Wales deal 
with over three million such claims each year. Should the 
Woolf recommendations with respect to settlements be 
implemented, one can expect that in the future, overall, an 
even larger proportion of cases will be settled out of court.
The Civil Fraud Regime
There has been a steady move away from criminal prosecution in 
the fiscal sphere. The 1985 Finance Act decriminalised VAT 
regulatory offences. As a whole VAT offences remain the most 
decriminalised, as the great majority are dealt with under the 
civil fraud regime. This regime, which was brought into being 
by Section 13 of the 1985 Finance Act on VAT, was extended to
excise duties by the 1994 Finance Act, and will also apply to
Customs duties shortly. The 'civil fraud' regime is therefore 
of particular significance in this context.
Under this regime, anyone who evades duty (whether or not his 
behaviour gives rise to any criminal liability) is liable to a 
penalty. The degree of proof required is based on the balance 
of probabilities rather than the criminal standard of beyond 
reasonable doubt.
In the civil fraud regime the standard of proof of dishonesty
is not stated. Evasion is defined as the act of claiming any
580 Watson, G (1996) From an adversarial to a managed 
system of litigation: a comparative critique of Lord Woolf's 
interim report, Achieving civil justice Appropriate dispute 
resolution for the 1990s, ed: R. Smith, Legal Action Group, 
London.
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repayment, rebate or drawback of duty, any relief exemption 
from or any allowance against duty, or any deferral or other 
postponement of liability to pay any duty or of the discharge 
by payment of any such liability, without being entitled to 
it.581 Although these acts do not necessarily attract the full 
range of financial penalties (fixed or proportionate penalty, 
daily penalty), failure to pay any amount appears to be a 
decisively aggravating factor, and attracts the full range of 
financial penalties from the court in all cases.582
A person convicted of the fraudulent evasion, or the attempted 
evasion of duty chargeable on goods (this usually involves 
forgery), or any provision of CEMA applicable to goods is 
liable to a penalty of the prescribed sum or three times the 
value of the goods, whichever is the greater, or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.583
In VAT cases, Customs and Excise will usually prosecute if a 
sworn statement (as to true earnings and profits) turns out to 
be incorrect.
Early cooperation with officials is taken into account when 
assessing the fine.584
Fines in the civil fraud regime
Under the civil fraud regime (soon to be extended to Customs 
duties, as mentioned earlier), the system of assessing the 
fine is mixed. It is proportional to the loss sustained, but 
also has a fixed-sum element (i) and (ii).
581 Article 8 (2) of the 1994 Finance Act.
582 Article 9(4) of the 1994 Finance Act.
583 Article 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act
1979.
584 Article 8(7) (b) and (d) of the 1994 Finance Act 1994.
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(i) for a failure to pay any amount of duty in 
contravention of subordinate legislation, 5% or £250, 
whichever is the greater amount
(ii) for the continuation of the above or failure to send 
a return, above the initial penalty in (i) to a penalty 
of £20 for every day, after the first, on which the 
conduct continues.585
There is also a right to mitigation on grounds which exclude 
insufficiency of funds.586
Criminal and civil liability
When irregularities entail both criminal and civil liability, 
parallel civil proceedings are usually delayed until the 
criminal prosecution is concluded. A fine or compensation 
order can be imposed by the criminal court at that stage. It 
is usually a matter of judicial discretion as to whether 
concurrent civil proceedings about the same subject-matter as 
a prosecution are stayed. The court must decide whether 
justice between the parties requires this. It will have 
regard, inter alia, to the following circumstances:
- the possibility of prejudicial publicity from the civil 
proceedings
- whether the criminal trial is imminent and
- whether there is a real danger that the defendant would be 
prejudiced by being forced to disclose his defence to the 
criminal charge prematurely.587
585 Article 9 of the 1994 Finance Act.
586 See Lagerberg, F (1994) It's no longer criminal, 
Taxation, 17 March, page 530-531.
587 Jefferson Ltd v Bhetcha [1979] I WLR 898. cf. Supreme 
Court Practice, Vol.2, para 3355 (1982 ed).
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5.2.2. The Criminal route
With regards to Crown prosecutions, the principle of 
expediency (opportunity) prevails.588 This means that the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 589, the Lord Advocate in 
Scotland or those responsible for prosecution decisions in 
departments such as HM Customs and Excise decide whether to 
prosecute or whether to pursue some other course of action 
(including dropping the case). In this context, Harding has 
pointed out that
[I]t would be misleading [...] to divorce negotiated 
settlements from the analogy of criminal proceedings when 
it is clear that at a national level of criminal 
procedure issues in relation to prosecution, trial and 
sentence may be decided in an administrative fashion.590
The CPS, for example, processes cases put up for prosecution 
through a two-stage evidential test. The first test consists 
in deciding whether there is enough evidence to provide a 
'realistic prospect of conviction' against each defendant on 
each charge. 'Weak evidence' remains the most often quoted
588 Professor Ashworth identified three groups of 
countries: (i) Member States where the principle of legality 
was maintained without significant exceptions like Austria, 
Greece and Spain (ii) Member States where the principle of 
expediency played a limited role like Portugal, Germany and 
France and (iii) Member States where prosecutors were allowed 
to make a wide use of the principle of expediency like 
Luxembourg, Sweden and the systems within the United Kingdom. 
(Ashworth, J (1989) Techniques for reducing subjective 
disparity in sentencing in Disparities in sentencing causes 
and solutions, Council of Europe, Strasbourg).
589 The Crown Prosecution Service was set up in 1986 and 
the prosecution of most criminal offences is now in its hands.
590 Harding, C (1993) European Community investigations and 
sanctions, Leicester University Press, page 68.
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reason for not going ahead with prosecution.591 The second 
test relates to the public interest. This means that even if 
the evidential sufficiency test is satisfied it must still be 
in the public interest to prosecute. In cases of any 
seriousness, a prosecution will usually take place unless 
there are public interest factors tending against 
prosecution.592 Two of the public interest factors against 
prosecution listed in the Code for Crown Prosecutors appear to 
be particularly relevant:
- The defendant has put right the loss or harm that was 
caused (but defendants must not avoid prosecution simply 
because they can pay compensation); or
- Details may be made public that could harm sources of 
information, international relations or national 
security.
But Crown prosecutors must decide how important each factor is 
in the circumstances of each case and go on to make an overall 
assessment.
There is no constitutional interpretation of the public 
interest. The executive is free to interpret public interest 
as they wish. In this context, Levi recently (1995) pointed 
out that
'[W]hat is or is not "in the public interest" is 
essentially subjective and can be political (with a small 
or a large p). British examples in which it has been 
alleged that pressure has been exerted not to prosecute 
in fraud cases include the House of Fraser case
591 See Home Office (1994) Case screening by the Crown 
Prosecution Service: how and why cases are terminated,
Research Study 137, HMSO.
592 See Crown Prosecution Service (1994) The Code for Crown 
Prosecutors.
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(involving the take-over of Harrods department store by 
the Fayed brothers, allegedly supported by the Sultan of 
Brunei); the Peter Cameron-Webb case (involving alleged 
"baby syndicates" given preferential treatment at Lloyd's 
of London); and the decision by the Department of Public 
Prosecution (DPP) in 1978 not to prosecute companies that 
broke sanctions imposed at the time of Rhodesia's 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence on the grounds 
that 'no good would be served by raking over these almost 
dead coals'. (The last is the only example in which 
policy rather than that usually unfalsifiable category 
"insufficient evidence" was given as the reason for non­
prosecution .)393
In the more recent 'Supergun' affair,394 Customs and Excise 
were advised that there were no realistic prospects of a 
conviction. But in view of the nature of the case, Customs and 
Excise sought advice from the Attorney-General as to whether 
there might be exceptional circumstances justifying 
prosecution in the public interest. The Attorney General 
concluded that a prosecution should not be brought without a 
reasonable prospect of conviction and that public interest 
considerations should not be introduced as a way to justify 
prosecutions [without a prospect of conviction]. Sir Richard 
Scott later endorsed this advice in his report, concluding
393 Levi, M (1995) Serious fraud in Britain, Corporate 
crime: Contemporary debates, eds F. Pearce and L. Snider, 
University of Toronto Press, 181-198, page 188.
394 The 'Supergun' affair involved the seizing in 1990 by 
Customs and Excise at Tees Dock, Middlesborough, UK of large 
tubes which were discovered to be sections of barrel for a 
huge long-range artillery gun. No export licence had been 
applied for as they were exported a petrochemical pipes. 
Customs and Excise prosecuted managers in the British firms 
who had forged the tubes. Two lines of defence emerged. The 
first was that the defendants did not know that the tubes were 
intended to be used as weapons. Secondly, the defendants had 
expressed concerns to the Ministry of Defence and the DTI in 
1988 about a possible military use of the tubes. The 
government departments had failed to investigate the concerns.
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that while there may be wholly exceptional circumstances in 
which such a prosecution could properly be brought, he could 
not formulate any practical examples.595 The CPS has been 
openly criticised for reducing or even dropping charges to 
save money.596
In his report, Sir Richard Scott took the view that although 
the CPS and the SFO were independent prosecuting agencies, 
government departments were not. Government departments' 
prosecutions could be regarded as a means of enforcing 
departmental policies in the area in question.597 This can 
lead (as in the 'Supergun' affair) to two different 
prosecuting bodies taking contrary decisions in the same 
circumstances. At present there are no signs that the various 
agencies which, in one way or another, represent the public 
interest actually converge in their approach to EC fraud.598
Government departments with powers of prosecution have their 
own guidelines for prosecution, which also adhere to the 
principle of opportunity. However policies on prosecutions are 
rarely set out publicly.599
595 'Scott Report' or Report of the Inquiry into the Export 
of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related 
Prosecutions (1996) HMSO, by Sir Richard Scott, Vice- 
Chancellor of the Supreme Court, J1 33, J1 39.
596 See Rose, D (1996) In the name of the law: The collapse 
of criminal justice; also newspaper article 'When justice 
takes a walk', in Guardian, November 19 1996, pp 2-3.
597 Scott Report, op.cit, K.4.7.
598 White, S (1995) The public interest as represented in 
English law: Relevance for EC fraud, proceeds on a conference 
held at Urbino, Italy, July.
599 Harwood, R (1996) Corruption and public sector fraud 
Prosecution by government agencies, Journal of Financial 
Crime, Volume 4, number 1, pp 51-54.
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Fines
Financial penalties are, by far, the most frequent penalties 
imposed by the criminal courts. A financial penalty can be 
imposed on its own, or in combination with a term of 
imprisonment, or any other sentence. In England, the 
magistrate's courts, which exercise jurisdiction over less 
serious crime, can impose a fine for any offence tried before 
them, up to a fixed upper limit.600
The Crown Court is empowered to impose a fine in lieu of, or 
in addition to imprisonment (provided that the offence does 
not carry a mandatory sentence such as life imprisonment). It 
enjoys an unlimited fining jurisdiction, although the 
prohibition of excessive fines found in the Magna Carta 
(1215)601 and the Bill of Rights (1689)602 still apply. In 
criminal courts generally, the level of the fine is determined 
by the gravity of the offence and the offender's financial 
circumstances.603 (A 'unit fine' experiment of 1991-1994 has 
been abandoned by the government). A fine can be paid in 
instalments. This is usually granted at the hearing without 
having to make a special application to the court. Both amount 
and period of repayment are subject to judicial discretion.
A Criminal court can request a financial circumstances report 
before imposing a fine. A fine can be imposed in addition to a
600 Where for example an offender has been summarily 
convicted of an offence triable either way the maximum fine is 
£5,000 under s.17(2)(c) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act.
601 Grebing, G (1982) The fine in comparative law a survey 
of 21 countries, Cambridge Institute of Criminology,
Occasional Papers number 9, page 86 and note 479.
602 It forbids 'excessive baile... excessive fines and 
cruell and unusuall punishments'.
603 S. 19 (2) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act explains that 
this may have the effect of either reducing or increasing he 
amount of the fine.
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term of imprisonment, or in addition to a probation order. 
Alternatively, it can be imposed on its own (see compensation 
order, 2)• A request to pay a fine by instalments is usually 
granted to the offender by the court without special 
application. Again, the amount and period of repayment are the 
subject of judicial discretion. In case of default to the 
terms agreed, a 'means inquiry' is ordered by the court. A 
means warrant has the effect of producing payment in most 
cases but, when it fails, the court is empowered to change the 
sum of the fine imposed or to remit. But generally speaking 
the Keith Committee (1983) found that, in revenue cases
'compared with the scale of culpable arrears, the fines 
imposed in the larger cases are modest...The recovery of 
fines imposed in the larger cases ...is slow and 
difficult...given the circumstances and scale of the 
larger tax frauds, it is questionable whether such 
sentences have significant deterrent value.'604
Compensation orders, which seek to compensate the victim for 
any damage caused, have been described as a method of short- 
circuiting civil proceedings. It is difficult to gauge, within 
the remit of this research, what role they have in the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Community, if any. Although in the past a compensation order 
could only be made in addition to another sentence for crime, 
a criminal court can now make one in its own right. A 
compensation order can also be made even though the precise 
amount of the loss or damage has not been proved.605
In cases of criminal bankruptcies the CPS is invariably the 
petitioner. In deciding whether to apply for a criminal 
bankruptcy order606 (which has the effect of making available
604 Keith Committee (1983) see supra.
605 Ibid.
606 S39 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.
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the machinery of civil bankruptcy administration for the 
recovery of sums owed), the CPS applies two criteria:
First, whether the offender has sufficient means to make 
bankruptcy proceedings worthwhile,
Second, whether it is in the public interest to take 
proceedings in respect of those assets (because, for example, 
such action might cause severe hardship to the criminal 
bankrupt's family).6fl7 But generally speaking, as Levi (1989) 
pointed out '... Civil redress against convicted persons is 
comparatively rare: it is more common as an alternative to 
prosecution./608
Finally there is no 'constitution de partie civile' whereby 
the civil and criminal actions can be joined in one single 
proceeding.609 Nor can the victim apply to join the 
proceedings as a civil party (plainte de partie civile).
5.2.3. Extra-judicial settlements: UK agencies and their 
practices
It is also within the discretion of government bodies managing 
EC funds to recover unwarranted payments without going to 
court. Such settlements occur when the agencies decide to off 
set amounts, to compound or to withhold payments. In line with 
the 'either/or' system in operation, extra judicial proposals 
for settlement are not presented to an independent body for 
approval. In practice, it is up to the aggrieved person to 
challenge the administrative decision with the administration
607 See Hodgson Report (1984) Profits of crime and their 
recovery Report of a Committee chaired by Sir Derek Hodgson 
(1984) Heinemann, London.
608 Levi, M (1989) Fraudulent justice? Sentencing the 
business criminal, in Paying for crime, ed P.Carlen and D. 
Cook, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, UK.
609 See Cappelletti, M (1989) The judicial process in 
comparative perspective, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
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itself. Most administrations have a formal internal review 
mechanism, and they will review on request, on the 
understanding that 'mistakes can occur on either side'. If the 
dispute persists a judicial remedy has to be sought. In some 
cases, the treasury can write off unrecoverable debts. These 
are addressed in more detail under part 5.
UK agencies
There is no central organizational framework in the United 
Kingdom for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of EC fraud or irregularities.610 Instead, a 
fragmented approach prevails, with each government body with a 
responsibility for the management of EC funds adopting a 
different policy with regards to the recovery of funds, as we 
shall see. MAFF, the Intervention Board for Agricultural 
Produce (IBAP), H.M Customs and Excise, the Department of 
Employment and the Treasury are the main government 
departments with responsibilities for EC funds which are 
examined below.
MAFF
MAFF (the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) 
administers, with the Agriculture Departments in Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales, government policies on 
agriculture, horticulture and fisheries. These department deal 
with the recovery of sums relating to the funds they 
administer. These include funds from the guarantee and from 
the guidance section of the EAGGF, from FIFG611 and from some
610 See Doig, A (1995) A fragmented organizational approach 
to fraud in a European context - The case of the United 
Kingdom public sector, in European Journal on Criminal Policy 
and Research, special edition on corruption and corporate 
crime, Vol 3, 2:48-64.
6,1 The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) 
provides structural assistance in the fisheries and 
aquaculture sector and for the processing and marketing of its
205
of the Community initiatives.612
The Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (IBAP)
IBAP is a separate government department which is accountable 
to the four Agriculture Ministers and funds all the
expenditure in the United Kingdom under the Guarantee Section
of the EAGGF.It also administers the trader-based Guarantee 
Section schemes in the United Kingdom. It is responsible for 
accounting for the recovery of overpayments and the collection 
of levies in respect of the schemes which it administers.
From time to time the authorities (MAFF, the Intervention 
Board) find themselves due to make a payment to a beneficiary 
of the Common Agricultural Policy who has failed to pay a levy 
or repay an overpayment within the time limit that has been 
given. The legal position in the UK is that mutual debts may 
be set off against each other provided that there are
established debts, that the two parties are acting in the same
capacity in relation to both debts and they both agree. Set­
off is the right to set up a compensating debt against a 
creditor in extinction or diminution of the claim, so that 
both obligations are to that extent simultaneously discharged 
and a net obligation is substituted.613 Set-off postulates 
mutual but independent obligations between two parties.614 It 
applies regardless of the degree of fault. Indeed 'in the case 
of an insolvent trader, such set-off may constitute the only 
practicable way open to the authorities to recover the wrongly 
paid sums'.615 Unlike Customs and Excise, the authorities
products•
612 For example under LEADER II or PESCA , see supra.
613 Hanak v Green [1958] ALL ER 141 at 153.
614 Southern, D (1994) Set-off revisited, New Law Journal 
(1994) 6669, page 1412-1414.
615 Case 250/78 Deka Getreideprodukte GmbH v EEC [1983] ECR
421.
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dealing with agricultural subventions do not have any power to 
seize goods or assets, so when fanners are not agreeable to 
set-off, they become liable to civil proceedings. Set-off is 
used mostly when there are repeated payments, for example in 
the case of subventions to farmers within the context of the 
EAGGF Guarantee Section funds.
HM Customs and Excise
Customs and Excise is responsible for the collection and 
administration of Customs and Excise duties and value added 
tax, the compilation of overseas trade statistics, the 
collection of Customs and agricultural levies for the European 
Union and the enforcement of prohibitions of the importation 
of certain goods. Most of the work is now organised in 
executive units. The Department is responsible for control of 
the export of all goods subject to export refunds and gets 
involved in negotiating extra-judicial settlements with 
respect to VAT and trade levies. It can prosecute in its own 
right.
Customs and Excise have the power to compound. This power, to 
be exercised entirely within their discretion, means that they 
can drop a case altogether, or reach an agreement with an 
individual to drop a case, generally in consideration of a 
payment of money.616 The Inland Revenue also have the power to 
compound.617 The Keith Report found that this power was 
exercised with respect to 90% of VAT fraud cases.618 Figures 
show that, in 1993 and 1994, this power has also been 
exercised with respect to CAP levies, as well as other duties 
(see table 5.5.) - but not to the degree reported in the Keith
616 S152 (a) of the Customs and Excise Act 1979; see also 
H.M. Customs and Excise (1992) Customs, compounding, seizure 
and restoration, customers' booklet, HMSO.
617 S102 of the Taxes Management Act 1970.
618 Keith Report on Enforcement Powers of Revenue 
Departments, Cznnd 8822 (1983) para 16,4.3.
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Report in respect of VAT.
Table 5.5.
Outcomes of court cases and compounded resolutions: CAP 
offences, 1992-94
Court
Settlements 
under S152 
CEMA
Number of
people
involved
Number of
people
imprisoned
Fines (in 
thousands 
of pounds 
sterling)
Fines (in 
thousands 
of pounds 
sterling)
From 1/4/92 
to 31/3/93:
Import 5 2 200.9 39.5
Export 11 4 200 88.5
From 1/4/93 
to 31/3/94:
Import 3 No figures 
available
No figures 
available
No figures 
available
Export 8 2 158 41.75
Note to table 5.5.
Source: H.M Customs and Excise Annual Report for the year 
ended 31 March 1993, pp 88-89; H.M Customs and Excise Annual 
Report for the year ended 31 March 1994, pp 92-93.
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Both compounding and civil fraud penalties are used in areas 
controlled by Customs and Excise, i.e VAT, excise, duties and 
levies. There is no difference in treatment between national 
funds and EC funds.
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
The Department's responsibilities are wide-ranging and include 
government policy on regional development, inward investment, 
energy, export services, innovation, environment, 
deregulation, competition policy, small firms and consumer 
affairs. The Department's responsibilities cover the UK as a 
whole, with the exception of some of its duties relating to 
regional assistance, which are devolved. It is within the 
Department's discretion to negotiate extra-judicial 
settlements with respect to the European Regional Fund (ERF) 
and of Community initiatives such as the SMEs initiative619 
INTERREG II,620 LEADER II,621 RECHAR II,622 RESIDER II,623 
RETEX,624 KONVER,625 URBAN,626 PESCA627 as well as pilot
619 The SME initiative is intended to help small and 
medium-sized enterprises to participate in the economy.
620 INTERREG II supports the development of networks and 
cross-border, transnational and inter-regional cooperation in 
areas such as the transfer of skills and technology towards 
the less-favoured regions.
621 LEADER II supports local initiatives for rural 
development.
622 RECHAR II assists the economic and social conversion of 
coal mining areas hardest hit by mine closures.
623 RESIDER II assists the economic and social conversion 
of steel areas.
624 RETEX aims to promote the diversification of activities 
in regions which are overt-dependent on the textile and 
clothing industry.
625 KONVER aims to helps to help areas affected by the run­
down of defence-related industries and military installations.
626 The URBAN initiative is aimed at supporting schemes in 
depressed urban areas.
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initiatives in inter-regional cooperation628 and most 
activities under the fourth R & D programme629 when it sees 
fit. It can also prosecute in its own right, in certain 
circumstances•
The Department of Employment
The responsibility for the administration of the European 
Social Fund (ESF) and of various Community initiatives630 
rests with the Department of Employment. It discharges its 
responsibilities through the ESF Unit based in London. Its 
Verification and Audit Section (VAS) was established recently 
in order to meet the responsibilities under Article 23 of 
Council Regulation 2082/93.631 In Scotland, the Secretary of 
State for Scotland now has responsibility for training policy 
and the administration of objectives 1, 2 and 5b under the ESF 
now rests with the Scottish Office Industry Department (SOID)• 
The Northern Ireland Office too has similar devolved 
responsibilities with respect to Northern Ireland. These 
agencies can be involved in negotiating extra-judicial 
settlements with respect to the European Social Fund, but have
627 PESCA aims to help areas which are heavily dependent on 
fishing to adapt to economic changes and diversify their 
activities.
628 For example PACTE, which promotes cooperation at local 
and regional level in the area of development; OUVERTURE and 
ECOS, which promotes cooperation between the less favoured 
regions of the European Union and their counterparts in 
central and eastern Europe and RECITE, which supports 36 
inter-regional projects and networks of regional and local 
authorities across the European Union in fields such as 
economic development.
629 The fourth framework programme for Community Research 
and Technological Development (1994-1998) supports research 
and development activities in key industrial technologies.
630 EMPLOYMENT-NOW, to reduce unemployment amongst women; 
EMPLOYMENT-HORIZON to improve employment prospects of disabled 
people; EMPLOYMENT-YOUTHSTART to prevent youth unemployment 
and several equal opportunities action programmes, etc.
631 OJ (1993) L 193/20.
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no power to prosecute in their own right. In the 1994 
financial year, the United Kingdom reported no fraud in this 
area. According to the London office, minor mistakes and 
irregularities, when they occurred were dealt with, for 
example, by withholding payments until appropriate targets 
were met.
H.M. Treasury: Overseeing role and direct involvement
The Treasury is responsible for tax and monetary policy, the 
control and planning of public expenditure, international 
financial relations, supervision of the financial system, and 
a range of Civil Service management issues. The responsibility 
of the Treasury and its executive agencies632 extends 
throughout the United Kingdom. Apart from its general 
executive role, the Treasury is directly involved in certain 
decisions, for example those relating to write-offs.
5.2.4. Particularities of extra-judicial recoveries in English 
law
(i) Setting-off: background
The right of set-off exists both under common law and under 
statute. The statutory right of set-off belongs to the 
administrative branch of the law and can be found in various 
forms in banking and consumer right legislation.633 It is 
based on the 1592 Compensation Act in Scotland, and the 1729 
and 1735 Statutes of Set-off in the rest of the United 
Kingdom. In England the Statutes of Set-off were repealed but 
their effect were preserved in the procedural rules of
632 See HMSO Publications (1995) The Civil Service, HMSO.
633 For example the Sale of Goods Act 1979 S53 (1) (a) 
provides for set-off.
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1 8 7 9 Because set-off is procedural in nature, it is lex 
fori635 - which means that it is classified according to (the 
many) circumstances in which it can arise. Furthermore set-off 
can only be invoked as a defence: it is 'a shield not a 
sword'. We shall see that in the discretionary British 
systems, this can create problems because set-off is being 
used more pro-actively than it was intended to be.
Mutuality and equity are two central pre-requirements to set­
off. The doctrine of mutuality (also called reciprocity, 
privity or the requirement of concursus debiti et crediti) 
requires that one person's claim shall not be used to pay 
another person's debt.636 The requirement of equity (i.e that 
the demands be held in the same right) would seem to mean no 
more than each of the parties who is liable to the other, 
should be the beneficial owner of a cross-demand.637
The literature confirms that set-off can be regarded as 
similar to payment. In setting off his cross-claim, the debtor 
'pays' the creditor's primary claim pro tanto and obliges the 
creditor to 'pay' the cross-claim. There is therefore a pro 
tanto redemption, discharge, satisfaction, extinguishment or 
reduction of the reciprocal debts.638
Set-off is used when there has been an overclaim (deliberate 
of not) of a subsidy and when the amount over-claimed can be 
deducted from the next payment. The type of set-off we are 
mostly concerned with here is of the solvent variety which has
634 Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act Repeal Act R.S.C 
ord.17, r.18 Paragraphs 2-6 et seq.
635 Meyer v Dresser (1864) 16 CB (NS) 646.
636 See Wood, P (1989) English and international set-off, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, page 1221.
637 Derham, R (1987) Set-off, Clarendon Press, Oxford, page
155.
638 Wood, op.cit., page 16.
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some similarities with a banker's right to set-off sums from 
customers' accounts.
The right to offset is not automatic, with some exceptions.639 
In cases of insolvency, set-off is mandatory. The insolvency 
Act 1986, S323, provides that where before the commencement of 
a bankruptcy there have been mutual dealings, an account shall 
be taken to establish the net balance for which the creditor 
may prove in the bankruptcy. The substance of mandatory set­
off in solvency remains the same for companies as for 
individuals.640
Some regulations specifically request that aids should be paid 
to the beneficiaries in their entirety.641 In defence of set­
off under these circumstances, the UK authorities have argued 
that
... [S]et-off does not actually decrease the entitlement 
of the beneficiary to be paid the amount in question .•• 
[t]he setting-off of part or all of the subsidy payment 
does not affect the entitlement to aid which has been 
calculated without deduction.642
639 Wood (op.cit.) states that in France and many other 
jurisdictions basing themselves on the Napoleonic Code, set­
off is automatic as soon as mutual independent claims are 
eligible for set-off, i.e when they are both liquid and have 
matured due and payable. The set-off occurs without the 
parties being aware of it. Jurisdictions following 
automaticity of independent set-off includes (besides France) 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain (...) although it may be that 
not all these jurisdictions are wholly faithful to the Code.
640 R 4.90 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986 adopts 
identical wording, mutatis mutandis, to s323 of the Insolvency 
Act.
641 For example Council Regulations 1765/92 (arable crops) , 
2066/92 (beef), 2082/93 (structural aids), 615/92 (oilseeds), 
84/93 (tobacco).
642 Extract from a letter from Robert Lowson, Minister for 
Agriculture to Guy Legras, Director General of DGVI dated 14 
February 1995.
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This has been the subject on an on-going debate between the UK 
authorities and the Commission, the case law of the European 
Court of Justice shedding little light on this subject.643 
This state of uncertainty led the Intervention Board to 
produce a 'non-paper' in 1992 stating that
...[T]he United Kingdom authorities would welcome a 
provision of Community law enabling the competent 
authorities of the Member States to withhold payments 
under CAP schemes to the extent that they believe the 
beneficiary to be indebted to them under the CAP.
The main pre-conditions to set-off are that:
(i) there is no obvious intent to defraud
(ii) a payment becomes available to set-off
(iii) the farmer/trader agrees
(iv) the conditions for mutuality are present.
With respect to the third requirement, which says for example 
that an agreement should be sought before amounts are offset,
643 In case 118/76 Balkan-Import-Export v Hauptzollamt 
Berlin-Packhof [1977] ECR 1117 the Court of Justice gave a 
preliminary ruling to the effect that a national 
administration could not apply a domestic rule when 'its 
effect would be to modify the scope of the provisions of 
Community law'. In the case of Pigs and Bacon Commission v 
McCarren and Co, Supreme Court of Ireland [1981] 3 CMLR 408, 
the Court of Justice ruled that a question of set-off was one 
to be decided according to national law although the 
obligation to repay the levy and recover the bonus both 
derived from Community law. Similarly in joined cases 146,
192 and 193/81 BayWa AG and others v Bundesanstalt fUr 
Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1982] ECR 1503, the Advocate 
General pointed out that the application of a national rule is 
forbidden when it would 'alter the effect of the Community 
rules'. In case 250/78 Deka v EEC [1983] ECR 421, Advocate 
General Mancini inferred from this that set-off in relation to 
sums payable under Community legislation was governed by EC 
law. This view appears to have been endorsed by the Court 
itself when it said that Community rules 'may give rise, as 
between authorities and traders, to reciprocal and even 
related claims which are an appropriate subject for set-off'.
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practice varies. When an agreement has not been properly 
sought by the authorities, this may lead to judicial review.
There is no fixed upper limit of set-off in financial terms. 
For practical purposes, the maximum that can be off set is the 
total amount due to the beneficiary by the administration.
The main principle governing set-off is the principle of 
mutuality, which postulates mutual but independent obligations 
between two parties. In some circumstances, the mutuality 
requirement is difficult to satisfy, as we shall see.
Third agency involved in set-off
When a third agency is involved in the management of EC funds, 
for example of EAGGF Guidance Section Funds, two possibilities 
have to be envisaged:
(1) the third agency is a Crown body and the principle of 
mutuality applies (the Crown being indivisible) or
(2) the third agency is not a Crown body, because its 
agents do not act merely as agents of the Crown in 
exercising their functions. Without mutuality, there is 
no (self-help insolvent) set-off, stricto sensu.
Although the second possibility was only encountered in 
Northern Ireland, it cannot be dismissed as an oddity. This is 
because these last few years have seen a vast programme of 
privatisation, reaching areas hitherto the sole preserve of 
the Crown. As a result, agencies proliferate which act on 
behalf of the Crown, but are not necessarily Crown bodies 
themselves.644 If this trend is to continue, it may well have 
an increasing impact on the availability of set off as a
644 Davies, J and Willman, J (1991) What next? Agencies, 
departments, and the Civil Service, Institute for Public 
Policy Research, London.
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defence.
Multiple registrations
Strictly speaking the principle of mutuality does not apply 
when, for example, claims originate
- from different members of the same family running the 
same farm or business
- from different individuals in the same partnership
- from the same individual(s) but under different or new 
company names (concurrently or successively).
One of my interviewees was sanguine about this difficulty, and 
suggested that it could be overcome by extending the system of 
securities/guarantees, perceived as successful, to more areas 
of the CAP. This system has the advantage that the security 
created can be used to settle relevant debts, and also remains 
valid in the event of the debtor's insolvency.
Setting-off across schemes
There does not appear to be any reason in English or Scots law 
why set-off should not occur across schemes, as long as the 
schemes are run by the same Crown body and this does not 
involve any unauthorized transfer of information.
Setting-off between national and EC funds
Can the authorities set off between national and EC funds?
This has been the subject of an on-going debate. Recent 
Correspondence (1994) from the Commission to the British 
authorities shows that subsidy stops should not apply on 
Community premia provided for in certain regulations.
[...] Several Community Regulations [... ] provide that 
the Community premia are to be paid over to the
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beneficiaries 'in their entirety' (cf. Regulation 615/92, 
oilseeds, Regulation 1765/92, cereals, Regulation 
2066/92, beef, Regulation 84/93, tobacco and Regulation 
2082/93, structural aids). The Commission services take 
the view that these provisions exclude the possibility 
for national authorities to withhold the Community premia 
concerned in order to recover debts arising from national 
schemes or provisions.645
In other words
[..] The use of any such direct aid granted as part of 
the reform of the CAP to offset a State Claim against 
those entitled to this aid (for example, a national tax 
liability) is not permitted.646
But more recently (February 1995) the UK authorities have
argued that
••• [T]here may be cases where purely national debts are 
recovered from payments under wholly Community funded 
schemes and, conversely, cases where it will be possible 
to recover Community debts from payments under wholly UK 
funded schemes which would be of particular benefit to 
the Community. It is our understanding of the law handed 
down from the European Court that a debtor should not be 
treated more or less favourably in relation to Community 
schemes than he would be in relation to national schemes. 
The rules of set-off under the national law should 
therefore not be operated in a way which prejudices the 
operation of Community law. By parity of reasoning, the
645 Extract from letter originating from G. Legras, 
Director General of D-G VI to Mr Richard Grant, the Scottish 
Office, Agriculture and Fisheries Department, Edinburgh dated
1.7.1994.
646 Extract from letter originating from Rene Steichen to 
The Rt. Hon. William Waldegrave, Minister of Agriculture, 
dated 27.12.1994.
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Community rules should, whenever possible, be interpreted 
in such a way that there is no discrimination against the 
operation of national law [... ] We have a long experience 
of using 'subsidy stops' both in Scotland and elsewhere 
in the UK and we have found that this is a very useful 
method of debt recovery. There have rarely been 
objections from farmers or traders directly affected and 
their application avoids recourse to alternative 
protracted and expensive debt recovery procedures.647
There is no limit to the amount that can be recouped through a 
compounded settlement. Each settlement has a reparative 
element (sum to be recovered) and a punitive element (fine). 
The amount of the punitive element in the settlement is 
discretionary. Compounding is part of Customs Law. In order to 
compound, Customs must have enough evidence for a criminal 
prosecution. Compounding applies both to criminal offence 
proceedings and to condemnations which are civil proceedings. 
There is no set rule about when the negotiations for a 
compound should begin, and sl52 of CEMA does not place any 
time limit on the matter.
Customs and Excise may also, after a court judgment, mitigate 
or remit any pecuniary penalty imposed under sl52(c) of CEMA - 
although this does not apply to VAT and the so-called civil 
penalties which the Department can assess under the Finance 
Act 1985.
(ii) Compounding
According to Customs and Excise, the one unequivocal guideline 
in deciding the suitability of a case for compounding is that 
the evidence would support a criminal prosecution. Each case 
is considered on its merits after a careful evaluation of all
647 Extract from letter originating from Robert Lowson, 
Minister (Agriculture) to Guy Legras, Director General of DG 
VI, dated 14 February 1995.
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known mitigating or aggravating factors including relative 
seriousness. Evidence of guilt (but not admission of guilt) is 
a prerequisite to compounding. An alleged offender is free to 
make an offer of settlement, but Customs and Excise can turn 
it down. A person who is offered a compounded settlement and 
turns it down is prosecuted in the criminal court. The general 
policy on compounding can mostly be found in answers to 
Parliamentary questions, and in the Keith Report.648 As a rule 
the Department is reluctant to compound, and will usually 
prosecute in the following cases:
(a) where a person already has a departmental record
(b) where he is known to be subject to sl* suspended prison 
sentence or on bail, nor when other related offences are 
being considered, either by Customs themselves, another 
Government department or the police
(c) when he is an undischarged bankrupt or in the case of 
a limited company is in administration or receivership
(d) where a person, in virtue of his occupation, is
supposed to have been more aware than the general public
of the gravity of his offence (judges, lawyers, 
accountants and civil servants fall into that category)
(e) in obscenity cases involving children
(f) when illicit distillation is involved, with a risk to
public health
(g) when Customs personnel have been assaulted by members 
of the public
(h) when abuse of hydrocarbon oil road fuel is involved
(i) when firearms are involved.
This list is not exhaustive, and may be added to by Customs. 
There is no threshold for compounding, and compounding 
settlements can reach millions of pounds. As far as civil 
fraud is concerned, there is a discretionary limit of £100,000
648 Report of the Committee on Enforcement Power of the 
Revenue Departments, chaired by Lord Keith of Kinkel, 1984, 
Cmnd 9440, HMSO.
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beyond which Customs and Excise prefer to prosecute.
According to Customs, compounded settlements are only 
available for first offences. Further offences are dealt with 
by the courts.
With regards to compounding, in 1983 the Keith Committee649 
recommended that although the tax authorities should be able 
to compound or make settlements, the names of the persons 
concerned should be publicised, except where there had been 
full spontaneous voluntary disclosure650. This was not taken 
up.
There is no special provision for the notification of third 
parties (apart from the provisions to be found in EC law). In 
case of insolvency, creditors are not usually kept informed of 
developments
Fines in compounded settlements
According to Customs and Excise, the punitive element of a 
compounding settlement (or 'fine' part of the compounded 
settlement) rests (informally) on a sliding scale roughly 25% 
and 100% of the reparative element, but can occasionally 
exceed 100%. In deciding on the amount of the punitive element 
of the compound, Customs broadly follow the guidance issued to 
the courts in CEMA, although they are not bound by it in this 
respect and enjoy complete discretion. In the Act a sum of up 
to three times the value of the goods can be set,651 although 
in compounded settlements involving EC funds, the amount of 
levy is usually taken into account, rather than the value of 
the goods.
649 See Keith Report, supra.
650 Ibid, paras 18.5.54 and 20.2.11-12.
651 Article 170 (3) (a) of the Customs and Excise Management 
Act 1979.
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The fine part of the compounded settlement can also be reduced 
when the alleged offender cooperates with the authorities at 
an early stage.
There is no hard and fast rule and authorities decide on a 
case by case basis.
(iii) Withdrawal/request for repayment
The 1995 Structural Funds Manual contains a draft offer letter 
which states that the Secretary of State reserves the right to 
withhold any or all of the payments and/or to require part or 
all of the grant to be repaid under certain circumstances. 
There is no provision for any contract of this type to be put 
up for approval to an independent tribunal.
(iv) Withholding payment
Authorities managing the Structural Funds make plain in their 
offer of contract to beneficiaries that they reserve the right 
to withhold any or all of the payments in the following 
circumstances:
(i) there is a substantial, or material, change in the 
nature, scale, costs or timing of a project.
(ii) The future of the project is in jeopardy.
(iii) There is unsatisfactory progress towards completing 
the project, or the project is not completed by the 
agreed date.
(iv) There is unsatisfactory progress towards meeting the 
forecast outputs specified.
(v) Any of the information provided in the application 
for grant or in supporting or subsequent correspondence 
is found to be substantially incorrect or incomplete.
(vi) The applicant is in receipt of a grant from other 
Community Institutions towards project costs, unless the 
grant has already been taken into account.
(vii) The assistance exceeds European Community Aid
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limits to the extent that any grant paid should not have 
been paid; or a decision of the European Commission or of 
the European Court of Justice requires payment to be 
withheld (or recovered).
(viii) This point applies to the public sector only:- any 
grant or other payment, which is payable towards the 
project, has been received or is likely to be received 
from any public authority. Of course, this does not apply 
to payments whose availability and amount have already 
been taken into account at the time the offer was made.
(ix) The project is used for purposes other than those 
specified in the offer letter during its economic life as 
specified in the offer letter.
The authorities can withhold payment of certain sums pending 
the outcome of court proceedings. In the recent case of 
Jewers, DG VI found that the Intervention Board had acted 
appropriately in doing so.
(v) Exchequer write-offs
Under Article 8(2) of Council Regulation 729/70, Member States 
must bear the financial consequences of irregularities and 
negligence attributable to their administrative authorities or 
other bodies.
In some cases, therefore, debts are written off and the loss 
borne by the Exchequer. For the 1993 financial year (March 
1993 to April 1994), a comparatively small amount of just over 
£247,000 was put forward by the Intervention Board to be 
written off in that way. The Treasury is keen to ensure that 
write-offs should be kept to a minimum. One of the strategic 
objectives, stated in the Corporate Plan 1993-94 to 1997-98 of 
the Intervention Board, in relation to disallowance resulting 
from its actions and falling on the Exchequer following the 
clearance of the 1991 EAGGF accounts, is to limit such 
disallowance to within 0.40% of the total of the accounts
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submitted for that year.
The position at the moment is that for EAGGF write-offs under 
£10, no prior recovery action is necessary. In the case of 
overpayment of subsidies and refunds or under collection of 
co-responsibility levies not exceeding £40, no prior recovery 
action is necessary except when overpayments to the same payee 
for the same cause total more than £40 a month. The same 
applies for Own Resources uncollected debits not exceeding 
£40. The Treasury may withhold their authority to write off, 
when they are not satisfied that proper steps have been taken 
to investigate a loss, to impose financial penalties or take 
adequate disciplinary procedures. A refusal by the Treasury to 
sanction write-off is reported to the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, and by the latter to the Public Accounts Committee, 
who may question the Accounting Officer about the action 
taken.652
Write-off can also occur, on a case by case basis, as a result 
of consultation with the Commission.653 In a case where the 
Intervention Board was owed in excess of £800,000 by a trader 
on the peas and beans scheme, it was approached by the debtor 
with the following dilemma. The debtor said he could pay 
£250,000 and carry on trading and retain his firm's employees 
- alternatively he could become bankrupt, with a result that 
very little would be recovered at all. In the circumstances,
DG VI agreed that the Intervention Board should accept the 
£250,000 offered.
(vi) Other arrangements
Repayment of grant
652 Finance Manual of the Intervention Board for 
Agricultural Produce, London.
653 Article 4(2) of Council Regulation 595/91 (1991) OJ L
67.
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The authorities also reserve the right to require part or all 
of the grant to be repaid in the circumstances outlined above. 
When matching funders have acted as guarantors, they are 
approached for repayment before civil proceedings are 
instituted.
Informal arrangement in case of insolvency
An 'informal moratorium' can sometimes be reached with 
creditors, such as a re-scheduling of debt payment. A break 
down of the arrangement leads to civil court proceedings.
5.2.5. Discussion: the effectiveness of extra-judicial 
settlements, from an English point of view
Three main claims have been made in relation to extra-judicial 
settlements, namely that they are fast, quick and cost 
effective. These claims are briefly examined below.
(i) Effectiveness
Non-court recoveries are perceived as highly effective, 
although a certain amount of institutionalised 'cherry 
picking' goes on: for example the person concerned must be 
solvent and/or in receipt of regular sums.
There are areas of uncertainty, particularly with regards to 
set-off. For example, it is not clear to what extent set-off 
can occur when a third party is involved, either between 
schemes, or between national and EC schemes. Nor are time­
limits clear.
At the moment, furthermore, there is no specific appeal 
procedure which deals with disputes over amounts to be offset 
Although agreement is meant to be a sine qua non of set-off, 
it is occasionally used more aggressively.
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(ii) Quickness
Administrative recoveries have been speedier than those 
effected by the courts. But it is not known how long 
administrative procedures can retain their reputation for 
dispatch now that new appeal procedures are being set up. The 
policy of the Customs and Duties Tribunal is to hear an appeal 
within three months of it being ready for listing, and to 
issue the decision, which will usually have been reserved, 
within two months of the date of hearing. Currently the 
waiting time for a hearing is around ten weeks throughout the 
United Kingdom. It is obviously too early to speculate on how 
long Customs duty cases will take to go through the system 
once the new appeal procedures (see below) get in full swing, 
on the other hand, the review procedure may work well and not 
produce many tribunal cases. But it must be remembered that 
the inferior courts in the UK are not always fast.654
(iii) Cost-effectiveness
Unlike court recovery, administrative recoveries are regarded 
as cost-effective. The importance of cost-effectiveness leads 
some civil servants to argue that when the defendant is on 
income support, or when he is drawing legal aid (both are 
means-tested in the UK), then this is a fair indication that 
recovery through the courts will not be successful, and will 
cost the tax payer a disproportionate amount to pursue. This 
is particularly true, they argue, when the defendant is 
drawing on legal aid funds, in which case the cost to the tax
654 For example in the recent case of Darnell (Case of 
Darnell v the United Kingdom, judgment of 26 October 1993, 
series A, Vol 272) the European Court of Human Rights found 
unanimously that the United Kingdom had breached article 6(2) 
of the Convention by letting Mr Darnell wait nearly nine years 
for an Industrial Tribunal hearing.
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payer will be even greater.655 The cost-effectiveness argument 
can thus be carried ad absurdum by the executive.
No doubt that when the debtor is solvent, administrative 
recovery is more cost-effective, and quicker than the courts 
can be, although it remains to be seen whether the 
introduction of new procedural safeguards will affect this 
performance. When the debtor has been declared bankrupt (a 
relatively easy process in the UK), it may be that little can 
be done to recover funds. The determination of whether funds 
are available for recovery or not - i.e., the thoroughness of 
the financial investigation - therefore remains of crucial 
importance.
5.2.5. The question of administrative discretion.
Government agencies with a responsibility for the managing of 
EC funds, and the recovery thereof may set-off, compound, 
withhold funds, or simply request repayment. Small amounts may 
also be written off. Special arrangements may also apply in 
cases of insolvency. These settlements modes are addressed in 
some detail below. On the whole, administrations prefer extra­
judicial settlements, because of increasing staff and costs 
constraints. This state of affairs raises question about the 
powers of discretion these agencies have. For example, how is 
that same discretion circumscribed?
The issue of the extent and limitation of administrative power 
can partly be discussed within the framework of the polarity 
legality v expediency. The principle of legality usually 
refers to the doctrine of mandatory prosecution but also, more 
generally, to the strict subordination of all administrative 
or other actions to legal rules. The principle of expediency, 
by contrast, refers to the ability to act with discretion and
655 The case of Saunders show that, because of the way the 
legal aid fund is administered, even relatively wealthy 
defendants on fraud charges can draw on legal aid.
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deal with matters on a case by case basis.
If one imagines a legalistic - expediency-prone continuum, the 
United Kingdom could perhaps be placed towards the 
'expediency' end. We have seen that when cases are put up for 
Crown prosecution, they are carefully 'filtered' in a two- 
stage process (see 5.2.2. above), which involves an assessment 
of the likely outcome. In fact the likely outcome is a 
consideration very much at the forefront throughout the 
system.
In reality, however, approaches are never purely 'legalistic' 
or 'discretionary'. Discretion is always circumscribed: 
'authorities vested with discretionary powers by an Act of 
Parliament can only exercise such powers within the limits of 
the particular statute' 656. Sometimes discretion is embedded 
in the legislation itself with expressions such as$ they see 
fit' (see CEMA 1979 mentioned earlier) and therefore is 
statutory. So,
M&me au sein de 1'univers de la r&gle et du r&glement, le
jeu avec la r&gle fait partie de la r&gle du jeu.657
The opportunity versus expediency debate does not necessarily 
help to clarify matters in the British context. It is a moot 
point as to whether any discussion as to the limits of 
discretion in the UK could more usefully focus on the 
procedures available to resolve the disputes which unavoidably 
arise from its use.
Two types of discretion
656 LJ Kerr in R v London transport Executive ex parte GLC 
[1983] 2 WLR 702.
657 Bourdieu, P (1990) Droit et passe-droit, le champ des 
pouvoirs territoriaux et la mise en oeuvre des rdglements, 
Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 81/82, page 89.
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What is the nature of this discretion? Theories of 
administrative discretion suggest that it arises in two main 
forms:
* discretionary non-performance or moderated performance of 
duties - as it seems when viewed from the perspective of 
strict legalism;658
* pro-active discretion - meaning a very active doing of 
things - possibly going well beyond what explicitly has been 
provided for in legislation. Yet it is not illegal, since it 
is not judged illegal by the judiciary, indeed commonly it is 
not even reviewed by the judiciary.
Discretion as non-action or moderated action
Traditionally, Customs and Excise has been entrusted with a 
great deal of discretion. S152(a) of the CEMA provides that 
the Customs Commissioners may, as they see fit,
'stay, sist659 [....] any proceedings for an offence or 
for the condemnation of any thing as being forfeited 
under the Customs and Excise Act'.
In other words, Commissioners are free to decide not to 
prosecute. This provision being statutory, it does not require 
the permission of any member of the judiciary. In this 
process, an alleged offender may make an offer of compound, 
but Customs and Excise are quite free to turn it down. 
Commissioners may also, after judgment, mitigate or remit any
658 Summarized in Makridimitris, A (1984) Reasoning and 
legality in administration PhD thesis, University College, 
London; also P^rez-Diaz, C (1994) L'indulgence, pratique 
discretionnaire et arrangement administratif, Deviance et 
Societe, Dec.1994 Vol XVIII no 4 page 397-430.
659 To 'sist' is the equivalent of staying proceedings in 
the terminology of the Scottish jurisdiction.
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pecuniary penalty imposed under sl52(c) of CEMA. But this is 
the exercise of discretion does not end there.
Pro-active discretion
It would be wrong to assume, as some legalist commentators 
have done, that discretion is exercised mostly by deciding not 
to do things: 'not to prosecute, not to initiate, not to 
investigate, not to deal or not to publicize'.660 Discretion 
can also mean being highly pro-active - in ways other than 
prosecution. Such actions cannot be understood as 'doing 
nothing' or 'indulgence'661.
For example, although Customs may decide not to prosecute, 
they are highly active in achieving compounded settlements. 
Authorities managing the Structural Funds, for example, spell 
out very clearly, in their offer letter, conditions which can 
lead to the withdrawal or suspension of the benefit. In that 
way, the beneficiary is forewarned and bound by contract. Such 
pragmatic pro-active agenda takes into account not only the 
need to deter and prevent, but also the need to recover funds 
quickly at the lowest cost to the state, whilst enabling 
traders and farmers to carry on with their commercial 
activities.
Except in cases of complex and serious frauds, when cases are 
put up for criminal prosecution, agencies are usually at 
liberty to take social and other factors into consideration 
when deciding upon their course of action. In using their 
discretion, the authorities follow internal guidelines and/or 
have an internal procedure to decide how a case should be 
dealt with. These guidelines are not usually in the public
660 Davis, K (1979) Discretionary justice: A preliminary 
enquiry, University of Illinois Press.
661 This is the French word used in some instances of 
extra-legal discretion, which clearly describes the practice 
of 'letting people off'.
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domain. A notable exception is the customers' leaflet on 
compounding from Customs and Excise which makes clear in what 
circumstances compounding will not be considered.
The use of statutory discretion raises questions of due 
process, some of which have recently been addressed. But its 
use must be put in the wider context of the administration of 
justice. The justice system is overburdened and extra-judicial 
settlements are increasingly seen as helping to relieve the 
situation.
(ii) Redress against administrative decisions
One means of speeding up the recovery procedure would be the
adoption of the Commission's proposal on amending the
Regulation on Own Resources 15589/89. Another means is the 
more systematic use of the 'clearance of accounts' procedure, 
where agricultural expenditure is affected by irregularities 
and deficiencies of control. Here again, the Commission has
proposed an amendment to the existing rules.
Redress can be sought through internal reviews and tribunals. 
New procedures include the Customs' duties tribunal, the 
customs' adjudicator and the Intervention Board adjudicator.
It can also be sought through the ombudsman (iv), or through 
the process of judicial review in the courts (v).
^  The Customs' duties tribunal
Article 253 of the Customs Code contained in Regulation 
2913/92661 states that Title VIII of the Code, relating to 
appeals, shall apply to the UK on 1 January 1995.663
662 [1992] OJ L 302.
663 The United Kingdom obtained a delay of one year before 
implementing the requirement for an appeal system contained in 
the Customs Code.
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As a result, in order to 'replace a very limited area of
appeal to the High Court on duty matters, which inevitably was
lengthy and expensive',664 the jurisdiction of the VAT 
Tribunal has now been extended to cover Customs duties. The 
appeal process provided for in the 1994 Finance Act has two 
stages: the review stage and the tribunal hearing per se, 
unlike the VAT appeal process which has no intermediary stage.
The review stage
An administrative (internal) review must be requested before a 
matter can be referred on appeal.665 Furthermore a request to 
review must be made
- by those who are liable to pay duty or penalties or 
upon whom conditions, restrictions or prohibitions are 
imposed
- within 45 days of the written notification of a
decision by Customs and Excise.666
Under Section 14(1) a request can be made for an internal 
review of an assessment or a decision in respect of:
- whether Customs duty or an agricultural levy of the EU 
should be charged
- the rate and duty of levy, or the amount charged
- the identity of the person liable to pay the amount 
charged, or the amount for which he is liable
- whether and to that extent a person is entitled to 
relief or repayment, remission or drawback of an amount 
of duty or levy
664 See Me Far lane, G (1994) Customs Tribunals, Importing 
Today, May/June 1994, pp 16-17.
665 S14 (2) of the 1994 Finance Act.
666 S14 (2) and 15 of the 1994 Finance Act.
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- an assessment for a penalty, as well as duty
- or any decision of a description specified in Schedule 
5 of the Act.
A second request for a review is barred,667 unless there are 
new facts. There is no provision for extending the time limit 
(45 days), though it is expected that Customs will accept 
genuine requests up to 90 days after the decision.
It is only possible to offer comments made on the review stage 
with respect to VAT cases. Despite assurances that the review 
is undertaken by officers not involved in the case,668 the 
procedure itself has previously been described as lacking 
independence and not creating any opportunity for the evidence 
to be properly heard on both sides. In a report669 Lord 
Mishcon described the process as one
... of a colleague walking over to another colleague in 
the same room saying 'You have been asked to review this 
matter. I shall explain to you briefly why I made this 
decision. Do you mind initialling this paper to say you 
approve of what I did and said?
As a result some observers feel that an external reviewer 
should be involved. Other commentators also feel that the 
review
inserts an extra stage in the appeal process causing 
further delay and increased costs. It is particularly bad 
where a universally binding decision is required by an 
industry on Customs. Customs frequently regard tribunal 
decisions as not universally applicable, so it is 
necessary to go the High Court which takes at present 18
667 S14(2) of the 1994 Finance Act.
668 S15 of the 1994 Finance Act.
669 House of Lords Official Report April 29, 1991, col 548.
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months to two years from the date of the tribunal 
decision.670
The review can confirm, vary or withdraw the original 
decision. If Customs do not respond within 45 days, they are 
deemed to have confirmed their original decision. On the other 
hand, the review procedure is a way of augmenting the level of 
non-court resolutions.
The tribunal stage
An appeal to the tribunal is only allowed once the internal 
review has been carried out. It must be lodged by the person 
who requested the internal review within thirty days of the 
decision in dispute. An appeal is struck out if all the duty 
has been paid or satisfactory security provided.671
In all cases (VAT, excise, Customs duties) tribunals do not 
usually hear appeals unless the disputed amount has already 
been paid. A waiver can be applied for, either from Customs or 
from the tribunal. In cases of hardship, a 'hardship 
application' has to be made. If Customs and Excise oppose the 
hardship application, then the tribunal arranges a hearing to 
decide whether or not to grant the certificate. Generally 
speaking third parties do not get involved in this review 
procedure, unless their property is in danger of forfeiture, 
confiscation or restitution.
There are two types of appeal: full appeals; appeals on 
ancillary matters. Fully appealable matters are usually 'money 
matters'672 and include liability to excise, Customs duties
670 Cockfield, R and Mulholland, M (1994) Tribunals, 
reviews and appeals: Sections 7 and 14-16, British Tax Review, 
page 283.
671 S16 of the 1994 Finance Act.
672 See Editorial: An appealing trader (1994) in Customs 
News, page 3.
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and agricultural levies, rate of duty or levy or excise, 
liability of a particular person, any entitlement to repayment 
and amounts of the new penalties.
Appeals on ancillary matters (non-money matters, 
authorizations, etc)673 are in form of quasi-judicial review. 
Ancillary matters include decisions relating to the release of 
goods, unloading, transhipment, etc. With respect to ancillary 
matters, the tribunal has limited powers. That is to say that 
it can only overturn a decision by Customs if it is satisfied 
that Customs could not have reasonably arrived at it. The test 
of reasonableness was laid down by Lord Greene in the 
Wednesbury case mentioned earlier.
Export refunds remain outside the extended jurisdiction of the 
VAT and Duties Tribunal. The exporter who is aggrieved by the 
application of this new penalty regime is obliged either to 
seek judicial review of a decision adverse to him, or to 
commence an action for recovery of sums statutorily due to 
him674 and to argue the penalty issues in that context.
However, 'administrative penalties recently introduced into 
the export refund regime may be appealed by reference to a 
higher authority within the Intervention Board. A full appeal 
mechanism including an independent assessment is currently 
being set up.'675
The Tribunal route: remaining problems
Although the extension of the jurisdiction of the VAT tribunal 
to Customs duties must be applauded, some issues still need to 
be addressed.
673 Ibid.
674 Roy v Kensington and Chelsea Family Practitioner 
Committee [1992] 1 AC 624.
675 Communication from Intervention Board, 26.7.95.
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(a) A single importation could involve VAT, Customs, 
excise and/or agricultural levies. Thus, there could be 
friction between the various jurisdictions.
(b) The 45 day rule may cause hardship to some importers.
(c) There is no provision for compensation after a 
successful appeal following judicial review by 
tribunal.676
(d) There is some concern that the restriction on right 
of direct access to the tribunal, and the cutting back on 
full appellate powers for some matters, may actually 
breach the Customs Code (Article 243 of the Customs Code 
suggests that there should be the option either of an 
administrative appeal or of an appeal to an independent 
tribunal, or both against [all] decisions taken by the 
Customs authorities which relate to the application of 
Customs legislation).
(e) The seizure of goods as liable to forfeiture has not 
been included in the list of appealable matters under 
CEMA.
(f) Tribunals decisions are not binding, and can be 
appealed against in the High Court (which adds on average 
another two years' delay to the proceedings). At present, 
in London, approximately 10% of cases heard in the 
tribunal are appealed against in that way.
(g) Finally, as mentioned earlier, export refunds remain 
outside the extended jurisdiction of the VAT and Duties 
Tribunal. Commission Regulations 2945/94677 and
676 S7 (5) of the 1994 Finance Act.
677 OJ 1994 L 130/57.
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1829/94678 amend the base legislation on export refund 
machinery679 by inserting a scheme of administrative 
penalties for overclaims. In practice this may mean less 
compounding in the future, but it does not resolve the 
problem of lack of redress to an independent tribunal.
The Customs Adjudicator
The role of the Revenue Adjudicator has just been extended to 
deal with complaints related to Customs. The office had been 
investigating complaints against the Inland Revenue for two 
years, and since 1 April 1995 it can now also investigate 
complaints regarding Customs and Excise. The adjudicator does 
not deal with appeals on matters where independent tribunals - 
such as VAT and duties tribunals - already exist for settling 
disagreements. She deals with cases when people complain, for 
example, that they have been harassed during an investigation, 
or when they have been improperly refused information under 
the Open Government provisions.680 Her decisions are binding 
on the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise. Redress can take 
the form of an apology, putting matters right, or 'consolatory 
payments', but usually only from the private sector.681 A 
person's right to ask their Member of Parliament (MP) to refer 
complaints to the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration682 (also called Parliamentary Ombudsman) is 
unaffected by the adjudicator's office. The obverse is not 
true.
678 OJ 1994 L 191/5.
679 OJ 1987 L 351/1.
680 See HMSO Publications (1994) Open Government: Code of 
practice on access to government information, HMSO.
681 Filkin, E (1994) Complaint and redress mechanisms in 
the public sector, paper given at the OECD Paris Symposium, 
mimeoed text, restricted.
682 The office was set up by the Parliamentary Commissioner 
Act 1967.
236
The Intervention Board's Adjudicator
Another new development is the appointment of an adjudicator 
by the Intervention Board, whose role it is to examine cases 
of complaint against maladministration by Intervention Board 
officials.
The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman)
The ombudsman only deals with certain matters683 where a 
member of the public has sustained injustice in consequence of 
maladministration and where no right of appeal or review 
exists. The Parliamentary Commissioner Act684 lays down the 
rules for access to the ombudsman. A written request must be 
made to a Member of Parliament685 who may decide to pass on 
the complaint to the ombudsman. The investigation is conducted 
in private686 and usually within twelve months from the day on 
which the person aggrieved first had notice of the matters 
alleged in the complaint.687
The main criticism of the Parliamentary Ombudsman's system 
relates to the lack of direct access. 688 A complainant may 
find it difficult, in some cases, to convince his MP to take
683 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 amended in 1967, 
1987 and 1994. S5 of the Act lists matters subject to 
investigation.
684 Ibid.
685 As per Article 5(2) (a) of the Act. The Member of 
Parliament, by convention, must usually be the constituent's 
MP, otherwise the request may be referred back to the said 
M.P.
686 Article 7(2) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act
1994.
687 Article 6(3) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act
1994.
688 Stacey, F (1978) Ombudsmen compared, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford.
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his complaint to the ombudsman. Following the 1993 Select 
Committee's Review of the UK Ombudsman system, the MP 'filter' 
is to be retained, although in the interest of speed, once an 
MP has referred a complaint to the ombudsman, the latter will 
deal with the complainant directly, whilst keeping the 
referring MP in touch. A nine months target for investigations 
was also set.
Judicial Review
When there is no right of appeal against administrative action 
or where all rights of appeal have been exhausted, an 
application can be lodged for judicial review but only on the 
grounds of procedural impropriety, unreasonableness, 
irrationality or incompatibility with Community law. It is 
difficult to underestimate the procedural hurdles this 
involves. Notwithstanding this deterrent, there has been a 
spectacular increase in the use and scope of the public law 
remedy of judicial review of administrative action. In 1974 
there were 160 applications for judicial review, in 1984 1,230 
applications were lodged and in 1993, 3,335.689
The appeal involves a reconsideration of the application de 
novo (an application to set aside a judgment which has been 
given in default of appearance is not regarded as a form of 
appeal). The application has to be lodged by the person 
aggrieved, i.e a person with a specific legal interest in the 
issue. The nature of relief offered under judicial review 
generally is of a narrow and limited dimension.
There is no liability in English law for ultra vires activity 
per se, unless a public body or official acts negligently or 
maliciously or knowingly outside his powers or jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, when a challenge is made upon the legality of 
action or decision-making of public bodies, the presumption is
689 Lord Chancellor's Department (1994) Judicial Statistics 
for the year 1993, HMSO.
238
always omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, which the plaintiff 
must displace on a balance of probabilities.690 Generally 
speaking, the courts are reluctant to enforce statutory 
obligations upon public bodies where to do so would cause 
significant public expenditure.
Damages, interim relief
Claims under Francovich691 have usually been decided within 
the context of national law on liability, which means that 
reviews have not usually resulted in an award for damages. But
following the House of Lords decision in Factortame II692 
injunctive relief, including interim relief, became available 
against the Crown. The House of Lords has decided that, 
contrary to its original view in Factortame II, interim 
injunctions, interlocutory injunctions and proceedings for 
contempt of court were available against ministers as a matter 
of English law.693
The preceding may show that, although there is no 
explicit requirement of national law to preserve the 
homogeneity of national law failing within and outside 
the sphere of Community law, such homogeneity is 
perceived as desirable. As shown by the decision of the 
House of Lords in M v Home Office it can be achieved, in 
the field and for the sake of legal protection of the 
rights of individuals, through means of 'homogeneity
690 Cannock Chase DC v Kelly [1978] 1 WLR 1 CA n29.
691 Francovich v Italian State (C 6 and 9/90) [1992] IRLR 
84 2 CMLR 66.
692 Factortame v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] 2 
AC 85.
693 M v Home Office [1993] 3 All ER 537.
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friendly' judicial interpretation.694
In Factortame III695 the ECJ confirmed that in the event of a 
breach of Community law attributable to a Member State, in a 
situation where the same state has a wide discretion to make 
legislative choices, individuals suffering loss or injury are 
entitled to reparation, where the rule of Community law 
breached is intended to confer rights upon them, and when the 
breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct causal 
link between the breach and the damage sustained by the 
individuals. Such reparation cannot be conditional upon fault 
on the part of the organ of the State responsible for the 
breach. Furthermore national legislation which generally 
limits the damage done to certain, specifically protected 
individuals not including loss of profit by individuals is not 
compatible with EC law.
In the circumstances, one would expect administrations to 
exercise a great deal of caution, for example, before imposing 
any sanctions on economic operators. In this Factortame III 
may indirectly circumscribe administrative discretion. Only 
time will tell whether this, in turn, has a negative impact on 
the recovery rate in the UK. Meanwhile, it may be useful to 
turn to another Member State, in order to glean ideas on how 
recovery rates could be improved.
5.3. A comparative dimension: Denmark
We have seen that in the United Kingdom there is no 
centralised agency responsible for the management and recovery
694 Van Gerven, W (1995) Bridging the gap between Community 
and national laws: Towards a principle of homogeneity in the 
field of legal remedies? Text of the first Gildesgame lecture 
delivered in the University of Oxford on 2 February 1995, 
Common Market Law Review 32: 679-702.
695 Joined cases C-46/93 an C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur v 
Germany and R v Secretary of State for transport, ex parte 
Factortame, judgement of 5 March 1996, nyr.
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of EC funds. The overall picture is one of flexibility and 
fragmentation, with the various government agencies concerned 
evolving different approaches to the recovery of EC funds, as 
practical circumstances dictate. In the absence of obvious 
criminal intent, there is overall a preference for extra­
judicial settlements, because they are thought to be cost- 
effective and speedier than court settlements. A possible 
exception to this rule can be made for small claims court 
settlements, which because of the informality of proceedings, 
can be less costly and speedier. Court proceedings usually 
mean that recoveries will be either protracted, or 
unsuccessful because of the level of insolvency generally.
At first glance, there are striking similarities between the 
British and Danish systems. For example, Denmark has no system 
of administrative courts. The decision whether to instigate 
criminal proceedings is subject to the principle of 
opportunity, as it is in the United Kingdom. Denmark has not 
incorporated the European Convention of Human rights into its 
national legislation, although it does have a written 
constitution. Furthermore the Danes also favour the practice 
of setting-off whenever possible.
However the Danish system is characterised by a high level of 
integration. Firstly, the Inland revenue and Customs and 
Excise have fused into one government department. One 
implication of this fusion is that it widens the possibilities 
for set-off, and therefore the chances of recovery. Secondly, 
Denmark has a centralised EU-directorate to manage EC funds. 
Thirdly, Denmark has a 'fast track' system of fines and 
recovery, as we shall see. It is difficult to compare recovery 
rates within the Union, as so many factors impinge. The Danes, 
for example, are fond of reminding us that they are a small 
country, and that this may somehow make recovery easier. The 
United Kingdom, in comparison, still imports a great deal from 
outside the European Union, hence the very high number of 
irregularities in the 'traditional own resources' area.
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Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Denmark is comparatively 
successful in recovering funds. For the period 1991-1994, it 
managed to recover 41% of unwarranted payments in traditional 
own resources (see tables 5.3.-5.4.), having reported 86 
irregularities during that period. It recovered 47% of 
unwarranted payments in the EAGGF Guarantee Section Fund, 
having reported 221 irregularities during that period. In view 
of this comparative success, which can be gauged by looking at 
the tables above, it may be interesting to examine the main 
features of the system for the recovery of EC funds in 
Denmark.
5.3.1. General features of Danish system
In Denmark the police usually prosecute cases where the 
statutory penalty for the violation does not exceed a fine 
(with some exceptions which need not concern us here). Cases 
under police prosecution are always tried without lay judges. 
In court a fine may be agreed upon with the consent of the 
accused and the police, provided the judge sees no reason to 
doubt the guilt of the accused and considers the fine an 
equitable one. The judge may also decide the case by issuing a 
warning to the accused.696
In practice the system works as follows. The EU Directorate in 
Denmark sends a letter with a brief description of the offence 
and a reference to the provisions which allegedly have been 
violated. A postal cheque form is enclosed. If the amount is 
paid the case is closed.697 The police or the administrations
696 Toft-Hansen, H-G (1982) The law of procedure in 
constitutional and administrative law Danish law A general 
survey, Bianco Lunos BogTrykkeri A/S, Copenhagen.
697 Greve, V and Gulmann, C (1994) Denmark: The system of 
administrative and penal sanctions, Report submitted to the EC 
Commission in accordance with a study contract of 19 September 
1990, in The system of administrative and penal sanctions in 
the Member States of the European Communities, Volume 1, 
national reports, OOPEC.
242
managing EC funds can suggest a fine. The accused can, by not 
paying the fine, cause the case to be brought before the 
judge. The police only enter the scene as auxiliaries to the 
specialised agency, and, most importantly, to prosecute the 
case immediately before the judge.
Recoveries are expedited:
... [Pjenalties are still comparatively rare, but 
settlements on recovery of funds unlawfully paid and 
received are common. When alleged offenders are solvent, 
recovery may be smooth and expedite, especially when such 
debtors receive amounts periodically as a set-off is then 
the solution. Set-off is not unknown in other fields; 
also in fiscal cases surplus payments in some respects 
may be set-off against other taxes due. But in no field 
is set-off such a spectacularly practical and efficient 
solution as in the EU cases.698
The last sentence is a strong echo of the British position on 
set-off.
5.3.2. Particularities of Danish extra-judicial recoveries
In Denmark, the police have a general competence to settle a 
case by an agreed fine, in accordance with Article 931 of the 
Administration of Justice Act which provides:
Where it is assumed that a violation will not result in a 
penalty of more than a fine the police chief may, instead 
of submitting an indictment to the court, indicate to the 
accused party that the case may be concluded without any 
legal action if he pleads guilty and is prepared to pay a 
fine of an amount stated to him within a stipulated term 
which, upon his request, may be extended.
698 Garde, P (1995) Settlement in Danish law, OOPEC, page
9.
A similar rule applies to confiscation.
Identical rules apply in relation to the Ministry of 
Agriculture's administration of the EC market organisation 
(Article 29 of the Act) and to the Customs/tax authorities, 
within their respective fields.
In Denmark, there exists a system of administratively imposed 
fines. This takes the shape of a letter in the form of an 
indictment. If the relevant official, typically a senior 
policeman, opines that the prosecution ought not to ask for a 
higher punishment than a fine, a postscript will be added to 
the text of the indictment as follows: 'if you admit your 
guilt and pay a fine of ...kroner, the case if closed; 
otherwise the case will be referred to the court' - much like 
the Dutch transactie system.699
Section 63 of the Danish Constitution endows the courts with a 
right to review the legality of administrative decisions. It 
refers to the right of the courts to 'decide any question 
relating to the scope of the administration's authority'. This 
review is placed in the hands of the ordinary courts. However 
it is a principle of Danish law that there shall normally be a 
possibility of having a case tried at two - and only two- 
levels.700 The ombudsman, whose powers go beyond that of his 
British counterparts, is also entitled to review the decisions 
of an administration.
5.4. Conclusion: improving recovery rates
699 Garde, P (1989) The suppression of fraud against the 
European Communities in Danish law and practice, in The legal 
protection of the financial interests of the Community: 
progress and prospects since the Brussels seminar of 1989, pp 
212-217, Oak Tree Press, Dublin.
700 See Nielsen, G.T (1982) Constitutional and 
administrative law in Danish law, a general survey, Bianco 
Lunos BogTrykkeri A/S, Copenhagen, pp 49-60.
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Focusing first of all on set-off, it is clear from the Danish 
and British examples that setting off is an efficient way of 
recovering EC funds. The situation in the UK is that set-off 
between tax and Customs claims is not possible,701 and that 
there are uncertainties regarding the application of set-off 
in particular circumstances. Civil court proceedings in the UK 
remain slow and costly. The Woolf Report has suggested a 
number of reforms to speed up procedures in the civil courts, 
and increase the scope for extra-judicial settlements in 
England and Wales.
On the basis of a very brief comparison of recovery in the UK 
and Denmark, it is fair to say that three conditions maximise 
the recovery of funds: firstly the integration of tax and 
Customs authorities, secondly an ambitious and robust approach 
to set-off, with clear ground rules and finally a fast-track 
court system to back up extra-judicial recovery. These are 
reforms which would benefit the UK generally.
But the international aspects of recovery should not be 
overlooked. A recent report stressed the need for mutual 
assistance legislation to be updated to the realities of the 
single market. The Commission has also asked to be 
automatically associated to requests for assistance when 
Community interests are involved.702
For some time the Commission has been concerned that
701 Martyn Bridges' cry that ' [H] istorically, one of the 
problems in dealing with tax evasion [in the UK] is that 
different government departments have not cooperated with, or 
even spoken to each other' must be echoed. (Bridges, M, 1996, 
Tax evasion - A crime in itself: The relationship with money 
laundering in Journal of financial Crime, November 1996, 
volume 4, number 2, page 165).
702 See White, S (1996) Recovering EC funds: The extra­
judicial route in Fraud on the European budget, vol 4 number 
3, Hume Papers on Public Policy, Edinburgh University Press, 
page 68.
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settlements may not be effective as a mode of recovery. The 
conclusions of the Edinburgh Council of December 1992 stated 
that ' {0]n agriculture, with particular reference to the 
clearance of accounts, the Commission intends to give the 
national authorities more responsibility for applying 
Community legislation by allowing them, under certain 
conditions, to negotiate settlements with individuals'. As a 
result the Commission put forward a proposal for a directive 
authorising the Member State, on a case by case basis, to 
derogate from certain provisions contained in the CAP (i.e the 
duty of Member States to recover amounts due in full) ,703 
It seems therefore that the Commission has used the word 
'settlement' in two different ways. The first way, contained 
in the proposed directive denotes 'settling for less'; whereby 
the later Commission definition, used in the settlement 
(transaction) study of 1995 refers to the practice of settling 
extra-judicially. Indeed, in systems where recovery are 
effected only through the courts (e.g. Spain, Greece), extra­
judicial settlements are often equated to settlements for less 
than the sum due. However this is not true of settlements in 
other systems (for example in the Netherlands, Denmark or the 
United Kingdom) where recovering full amounts extra-judicially 
is a normal, and legal expression of administrative 
discretion.
One wonders therefore what intervention (if any) can be taken 
in this area by a Commission respectful of subsidiarity. As 
the Labayle Report704 has confirmed, there is a bewildering 
diversity of practice in the Union concerning the recovery of 
EC funds. The proposal puts forward the idea that settlements 
constituting less than the amount owed should be approved by 
the Commission. This would not affect the UK, since its
703 Commission minute VI/ 025658 dated 26.07.93 From G. 
Legras, Director General of DG VI.
704 Labayle, H (1996) La transaction dans 1'Union 
Europeenne Rapport de synthese ('Labayle Report').
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agencies already consult with the Commission on such matters 
when they arise. Perhaps the instances when no recovery can be 
made at all should be of more concern to a Commission eager to 
protect EC finance. In this research on insolvency regimes in 
the Member States and the way they affect the recovery of EC 
funds could throw a great deal of light on the present state 
of affairs.
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PART IV.
WIDENING THE ENFORCEMENT AGENDA
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CHAPTER 6. PROCUREMENT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CORRUPTION
6,1. Introduction
There is now a recognition that the CAP is not the only area 
in which fraud is taking place, and of the dangers posed by 
transit and procurement fraud. In the last area in particular, 
EC fraud cases continue to throw up a variety of corrupt or 
'grey' practices engaged in by officials, economic operators 
and/or various intermediaries.
However there is no agreed definition throughout the Union of 
what constitutes a corrupt practice. This means that some 
Member States criminalise conduct which others do not. For 
example one Member State may define a certain conduct as 
'trading in influence' (a criminal offence) whilst another 
accepts it as 'lobbying'. Furthermore, provisions in the 
criminal laws of the Member States relating to the corruption 
of officials are often restricted to nationals.705 Most 
national criminal laws punish the bribery of national public 
officials but at the same time do not make it a specific 
criminal offence for companies to bribe foreign officials. 
Bribes to foreign officials are tax-deductible in some of the 
Member States.706 This situation creates a 'legal vacuum' as 
far as certain officials are concerned, whether they be EC 
officials or officials from another Member State, but also in 
relation to some economic operators.
Because of the international dimensions of both transit and 
procurement, the concern over protection of the EC budget has 
been 'spilling over' - from the Member States and the Union,
705 It is not the case in the UK, where the Prevention of 
Corruption Act criminalises corrupt acts by 'any member, 
officer or servant of a public body'.
706 See for example: Transparency International (1995) The 
fight against corruption: What the European Union can do, 
November, unpublished paper; Newspaper article: "Anger over 
bribes ruling" in European, 18 April 1996, page 17.
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to international trade and international relations. It is now 
more difficult to 'detach' EC fraud and corruption 
conceptually from other types of international and organised 
financial crime, as we shall see.
This chapter examines these issues. Firstly, the problem with 
respect to EC funds is discussed, in particular the award of 
public contracts financed by the Structural Funds, and the 
prospects for improvement are explored. Secondly, the Union's 
specific response in the shape of two third pillar proposals 
is examined in some detail (6.3.). Thirdly some of the 
difficulties in evolving a successful anti-corruption strategy 
are discussed with regards to EC officials (6.4.). Fourthly 
the impact of corruption on the terms of international trade - 
an issue fore-fronted by the United States - is discussed, 
together with the Union's response. Corruption undeniably has 
an international dimension, and calls for an international 
strategy, which is discussed in closing.
It is argued that the Union must define the problem in its own 
way, by articulating a strategy which is capable of both 
protecting the financial interests of the European 
Communities, but also of dealing with the international 
ramifications of corruption. Many of these issues recur within 
the context of enlargement of the Union which, for reasons of 
space, is dealt with in chapter 7.
6.2. Procurement and EC funds; the impact of corruption
In 1991, Woolcock found that 'total public procurement in the 
EC accounts for about 15% of GDP'.707 However government 
contracting has in certain countries been a byword for 
corruption in many forms: financial, political, social or
707 Woolcock, S (1991) Public procurement, in The state of 
the European Community Policies, institutions and debates in 
the transition years, eds: L. Hurwitz and C. Lequesne, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Longman.
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legal.708 According to a European Parliament report, in most 
Member States, bribes would amount to between 2 and 10% of the 
value of transactions.709 The Council of Europe estimates that 
in some countries between 10 and 15% of the price the consumer 
pays for a product goes into corruption.710 In Germany, for 
example, the amount involved would reach between 5 and 10 
billion DM a year.711 Der Spiegel newspaper reported in July 
1996 that 50 employees of private companies and 10 of the 
Frankfurt airport were being investigated for alleged 
corruption in the construction of their airport's Terminal 2. 
Millions of DM were used for bribing airport officials in bids 
amounting to a total value of 2.5 billion DM. The bribes 
resulted amongst other things in increased prices for the 
projects. The public prosecutor estimated an increase of 
prices by about 20 to 30%.712 Indeed the main area in which 
corrupt practices have been highlighted is that related to 
public work contracts and services.
Within the context of the EC budget, procurement financed out 
of the Structural Funds, which in the 1994 financial year 
accounted to approximately 40% of the 68 446 million ECU 
budget, is naturally also affected. Public works and supplies 
contracts were the first areas to be regulated at Community
708 Gormley, L (1994) Public Procurement, 1993, in The 
European market Myth or reality? eds D.Campbell and C. Flint, 
Kluwer, page 151.
709 European Parliament (1995) Report of the Committee on 
Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on combatting corruption 
in Europe, rapporteur: Mrs Heinke Salish, December.
710 Council of Europe (1995) Administrative, civil and 
penal aspects, including the role of the judiciary, of the 
fight against corruption, proceedings of 19th Conference of 
European Council of Ministers, Valletta, Malta, 14-15 June 
1994.
711 Ibid, pp 39-41.
712 See Transparency International Newsletter, September 
1996, page 13.
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level in the 1970s,713 with an initial emphasis on four 
specific aspects:
(i) compulsory advertising any tender notices in the OJ for 
tenders above certain thresholds,
(ii) the prohibition of discriminatory standards
(iii) the harmonisation of technical requirements and
(iv) transparency in selection and award procedure.
In anticipation of the single market and of the related 
opening up of public procurement, substantial problems were 
highlighted. A report from the Commission noted that in 
particular the transposition of the 1970s procurement 
directives was unsatisfactory and that there were numerous and 
varied breaches of every Community procurement rule by public 
purchasers. The report however acknowledged that public 
procurement was both a complex and politically sensitive 
area.714 This lead to a re-casting of the 1970s directives 
(see below) to tighten existing rules, and to a closer 
monitoring of transposition.
In the mid 1990s procurement cases involving EC funds, corrupt 
practices often come to light, predictably, in relation to the 
tendering process itself, but also in the use of 
intermediaries. There are also a number of 'grey' practices, 
which, more controversially perhaps, need to be examined for 
their ability to give good value for money and to foster fair 
practices generally. A few cases are outlined below, followed 
by discussion of the EC control framework, and the prospects 
for its improvement.
713 Council Directives: 71/305 OJ (1971) 185/5 
(coordinating of procedures for the award of public work 
contracts); 77/62 OJ (1977) 13/1 (coordinating procedures for 
the award of public supply contracts). The former was repealed 
by Council Directive 93/37 and the latter by 93/36.
714 European Commission (1993) The opening up of public 
procurement, OOPEC; see also Arrowsmith, S (1996) An 
assessment of the legal techniques for implementing the 
procurement directives, W G Hart Legal Workshop, London, July.
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6.2.1, Procurement fraud
(i) Procurement corruption cases and 'grey area' practices
(a) The tendering process 
Case 1: No tendering procedure
A total absence of tendering procedures was found in the 
majority of projects administered by the regional government 
of Cantabria (Spain). The contracts, with an estimated worth 
of 20 million ECU were awarded to the enterprises directly and 
by word of mouth. The contracts were only formalised 
subsequently, sometimes not until after the work had been 
completed.715
Case 2: Exclusion of low bids
Low bids were excluded with respect to the Gomeira airport 
project, worth 13 million ECU and the Almendralejo highway 
project (Spain) worth 5 million ECU.716
(b) Intermediary bodies
Case 3: conflicts of interest
In Italy 8 million ECU of Community funds were transferred to
.a private company acting'an intermediary body. The audit 
revealed an apparent conflict of interest concerning the 
management of this 8 million ECU operation by a high-ranking 
Commission official.
In Andalucia (Spain) the President of a vocational training 
centre which had received Community assistance was also on the
staff of the intermediary body responsible for allocating the
funds.717
715 Ibid, 4.29 (a).
716 Ibid, at 4.29. (g) and (h) .
717 Ibid, at 4.54.
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Case 4: Insolvency
In Spain the administration of a global subsidy amounting to 
46 million ECU was entrusted to an intermediary body which, on 
the basis of the 1991-92 financial data, did not present the 
solvency guarantees required.718
Case 5: Double charging
In Italy, two suppliers of services had supplied two 
enterprises with an identical service, which consisted of 
setting up a quality control manual and an automated 
management system, and had invoiced both for the same amount, 
namely 18.6 million ECU.719
Case 6: Amendment to project
In the case of the Lucas Estate in Birmingham (UK), the 
project implemented and costing 5.5 million ECU was found to 
differ substantially from the project for which the contract 
was awarded.720
(c) Some grey areas
Structural Funds are also affected by practices which hardly 
offer value for money, even if, arguably, they are not 
illegal. For example The ERDF was used to co-finance a one-day 
seminar in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania organized by an 
association of local businessmen. The ERDF contributed three 
quarters of the total cost of 165 000 ECU. The main feature of 
this meeting was a one-hour speech by a Member of the European 
Commission, who was hired through a private agency at a cost 
of approximately 20 000 ECU (excluding VAT) for the service. 
The Court of Auditor's checks established that the cost of
718 Ibid, at 4.52.
719 Ibid, at 4.59.
720 Ibid, at 4.28(f) .
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this event was quite out of proportion to the result 
obtained.721
The low rate of officials' remuneration in central and eastern 
Europe has been flagged in the evidence given to the Committee 
of Inquiry on transit fraud as one factor which encourages 
corrupt practices (see chapter on income fraud). The 
Committee's observation would be in line with a Mertonian 
reading of corruption, seeing disparities in wealth, or income 
(i.e extremes) as creating incentives to deviant behaviour. 
There is little or nothing the European Union can do about low 
remuneration of officials in central and eastern Europe, but 
PHARE consultancy fees, by contrast, are within its remit. In 
1995, average fees paid to western consultants in the PHARE 
programme ranged from 300 ECU to 1,000 ECU per day (such fees 
totalled 20 million ECU in Hungary alone). But the range was 
only 50 to 200 ECU per day for local consultants working in 
PHARE beneficiary countries.722 Although it is understandable 
that standards of living vary from one country to the next, 
the Commission could perhaps look into ways of not 
exacerbating already existing and serious disparities.
6.2.2. Procurement control framework
Article 7 of Council Regulation 2052/88723 stipulates that 
measures financed by the Structural Funds or receiving 
assistance from the EIB or from another existing financial 
instrument must be in keeping with the provisions of the 
Treaties and with Community policies, including those 
concerning the rules on competition and the award of public 
work contracts. Compliance with Article 7 therefore requires 
the full and correct transposition of Community directives on
721 Ibid, at 4.82.
722 Euro-East Information Service, PHARE consultants' fees, 
December 19 1995.
723 OJ (1988) L 185/9.
257
competition. Judging by the number of proceedings under way, 
the Member States are experiencing the same difficulties in 
transposing as they did in the 1970s, and/or are as 
ambivalent, depending on one's preferred reading of the 
situation.
The group of directives now regulating public work contracts 
and supplies (89/665, 92/13, 92/50, 93/36, 93/37 and 93/3S)724 
are particularly relevant to ERDF interventions, which relate 
mainly to infrastructure investments involving the award of 
public work contracts. The aim of the directives is to ensure 
transparency and competitive tendering for public contracts 
above 5 million ECU and supplies above 130,000 ECU, so as to 
avoid discrimination at the time they are awarded. However, 
all too often their transposition into national law has been 
either protracted, or inaccurate, as illustrated in table 6.1. 
overleaf.
724 Council Directives: 89/665 OJ (1989) L 395/33 
(coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of review procedures to 
the award of public supply and public work contracts); 92/50 
OJ (1992) L 209/1 (coordination of procedures on the award of 
public service contracts; 92/13 OJ (1992) L 76 (review 
procedures for contracts in the water, energy, transport and 
telecommunications sectors); 93/36 OJ L 199/1 (coordinating 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts); 93/37 OJ 
(1993) L 199/54 (coordinating procedures for the award of 
public works contracts); 93/38 OJ (1993) L 199/84 
(coordinating the procurement procedures of entities in the 
water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors).
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Table 6.1.
Transposition of procurement directives as of 30.6.96
Directives BE DK DE EL ES FR IRL IT LU NL PT UK AUT SE SU
89/440
(Works)
I 1 1
88/295*
(Supplies)
1
89/66
(Remedies)
1 t 1 1
90/531 
(Supplies)
! t D D I
92/13
(Remedies)
1 D 111 1 I D 1 m
92/50 
(Services) ■ ■ 3
93/36 
(Supplies) 3 Ss ■ 1 1 Sp
93/38 
(Services)
i D D H ° m m
1
| Full transposition not yet communicated to the Commission
Transposition communicated, infringement proceedings taken
Transposition communicated to the Commission
D Derogation
Notes to table 6.1.
Source: Communication from DGXV dated 13 August 
1996, translated from French by author.
* Now superseded by Directive 93/38
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In order to check whether the rules concerning public 
works contracts were respected in the award of Structural 
Funds, in 1988 the Commission imposed a system of 
reporting on the Member States,725 which included a 
declaration that those contracts which had not been 
published (i.e under the special procedures exempting 
from publication) had been awarded in accordance with the 
directives and a questionnaire on public works which has 
to be sent to the Commission at the latest when the 
request for payment of the balance of the Structural 
Funds subsidy is made. However in its report for the 1994 
financial year, the European Court of Auditors found that 
this system had not been implemented.726 Usually, the 
regional and local authorities were poorly informed about 
the existence, content and purpose of the 'public 
procurement questionnaire' thus introduced.727
As a result, the Commission abandoned this instrument in 
favour of a new supervisory system, to take effect in 
1994. For all operations exceeding 25 million ECU, 
decisions to grant Community finance automatically entail 
the transmission to the Commission of the main details 
concerning awards of the contracts concerned, including 
the record of the award of tenders, the aim being to 
ensure systematic and more thorough checks. As a result 
of those checks, the Commission can (i) agree without 
reservation the proposed contract awards, (ii) agree in 
principle subject to retrospective check, or (iii) 
suspend finance. Smaller projects are monitored on the
725 Communication C(88) 2510 OJ (1989) C 22/3, from the 
Commission to the Member States concerning checks that the 
rules relating to public works contracts are being respected 
in the projects and programmes financed by the Structural 
Funds and the financial instruments.
726 Court of Auditors Annual Report for the financial year 
1994 OJ (1995) C 303/1, at 4.23.
727 See European Commission (1996) The Structural Funds in 
1994, sixth Annual Report, OOPEC, page 117.
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basis of on-the-spot checks. But in view of the growing 
number of public work contracts awarded in the Member 
States, and subject to the rules of subsidiarity, the 
Commission is now considering a system of certifying that 
the internal procedures for awarding contracts employed 
by each awarding authority comply with Community law.728 
It would, however still be up to the Member States to 
ensure that the certification is meaningful on a day-to- 
day basis.
In its Annual Report for the 1994 financial year, the ECA 
commented '[T]he lack of transparency in awarding public 
work contracts is not without consequence as regards the 
risk of fraud and irregularity'.729 There are two aspects 
in particular where transparency seems to be lacking. 
Firstly, Member States seem to prefer to make maximum use 
of the exceptions730 provided for under the procurement 
rules, and secondly it is unclear how intermediaries are 
selected.
Exemptions to procurement rules
Under Article 7(2) of Council Directive 93/37 contracting 
authorities may, under certain circumstances, waive the 
requirements for prior publication of a contract notice, 
and select their own candidates. One criticism which is 
often levelled at the Member States is that too much use 
is made of such exceptions: negotiated procedures (with 
chosen suppliers), restricted procedures (with a list of 
qualified suppliers) and preference schemes731 'where an
728 Ibid.
729 Ibid, at 4.28.
730 European Commission (1987) An EC programme for public 
procurement in the Community, COM(86) 375.
731 European Commission (1989) National regional preference 
schemes in the placing of public contracts, COM(89) 400.
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appeal to local preference permits direct 
negotiations'.732 There is still therefore ample 
opportunity to circumvent basic procurement rules such as 
advertising, competitive tendering and non­
discrimination. This is not aided by the lack of clarity 
in defining exceptions. What might, for example, 
constitute an 'urgency brought about by events 
unforeseen'? Such an emergency has the effect of waiving 
basic procurement rules [Article 7(3)(c)]. Once 
transcribed into national law, this exemption could lead 
to wildly different approaches in the Member States. The 
abuse of any such exemptions leads to the possibility of 
contracts (for our purpose, involving EC funds) being 
awarded on the basis of personal preference and gain.
The selection of intermediaries
The use of intermediary bodies, agencies or other private 
bodies continues to raise problems, and the system need 
tightening up. Intermediaries can be designated by the 
Member States in order to manage global grants. The 
intermediary then allocates individual grants to final 
beneficiaries.733 Intermediaries must have the necessary 
administrative capability,734 must be present and 
represented in the regions concerned, operate in the 
public interest, and represent the socio-economic 
interests directly concerned by the implementation of the 
measures planned.735 Although intermediary bodies must 
provide adequate solvency guarantees and have the
732 European Commission (1996) The Structural Funds in 
1994, OOPEC, pp 116-117.
733 Article 5(1) (c) of Council Regulation 2052/88 OJ (1988) 
L 185/9.
734 Article 16(1) of Council Regulation 4253/88 OJ (1988)
L 374/1.
735 Article 6(1) of Council Regulation 2083/93 (ERDF) OJ 
(193) L 193/34.
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administration capacity necessary for the administration 
of the subsidies,736 there are at present no formal 
procedures for selecting such bodies. At Commission 
level, an inter-departmental consultation is provided 
for, but the authorizing officer retains the option of 
ignoring opinions given.
6.2.3. Prospects for improvement
There is according to Draetta,737 Transparency 
International738 and a recent report from the European 
Parliament,739 more that the European Union can do to 
combat corruption within the confines of the first 
pillar. In particular procurement rules could be 
tightened up. Exemptions need to be narrowed further, and 
the selection of intermediaries, in particular needs 
regulating. But bearing in mind that some of the Member 
States have been slow in transposing the procurement 
directives, it is clear that such a move could only be a 
small part of a wider strategy to prevent and control 
corrupt practices (and recover monies laundered as a 
result). Such a strategy is at present emerging inter­
government a 1 ly.
736 Article 16 of Council Regulation 4253/88 OJ (1988) L
374.
737 Draetta, U (1995) The European Union and the fight 
against corruption in international trade, Revue de Droit des 
Affaires Internationales, number 6, pp 701-711.
738 Transparency International (1995) The fight against 
international corruption What the European Union can do, 
November; also paper by Dieter Frisch at T.I. Workshop in 
London on 4 July 1996, same title.
739 European Parliament (1995) Report of the Committee on 
Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on combatting corruption 
in Europe, rapporteur Heinke Salish, December.
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6.3. The emergence of a European strategy
The so-called third pillar of the Treaty on European 
Union is host to two relevant instruments which address 
this situation: a Protocol focused tightly upon the 
financial interests of the Community - dealt with at this 
point in the work - and a broader 'Anti-Corruption' 
Convention which will be discussed later.
6.3.1. The anti-corruption Protocol to the 'PIFf 
Convention
The purpose of the Protocol to the Convention on the 
Protection of the Financial Interests of the European 
Communities is to combat corruption that damages or is 
likely to damage the European Communities' financial 
interests and which involves European or national 
officials or members of the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the Court of 
Justice and corruption of the type referred to in the 
Convention, committed by the same officials and 
members.740 It takes into account the immunities 
conferred by the Protocol on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Communities.741 The PIF Convention has 
been agreed and its adoption by Council is anticipated.
It was drawn up on the basis of Article K.3(2c), which 
gives the Council of Ministers a framework within which 
to draw up conventions in areas of common interest, such 
as combatting fraud on an international scale.
740 Council of the European Union (1995) introduction, 
draft protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests, document 11723/95, 
November, page 1.
741 On this point see European Commission (1996) Protecting 
the Community's financial interests the fight against fraud 
annual report 1995 COM(96) 173, page 17; also White, S
(1996)\Proposed measures against corruption of officials in 
the EU, in European Law Review, forthcoming.
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As a necessary first step, the Protocol defines 'European 
Official' and 'National Official'.742 A European Official 
means any employee within the meaning of the Staff 
Regulations of the European Communities or seconded 
person carrying out corresponding functions. National 
Official is to be understood, for the purposes of 
application of criminal law, by reference to the 
definition of 'official' and 'public officer' in the 
national law of the Member State in which the person in 
question performs that function.
The Protocol also gives a definition of 'passive' and 
'active' corruption, where the former refers to the 
official who is corrupted and the latter to the person 
who induces corruption.743 More precisely, passive 
corruption is defined as the deliberate action of an 
official who requests, accepts or receives, directly or 
through a third party, for himself or for a third party, 
offers, promises or advantages of any kind whatsoever to 
act or refrain from acting in accordance with his 
functions or in the exercise thereof in breach of his 
official duties in a way which damages or is likely to 
damage the European Communities' financial interests. 
Active Corruption is defined as the deliberate action of 
whosoever promises or gives, directly or through an 
intermediary, an advantage of any kind whatsoever to an 
official for himself or for a third party for him to act 
or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in 
the exercise of his functions in breach of his official 
duties in a way which damages or is likely to damage the 
European Communities' financial interests.
The protocol also proposes that the two categories of
742 Article 1 of proposed 'anti-corruption' Protocol.
743 Articles 2 and 3 of proposed 'anti-corruption' 
Protocol.
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officials, European and national, are to be assimilated 
for the purpose of national anti-corruption 
legislation.744 This means that each Member State would 
ensure that measures in their respective criminal laws 
relating to the corruption of officials apply equally to 
all officials with responsibilities for EC funds. This is 
not the first time that the principle of assimilation has 
been used in the protection of the financial interests of 
the European Communities. The principle was first applied 
in this area in the Greek Maize case,745 when the Court 
of Justice ruled that infringements of Community law were 
to be penalised under the conditions analogous to those 
applicable to infringements of national law. The 
principle was then enshrined in Article 209a of the EC 
Treaty, which was added by the TEU, and which requires 
Member States to take the same measures to counter fraud 
affecting the financial interests of the Community as 
they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial 
interests. The requirement can thus be seen as an 
extension of already established practice in the Member 
States.
As well as assimilating Union officials to national 
officials under criminal law, the protocol requires 
Member States have established their jurisdiction in a 
number of circumstances. They must prosecute in any of 
the following conditions:
(i) if the offence is committed in whole or part in their 
territory,
(ii) if the offender is a national or an official of the 
state concerned,
(iii) if the offence is committed by or against a 
European or National official, Government Minister, 
elected Member of Parliament, member of the Member
744 Article 4 of proposed 'anti-corruption' Protocol.
745 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965.
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state's highest courts, member of its Court of Auditors, 
or a member of the Commission, European Parliament, 
European Court of Auditors or Court of Justice who is a 
national of the Member State concerned and,
(iv) if the offender is a European official working for 
the Community institution or a body set up under the 
Treaties establishing the Communities and with its 
headquarters in the Member State concerned.
A Member State which does not extradite its own nationals 
would have to establish its jurisdiction over corruption 
offences committed by officials outside the national 
territory. A Member State also has to prosecute whenever 
extradition is not appropriate. Files, information and 
exhibits would be transmitted in accordance with the 
procedures laid down in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Extradition. Bilateral and multilateral 
agreements concluded between Member States and relevant 
declarations would remain unaffected.
The measure therefore provides for 'limited extra­
territoriality' (in as much as it only applies within the 
territory of the EU), for EU and national officials and 
in the context of the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities.
Member States would have to ensure that active and 
passive corruption are punishable by effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, 
including penalties involving deprivation of liberty 
which can give rise to extradition. Penalties would apply 
without prejudice to the exercise of disciplinary 
powers.746
Each Member State would have to take the necessary
746 Article 5 of proposed 'anti-corruption' Protocol.
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measures for heads of businesses to be declared 
criminally liable in cases of corruption involving 
officials.
A sizeable obstacle to the prosecution of allegedly 
corrupt officials is the failure of cooperation 
mechanisms, which lag behind the realities of 
international criminality. As corruption takes the form 
of an international crime, its suppression is still 
regulated by national legal instruments inherently 
territorial in nature and, therefore, largely inadequate 
to confront it.747 When and if the proposed measures come 
into effect, Member States would acquire duties to 
cooperate effectively, when the corruption constitutes a 
criminal offence, in the investigation, the prosecution 
and in carrying out the punishment imposed, by means, for 
example, of mutual legal assistance, extradition, 
transfer of proceedings or enforcement of sentences 
passed in another Member State. They would also have to 
cooperate in deciding which Member State should 
prosecute, in order to 'centralise' prosecutions in a 
single Member State.
The provisions on ne bis in idem contained in the 'PIF' 
Convention would also be extended to cases of corruption 
by officials. This means that an official whose trial has 
been finally disposed of in a Member State may not be 
prosecuted in another Member State, save in exceptional 
circumstances. Member States would be able to launch a 
second prosecution if, for example, the facts which were 
the subject of the judgment rendered abroad constituted 
an offence directly against the security or other equally
747 Draetta, U (1995) The European Union and the fight 
against corruption in international trade, Revue de Droit des 
Affaires Internationales, number 6, page 703.
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essential interests of that Member State.748 However, 
exceptions would not apply if the Member State in 
question had requested, in respect of the same facts, 
prosecution by the other Member State, or granted
extradition of the person concerned.
No provision in the Protocol would prevent Member States 
from adopting internal legal provisions which go beyond 
the obligations deriving from the 'PIF' Convention. 
Lastly, Member States would acquire a duty to transmit to
the Commission the text of their domestic law into which
the provisions of the Protocol are transposed.
The European Court of Justice would have jurisdiction to 
rule on disputes between Member States on the 
interpretation or application of the Protocol if no 
solution is found within six months. This 'compromise' 
was also adopted in the 'PIF' Convention. In addition, 
certain disputes (for example, relating to the 
definitions of corruption, the principle of assimilation, 
ne bis in idem, internal provisions and transmission) 
between the Commission and the Member States which have 
not been resolved by negotiation would be submitted to 
the European Court of Justice. Excluded from this 
dispute-resolution mechanism are disputes regarding the 
interpretation of 'National Official' contained in 
Article 1, second indent of paragraph 1, where presumably 
the national view would prevail.
The Protocol would not enter into force until the 
Convention for the Protection of the Financial Interests 
of the European Communities has entered into force. In 
any new Member State, it would enter into force ninety
748 This would only be possible if the Member State in 
question had already made a declaration notifying adoption of 
the Convention.
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days after accession.749
As far as the relationship with the 'PIF' Convention is 
concerned, Article 7 of the 'anti-corruption' Protocol 
would ensure that the provisions already contained in the 
'PIF' Convention with regards to the criminal liability 
of heads of businesses,750 extradition,751 
cooperation,752 ne bis in idem (save reservations) ,753 
internal provisions and transmission754 would be extended 
to cases involving corrupt officials.755
6.3.2. Extension of third pillar strategy: the anti­
corruption convention
More recently, a more ambitious project has been agreed 
by the Council of Ministers: a Convention on the fight 
against corruption of officials of the European 
Communities or officials of Member States of the European 
Union.756
The contents of this Convention duplicate that of the 
Protocol, except for one important consideration: its 
action is not restricted to the protection of the 
financial interests of the European communities.
According to the Convention, the principle of 'limited
749 Articles 9 and 10 of the proposed 'anti-corruption' 
Protocol.
750 Article 3 of 'PIF' Convention.
751 Article 5(1), (2) and (4) of 'PIF' Convention.
752 Article 6 of 'PIF' Convention.
753 Article 7 of 'PIF' Convention.
754 Articles 9 and 10 of 'PIF' Convention.
755 Article 7 of 'anti-corruption' Protocol.
756 Document 4265/96 JUSTPEN of 12 January 1996, Council 
Act drawing up the Convention.
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extra-territoriality' outlined above is extended to any 
act of passive or active corruption by an EU or national 
official. The question of the fight against political 
corruption, however, remains a sensitive issue.757
The Convention was drawn up on the same legal basis as 
the Protocol, with the aim of improving judicial 
cooperation. Its contents duplicate the provisions 
(examined above) extracted from a conjoint reading of the 
'PIF' Convention and its first Protocol. In its first six 
articles, the Convention reiterates the Protocol's 
definitional provisions on National and European 
Officials, passive and active corruption, with one 
difference: in the definitions of passive and active 
corruption, the words 'or is likely to damage the 
European Communities' financial interests' have been 
omitted. This means that the 'Anti-Corruption' Convention 
seeks to establish common rules for dealing with 
corruption, leaving aside the question of the impact it 
may have on the EC budget.
The provisions on assimilation, penalties and 
jurisdiction are reproduced word for word. The provisions 
found in the 'Anti-Corruption' Convention concerning 
criminal liabilities of heads of businesses, extradition, 
cooperation, ne bis in idem rules and provisions of 
national laws can also be extracted from a joint reading 
of the 'PIF' Convention and its protocol.
Again, the European Court of Justice would have 
jurisdiction over disputes if no solution were found 
within six months. The present text suggests that its 
entry into force would not differ substantially from that 
of the 'PIF' Convention. The 'Anti-Corruption' Convention 
would have to be ratified by all the Member States and
757 See parliamentary question E-2106/94 OJ (1995) C 36/39.
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apply ninety days thereafter. Until then, the Member 
States could choose to apply the Convention either 
bilaterally, or through the means of a declaration. This 
process has been referred to as one of 'rolling 
ratification'.758 It would be open to accession by any 
State that becomes a member of the European Union.
There is only one respect in which the 'Anti-Corruption' 
Convention differs from the earlier proposal for a 
Protocol, and it is in the area of cooperation. A 
conjoint reading of the Protocol and the 'PIF' Convention 
establishes that, when the corruption of officials 
concerns at least two Member States and constitutes a 
criminal offence, then those States would have a duty to 
cooperate effectively in relation to investigation, 
prosecution and punishment. This could be achieved by way 
of mutual legal assistance, extradition, transfer of 
proceedings, enforcement of sentences passed in another 
Member State, and/or other means of cooperation.759 This 
has the effect of limiting cooperation to criminal 
proceedings.
The 'Anti-Corruption' Convention, by contrast, states 
that if officials are involved in passive or active 
corrupt behaviour (defined above) which concerns at least 
two Member States then the States would have to cooperate 
effectively in the investigation, in judicial proceedings 
and in enforcing the penalty imposed, for instance by 
means of mutual legal assistance, extradition, transfer 
of proceedings or enforcement of judgments rendered 
abroad.760 This could be interpreted to mean that
758 See Statewatch bulletin, volume 6, number 4, July- 
August 1996, page 6.
759 See Article 7 of the protocol read in conjunction with 
Article 6 of the 'PIF' Convention.
760 See Article 8.
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administrations have a duty to cooperate in cases of 
suspected corruption, even if the behaviour in question 
was not the object of criminal sanctions. This reflects 
the opinion, expressed by the Council of Europe 
Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption, that a 
comprehensive anti-corruption strategy should not be 
confined to the criminal sphere alone.761
Thus, apparently, the proposed 'Anti-Corruption 
Convention' would go beyond the proposed Protocol in one 
important respect, by mandating for cooperation in 
control of conduct, regardless of whether the diverse 
legal and other traditions of Member States have led them 
to regulate such conduct within their administrative, 
civil and/or criminal law systems.762 In this way, the 
proposed Convention builds up and extends existing forms 
of cooperation in the administrative and civil spheres.
For example, in the administrative sphere, instruments 
exist to promote cooperation in Customs and tax matters. 
It is now being recognised that cooperation is equally 
important in cases of corruption involving officials. 
Administrative authorities may be in a position to 
cooperate more speedily than judicial authorities.
Cooperation in the civil sphere is also of primary 
importance. The need for authorities to cooperate in 
attempting to recover advantages illegally obtained, of 
actions for damages, or for breach of contract which may 
involve more than one Member State, must not be
761 Council of Europe (1995) Draft Programme of Action 
Against Corruption by the Multidisciplinary Group on 
Corruption, October, page 21.
762 See Council of Europe (1995) Administrative, civil and 
penal aspects, including the role of the judiciary, of the 
fight against corruption, proceedings of the 19th Conference 
of European Minsters of Justice, Valetta, Malta, 14-15 June 
1994, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg.
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overlooked.
6,3.3, Discussion on protocol and convention
It must be asked whether the proposed measures described 
above sufficiently address the weakness in the ways in 
which the European Communities presently respond to the 
challenge of corruption. For this author, the answer must 
be that they have potential, which can only be assessed 
once they come into force. It seems important that these 
instruments be in place before the next enlargement, 
which promises to be a difficult one. However the 
implementation of conventions in general,763 and third 
pillar instruments in particular tend to be protracted. 
Once implemented, the usual difficulties associated with 
judicial cooperation often apply.
At present inter-governmental acts, such as the Protocol 
and Convention outlined above, require unanimity, and 
escape the scrutiny of the European Parliament. 
Instruments do not become effective until they are 
ratified by the fifteen Member States. Disputes over the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice can be 
protracted, as in the case of the Europol Convention. In 
the case of the 'Anti-Corruption' Convention it is hoped 
that a similar compromise can be reached concerning the 
role of the European Court of Justice. The Europol 
convention stipulates that whenever a dispute cannot be 
settled within six months, the matter may be referred to 
the Court of Justice by a party to the same dispute.
This conditionality has lead some commentators to argue 
that matters related to the protection of the financial 
interests of the Community, in particular, should be 
brought under Community competence (first pillar), where
763 For example the Dublin Convention, signed in June 1990, 
still awaits full ratification six years later.
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these problems do not arise. A similar argument has been 
made in relation with the fight against corruption (see 
5.) .
The protocol to the 'PIF' Convention will not enter into 
force until the 'PIF' Convention itself has entered into 
force, that is to say after all the Member States have 
ratified it. Nevertheless, some aspects of this 
Convention and its protocols raise considerations that 
may be delicate for Member States, and interact with 
broader issues regarding the 'third pillar' and the IGC. 
One problem for cooperation in criminal investigation of 
cases of possible corruption is that many different 
administrations may have to cooperate, which in some 
cases may cause difficulty. Another is that transfers of 
criminal proceedings, even within the European Union, are 
slow.764 Diplomatic channels have often proved an 
unsatisfactory conduit for rogatory letters. In addition, 
the enthusiasm for the use of rogatory letters can vary 
greatly from one Member State to the next, with for 
example Italy making the most use of the medium in the 
European Union, and the United Kingdom seldom doing 
so.765 This has prompted some commentators to put forward 
the 'free movement of judges' as a remedy to this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs.766 Indeed the proposed 
second Protocol to the 'PIF' Convention provides for a 
network of 'liaison judges' in order to facilitate
764 See newspaper article 'Greeks in EU fraud case', The 
European, 15 February 1996, page 18.
765 Leguet, G (1996) La confusion dans la repartition des 
competences dans le domaine des poursuites, paper given at the 
Conference on the protection of the financial interests of the 
European Communities, held in Lille, 25-26 January.
766 De Angelis, F (1996) Les problernes lies A la 
decentralisation, paper given at the conference on the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities, held in Lille, 25-26 January.
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judicial cooperation.767 This step in the direction of a 
common European legal space may however cause pause for 
thought in some justice ministries.
Meanwhile, should the 'Anti-Corruption' Convention be 
adopted, any ensuing improvement in cooperation in the 
administrative and civil spheres could bring considerable 
benefits. The potential value of the proposed extension 
of cooperation from the criminal to the civil and 
administrative spheres will be appreciated by those who 
acknowledge present difficulties facing cooperation in 
criminal matters. In some circumstances, evidence may be 
more readily available within an administrative context 
than a criminal one. Another potential limitation of 
relying too much upon criminal proceedings is that in 
some Member States, the discretion not to prosecute may 
be used by the prosecuting authorities, perhaps 
occasionally for political reasons, or sometimes the 
judiciary itself is 'penetrated by the world of 
corruption'.768 For all these reasons, it seems important 
that future improvements in cooperation not be confined 
to the criminal sphere alone, and both the Protocol and 
the proposed convention are to be welcomed on this score.
Taken together, the proposals go a considerable way 
towards enhancing cooperation in criminal law for the 
prosecution of corruption, leaving administrative and 
civil cooperation as useful back-ups. The problem of 
corruption is being addressed in an unprecedented climate 
of transparency and this can only bear witness to the 
renewed vigour of the European project.
767 Article 9(2) of the proposed second Protocol to the 
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities' 
Financial Interests sees proposal for a Council Act, COM(95) 
693, December 1995.
768 See Council of Europe (1995) op.cit. report presented 
by the Italian Minister of Justice.
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6.3.4. International agreements and American proposals
The global situation has been considerably altered by the 
opening-up of markets, culminating in the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO. The 
impact of these developments has been heightened by the 
association agreements and the setting-up of the EEA, the 
accession of the new Member States and the Association 
Agreements with countries of central and Eastern 
Europe.769 Unfortunately, in our 'post-national'770 
economies of increasingly freer trade, where commerce and 
procurement are international, relevant national rules 
all too easily fail to address the more negative 
consequences of the single market and of the broader 
internationalisation of trade.
Internationally, there are a number of recommendations 
and codes of practices which have been agreed to in 
various fora.771 The 1994 OECD recommendation on bribery 
in international business transactions,772 for example, 
spells out part of the control agenda, but it is not 
binding. The recommendation suggests, inter alia, that 
bribes should no longer be tax-deductible (as they 
presently are in some of the Member States), and that the
769 See OJ (1994) C 397.
770 See for example newspaper article: 'Let's make the 
global playing field level', in the Independent, 5 June 1996; 
also McShane, D (1996) Global business: global rights, Fabian 
Pamphlet 575.
771 See for example International Chamber of Commerce 
(1996) Extortion and bribery in international business 
transactions, Revisions to the 1977 Report and rules of 
conduct to combat extortion and bribery, March. This report 
covers recommendations to governments and international 
organisations and rules of conduct to combat extortion and 
bribery.
772 OECD (1994) Council Recommendation on bribery in 
international business transactions adopted by the Council at 
its 829th session on 27 may 1994, C(94)/75.
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bribery of foreign officials should be sanctioned on par 
with the bribery of national officials. But the problem 
with non-binding instruments is basically, that no one 
state wants to be first at making them binding, lest they 
lost out economically. This perception means that some 
comprehensive non-binding instruments have remained non­
binding to-date. Following an OECD pact signed in Paris 
in April 1996, however, there have been some moves in the 
direction of abolishing the tax deductibility of bribes 
in some of the Member States, with iatrogenic 
consequences, such as the resurgence of legal phone 
tapping in Germany for the first time since the end of 
the second world war.773 The non-deductibility of bribes 
may, in any case, have little impact if it turns out that 
most bribes are paid out of laundered money.774 In this 
case 'chercher 1'argent' may well emerge as the central 
anti-corruption task for the international community in 
the near future.
There has been a robust challenge from the United States. 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA) extends the 
jurisdiction of US courts to all American citizens and 
companies, wherever the offence of bribery is committed, 
attempted or contemplated. US companies maintain that 
they lose contracts as a result of bribes offered by 
European competitors in particular,775 hence American
773 See newspapers articles: 'Frankfurt fights corruption 
war on two fronts', in Financial Times 14 August 1995; 'Anger 
over bribes ruling',in European 18 April 1996, page 17; 
'Germany acts to combat corruption', Financial Times 20 June 
1996 page 2.
774 Robinson, J (1995) The laundrymen, Pocket Books, 
London, page 24: 'Corporations do it [launder money] to avoid 
or evade tax, to defraud, their shareholders, to get around 
currency control regulations and/or to bribe prospective 
clients.'
775 See newspaper articles: (i) 'US companies "lost $20bn 
in deals after rivals offered bribes Kantor calls for bribery 
action' by N. Dunne in Financial Times, 26 July 1996, page 3;
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lobbying to see a US-style system operating in Europe. In 
September 1996 the US Department of Commerce indicated 
its intention to establish a hot line for US companies to 
report suspected bribery of foreign officials by non-US 
companies. The confidential hot line is to be monitored 
and followed up by the Trade Promotion Co-ordinating 
Committee (TPCC)
The European response to this pressure has been one of 
caution, and of reluctance to adopt the American agenda 
and 'import' ready-made solutions. There are, the author 
suggests, at least two reasons for this reluctance. The 
first is historical. For the United States, extra­
territoriality has long been understood as a way of 
influencing conditions of trade beyond the US territory; 
European powers developed this idea to a much lesser 
extent. The second reason for caution relates to concern 
about the effectiveness of the FCPA in particular, and 
extra-territoriality in particular.
At best, the success of the FCPA can be described as 
mixed. Extra-territoriality as applied to corruption 
offences has inherent weaknesses, as the American 
experience has shown, and in any case the effects of the 
FCPA have on occasion been circumvented by engaging an 
intermediary to make illicit payments.777 Closer to the
(ii) 'US will demand "no-bribe” pledges by A. Counsell in 
Financial Times 25 September 1996, page 7. The latter reads: 
"The TPCC report said that bribery was one of the most 
difficult and persistent barriers to working abroad. US 
companies had lost 36 out of 139 international commercial 
contracts which had come under scrutiny for allegations of 
bribery, at an estimated cost of $llbn."
776 Ibid.
777 See newspaper article: 'Greasing wheels: How US 
concerns compete in countries where bribes flourish, foreign 
travel, donations and use of middlemen help them win business, 
paying for reporters' cabs' in The Wall Street Journal of 
September 29, 1995; Levy, R (1985) The antibribery provisions
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European Union, in Switzerland, where the prosecution of 
Swiss nationals for corrupt offences abroad is (in theory 
at least) possible, this power does not seem to have been 
used in practice.778
Given the European Union's structure, powers and 
competencies, it has developed its own characteristic 
responses, based in its first pillar and third pillar 
competencies, rather than adopting either a purely 
intergovernmental or an extraterritorial approach. US 
pressure recently may have influenced the pace of the 
European response rather than its form. Nevertheless, the 
approach of the Union is still developing, not without 
difficulty, unproven and no doubt open to improvement. In 
the closing pages of this chapter some possible 
improvements will be noted.
6.4. An issue not vet scruarelv confronted; immunities
The European budget has increased by a factor of 2.7 in 
ten years, rising from 28 800 million ECU in 1985 to 79 
800 million ECU in 1995.779 As a result, the financial 
officers of the European Communities have been called 
upon to exercise more responsibility on behalf of the 
European tax payer, in an increasingly complex regulatory
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 : are they really 
as valuable as we think they are? in Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law, 71-95; Bliss, J (1989) The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1988: clarification or evisceration? in Law 
and Policy in International Business, 441-469; The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: curse or cure? (1981) in American 
Business Law Journal, 73-86.
778 Lachat-Heritier, A (1983) Commercial bribes: The Swiss 
answer, Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 
number 5, 79-96.
779 European Court of Auditors (1995) Report to the 
Reflection Group on the Operation of the Treaty on European 
Union, May, page 2.
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environment. The case iaw of the European Court of 
Justice shows that occasionally Community funds have been 
misappropriated, through the allegedly corrupt behaviour 
of EC officials.780
6,4.1. EC Officials: disciplinary framework
Under Article 260 EC if a Member of the Commission no 
longer fulfils the conditions required for the 
performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of 
serious misconduct, the Court of Justice may, on 
application by the Council or the Commission, 
compulsorily retire him. The Staff disciplinary framework 
also provides for a wide range of sanctions to be applied 
by the appointing authority, irrespective of the 
immunities officials may enjoy. But these disciplinary 
sanctions, typically, do not extend to custodial 
penalties or even fines, and are not made public. They 
can never be seen as a suitable alternative to sanctions 
imposed by the courts.
Any failure by an EC official to comply with his duties 
under the Staff Regulations, whether intentionally or 
through negligence, renders him liable to disciplinary 
action and penalties which range from a written warning, 
a reprimand, a deferment of advancement, a relegation in 
step to downgrading or removal from post and entitlement 
to retirement pension according to the severity of the 
misconduct or negligence. Sanctions with regards to post- 
employment duties such as confidentiality can also be
780 See for example cases 46/72 De Greef v Commission 
[1973] ECR 543; 49/72 Drescig v Commission [1973] 567; 326/91 
De Compte v European Parliament [1994] ECR I 2091; and more 
recently 12/94 Daffix v Commission, 28 March 1995, nyr.
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applied after the official has left the service.781 
Furthermore where an allegation of serious misconduct is 
made against an official by the appointing authority, 
whether this amounts to failure to carry out his official 
duties or a breach of law, the authority may order that 
he be suspended forthwith.782 Indeed, for the fight 
against corruption, the possibility of post-employment 
sanctions is important so that a more subtle form of 
corruption where the official is granted employment, 
consultancy contracts or other advantages after (or 
rather as a result of) his employment with the 
administration can be dealt with. This practice is 
usually referred to in the continental literature as 
' pantouf lage '.783
Nevertheless there has been some scathing criticism of 
the Staff Regulations. For example the House of Lords, in 
its 1996 IGC Minutes of Evidence, pointed out that the 
Staff Regulations were overdue for reform so as to 'make 
it easier for staff to be reviewed, moved, promoted and 
sacked'.784 The European Court of Auditors, which is also 
critical of the present arrangements, has argued for an 
investigative role in disciplinary hearings, since it is 
within its powers to perform controls by examining
781 Article 86 of Regulation number 31 OJ Special Edition 
159-62, pages 135-200, 1385/62 laying down the Staff 
Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of 
other Servants of the European Economic Community and the 
European Atomic Energy Community, amended by Regulation 259/68 
OJ L (1968) 259/68, and known as 'the Staff Regulations'.
782 Article 88 of Staff Regulations.
783 From the French 'pantoufle', which means slipper.
784 House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, (1995) Inter-Governmental Conference, Minutes of 
Evidence, session 1994-95, 18th report, July, page 386.
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records.785
Serious misconduct can include an alleged 
misappropriation of funds. Such misconduct, however, 
according to the Disciplinary Board in one case 
'justifies a sanction going beyond that recommended by 
the Disciplinary Board'.786 This is in line with 
Commission sentiment. In response to a Parliamentary 
question, Jacques Delors replied on behalf of the 
Commission that as far as Commission Officials were 
concerned, if there were any case of corruption, criminal 
proceedings would normally be launched.787
Yet in relation to the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities, such prosecutions 
under the criminal laws of the Member States are rare. 
This is because provisions sanctioning corruption and 
bribery in the Member States' criminal laws tend to be 
addressed to their own nationals, on their own territory. 
Notwithstanding this discrimination, the prosecution of 
national officials is also rare. At present only France, 
the United Kingdom and Ireland have a less restrictive 
approach, which does not exclude EC officials.788 One 
complicating factor in this already very uneven control
785 See White, S (1995) Reflections on the IGC and the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities, AGON October, page 10; also European Commission 
(1995) Preparation CIG 1996 contribution de la cour des 
comptes, information aux delegations exterieures de la 
Commission, info-note number 31/95, June.
786 Case 12/94 Daffix v Commission, 28.3.1995, nyr.
787 Written question E-2478/94 by Fausto Bertinotti to the 
Commission (30 November 1994) OJ C (1995) 55/58.
788 See De Koster, P (1995) Obstacles causes par le regime 
d'immunites des fonctionnaires publics, paper given at a 
conference on the protection of the financial interests of the 
European Communities held at Sirmione, Italy, July.
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space, is that EC officials enjoy immunities, which, as 
we shall see, have to be lifted if a prosecution is to 
take place.
6.4.2. Privileges and immunities
EC officials enjoy privileges and immunities set out in 
the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
European Communities.789
In particular, the premises and buildings of the 
Communities are inviolable. The property and assets of 
the Communities cannot be the subject of any 
administrative or legal measure of constraint without the 
authorization of the Court of Justice. EC officials are 
immune from legal proceedings in respect of acts 
performed by them in their official capacity. This 
immunity extends even after they have ceased to hold 
office. Each institution is required to waive the 
immunity wherever it considers that the waiver of such 
immunity is not contrary to the interests of the 
Communities.790
(i) Test of functional necessity
One important issue is whether these immunities in any 
way hinder the investigation, or prosecution of allegedly 
corrupt behaviour. The rationale for an official's 
privileges and immunities is that they must be necessary 
to enable him to perform his functions. Accordingly, the 
immunity referred to under Article 1 of the Protocol on
789 Protocol signed in Brussels in 1965, superseding the 
Protocols on the Privileges and Immunities of the European 
Atomic Energy Community, of the European Coal and Steel 
Community and European Economic Community.
790 Articles 1, 12(a) and 18, second subparagraph of the 
Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European 
Communities.
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Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities 
cannot be invoked to prevent EC officials' earnings from 
being docked. Similarly, Article 23 of the Staff 
Regulations states:
The privileges and immunities enjoyed by officials 
are accorded solely in the interests of the 
communities. Subject to the Protocol on Privileges 
and Immunities, officials shall not be exempt from 
fulfilling their private obligations or from 
complying with the laws and police regulations in 
force.
In these matters, the institutions and the European Court 
of Justice have applied the test of functional necessity. 
The Court of Justice has held it constant that, with 
respect to administrative or legal measures of 
constraint, the principle of functional necessity has to 
prevail. For example, an attachment of earnings affecting 
the salary of an EC official, does not, according to the 
Court of Justice, constitute an obstacle in the way of 
the functioning and independence of the Communities, 
particularly when the serving of such an order was not 
opposed by the appointing authority itself.791
(ii) Immunity from prosecution
Likewise, the immunity from prosecution under Article 
12(a) of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities cannot
791 For example cases 4/62 Application for authorization 
to enforce a garnishee order against the High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community [1962] ECR 41; 64/63 Potvin 
v Van de Velde [1963] ECR 47; 85/63 Application for 
authorization to notify the EEC of an assignment of salary 
[1963] ECR 195; 1/71 Application for authorization to serve an
attachment order on the Commission of the European Communities
[1971] ECR 363; 1/87 Universe Tankship Incorporated v 
Commission [1987] ECR 2807; 1/88 SA Generale de Banque v
Commission [1988] ECR 857.
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be invoked outside the sphere of the official's duties. 
The European Court of Justice ruled that the immunity 
against prosecution should be waived in the case of an 
official prosecuted in a Belgian court following a car 
accident, since his official duties did not require the 
use of a car.792 Crimes unconnected with the performance 
of officials' duties do not fall within the scope of the 
immunity against prosecution.
The Commission considers that it is its right and 
duty to cooperate with the police and the judicial 
authorities of the Member States and to comply with 
any legitimate request for information in so far as 
its own interests, immunities and privileges are not 
jeopardized. They are in principle not affected in 
the case of crimes committed by the Commission's 
staff unconnected with the performance of their 
duties.793
With respect to crimes connected with the performance of 
officials' duties, the appointing authority waives the 
immunity if it is not contrary to the interests of the 
Communities, which remains disturbingly vague. A positive 
duty to lift immunities immediately when the protection 
of the financial interests of the European Communities 
are at stake would go a long way towards clarifying this 
state of affairs.
Official secrecy
Under Article 19 of the Staff Regulations officials have 
a duty of discretion. They must not disclose in any legal 
proceedings information of which they have knowledge by
792 Case 9/69 Sayag and Another v Leduc and others 
(Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation) [1969] ECR 329.
793 Case 180/87 Hamill v Commission [1988] ECR 6141.
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reason of their duties. Permission must be sought, and 
will be refused only when where the interests of the 
Communities so require. An official continues to be bound 
by this obligation after leaving the service. However 
this provision does not apply to an official or former 
official giving evidence before the Court of Justice or 
before the Disciplinary Board of an institution on a 
matter concerning a serving or former serving staff.794
Duty of assistance
When misconduct is alleged, the appointing authority must 
give the official assistance. Each Community has a right 
to assist an official in its service, in particular in 
proceedings against a person perpetrating threats, 
insulting or defamatory acts or utterances, or any attack 
to person or property to which he or a member of his 
family is subjected by reason of his position and duties. 
It must also compensate the official for damage suffered 
in such cases, in so far as the official did not either 
intentionally or through grave negligence cause damage 
and has been unable to obtain compensation from the 
person who did cause it.795 An official may therefore sue 
for violation of this guarantee if an unproven allegation 
of fraud has been made against him and the appointing 
authority has failed to protect his reputation. This 
leaves the institution open to a claim for damages, if 
for example disciplinary proceedings are taken and 
allegations turn out to be unfounded, or the official is 
arrested and prosecuted as a result of information 
communicated by the appointed authority, and is
794 See Schmidt, C (1991) Le Protocole sur les Privileges 
et Immunites des Communautes Europeennes, Cahier de Droit 
Europ£en, 61-100, pp 81-82.
793 Article 24 of the Staff Regulations.
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subsequently acquitted.796 One can see that whilst it 
might be possible for the appointing authority to 
investigate in-house and protect the reputation of an 
official in the meanwhile, this might prove more 
difficult when cooperating with the judicial authorities 
of the Member States. There is a potential tension 
between the duty of the appointing authorities to assist 
officials and the duty to cooperate with the judicial 
authorities of the Member States.
6.4.3. Immunities and delays
To some commentators, the existence of privileges and 
immunities in itself does not in fact present a 
significant obstacle to prosecution.797 Indeed immunities 
are relative798 or functional, so their significance must 
not be overstated. Immunities were never intended to 
prevent the investigation of serious crimes against the 
tax payer. But corruption thrives on secrecy and 
silence799 and is by nature difficult to detect.800 There 
may be a sense in which the presence of immunities may 
make the detection of such crimes even more difficult. As 
was pointed out in the context of diplomatic immunity:
What limits the scope of a diplomat to perform
796 Cases 158/79 Roumengous v Council [1982] ECR 4379; 
145/83 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3539; 59/92 Caronna v 
Commission ECHR [1993] ECR II 1129; 180/87 Hamill v Commission 
[1988] ECR 6141.
797 For example, De Koster, op. cit.
798 See case 2/88 Zwartveld and others v Commission [1990] 
5(1) 3365, page 3372, points 19-20.
799 Council of Europe Report, op. cit. page 21.
800 See for example Merlin-Calzia, R (1995) Le service 
central de prevention de la corruption comme possible 
instrument au service de la defense des interets financiers de 
la Communaute, AGON, July, pages 8-9.
288
criminal acts? Like any other person guilty of a 
crime, he must first be detected. Moreover, because 
of the inviolability of his person and premises, 
detection is especially difficult.801
Police investigations may be delayed by the 
administrative processes involved in waiving immunities. 
In the 'Tourism Unit' case, which hit the headlines in 
1995, there seems to have been a long delay before the 
immunities of several officials were lifted,802 in what 
turned out to be 'the first inquiry to involve outside 
investigators (i.e the police) in the 40-year history of 
the Commission', leading to the early retirement of the 
director-general of the D-G for tourism (DG XXIII) .8CB 
Indeed the lifting of immunities is the gift of the 
appointing authority, who has to base its decision on the 
evidence available. Evidence-gathering may be a difficult 
exercise in such cases.
To conclude, the privileges and immunities of EC 
officials, respected by recent third pillar measures, 
pose problems in the investigation of possible 
corruption. This issue has also been raised in the 
context of the European Parliament, and of national 
parliaments too.804
801 McClanahan, G (1989) Diplomatic immunity, principles, 
practices, problems, Hurst, London, page 128.
802 See newspaper articles: 'Audit damns EC tourism unit' 
European 10 February 1995; 'Immunity lifted on EC suspects', 
European 24 February 1995; 'EC anti-fraud chief pledges 'no 
cover-ups', European 10 March 1995, pages 1 and 19.
803 See newspaper article 'Police anger as tourism chief 
goes', in The European, 24-30 October 1996, page 26.
804 See for example newspaper article: 'Who should judge 
corrupt MPs?' in Times, November 12, 1996 page 39.
289
6.5. Towards a credible anti-corruption strategy
Clearly, an anti-corruption strategy needs both increased 
prevention and repression, with respect to both economic 
operators and officials. Transparency must be increased 
in order to defeat the secrecy which naturally surrounds 
corrupt practices. But increased transparency must be 
backed up by a credible system of prosecution. The 
problem has hitherto only partly been addressed within 
the European Union, and much remains to be done.
6.5.1. Immunities: need for assimilation
With regards to EC officials, a positive duty could and 
should be placed upon the institutions to lift immunities 
promptly when an internal investigation shows that EC 
funds are be involved. More generally, on the subject of 
immunities and of elite corruption, DGXX could consider a 
study on the regimes of immunities politicians and 
officials enjoy in the Member States with a view to 
assimilation, as far as the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities is concerned. 
Without this, the anti-corruption protocol and the 
convention could prove to be of little value since most 
officials and politicians handling EC funds seem to enjoy 
either nationally or internationally determined 
immunities.
6.5.2. Third pillar action: conditions for effectiveness
With regards to the two proposed third pillar instruments 
outlined above, it is hoped that a permanent compromise 
can be reached with regards to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice, and that a swift ratification 
will follow. If the instruments are to work well, mutual 
assistance should be stepped up. This may be difficult at 
the moment, since mutual assistance still rests on
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instruments unsuited to a single market. In this the 
exchange of magistrates could go some way towards 
ameliorating the situation. One cannot help but feel, 
however, that much more drastic reform is needed in order 
to try and attain a system which functions with the 
requisite despatch, and which could easily be extended to 
new Member States upon accession.
The question remains whether the seriousness with which 
these issues have been addressed by the Council of 
Ministers will find echoes in the legislatures of every 
Member State, or whether procrastination once again will 
emerge as the villain, as was the case when such issues 
were first debated in the 1970s. There may be good reason 
for pessimism on this score. Because corruption refers to 
several distinct but related problems,805 its 
'definition' in a particular historical context is far 
from value-free. Corruption may be likened to a political 
'projective test': each political group highlights 
particular aspects which it sees as ripe for enforcement, 
and de-emphasises other aspects, according to its own 
preoccupations, interests and position in the world. In 
many or perhaps all Member States, political agenda may 
be the result of political compromise, which may make it 
difficult to get quick and vigorous implementation of 
third pillar measures.
The question thus arises - can more also be done within 
the first pillar?
6.5.3. First pillar action
There is scope within Community law to protect the 
integrity of the single market by seeking to eradicate 
commercial behaviour, such as corrupt practices, which
805 Gardiner, J (1993) Defining Corruption, Corruption and 
Reform number 7, pp 111-124.
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grant an unfair advantage and distort competition. This 
could be put in the context of the already existing, and 
largely successful Community crime prevention space which 
has evolved mostly since the Single European Act,806 with 
the aim of protecting the single market.
It has been argued in particular that Article 92 EC could 
be used to ban the tax-deductibility of certain payments, 
the provision of export credit guarantees concerning 
illicit payments and the public financing of exports 
which includes illicit payments807 by treating bribes as 
state aids, which have the effect of distorting 
competition and impacting on intra-community trade. As 
part of this strategy, and in view of the growing number 
of corruption cases involving public procurement, it has 
been suggested that procurement rules would be tightened 
up. However the problem of speedy and accurate 
implementation remains.
Such an approach, once part of the acquis communautaire, 
would in turn become part of the pre-accession strategy 
for central and eastern Europe through the existing 
Europe agreements under Article 113 and 228(a).808 By
806 Vernimmen, G and Missir di Lusignano, A (1995)
Editorial of AGON number 9; Dorn, N and White, S Beyond 
'pillars' and 'passerelle' debates: The European Union's 
emerging crime prevention space, in Legal Issues of European 
Integration, forthcoming.
807 Transparency International (1995) The fight against 
international corruption: what the European Union can do, 
November.
808 The EU now has Europe Agreements with Bulgaria (entered 
into force 1.2.95), the Czech Republic (1.2.95), Estonia (not 
yet entered into force), Hungary (1.2.94), Latvia (not yet 
entered into force), Lithuania (not yet entered into force), 
Poland (1.2.94), Romania (1.2.95), the Slovak Republic 
(1.2.95) and Slovenia (not yet entered into force). Each of 
these agreements stipulate that (i) all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which have as their project or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition must be
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contrast, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, taken 
under the same legal basis, impose less constraining 
duties on the signatory states, such as the duty not to 
enact or maintain any measure distorting trade between 
the Community and the signatory state.809 Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreements meanwhile, with Articles 
113 and 235 as a legal basis, only impose a duty not to 
impose counter-trade requirements.810
There has been no direct case law as to whether 
competition is within Article 113. In 1992811 the Court 
opined that the Community's power to enter into 
international agreements in the competition field arose 
from the competition rules in the EC Treaty.812 This 
power remains uncontested to date. More recently, in 
1996813 the Court opined that Article 235 EC could not be 
used as a legal basis to justify the Community's 
accession to the Convention of Human Rights as such 
accession would entail substantial changes of a 
constitutional nature which go beyond the scope of 
Article 235 EC. This could potentially limit the field of 
action of the Community to enter into international
progressively abolished; (ii) any practices will be assessed 
on the basis of Articles 85, 86 and 92 EEC and the relevant 
secondary legislation. The necessary rules for implementation 
must be adopted by 31 December 1997.
809 PCAs have partially entered into force in Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Russian and Ukraine where 
interim agreements on trade aspects are awaiting ratification.
810 The TECA with Albania entered into force on 1.12.92. 
TECAs also apply when the full PCAs have not been ratified yet 
(see previous note).
811 Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR 2821 at para. 40.
812 See McLeod, I, Hendry, I and Hyett, S (1996) The 
external Relations of the European Communities, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, pp 271-273.
813 Opinion 2/94 re the accession of the Community to the 
European Human Rights Convention [1996] 2 CMLR 265.
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agreements only in areas where it has explicit 
competence, and whilst emphasising downwards 
subsidiarity, may well limit the potential for Community- 
based action to fight corruption.
Procurement
There may be a sense in which, as far as the Structural 
Funds are concerned neither co-financing nor programming 
have delivered the expected protection. Firstly, not all 
operational programmes are co-financed in any case. 
Community Initiatives, for example, are financed 100% 
from Community funds and other initiative only require a 
small participation from the Member States. In other 
cases, costs have sometimes been inflated in order to 
lessen the impact on the local purse. Secondly the 
Commission has argued that it is in the nature of the 
system of contributing to the financing of programmes, 
rather than projects, under the Structural Funds that 
monitoring of compliance with public tendering rules must 
take place essentially at the level of national 
authorities. This probably indicates that the Commission 
is thinking about having shorter-term, better defined 
projects in the future, whilst subjecting them to 
rigorous on-the-spot checks.
Procurement rules could be tightened up, as suggested 
earlier, if it becomes clear that the desired effect can 
only be achieved by legislative action in the first 
pillar. This means, in particular, regulating the 
selection of intermediaries, and monitoring the use of 
'emergency' procedures, which allow normal procurement 
rules to be circumvented when contracts involving EC 
funds (and others) are involved. Without this tightening 
of rules, the problem could reach dramatic proportions 
after the next enlargement.
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International Trade: the CCEEs
Outside the Union, it is through the Europe Agreements 
that there is the most scope to prevent economic crime 
through procurement rules, although in some cases these 
rules will not be effective until 1998. Procurement 
rules, which as we have seen take their place in 
instruments regulating the (economic) external relations 
of the European Union have the potential to be of 
strategic importance in the fight against procurement 
fraud in an enlarged Union. More is said on enlargement 
in the following chapter.
With regards to the grey area which concerns projects 
which offer disastrously low value for money, or which 
let certain consultants 'cream off' funds destined to 
help central and eastern Europe, there seems to be a need 
for the Commission itself to look at the way it awards 
contracts.
6.5.4. Conclusion
The potential of first pillar instruments to 
bring about changes in Member States' criminal laws 
should not be underestimated. Cadoppi stressed that 
harmonisation of criminal law had already come largely 
through the European Court of Human Rights, but also 
through economic regulation.814 Economic matters being 
dealt with under the first pillar, measures preventing 
economic criminality and indeed putting an obligation on 
the Member States to harmonise their criminal laws have 
also arisen therefrom. This is the 'Trojan Horse' quality 
of the first Pillar, which is so often overlooked.
814 Cadoppi, A (1996) Towards a European Criminal Code? 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 
Volume 4, Issue 1, 2-17.
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Nevertheless there would remain practical and 
administrative issues requiring attention in order to 
give effect to first pillar measures against corruption. 
Such measures would entail cross-directorate cooperation 
which, unfortunately, does not seem to be forthcoming at 
the time of writing (September 1996). But it is not 
beyond the realms of possibilities that this situation 
could improve rapidly. If so, then first pillar action 
might be demonstrated to have potential lacking in third 
pillar action. It would be both an irony and tragedy if 
an impediment to that demonstration were to be found not 
in the Member States but in the guardian of the first 
pillar.
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CHAPTER 7. ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
7.1. Whither the CAP?
We are now moving towards a Union where in the future a 
'core' may forge ahead by fulfilling EU policy goals, 
whilst others may well accede only to part of the acquis 
communautaire. In view of the proposed proportional 
increase in expenditure on structural measures, what 
might this mean for the future of fraud prevention and 
enforcement?
7.1.1. Background: anticipated enlargement
The Community has been subjected to a regime of rapid 
enlargements and its budget has increased exponentially, 
as well as CAP expenditure. Poland and Hungary are now 
first in line for accession, followed by the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, and Bulgaria and Rumania as soon as 
they can satisfy the economic and political conditions 
required. The Baltic States are to follow suit. Turkey, 
Malta and Cyprus have also formally applied to join. It 
is expected that on the very optimistic assumption that 
the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference comes to an early 
and successful conclusion, entry talks with an 
undetermined number of states should start in late 1997.
It is already clear that a union of 20 Member States, or 
even as many as 27 by next century, cannot be run on the 
same lines as a union of twelve of fifteen. Back in 1972 
Spinelli had already predicted that the enlargement of 
the Community would not automatically bring a better 
balance to agriculture, but that it might, on the 
contrary, increase the desiquilibria.815 At the Essen 
summit (1994) the then president of the Commission,
815 Spinelli, A, 1972, The European adventure, Tasks for an 
enlarged Community, London, Charles Knight & Co, page 69.
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Jacques Delors made it clear that the European Union 
would have to reform its own policies to cope with 
eastern enlargement, including reform of the CAP and the 
Structural Funds. In fact the CAP has grown in size and 
complexity in order to remedy the 'desiquilibria' 
aggravated by a regime of rapid enlargements, and in 
order to maintain a common market in agriculture.
7.1.2. CAP: major obstacle
Notwithstanding attempts at trimming the CAP, its size is 
still such that it has been described as the major 
obstacle to further enlargement.816 Estimates as to how 
much the budget would have to increase if the four 
Visegrad countries joined the Union and the present level 
of CAP intervention was extended to them vary between an 
increase of 40 to 70 billion ECU.817 That is to say, some 
commentators estimate that a doubling of the budget would 
be needed in order to extend the present system at the 
next accession. In realpolitik, this is impossible. Yet a 
radical reform of the CAP promises to be a political 
minefield. It has been pointed out that the agricultural 
lobby is an 'insider' in the policy community and has 
been the most consistently powerful economic interest in
816 See Baldwin, R (1994) Towards an integrated Europe, 
London Council for European Policy Studies; also Sutton, M 
(1994) Transition to the European Union? in Economies in 
transition Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, London, 
Economist Intelligence Unit.
817 The following reports were commissioned by Directorate- 
General I of the European Commission: Buckwell, A (1994)
Report on the feasibility of an agricultural strategy to 
prepare the countries of central and eastern europe for EU 
accession; Tangermann, S and Josling, T (1994) Pre-accession 
agricultural policies for central Europe and the European 
Union; Tarditi, S and Senior-Nello, S (1994) Agricultural 
strategies for the enlargement of the European Union to 
central and European countries; Mah£, L-P (1995) Agriculture 
and enlargement of the European Union to include the central 
and eastern European countries Transition with a view to 
integration or integration wit a view to transition?
298
the EC.818 It is therefore to be expected that the 
lobbies would oppose preferential treatment being given 
to central and eastern european agricultural products.
As far as Structural Funds are concerned, it has been 
acknowledged that they still have an important role to 
play in the completion of the single market, and in 
promoting economic and social cohesion, but that they 
need to be deployed to underpin this force for 
convergence more effectively. It has been suggested that 
in an enlarged union they should be better geared to 
local development needs and that they should give more 
support to programmes which involve more than one 
country, particularly in financing trans-European 
networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications 
and energy. This would strengthen their role in 
stimulating investments in which there is a shared 
interest, and would also provide crucial support for the 
creation of new infrastructure in the single market by 
supplementing other sources of financing, including loans 
floated on the capital markets.819
Unfortunately, programmes which involve more than one 
country have hitherto offered particularly poor value for 
money, and have attracted fraud. An increase in such 
programmes would therefore entail an increase in UCLAF's 
workload, since its task is primarily to coordinate 
transnational investigations. From the ascendent position 
of Structural Funds will not necessarily follow a 
movement downwards (in subsidiarity terms) of control to 
the Member States. In fact one can safely predict a 
substantial enlargement in UCLAF's personnel, whose task 
it is to deal with complex trans-national investigations.
818 Collins, N (1990) The European Community's farm lobby, 
Corruption and Reform (5) 235-257.
819 Opinion on the Single Market in 1994 OJ (1996) C 39/70.
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7.2. Prevention/enforcement in an enlarged Union
As we have seen, extending present agricultural policies 
to the CCEEs could lead to a considerable increase of the 
present EC budget. This would not be acceptable to the 
main contributors (Germany, France and Italy). Although 
Germany and the UK see scope for reductions in regional 
and CAP funding, this is likely to be resisted by the 
main contributors as well as the mediterranean countries 
and compromises will have to be sought.820 There seem to 
be three possible 'ideal type' scenarios for future 
enforcement, which are mooted below. The first 
possibility illustrates a situation where 'classical 
enlargement'821 takes place, with the CCEEs taking on the 
full acquis communautaire, after transition periods of 
varying lengths. The second possibility is that connected 
with 'partial membership', where the CCEEs only take on 
part of the acquis, namely the second and third pillars 
of the present Treaty establishing the European Union. A 
mixed scenario is also possible, with parallel systems 
(CAP, Structural Funds) in operation. All these scenarios 
have different implications for anti-fraud enforcement, 
as we shall see.
(i) Classical enlargement
Such a scenario could involve the (reformed) CAP and 
Structural Funds being extended to the CCEEs and the 
Customs Union is extended to include them. The whole 
acquis communautaire is taken on gradually, which means 
that all measures relating to the protection of the 
financial interests of the European Communities apply
820 See European Parliament News, 13-17 February 1995.
821 De La Serre, F (1996) L'elargissement aux PECO: Quelle 
diff€renciation? Revue du Marche Commun, number 402, November, 
642-655.
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after an agreed period of time.
(ii) Partial membership
By contrast, partial membership through accession to only 
the second and third pillars would theoretically entail 
exclusion from first pillar re-distribution policies, 
such as the CAP and Structural Funds, until the full 
acquis is taken on at a later stage. This would be an 
enlargement firstly looking to the free movement of goods 
(already greatly encouraged by the extension of the 
Community transit system to the Visegrad countries), but 
without free movement of persons. The Customs Union would 
not at first be extended to the CCEEs. In an ideal type 
partial membership scenario, the CCEEs do not at first 
benefit from the redistributive policies of the Union any 
more than they do at present, so enforcement problems 
remain at first unchanged. In such a scenario, it seems 
important that both redistributive policies and first 
pillar measures be taken on simultaneously. The 
'decoupling' of the two could prove financially 
disastrous for the Union.
(iii) Mixed membership
A mixed scenario is also likely, where parallel systems 
develop. A 'compromise' may involve a complex re­
organisation of funds to fit in with the various levels 
of integration. This is, for example what Buckwell 
envisaged, with regards to the CAP:
A separate CAP could be designed for the countries 
of eastern and central Europe which would operate 
alongside822 the existing CAP for the EU.
822 Emphasis added.
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Parallel Structural Funds may also be put in place, to 
deal with the specific problems experienced in the CCEEs. 
Enforcement, as a result, may become highly contingent 
and may include areas with the enforcement 
characteristics of a fragmented union (i.e. with third 
pillar measures awaiting ratification), and others with 
the enforcement characteristics of an integrated union 
(i.e. first pillar measures in place, with third pillar 
measures awaiting ratification) leading to (more) uneven 
enforcement and a degree of unpredictability throughout 
the Union.
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CHAPTER 8. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL 
SPACE
In this penultimate chapter, the author looks at the 
latest proposal to protect the financial interests of the 
European Communities, a Corpus Juris. The description of 
this proposal - which is reproduced in full in an 
appendix - is preceded by a very brief overview of the 
existing legal space, in so far as it relevant to EC 
fraud. Unfortunately, from the point of view of the 
author, the Corpus Juris does not look like a very likely 
prospect in the very short term, and so, having noted its 
most interesting features, she concludes on the basis of 
existing institutional and legal arrangements.
8.1. The existing legal space
The evolution of control bears witness to the increased 
heterogeneity of the legal space. Measures to prevent and 
combat fraud affecting the EC budget, either directly or 
indirectly, can now be found not only in sectorial 
economic regulations under the first pillar, under 
Article 235 EC, under various K articles, but also in 
international conventions.
8.1.1. Crime prevention: a diversity of approaches
The role of Community law in preventing criminal 
activities generally was outlined in detail by the 
Commission at the ninth United Nations Conference in May 
1995,823 It is in this wider context of Community crime 
prevention that the numerous sectorial rules for the 
protection of the financial interests of the European
823 Vernimmen, G and Missir di Lusignano, A (1995) 
Editorial of AGON number 9.
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Communities, and procurement rules can also be 
located.824
Additionally, Article 209a EC creates an obligation on 
the Member States to treat fraud affecting the EC budget 
in the same way as fraud affecting national interests, 
but it has yet to be used as legal basis, the more 
ambiguous Article 235 having hitherto been preferred.825
If action by the Community shall prove necessary to 
attain, in the course of action of the operation of 
the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community and this Treaty has not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, take the 
appropriate measures. (Article 235 EC)
Article 235 EC retains some of the distinctive 
characteristics of the first pillar: the Commission has a 
right of initiative and the Court of Justice has 
jurisdiction to rule on disputes. 826 But the advantage of 
the article is that, given political consensus in the 
Council, it offers the possibility of going beyond 
express powers in the first pillar, in furtherance of the 
objectives of the Community. Both the 'PIF' Regulation
824 Dorn, N and White, S (1996) Beyond 'Pillars' and 
'Passerelle' debates: the European Union's emerging crime 
prevention space, Legal Issues of European Integration, 
forthcoming early 1997.
825 Vervaele, J (1996) L' Application du droit 
communautaire: la separation des biens entre le premier et le 
troisieme pillier? Revue de Droit Penal et de Criminologie; 
also Vervaele, J (1995) Criminal law in the European 
Community: About myth and taboos in AGON number 7.
826 Article 169 EC.
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and the proposed Regulation827 concerning on-the-spot 
checks and inspections by the Commission (See chapter 1) 
have Article 235 EC as a legal basis. It has been argued 
that Article 235 EC provides the legislator with the 
necessary flexibility to meet some of the challenges of 
integration. It has also been suggested that Article 235 
EC should be used more widely, and in particular that it 
could be used as a legal basis to establish penal 
sanctions.828 Generally, learned commentators829 have 
opined that the time had come for the ' penal landscape to 
be re-constituted'830 and for the Community to have a 
'competence dans le domaine r€pressif' - which would 
enable it to establish uniform sanctions for breaches of 
Community regulations.
However, in matters relating to the repression of fraud 
and corruption the Member States have chosen, since 1995, 
to take action within the inter-governmental framework. 
One reason for such action being preferred within an 
intergovernmental framework has been the Member States' 
reluctance to prejudice their control of policing or
827 See UCLAF (1995) Proposal for Council Regulation 
concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections by the 
Commission for the detection of frauds and irregularities 
detrimental to the financial interests of the European 
Communities, SEC(95\09151final and General Secretariat of the 
Council DG FII (1996) amended draft for the subgroup on 
protection of financial interests, 30 April.
828 Missir di Lusignano, A (1996) La protection des 
interets financiers de la Communaut€, Journal des Tribunaux 
Droit Europeen, 18 April, page 78.
829 See Schockweiler, F (1995) La repression des 
infractions au droit communautaire dans la jurisprudence de la 
Cour, Seminar on judicial cooperation in criminal matters in 
the European Community, Luxembourg; Labayle, H (1995) La 
protection des interets financiers de la Communaut6, Revue 
Europe, March, Ed. Techniques.
830 Delmas-Marty, M (1994) Pour un droit commun, Seuil, 
Paris, see chapter on 'La recomposition d'un paysage'.
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criminal law.831 In general, the entry into force of 
conventions relating to the European Union space has been 
protracted, with few improvements since 1993.832 This is 
one of the arguments often used in an attempt to ,move/ 
law-making to the first pillar. A number of conventions 
also have been concluded under the aegis of the Council 
of Europe in order to further cooperation in judicial 
matters. However, as a rule, entry into force has been 
protracted. For example, as of 1996, the money laundering 
convention had been ratified by only five Member States 
within the European Union.
8.1.2. Creative cross-overs or uncertainty?
A certain amount of 'cross-over', or 'enchevStrement'833 
has occurred between legal bases. This has not escaped 
the notice of the Committee on Civil Liberties and 
Internal Affairs who, on the subject of the choice of 
legal bases for the two 'PIF' instruments, opined that 
because of their parallel contents, both should have been 
submitted in the same institutional context:
The ['PIF'] Convention and the proposal for a 
['PIF'] Regulation on the materialities of the 
penalties are both operative at the level of 
criminal/administrative law and no clear distinction 
can be drawn in terms of content and legal nature 
justifying their being assigned to two different
831 Anderson, M et al (1995) Policing the European Union, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, page 198.
832 Delmas-Marty, M (1996) Vers un espace judicaire 
Europeen, Corpus Juris portant dispositions p€nales pour la 
protection des interets financiers de 1'Union Europeenne, 
September, pp 4-9.
833 Tulkens, F (1994) Les fraudes communautaires: Un 
observatoire penal Europeen, in Deviance et Soci6te, vol 18, 
number 2, pp 215-226.
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institutional frameworks (EC Treaty and Title VI of 
the Treaty on European Union) .834
As a result of this 'cross-over', and looking at 
precedents in the fight against fraud affecting the EC 
budget, it is difficult to predict, for example, under 
which legal basis the protection of the Community's VAT- 
based income would take place. The protection of VAT 
revenue is a more difficult issue at the level of the 
institutions, since the EC only receives a small 
percentage of national VATs, which nevertheless 
constitute over 50% of the total EC budget. However since 
fiscal frontiers were abolished in 1993, and the 
transitional system established, VAT collection can no 
longer be described as a 'national' revenue collecting 
system. VAT evasion affects the EC budget and there is 
scope for creative fraud prevention of an international 
nature in that area too.
Looking at what has happened since the adoption of the 
Treaty on European Union, one finds increasing 
interpenetration between the legal bases (for example 
between 100a, 235 and K.3). Yet the frontiers of this 
increasingly diversified legal space are being tested by 
a proposal, explored below, which has the effect of 
putting the relationship between Community law and 
national criminal laws back very firmly on the agenda.
8.2. The Corpus Juris proposal
The difficulties of dealing with fraud within the Union, 
the breakdown of the transit system, and projects for 
expansion of the Union to the CCEEs, make clear the need 
for the Community to devise more effective action not
834 European Parliament (1995) Report on the joint 
guideline of the Council on the proposal for a Council 
regulation on protection of the Communities' financial 
interests, 23 November, consultation procedure.
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only at local level and nationally, but also 
internationally. In 1995, the Commission began to argue 
that assimilation, cooperation and harmonisation (the 
three goals hitherto pursued) could provide but an 
incomplete and thus unsatisfactory answer to the 
protection of the financial interests of the European 
Community. The 'Espace Judiciaire Europeen' project was 
launched, and in the autumn of 1996 a draft for a unified 
body of rules to deal with criminal offences affecting 
the budget, and to establish a discrete prosecution 
service, or Corpus Juris (CJ henceforth) was produced by 
a team of experts.835
It easy to see why the Commission came to the conclusion 
that assimilation, cooperation and harmonisation were 
insufficient. Firstly, assimilation on its own does not 
guarantee effective sanctions. In addition, for economic 
operators, assimilation means that treatment continues to 
differ from Member State to Member State. Secondly, 
cooperation remains marred with difficulties. Conventions 
dealing with cooperation matters are dependent upon the 
ratification of all the Member States, which means that a 
number remain un-implemented to date. This applies 
equally to Council of Europe Conventions, Conventions 
relating to the Schengen area, and third pillar 
conventions specific to the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Community. It is widely 
acknowledged that cooperation still relies on outdated, 
less than speedy mechanisms, such as the delivery of 
rogatory letters through diplomatic channels (see chapter 
6). Furthermore, incompatibilities between national
835 Report on substantive law: E. Bacigalopulo, G. Grasso 
and K. Tiedemann; report on rules of competence and 
extraterritoriality: C. Van den Wyngaert, D. Spinellis and N. 
Jareborg; report on evidence, appeals and interpretation: M. 
Delmas-Marty and J. Spencer; report on rights of the defense 
by C. Cirese. (French only).
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legislations, and 'asymmetries'836 between national 
investigating and prosecuting agencies make cooperation 
highly complex in practice. Van den Wyngaert837 has 
argued that even if all the above texts were duly 
ratified by all and implemented, the resulting situation 
would still be one which falls short of establishing the 
recommended838 extra-territoriality and universal 
competence in criminal matters. With respect to 
harmonisation (much of which still depends upon the 
ratification of 'PIF' third pillar instruments), matters 
relating to procedure and evidence, as well as matters 
relating to the determination of criminal liability, for 
instance, remain un-harmonised. The Commission believes 
that this leads to slow, and inefficient enforcement.839
Bearing in mind the above, the Commission has asked 
whether it is sufficient, and satisfactory just to pursue 
the three 'traditional' objectives (assimilation, 
cooperation and harmonisation), and to wait for 
incremental improvements to occur through the slow 
convergence of national systems. This concern is voiced
836 This term was first coined by Van den Wyngaert in 1995, 
and refers to the lack of correspondence between national 
agencies performing similar tasks. For example, a French 
investigating magistrate carrying out an investigation may 
have to liaise not with an English magistrate, but with any of 
several British agencies endowed with investigative powers.
837 Van den Wyngaert, C (1996) Etude espace judiciaire 
europeen Groupe thematique no 2 Regies de competence et extra­
territoriality, May.
838 Delmas-Marty, M (1994) Rapport Final - Etude 
comparative des dispositions legislatives, r£glementaires des 
etats membres relatives aux agissements frauduleux commis au 
prejudice du budget communautaire in rapport de synthese, 
etude sur les systemes de sanctions communautaires, SEC 
1994(93), OOPEC.
839 Delmas-Marty, M (1996) Vers un espace judicaire 
Europeen, Corpus Juris portant dispositions penales pour la 
protection des interets financiers de 1'Union Europeenne, 
September, pp 1-18.
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by Delmas-Marty in her introduction to the CJ.
A cette etape de la construction europ€enne, se pose 
la question de savoir si l'on peut encore se 
contenter de ces trois voies, et se r€signer A 
attendre des ann€es pour observer quelque 
amelioration du systdme r^pressif.840
The draft CJ is in response to the bold suggestion that 
the only way to combine justice, clarity and 
effectiveness is to pursue 'unification'. Such 
unification of criminal justice systems, in areas 
concerned with the protection of the financial interests 
of the Community, was felt to be 'only a step away from 
harmonisation'.MI
A brief summary of the CJ's contents can now be given. As 
of January 1997, the CJ was not available in English, was 
in early draft form, and seemed likely to incur many 
changes over the coming period. Title I of the CJ deals 
with principles of criminal law (Articles 1^ 17) and Title 
II deals with criminal procedure (Articles 18-35). Part 1 
of Title I lays down common definitions for various 
offences: budget fraud (Art 1); procurement fraud (Art 
2); corruption (Art 3, which duplicates definitions found 
in the Protocol to the 'PIF' Convention); offences 
related to EC officials abusing their powers and making 
unwarranted payments (Art 4 and 5); breach of 
confidentiality by EC officials (Art 6); money laundering 
(Art 7); association de malfaiteurs (Art 8); penalties 
(Art 9). It is envisaged that for offences described in
840 Ibid, page 17.
841 See Delmas-Marty, M (1995) La criminalite economique 
internationale: Pour une politique criminelle a strategie 
diversifiee, Le Trimestre du Monde, premier trimestre (Dossier 
Mafias et criminalite transnational), pp 83-90.
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Articles 1 to 8, prison sentences of up to five years or 
more would be inflicted and/or a fine of up to a million 
ECU. Exclusion from future benefits or from competing for 
procurement contracts is also foreseen. Part 2 of Title 1 
defines criminal liability of individuals and businesses 
(Art 10-14). Part 3 lays down rules to ensure that 
penalties are proportional, and for dealing with 
aggravating circumstances and concurrent offences (Art 
15-17).
Title II, which deals with procedure, is in four parts. 
Part 4 (Art 18-24) lays down rules for the establishment 
of a MPE (Minist&re Public Europeen, or European 
Prosecution Service) to investigate and prosecute in 
matters defined in Art 1-8. The MPE would be independent 
from the Commission and the Member States, and would 
investigate matters in its own right, though its chief 
prosecutor, based in Brussels, and prosecutors working 
from a specialist court in each of the Member States.
Part 5 (Art 25-28) lays down procedural guarantees, and
Part 6 (Art 29-33) lays down the rights of the accused,
and rules for the admissibility of evidence. Part 7 (Art 
35) defines the subsidiary role of national law in 
relation to the CJ: the lex fori would apply whenever the 
CJ fails to provide rules.842
8.3. Can the Corpus Juris be more then an idea?
The CJ has been welcomed by some key European p£nalistes 
whose main concern, of course, is efficient repression of 
crimes affecting the EC budget. Such a body of rules is 
meant to supplement, and not replace existing provisions. 
Further diversification, or creative use of the legal 
space can therefore be envisaged.
842 For a detailed analysis of the Corpus Juris, see White, 
S (1997) Corpus Juris: Beyond harmonisation, forthcoming.
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8.3.2. Legal basis: discussion
The CJ aims to establish a centralised repressive system, 
with prescribed penalties (including prison sentences) 
applying throughout the Union. Thus it appears that the 
CJ would be a major break with the approach hitherto 
adopted, rather than a small step away from 
harmonisation, as Delmas-Marty has argued.843 
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how it might fit into 
present legal architecture.
In a video linked conference between ALPFIEC and the 
European Commission, which took place on 16 January 1997, 
the author had the opportunity to ask the Commission 
representative what legal basis was envisaged for the CJ, 
and whether the Commission had hitherto received any 
reaction to the CJ from any of the Member States' 
executives. The response was that the Commission felt 
that the CJ could be adopted under Articles 100a and 
189b, which together allow for the adoption of measures 
for the approximation of laws, and with the aim of 
establishing the internal market, by a qualified majority 
and with the fullest available participation of the 
European Parliament. It was too early for detailed 
responses from the Member States' executives.
The suggestion that any instrument to protect the 
financial interests of the Communities should be placed 
under the first pillar should not unduly surprise. The 
Commission is only reiterating its well-rehearsed 
argument that matters relating to Community finances 
should be placed under the Community pillar. The argument 
that such a measure should be taken by qualified majority 
is a recognition that it is controversial, and therefore 
likely to be blocked should unanimity be required, for
843 See introduction to the CJ.
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example under Article 235 EC.
Council Directives which aim to harmonise rules in order 
to prevent financial and other crimes in the internal 
market environment have already been adopted under 
Article 100a. For example Council Directives 91/308844 on 
money laundering, 92/109845 on precursors, 89/592s46 on 
insider dealing all have Article 100a either as a sole 
legal basis, or as a conjoint legal basis with another 
article. What these directives have in common is that, 
although penal measures may be mentioned in their 
preambles, they do not figure in the texts of the 
directives proper, which however refer to 'prohibitions', 
'penalties', requiring Member States to 'take appropriate 
measures' in order to prevent criminal opportunities from 
being created through the internal market. However, the 
word 'penal' seems to have been banished from qualified 
majority first pillar instruments so far, so the ambition 
to introduce a veritable tranche of penal measures, as 
represented by the CJ, is a very considerable ambition.
8.3.2. Specificity of the Corpus Juris
An issue arises in relation to the specificity of the CJ. 
The CJ is aimed specifically at the protection of the 
financial interests of the European Community. But it is 
suggested, in the introduction to the CJ itself, that its 
innovatory character makes it a suitable prototype for 
exploring the possibilities of centralising prosecutions
844 Council Directive 91/308 OJ (1991) L 166/77, on 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money laundering.
845 Council Directive 92/109 OJ (1989) L 370/76, on the 
manufacture and the placing on the market of certain 
substances used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances.
846 Council Directive 89/592 OJ (1989) L 334/30, 
coordinating regulations on insider dealing.
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in areas other than those concerned with the protection 
of the financial interests of the European Communities. 
For example, the argument that harmonisation of criminal 
law has failed to protect the European Union,s economic 
interests could, in the view of the author, be extended 
to several other areas, such as the smuggling of radio­
active waste, drugs, and trans-national environmental 
crimes, all of which damage EU economic and wider 
interests. So far, there has been little discussion of 
the possibilities of creating supranational jurisdiction 
in order to deal with such 'pan-EU' crimes more 
efficiently. In fact, hitherto, supranational 
jurisdictions have been restricted to the 'big issues' of 
war crimes and human rights. In this perspective, the CJ 
would, if implemented, represent a major cultural shift 
in legal thinking.
8.3.3. Looking to the IGC
It is possible that CJ will create a great deal of 
controversy in some of the Member States. How willing 
would the UK executive be, for example, to relinquish 
part of its sovereignty associated with prosecution? It 
is equally possible that many Member States will simply 
ignore this proposal. Certainly, it raises in rather 
stark form the problems of competency which were noted in 
the Introduction to this thesis. One must wait for the 
outcome of the IGC to find out what further changes are 
likely to occur within the European legal space, and 
whether they would make the adoption of a Corpus Juris 
any easier. The present author is by no means adverse to 
this proposal, but doubts whether it can be agreed in the 
short or medium term. In any event, as can be now be 
concluded, it would not be sufficient.
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CONCLUSION
From the institutional point of view, 'PIF' is one area 
where the European Court of Justice cannot be accused of 
activism, but where the interests of the European 
Parliament and of the Commission have fruitfully 
coincided in the 1990s. Provoked by the powerful duo, the 
Council has acted, albeit slowly, due to the requirement 
for unanimity that anti-fraud measures usually demand.
But it has been argued that the Commission is now acting 
at the limit, or beyond its powers. The proposed on-the- 
spot check Regulation, in particular, has provoked the 
ire of the French Assembly, which pointed out that checks 
were already carried out by several agencies, and that 
additional checks would impose a disproportionate burden 
on administrations responsible for the management of EC 
funds in the Member States. Such criticism has to be 
taken seriously, if the spirit of cooperation between the 
Commission and national administrations is to be 
nurtured, and if the Commission is not to become over­
burdened, as it has increasingly become so in the 
competition field, to the point of looking at ways of 
handing back regulatory activity to the Member States (on 
the grounds of subsidiarity!). The proposed on-the-spot 
checks Regulation does raise a fundamental question: are 
ever-more penetrating supervisory powers for the 
Commission the way forward? Would this approach be viable 
in an enlarged Union?
The author argues that economically and fiscally radical 
approaches which focus on reducing opportunities for 
fraud or corruption should be prioritised. This means, 
first and foremost, completing the single market. In this 
the proper implementation of Article 99 EC could go some 
way towards reducing opportunities for crime. A radical 
approach to the protection of VAT resources, for example, 
must include a move to the definitive system, together
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with further harmonisation of indirect taxation. The 
persisting disparities in excise rates, although not 
having a direct effect on Community finance, encourage a 
black market in sensitive products, which in turn 
undermines EC income, in the shape of import duties.
As far as import duties are concerned, the whole of which 
accrue to the budget, 'Europeanising' national Customs 
authorities, by increasing their identification with the 
task of collecting common revenue, seems an important 
step. This could go some way towards ensuring that 
Customs' powers of deterrence are restored in the single 
market environment, and beyond. In these areas of the 
budget (VAT, import duties), where the Member States 
exercise their sovereign tax-raising powers, the 
penetrating powers of the Commission to perform 
inspections are likely.to be resented, and constructive 
but relatively hands-off approaches need to be 
prioritised at Community-level.
On the expenditure side of the budget, the enforcement 
space remains very uneven, with most checks and 
inspections falling on to the EAGGF Guarantee Section, 
and most anti-fraud appropriations spent there too. The 
Structural Funds remain fairly un-policed, and the Member 
States tend to escape financial liability for any 
misappropriation of funds. This is worrying in view of 
the plan which has been mooted to give Structural Funds 
an enhanced role and a larger share of the budget, in 
anticipation of the next wave of enlargement. The type of 
Structural Funds held to be best suited for the post-1999 
period are transnational Community initiatives. 
Transnational initiatives seem to have been particularly 
vulnerable to fraud in the past, and to increase their 
use would in turn entail more work for (an enlarged?) 
UCLAF, whose job it is to coordinate trans-national 
investigations. Any such move (towards more Structural
316
Funds of a transnational nature), the author believes, 
should also be accompanied beforehand by an American- 
style multi-disciplinary 'Criminal Impact Assessment', to 
which the European Court of Auditors could be a major 
contributor. That way, criminogenic schemes could be 
detected in utero, and either avoided altogether or re­
drafted to reduce the obvious (or less obvious) 
opportunities for crime they create.
Tighter financial accountability and a credible anti­
corruption strategy could help achieve some protection of 
vulnerable sectors, such as procurement expenditure. A 
credible anti-corruption strategy, however, means paying 
attention to the role of political corruption as well as 
corruption involving fonctionnaires, confronting squarely 
the issue of immunities, and generally dealing with the 
wider international and organised crime dimensions of 
this phenomenon. Riding on the mid 1990s political 
impetus to consolidate the European Project prior to 
monetary union, and looking back at the amount of 
creative law-making that has already occurred to protect 
the budget, further progress should be possible.
It has not been the objective of this work to address 
'pillars' questions. Nevertheless it is to be hoped that 
the in-depth understanding offered here of Community 
control in the protection of the financial interests of 
the European Communities will contribute to the wider 
debate on crime in the Union. The danger of white collar 
crime, flourishing in the 'grey zone' where otherwise 
legal and unambiguously criminal activities occur, must 
be more effectively addressed. More can be done at 
Community level to reduce the opportunities for a rise in 
crime that too easily could swamp intergovernmental third 
pillar action or even a supranational criminal law 
system. It is in this wider context that the Corpus Juris 
represents the most ambitious attempt to deepen the legal
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space. That level of ambition is both its great virtue 
and its potential Achilles' heel.
In conclusion, it is maintained that the interests of the 
European tax payer and citizen could be served by greater 
economic and fiscal integration. Necessary measures 
include the completion of the single market, the 
integration of Customs forces, and harmonisation of 
insolvency regimes. In other words, the centre of gravity 
for effective action should be economic and fiscal 
radicalism in the classical, Treaty of Rome tradition, 
without which the criminal law radicalism epitomised in 
the Corpus Juris would be icing without any cake.
-  *  -
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ALPFIEC Association of Lawyers for the Protection of 
the Financial Interests of the European 
Communities
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CCC Community Customs Code
CCEEs Countries of central and eastern Europe
CCT Common Customs Tariff
CEMA Customs and Excise Management Act
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS Customs Information System
CJ Corpus Juris
COCOLAF Comite Consultatif pour la coordination dans le 
domaine de la lutte AntiFraude (French 
acronym), in English: Advisory committee for 
the coordination of fraud prevention 
CPS Crown Prosecution Service
CFS Community Support Framework
DPP Director of Public Prosecution
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
EAGGF European Guarantee and Guidance Fund
EC European Community (term used since the entry
into force of the treaty on European Union)
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECU European Currency Unit
EIB European Investment Bank
EDF European Development Fund
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EP European Parliament
ESF European Social Fund
EUA European Unit of Account
FIFG Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
FCPC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (US)
GATT General agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP Gross National Product
GSP Generalized System of Preferences
IACS Integrated Administrative and Control System
IBAP Intervention Board in Agricultural Product
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
IRENE Irregularites, ENqu§tes, Exploitation -
irregularities, investigations, exploitation 
IRU International Road Transport Union
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
MAFF Ministry for Agriculture Fisheries and Food
MPE Ministere Public Europeen: European
Prosecution Service
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OJ Official Journal of the European Communities
(OJ L: series L, legislation; OJ C: series C, 
communications)
OOPEC Office of the Official publications of the
European Communities
/piF' Protection des int§r£ts financiers de la
communaute; in English protection of the 
financial interests of the European Communities
SAD Single Administrative Document
SCENT System for a Customs Enforcement NeTwork
SEM 2000 Programme to improver financial management
launched by the Commission in 1995. Its full 
name is Sound and Efficient Financial 
Management, SEM 2000 
SFO Serious Fraud Office
SME Small and medium sized enterprise
SOA Statement of Assurance
SOID Scottish Office Industry Department
SPD Single Programming Document
TCI Temporary Committee of Inquiry
TECA Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement
TIR Transport International Routier - in English
International Road Transport 
TPCC Trade Promotion Co-ordinating Committee
UA Unit of Account
UCLAF Coordinating unit for the fight against fraud
VAS Verification and Audit Section
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organisation
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APPENDIX B: COUNCIL REGULATION 2988/95
Council Regulation 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the 
protection of the European Communities financial 
interests, OJ (1995) L 312/1.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, and in particular Article 235 thereof,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 203 
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,1
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,2
Whereas the general budget of the European Communities is 
financed by own resources and administered by the 
Commission within the limit of the appropriations 
authorized and in accordance with the principle of sound 
financial management; whereas the Commission works in 
loose cooperation with the Member States to that end;
Whereas more than half the Community expenditure s paid 
to beneficiaries through the intermediary of the Member 
States;
Whereas detailed rules governing this decentralized 
administration and the monitoring of their use are the 
subject of differing detailed provisions according to the 
Community policies concerned; whereas acts detrimental to 
the Communities' financial interests must, however, be 
countered in all areas;
Whereas the affectiveness of the combating of fraud 
against the Communities' financial interests calls for a 
common set of legal rules to be enacted to be enacted for 
all areas covered by Community policies;
Whereas irregular conduct, and the administrative 
measures and penalties relating thereto, are provided for 
in sectoral rules in accordance with this Regulation;
Whereas the aforementioned conduct includes fraudulent 
actions as defined in the Convention on the protection of 
the European Communities' financial interests;
1 OJ No C 216, 6.8. 1994, p.11.
2 OJ no C 89, 10.4. 1995, p. 83 and opinion delivered on 
30 November 1995 (not yet published in the Official Journal)•
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Whereas Community administrative penalties must provide 
protection for the said interests; whereas it is 
necessary to define general rules applicable to these 
penalties.
Whereas Community law has established Community 
administrative penalties in the framework of the common 
agricultural policy; whereas such penalties must be 
established in other fields as well;
Whereas Community measures and penalties laid down in 
pursuance of the objectives of the common agricultural 
policy form an integral part of the aid systems; whereas 
they pursue their own ends which do not affect the 
assessment of the conduct of the economic operators 
concerned by the competent authorities of the Member 
States from the point of view of criminal law; whereas 
the effectiveness must be ensured by the immediate effect 
of Community rules and by applying in full Community 
measures as a whole, where the adoption of preventive 
measures has not made it possible to achieve that 
objective;
Whereas not only under the general principle of equity 
and the principle of proportionality but also in the 
light of the principle of ne bis in idem, appropriate 
provisions must be adopted while respecting the acquis 
communautaire and the provisions laid down in specific 
Community rules existing a the time of entry into force 
of this Regulation, to prevent any overlap of Community 
financial penalties imposed on the same persons for the 
same reasons;
Whereas, for the purposes of applying this Regulation, 
criminal proceedings may be regarded as having been 
completed where the competent national authority and the 
person concerned come to an arrangement;
Whereas this Regulation will apply without prejudice to 
the application of the Member States' criminal law; 
Whereas Community law imposes on the Commission and the 
Member States an obligation to check tat Community budget 
resources are used for their intended purpose; whereas 
there is a need for common rules to supplement existing 
provisions;
Whereas the Treaties make no provision for the specific 
powers necessary for the adoption of substantive law of 
horizontal scope on checks, measures and penalties with a 
view to ensuring the protection of the Communities' 
financial interests; whereas recourse should therefore be 
had to Article 235 of the EC Treaty and to Article 203 of 
the EAEC Treaty;
Whereas additional general provisions relating to checks 
and inspections on the spot will be adopted at a later
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stage,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
TITLE I
General principles
Article 1
1. For the purposes of protecting the European 
Communities' financial interests, general rules are 
hereby adopted relating to homogenous checks and to 
administrative measures and penalties concerning 
irregularities with regard to Community law.
2. 'Irregularity' shall mean any infringement of the 
provision of Community law resulting from an act or 
omission by an economic operator, which has, or would 
have, the effect of prejudicing the general budget of the 
Communities or budgets managed by them, either by 
reducing or losing revenue accruing from own resources 
collected directly on behalf of the Communities, or by an 
unjustified item of expenditure.
Article 2
1. Administrative checks, measures and penalties shall be 
introduced in so far as they are necessary to ensure the 
proper application of Community law. They shall be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive so that they 
provide adequate protection for the Communities' 
financial interests.
2. No administrative penalty may be imposed unless a 
Community act prior to the irregularity has made 
provision for it. In the event of a subsequent amendment 
of the provisions which impose administrative penalties 
and are contained in Community rules, the less severe 
provisions shall apply retroactively.
3. Community law shall determine the nature and scope f 
administrative measures ad penalties necessary for the 
correct application of the rules in question, having 
regard to the nature and seriousness of the irregularity, 
the advantage granted or received and the degree of 
responsibility.
4. Subject to the Community law applicable, the 
procedures for the application of Community checks, 
measures and penalties shall be governed by the laws of 
the Member States.
Article 3
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1. The limitation period for proceedings shall be four 
years as from the time when the irregularity referred to 
in Article 1(1) was committed. However, the sectoral 
rules may make provision for a shorter period which may 
not be less than three years.
In the case of continuous or repeated irregularities, the 
limitation period shall run from the day on which the 
irregularity ceases. In the case of multiannual 
programmes, the limitation period shall in any case run 
until the programme is definitely terminated.
The limitation period shall be interrupted by any act of 
the competent authority, notified to the person in 
question, relating to investigation or legal proceedings 
concerning the irregularity. The limitation period shall 
start again following each interrupting act.
However, limitation shall become effective at the latest 
on the day on which a period equal to twice the 
limitation period expires without the competent authority 
having imposed a penalty, except where the administrative 
procedure has been suspended in accordance with Article 
6 (1).
2. The period for implementing the decision establishing 
the administrative penalty shall be three years. That 
period shall run from the day on which the decision 
becomes final.
Instances of interruption and suspension shall be 
governed by the relevant provisions of national law.
3. Member States shall retain the possibility of applying 
a period which is longer than that provided for in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 respectively.
TITLE II
Administrative measures and penalties
Article 4
1. As a general rule, any irregularity shall involve 
withdrawal of the wrongly obtained advantage:
- by an obligation to pay or repay the amounts due or 
wrongly received,
- by the total or partial loss of the security provided 
in support of the request for an advantage granted or at 
the time of the receipt of an advance.
2 • Application of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 
shall be limited to the withdrawal of the advantage
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obtained plus, where so provided for, interest which may 
be determined on a flat-rate basis.
3. Acts which are established to have as their purpose 
the obtaining of an advantage contrary to the objectives 
of the Community law applicable in the case by 
artificially creating the conditions required for 
obtaining that advantage shall result, as the case shall 
be, wither in the failure to obtain the advantage or in 
its withdrawal.
4. The measures provided for in this Article shall not be 
regarded as penalties.
Article 5
1. Intentional irregularities or those caused by 
negligence may lead to the following penalties:
(a) payment of an administrative fine;
(b) payment of an amount greater than the amounts wrongly 
received or evaded, plus interest where appropriate; this 
additional sum shall be determined in accordance with a 
percentage to be set in the specific rules, and may not 
exceed the level strictly necessary to constitute a 
deterrent;
(c) total or partial removal of an advantage granted by 
Community rules, even if the operator wrongly benefitted 
from only a part of that advantage;
(d) exclusion from, or withdrawal of, the advantage for a 
period subsequent to that of the irregularity;
(e) temporary withdrawal of the approval or recognition 
necessary for participation in a Community aid scheme;
(f) the loss of a security or deposit provided for the 
purpose of complying with the conditions laid down by 
rules or the replenishment of the amount of a security 
wrongly released;
(g) other penalties of a purely economic type, equivalent 
in nature and scope, provided for in the sectoral rules 
adopted by the Council in the light of the specific 
requirements of the sectoral rules adopted by the Council 
in the light of the specific requirements of the sectors 
concerned and in compliance with the implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission by the Council.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions laid down in the 
sectoral rules existing at the time of entry into force 
of this Regulation, other irregularities may give rise 
only to those penalties not equivalent to a criminal 
penalty that are provided for in paragraph 1, provided
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that such penalties are essential to ensure correct 
application of the rules.
Article 6
1. Without prejudice to the Community administrative 
measures and penalties adopted on the basis of the 
sectoral rules existing at the time of entry into force 
of this Regulation, the imposition of financial penalties 
such as administrative rules may be suspended by decision 
of the competent authority if criminal proceedings have 
been initiated against the person concerned in connection 
with the same facts. Suspension of the administrative 
proceedings shall suspend the period of limitation 
provided for in Article 3.
2. If the criminal proceedings are not continued, the 
suspended administrative proceedings shall be resumed.
3. When the criminal proceedings are concluded, the 
suspended administrative proceedings shall be resumed, 
unless that is precluded by general legal principles.
4. Where the administrative procedure is resumed, the 
administrative authority shall ensure that a penalty at 
least equivalent to that prescribed by Community rules is 
imposed, which may take into account any penalty imposed 
by the judicial authority on the same person in respect o 
the same facts.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not apply to financial 
penalties which form an integral part of financial 
support systems and may be applied independently f any 
criminal penalties, if and in so far as they are not 
equivalent to such penalties.
Article 7
Community administrative measures and penalties may be 
applied to the economic operators referred to in Article 
1, namely the natural or legal persons and the other 
entities on which national law confers legal capacity who 
have committed the irregularity and to those who are 
under a duty to take responsibility for the irregularity 
or to ensure that it is not committed.
TITLE III
Checks
Article 8
1. In accordance with their national laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions, the Member States shall
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take the measures necessary to ensure the regularity and 
reality of transactions involving the Communities' 
financial interests.
2. Measure providing for checks shall be appropriate to 
the specific nature of each sector and in proportion to 
the objectives pursued. They shall take into account 
existing administrative practice and structures in the 
Member States and shall be determined so as not to entail 
excessive economic constraints or administrative costs.
The nature and frequency of the checks and inspections on 
the spot to be carried out by the Member States and the 
procedure for performing them shall be determined as 
necessary by sectoral rules in such a way as to ensure 
uniform and effective application of the relevant rules 
and in particular to prevent and detect irregularities.
3. The sectoral rules shall include the provisions 
necessary to ensure equivalent checks through the 
approximation of procedure and checking methods.
Article 9
1. Without prejudice to the checks carried out by the 
Member States in accordance with their national laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions and without 
prejudice to the checks carried out by the Community 
institutions in accordance with the EC Treaty, and in 
particular Article 188C thereof, the Commission shall, on 
its responsibility, have checks carried out on:
(a) the conformity of administrative practices with 
Community rules;
(b) the existence of the necessary substantiating 
documents and their concordance with the Communities' 
revenue and expenditure as referred to in Article 1;
(c) circumstances in which such financial transactions 
are carried out and checked.
2. In addition, it may carry out checks and inspections 
on the spot under the conditions laid down in the 
sectoral rules.
Before carrying out such checks and inspections, in 
accordance with the rules in force, the Commission shall 
inform the Member State concerned accordingly in order to 
obtain any assistance necessary.
Article 10
Additional general provisions relating to checks and
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inspections on the spot shall be adopted later in 
accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 235 
of the EC Treaty and Article 203 of the EAEC Treaty.
Article 11
This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day 
following its publication in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 18 December 1995.
For the Council 
The President 
J. Borrell Fontelles
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APPENDIX C: CORPUS JURIS
I - DROIT PflNAL
Art.l - Fraude au budget communautaire
1 - Est definie comme infraction pinale la fraude 
affectant le budget des Communautes europeennes, en 
matiere des depenses comme en matiere de recettes, 
lorsgue l'un des comportements suivants a ete commis soit 
intentionellement soit par imprudence ou negligence 
grave:
a) presenter devant 1'autorite des declarations 
incompletes, inexactes ou basees sur de faux 
documents, concernant des faits importants (pour 
1'octroi d'une aide ou d'une subvention ou pour la 
liquidation d'une dette fiscale) pouvant porter 
prejudice au budget communautaire;
b) omettre de fournir des informations sur les mimes 
faits aux autorites competentes au mepris d'une 
obligation d'informer;
c) detourner des fonds communautaires correspondant 
A une subvention ou i une aide reguliirement 
obtenue.
2. N'est pas punissable celui qui corrige ou complete les 
declarations ou renonce i la demande formuiee sur la base 
de faux documents, ou encore informe les autorites sur 
les faits qu'il a omis de signaler, avant que le fait ait 
ete decouvert.
Art. 2 - Fraude en matiere de passation de marches
Est definie comme infraction penale la fraude commise a 
1'occasion d'une procedure d'adjudication en matiere de 
passation des marches, lorsque les faits de fraude sont 
susceptibles de porter atteinte aux interets financiers 
des Communautes. La fraude consiste dans 1'accord occulte 
sur les offres avec les concurrents, ou la menace, la 
promesse ou la tromperie des concurrents, ou dans la 
collusion avec le fonctionnaire charge de 1'adjudication.
Art.3 - Corruption
Aux fins du present texte le terme fonctionnaire designe 
tout fonctionnaire tant 'europeen' que 'national'.
Par fonctionnaire 'europeen' on entend:
a) toute personne qui a la qualite de fonctionnaire 
ou d'agent engage par contrat au sens du Statut des 
fonctionaires des Communautes europeennes;
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b) toute personne mise a la disposition des 
Communautes europeennes, par les Etats membres ou 
par tout organisme public ou privd, qui y exerce des 
fonctions equivalentes a celles qu'exercent les 
fonctionnaires ou autres agents des Communautes 
europeennes;
L'expression 'fonctionnaire national' est 
interpretee par reference a la definition de 
'fonctionnaire' ou 'officier public' dans le droit 
national de l'Etat membre oil la personne en question 
presente cette qualite aux fins de 1'application de 
son droit penal.
2 - Sont definis en infraction penale les faits de 
corruption passive et de corruption active qui porte 
atteinte, ou sont susceptibles de porter atteinte, aux 
interets financiers des Communautes europeennes.
3 - Par corruption passive on entend le fait, pour un 
fonctionnaire, de solliciter ou d'agreer, directement ou 
par interposition de tiers, pour lui-meme ou pour un 
tiers, des offres, des promesses ou tout autre avantage 
de quelque nature qu'il soit:
a) pour qu'il accomplisse un acte de sa fonction ou 
un acte dans l'exercice de sa fonction, de fagon 
contraire a ses devoirs officiels;
b) pour qu'il s'abstienne d'accomplir un acte de sa 
fonction, ou un acte dans l'exercice de sa fonction, 
que ses devoirs officiels lui demandent d'accomplir.
4 - Par corruption active on entend le fait, pour 
quiconque, de faire ou de donner, directement ou par 
1'interposition de tiers, des offres, des promesses ou 
tout autre avantage, de quelque nature qu'il soit, a un 
fonctionnaire, dans son propre interet ou dans l'intdret 
d'un tiers:
a) pour qu'il accomplisse un acte de sa fonction, ou 
un acte dans l'exercice de sa fonction, de fagon 
contraire a ses devoirs officiels;
b) pour qu'il s'abstienne d'accomplir un acte de sa 
fonction, ou un acte dans l'exercice de sa fonction, 
que ses devoirs officiels lui demandent d'accomplir.
Art 4 - Abus de fonction
1 - Est ddfini comme infraction penale le fait du 
fonctionnaire qui:
a) soit decide l'octroi d'une subvention, d'une aide 
ou d'une exoneration de droits en faveur d'une 
personne qui n'y a manifestement pas droit;
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b) soit intervient, directement ou indirectement, 
dans 1'octroi de subventions, d'aides ou 
d'exoneration de droits £ des entreprises ou en 
relation & des operations oCt il ait quelque int&r&t 
personnel.
2 — La sanction devra etre aggravee lorsque le dommage 
cause depassera 100 000 ecus.
Art 5 - Malversation
1 - Est defini comme infraction penale l'abus de 
confiance des fonctionnaires communautaires dans leurs 
fonctions d'administration de fonds provenant de budget 
communautaire. L'infraction consiste dans le fait, pour 
un fonctionnaire communautaire formellement autorise A 
disposer de fonds provenant de budget communautaire, ou A 
contracter des obligations a la charge de la Communaut€, 
d'abuser de ses pouvoirs en causant un dommage aux 
interets qui lui ont ete confies.
2 - La sanction devra €tre aggravee lorsque le dommage 
caus£ depassera 100 000 ecus.
Art 6 - Revelation de secrets de fonction
1 - Est defini comme infraction pdnale la revelation 
illicite de secrets de fonction par le fonctionnaire, 
lorsque le secret a pour l'objet une information acquise 
dans l'exercice, ou en vertu de 1'activity
professionnelle de celui-ci, notamment lors d'une 
procedure concernant le contrdle des recettes ou 1'octroi 
des aides et subventions.
2 - Cette disposition n'est pas applicable dans le cas oil 
la loi, ou un reglement, impose ou autorise la revelation 
de secret, ou quand il y a consentement de la personne 
ddpositaire de secret.
Art 7 - Blanchiment et recel
1 - Est defini comme infraction penale le blanchiment des 
produits ou du profit des infractions prevues aux 
articles 1 £ 6.
Par blanchiment on entend:
a) La conversion ou le transfert de biens provenant 
d'une des activites criminelles visees a l'alinea 
precedent ou d'une participation a une telle 
activite dans le but de dissimuler ou de deguiser 
l'origine illicite desdits biens ou d'aider toute 
personne qui est impliquee dans cette activite a 
echapper aux consequences juridiques de ses actes;
b) la dissimulation ou le deguisement de la nature,
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de l'origine, de 1'emplacement, de la disposition, 
du mouvement ou de la propriety reels de biens ou de 
droits y relatifs provenant d'une des activit€s 
criminelles visees a l'alinea precedent ou de la 
participation 8 une telle activity.
2 - Est d€fini comme infraction penale le recel de 
produits ou du profit des infractions prevues aux 
precedents articles 1 a 6.
Par recel on entend 1'acquisition, la detention ou 
1'utilisation de biens provenant d'une des activites 
criminelles visees a l'alinea precedent ou d'une 
participation a une telle activite.
Art 8 - Association de malfaiteurs
1 - Est definie comme infraction penale 1'association de 
malfaiteurs au detriment du budget communautaire.
2 - Par association de malfaiteurs on entend le fait que 
deux ou plusieurs personnes s'associent, en se donnant 
une organisation adequate, en vue de realiser une ou 
plusieurs des infractions visees aux articles 1 8  7.
Art 9 - Peines
1 - Sont prevues comme peines principales, communes 8 
toutes les infractions definies aux articles 1 8  8:
a) pour les personnes physiques, la peine privative 
de liberte pour une duree de cinq ans au plus et/ou 
1'amende jusqu'a un million d'Ecus, pouvant etre 
portee jusqu'au quintuple du montant de
1'infraction;
b) pour les personnes morales la mise sous 
surveillance judiciaire pour une duree de cinq ans 
au plus et/ou l'amende jusqu'8 un million d'Ecus, 
pouvant etre portee jusqu'au quintuple du montant de 
1'infraction;
c) la confiscation des instruments, des produits et 
du profit de 1'infraction;
d) la publication de l'arr§t de condamnation.
2 - Sont prevues comme peines complementaires pour les 
memes infractions:
a) pour le delit prevu 8 1'article 1, 1'exclusion 
des subventions futures pour une duree de cinq ans 
au plus;
b) pour le delit prevu 8 1'article 2, 1'exclusion
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des marches futures pour une dur6e de cinq ans au 
plus;
c) pour les delits prevus aux articles 3 I 6,
1'interdiction de la fonction publique communautaire 
et nationale pour une dur€e de cinq ans au plus.
Art 10 - Element moral
Pour toutes les infractions definies ci-dessus (art. 1 a 
8), la faute intentionnelle ou dol est necessaire, a 
1'exception de la fraude communautaire (art.l) pour 
laquelle 1'imprudence grave, est suffisante.
Art. 11 - Erreur
1 - 1/ erreur sur les elements essentiels de 1'infraction 
exclut le dol, 1'imprudence grave pouvant ytre n^ammoins 
sanctionnee dans le cas de fraude communautaire.
2 - L'erreur sur la prohibition, ou sur 1' interpretation 
de la loi, exclut la responsibility au cas d'une erreur 
inevitable par un homme prudent et raisonnable. Si
1'erreur ytait inevitable, la sanction sera diminu£e, ce 
qui exclut alors la possibility pour le juge de prononcer 
le maximum de la peine encourue (supra, art.9).
Art. 12 - Responsibility penale individuelle
1 - Tout individu peut etre declare responsable des 
infractions definies ci-dessus (art. 1 8  8) en tant 
qu'auteur, instigateur ou complice:
a) est auteur de 1'infraction celui qui commet les 
faits incrimines ou qui participe, comme coauteur, 8 
la commission de 1'infraction;
b) est instigateur de 1'infraction celui qui, par 
don, promesse, menace, ordre, abus d'autorite ou de 
pouvoir aura provoque 8 1'infraction ou donne des 
instructions pour les commettre;
c) est complice de 1'infraction, celui qui 
sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facility la 
preparation ou la consommation.
Art. 13 - Responsibility penale du chef d'entreprise
1 - Au cas oft l'une des infractions dyfinies ci-dessus 
(art. 1 8 8) a ete commise pour le compte de l'entreprise 
par une personne soumise 8 leur autorite, sont egalement 
responsables penalenient les chefs d'entreprise, ou tout 
autre personne ayant le pouvoir de d8cision ou de 
contrdle au sein d'une entreprise, qui, en connaissnace 
de cause, ont donne des ordres, laisse commettre 
1'infraction ou omis d'exercer les contrdles ndcessaires.
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2 - Une delegation des pouvoirs et de la responsibility 
penale n'est valable que si elle est partielle, precise 
et sp£ciale, si elle correspond d une organisation 
necessaire 4 l'entreprise et si les deiegataires sont 
reellement en situation de remplir les fonctions 
deleguees. Cette delegation n'exclut pas la 
responsibility generale de contrdle, de surveillance et 
de choix du personnel, et ne concerne pas les domaines 
propres du chef d'entreprise tels que 1'organisation 
generale du travail au sein de l'entreprise.
Art. 14 - Responsibility penale des groupements
1 - Sont ygalement responsables des infractions definies 
ci-dessus (art. 1 -8) les groupements ayant la 
personnalite morale, ainsi que ceux ayant la quality de 
sujet de droit et etant titutlaire d'un patrimoine 
autonome lorsque 1'infraction a ete realisee pour le 
compte du groupement par un organe, un representant ou 
toute personne agissant en son nom ou ayant un pouvoir de 
decision, de droit ou de fait.
2 - La responsibility penale des groupements n'exclut pas 
celle des personnes physiques, auteurs, instigateurs ou 
complices des memes faits.
Art. 15 - Mesure de la peine
Les peines applicables aux infractions definies ci-dessus 
(art 1 e 8) doivent etre prononcees en fonction de la
gravity du fait, de la faute de 1'auteur et du degre de
sa participation d 1'infraction. Seront notamment pris en 
consideration la vie anterieure de 1'accuse, son 
eventuelle recidive, sa personnalite, ses mobiles, sa 
situation economique et sociale, et en particulier ses 
efforts pour reparer le dommage cause.
Art 16 - CirConstances aggravantes
1 - Sont definies comme aggravantes les circonstances 
suivantes:
a) Le resultat frauduleux poursuivi est realise;
b) Le montant de la fraude ou du profit poursuivi 
avec 1'infraction est superieur I 200 000 Ecus;
c) 1'infraction est realisee dans le cadre d'une 
association de malfaiteurs.
2 - En cas de circonstance aggravante, la peine privative
de liberty (ou, le cas echeant la mise sus surveillance
judiciaire) est necessairement appliquee et la duree 
maximale des peines encourues est portee d. sept ans.
Art. 17 - Peines encourues au cas de concours
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d'infractions
1 - Dans le cas oil une meme personne doit repondre de 
plusieurs infractions definies ci-dessus (art. 1 A 8), 
sera appliquee une peine unique, determinee sur la base 
de la sanction qui aurait ete encourue pour 1'infraction 
la plus grave, augmentAe jusqu'au triple; la peine ainsi 
determinee ne pouvant depasser la somme des sanctions qui 
auraient ete infligees pour chaque infraction.
2 - Lorsqu'un meme fait constitue une infraction pAnale 
selon la rAglementation communautaire et selon la 
rAglementation nationale, seule la premiAre doit Atre 
appliquee.
3 - En tout autre cas de concours, 1'AutoritA compAtente 
doit tenir compte, dans la determination de la sanction, 
des sanctions dAja infligees pour le mAme fait.
II - PROCEDURE PENALE
Art. 18 - statut et composition du Ministdre public 
European (MPE)
1 - Pour les besoins de la recherche, de la poursuite, du 
jugement et de 1'execution des condemnations concernant 
les infractions definies ci-dessus (art. 1 A 8),
1'ensemble des territoires des Etats membres de 1'Union 
constitue un espace judiciaire unique.
2. Le MPE est une autorite de la CommunautA europAenne, 
responsbale pour al recherche, la poursuite, le renvoi en 
jugement, l'exercice de 1'action publique devant la 
jurisdiction de jugement et 1'AxAcution des jugements 
concernant les infractions definies ci-dessus (art. 1 A 
8). II est indApendant tant A l'egard des autoritAs 
nationales qu'a l'egard des organes communautaires.
3. Le MPE est compose d'un procureur general europeen 
(PGE) dont les services sont installAs A Bruxelles et de 
Procureurs europeens dAlAgues (PED) dont les services 
sont installAs dans la capitale de chaque Etat membre, 
out tout autre ville ou siege le tribunal competent en 
application de 1'article 26.
4. Le MPE est indivisible et solidaire:
a) l'indivisibilite implique que tout acte accompli 
par l'un de ses membres est repute accompli par le 
MPE; que tous les actes de la competence du MPE (en 
particulier les pouvoirs d'investigation AnumArAs A 
1'article 20) peuvent etre accomplis par l'un 
quelconque de ses membres; et que, avec 1'accord du 
PGE, ou en cas d'urgence sous son contrAle, chacun 
des PRD peut exercer ses fonctions sur le territoire 
de l'un quelconque des Etats membres, en
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collaboration avec les services du PED installes 
dans cet Etat membre;
b) La solidarity impose, entre les differents PED, 
une obligation d'assistance.
5. A l'egard du MPE, les ministtres publics nationaux 
(MPN) sont egalement tenus d'une obligation d'assistance.
Art. 19 - Saisine du MPE et mise en mouvement de 1'action 
publique
1 - Le MPE doit etre informe de tous les faits pouvant 
constituter l'une des infractions dtfinies ci-dessus 
(art. 1 A 8), tant par les autorites nationales (police, 
procureurs, juges d'instruction, agents des 
administrations nationales telles que le Fisc ou les 
Douanes) que par l'organe communautaire competent, A 
savoir l'UCLAF (Unity de Coordination de la lutte 
antifraude). II peut egalement ttre informe par 
dtnonciation de tout citoyen ou par plainte de la 
Commission. Les autoritts nationales ont 1'obligation de 
saisir le parquet europeen au plus tard au moment de la 
'mise en accusation', au sens de l'artilce 29, par. 2., 
ou de l'emploi de mesures contraignantes telles que, 
notamment, l'arrestation, les perquisitions et saisies ou 
le placement sur ecoutes telephoniques.
2 - Si l'enquete menee par une autorite nationale vient a 
rtvtler 1'existence de l'une des infractions definies ci- 
dessus (art. 1 a 8), le dossier doit ttre aussitdt 
transmis au MPE.
3 - Informt des faits par quelque moyen que ce soit, le 
MPE peut soit ttre officiellement saisi par les autorites 
nationales, soit se saisir d'office.
4 - La decision de poursuivre, qui vaut ouverture d'une 
information, peut etre prise par le MPE quel que soit le 
montant de la fraude. Tenue par la ltgalite des 
poursuites, le MPE doit exercer celles-ci dts lors que 
l'une des infractions visees (art. 1 £ 8) parait 
constitute. II peut cependant, par decision specialement 
motivee aussitdt communiquee a la personne qui l'a 
informe, comme a celle qui a denonce 1'infraction a ses 
services ou porte plainte contre celle-ci:
a) soit deferer aux autorites nationales les 
infractions de faible gravity ou qui affectent 
principalement des inttrets nationaux;
b) soit classer l'affaire sans suite, si l'accuse, 
ayant reconnu sa culpability, a repart le dommage et 
restitue, le cas echeant, les fonds irregulitrement 
pergus;
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c) soit accorder l'autorisation de transaction A 
1'autorite nationale qui en a fait la demande, selon 
les conditions enumerees ci-dessous (art. 22, par.
2, b) •
Art. 20 - Pouvoirs d'investigation du MPE
1 - Afin de permettre la manifestation de la vAritA et de 
mettre l'affaire en Atat d'etre jugee, le MPE conduit, A 
charge et A dAcharge, les investigations relatives aux 
infractions dAfinies ci-dessus (art. 1 A 8). Ses pouvoirs 
sont repartis entre le Procureur general europeen (PGE), 
les procureurs europeens dAlAguAs (PED) et, le cas 
AchAant, les autoritAs nationales designAes A cet effet, 
selon les rAgles qui suivent.
2 - Les pouvoirs propres du PGE comprennent:
a) La direction gAnArale des investigations et leur 
delegation A un ou plusieurs PED dans les conditions 
et limites dAfinies ci-aprAs (art. 20, par.3);
b) la coordination des investigations menAes tant 
par les PED que par les services de police nationaux 
et les adminstrations nationales compAtentes et, le 
cas AchAant, par l'UCLAF; cette coordination pouvant 
prendre la forme de recommandations orales ou 
Acrites aux services concernAs;
c) l'Avocation d'affaires dont 1'enquAte rAvAle 
qu'elles concernent en tout ou en partie des 
infractions dAfinies ci-dessus (art. 1 A 8)
3 - Peuvent etre soit exercAs par le PGE soit dAlAguAs 
aux PED, au cas d'enquete relative aux infractions 
dAfinies aux articles 1 A 8, tous les pouvoirs suivants:
a) 1'interrogatoire du suspect, dans les conditions 
respectant ses droits AnumArAs ci-dessous (art. 29);
b) la collecte des documents, et/ou des donnAes 
informatisAes nAcessaires A l'enquete et, le cas 
AchAant, le transport sur les lieux de 1'infraction;
c) la demande adressAe au juge d'ordonner une 
expertise dans les conditions dAfinies ci-dessous;
d) les perquisitions, saisies et Acoutes 
telephoniques ordonnAes, conformement A la regie 
AnoncAe ci-dessous (art. 25), aprAs autorisation 
d'un juge ou sous contrdle et pratiquAes dans le 
respect des droits de 1'accusA (art. 31);
e) les auditions des tAmoins qui acceptent de 
coopArer avec la justice et, le cas AchAant, des 
tAmoins obligAs A comparaitre dans les conditions
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indiquees ci-dessous.
f) la notification des charges k 1'accuse, dans le 
respect des droits enonces ci-dessous (art. 29);
g) la demande de mise en detention ou de placement 
sous contrdle judiciaire, pour une periode au 
maximum de 6 mois, renouvenable pour 3 mois, 
lorsqu'il y a des raisons plausibles de soupgonner 
que 1'accuse a commis l'une des infractions definies 
ci-dessus (art. 1 a 8) ou des motifs raisonnables de 
croire a la necessity de l'empdcher de commettre une 
telle infraction ou de s'enfuir aprds 
l'accomplissement de celle-ci; cette demande, dcrite 
et motivee, devant etre adressee a 1'autorite 
judiciaire nationale competente en application des 
regies posees ci-dessous (art. 24 et 25),
1'execution de ces mesures etant organisee dans le 
pays oft l'arrestation a eu lieu.
4 - Les pouvoirs delegues aux PED peuvent faire 1'object 
d'une subdelegation partielle, limitde ratione materiae 
et ratione temporis, adressee a une autorite nationale 
(autoritd de poursuite, police, ou toute autre 
administration competente comme le Fisc ou les Douanes) 
qui devra respecter 1'ensemble des rdgles resultant du 
corpus europeen.
Art. 21 - Cloture de la phase preparatoire
1 - Lorsqu'il estime que les investigations sont 
terminees, le PED decide, sous le contrdle du PGE, soit 
de rendre une decision de non-lieu, soit de renvoyer
1'affaire en jugement.
2 - La ddcison de non-lieu est notifide d la Commission 
europeenne, k 1'accuse, et d toute organe ou personne qui 
avait informd le MPE, denoncd l'infracton d ses services 
ou porte plainte contre celle-ci, au sens defini ci- 
dessus (art. 19, par. 4).
3 - La decision de renvoi, notifide dans les mdmes 
conditions que le non-lieu (art. 21, par.2), mentionne 
les nom et adresse de 1'accuse, la description des faits 
et leur qualification, ainsi que 1'indication de la 
jurisdiction de renvoi. Elle est soumise au contrdle de 
1'autorite judiciaire nationale competente selon les 
rdgles definies ci-dessous (art. 25) qui, aprds 
verification de la regularity de la procedure, saisit la 
jurisdiction de jugement competente et adresse £ 1'accuse 
une convocation precisant le jour et l'heure de sa 
comparution.
Art. 22 - Exercice de 1'extinction de 1'action publique
1 - Pour les infractions definies ci-dessus (art. 1 k 8),
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le MPE exerce 1'action publique aupres de la jurisdiction 
de jugement (designee comme il est indique ci-apres, art. 
26), selond les regies en vigueur dans l'Etat dont elle 
relive. La partie poursuivante nationale peut, le cas 
€ch€ant, exercer 1'action publique e ses cdtes, si des 
interets nationaux sont Egalement adrissds Bl la partie 
poursuivante nationale et le dossier lui est communique 
en temps utile.
2 - Pour ces memes infractions, 1'action publique 
s'eteint, a 1'exclusion de toute mesure nationale de 
grSce ou d'amnistie, par la mort du pr€venu (ou la 
dissolution s'il s'agit d'un groupement), la prescription 
ou la transaction:
a) en ce qui cocnerne la prescription, le ddlai est 
de cinq ans, a compter du jour oCl 1'infraction a ete 
commise si dans cet intervalle, il n'a ete fait 
aucun acte d'investigation ou de poursuite; s'il en 
a ete effectue dans cet intervalle, 1'infraction ne 
se prescrit qu'apres cinq annees rdvolues a compte 
du dernier acte. En toute hypothese, la notification 
des charges au suspect interrompt la prescription;
b) en ce qui concerne la transaction, elle est 
exclue en cas de recidive, port d'armes, usage de 
documents falsifies ou si le montant de la fraude 
est superieur ou egal a 50 000 Ecus. Dans les autres 
cas, elle peut etre proposee par les autorites 
nationales au MPE, tant pour des afffaires relevant 
de la competence nationale (cf. art. 19, par.4,a), 
que pour les affaires de competence europeenne, sous 
les conditions suivantes: le defendeur reconnait 
librement sa culpabilite, les autorites disposent
d'indices de culpabilite suffisants pour justifier 
le renvoi en jugement, la decision de transiger est 
rendue publiquement, 1'accord conclu respecte le 
principle de proportionalite. En cas de refus, le 
MPE doit, s'il y a lieu, evoquer 1'affaire.
Art. 23 - Execution des jugements
1 - Lorsque le jugement de condemnation devient 
definitif, il est aussitdt transmis par le MPE aux 
autorites de l'Etat membre designe comme lieu d'execution 
de la decision, certaines peines comme la confiscation, 
la privation de droits ou la publication de jugement
differents(s) de celui de l'emprisonnement. Le MPE est
responsable, aux cotes de 1'autorite nationale
competente, pour ordonner et contrdler la mise a
execution du jugement lorsque celle-ci n'est pas 
automatique. En principe 1'execution des peines est regie 
par les regies en vigueur dans l'Etat membre designe 
comme lieu d'execution de la decision. Toutefois le MPE 
veille a 1'application des regies communes suivantes sur 
tout le territoire des Etats de 1'union europeenne:
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a) toute periode de detention accomplie par 1'accuse 
i raison des mimes faits, dans guelque Etat et A 
guelque moment de la procidure que ce soit, est 
deduite de la peine d'emprisonnemnet prononcie par 
la jurisdiction de jugement;
b) nul ne peut etre poursuivi ou condamni penalement 
dans un Etat membre en raison d'une infraction 
definie ci-dessus (art 1 A 8) pour laquelle il a 
deja it A soit acquitti, soit condamne par un 
jugement definitif, dans l'un quelconque des Etats 
membres de 1'union europeenne;
c) toute dicision de condamnation pour l'une des 
infracitons difinies ci-dessus (art. 1 A 8) doit 
prendre en considiration dans la ditermination de la 
peine les regies difinies ci-dessus (art. 17) pour 
les concours d'infractions.
2 - Le MPE autorise s'il y a lieu, le transfert lorsque 
la personne condamnee a une peine privative de liberti 
demande a itre incarcere dans un Etat membre autre que 
celui designe par le jugement de condamnation.
3 - En application de la regie generale de subsidiariti 
du droit national (art. 35), les juridictions nationales 
doivent se referer aux regies posies dans le corpus 
europien et, en case de lacune, appliquer la loi 
nationale. En toute hypothise, elles sont tenues de 
motiver la peine par rifirence aux circonstances 
particuliires propres a chaque affaire, en application 
des rigles difinies ci-dessus (art. 15 A 17).
Art. 27 - Recours aupres des juridictions nationales
1 - Toute dicision de condamnation prononcie contre une 
personne diclarie coupable de l'une des infractions 
difinies ci-dessus (art. 1 a 8) doit pouvoir faire 
l'objet d'un appel du condamni a faire rejuger l'affaire, 
en droit et en fait, par une jurisdiction supirieure 
appartenant a l'Etat dans lequel la condamnation a iti 
prononcie en premiere instance et appliquant, comme la 
jurisdiction du premier degri, les rigles posies dans le 
corpus europein et, en cas de lacune, dans la loi 
nationale.
2 - L'appel est igalement ouvert, en cas d'acquittement 
total ou partiel, au MPE en tant que partie poursuivante, 
la Commission pouvant se joindre a lui, comme partie 
civile, sur les seuls intirets civils.
3 - En cas d'appel du seul condamni, la jurisdiction 
saisie ne peut aggraver la peine.
Art. 28 - Recours aupres de la Cour de Justice des 
Communautis europiennes (CJCE)
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1 - La Cour de Justice est compytente pour statuer en 
mati&re d'infractions definies ci-cessus (art. 1 & 8) 
dans trois cas:
a) & titre prejudicial sur 1'interpretation du 
corpus et des eventuelles mesures d'applicaiton;
b) a la demande d'un Etat membre ou de la Commission 
sur tout differend concernant 1'application du 
corpus;
c) a la demande du MPE ou d'une autority judiciaire 
nationale sur les conflits de competence relatifs & 
1'application des regies posant le principe de 
territoriality europeenne, en ce qui concerne tant 
le ministere public (art. 18 et 24) que l'exercice 
de la garantie judiciaire par les jurisdictions 
nationales (art. 25 a 27).
2 - Lorsqu'une question d'interpretation est soulev£e ou 
un conflit de competence eleve devant une jurisdiction 
d'un des Etats membres, cette jurisidiction peut, si elle 
estime qu'une decision sur ce point est necessaire pour 
rendre son jugement, demander £ la Cour de justice de 
statuer sur cette question.
3 - Lorsqu'une telle question ou conflit est soulev£e ou 
elev^e dans une affaire pendante devant une jursidiction 
nationale dont les decisions ne sont pas susceptibles 
d'un recours juridictionel de droit interne, cette 
jurisdiction est tenue de saisir la Cour de justice.
Art 29 - Les droits de 1'accuse
1 - Dans tout proces ouvert pour une infraction ddfinie 
ci-dessus (art. 1 d 8), 1'accuse beneficie des droits de 
la defense qui lui sont accordes par 1'article 6 de la 
Convention europeenne des droits de l'homme et 1'article 
10 du Pacte international de l'ONU sur les droits civils 
et politiques.
2 - Une personne ne peut etre entendue comme temoin mais 
doit etre consideree comme accuse a partir de tout acte 
constatant, denongant ou revelant 1'existence d'indices 
graves et concordants de culpability a sa charge et, au 
plus tard, lors du premier interrogatoire par une 
autority connaissant 1'existence de tels indices.
3 - Des le premier interrogatoire, 1'accuse a le droit de 
connaitre le contenue des charges existant contre lui, le 
droit d'etre assiste du defenseur de son choix, et le cas 
ychyant d'un interprete. II se voit reconnaitre le droit 
de se taire.
Art. 30 - Les droits de la Commission comme partie civile
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1 - La Commission europeenne, dans la mesure oil la 
Communaut§ est victime d'un dommage directement cause par 
l'une des infractions definies ci-dessus (art. 1 a 8), 
peut se constituer partie civile aupr&s du juge 
competent, soit pendant la phase pr§paratoire, soit A 
l'ouverture de la phase de jugement. Elle peut demander 
au juge de prendre des mesures conservatoires et 
d'ordonner, le cas echeant, la reparation du dommage.
2 - La constitution de partie civile, quand elle est 
d6clar€e recevable, confere a la Commission les droits et 
prerogatives d'une partie au proc£s: communication du 
dossier, notification des actes de la procedure, 
assistance d'un avocat, presence & 1'audience, 
participation a 1'administration de la preuve, exercice 
des voies de recours en ce qui concerne les int€r£ts 
civils (cf. art. 27).
Art 31 - La charge de la preuve
1 - Toute perosnne accusee de l'une des infractions 
definies ci-dessus (art. 1^8) est presumee innocente 
jusqu'a ce que sa culpabilite ait et€ etablie legalement 
par un jugement definitif ayant acquis 1'autority de la 
chose jugee.
2 - Sous reserve des obligations de produire certains 
documents pouvant resulter du droit national ou du droit 
communautaire, nul n'est oblige de contribuer de mani&re 
active, directement ou indirectement, £ 6tablir sa propre 
culpabilite.
Art. 32. Les preuves admises
1 - Sont admises dans les Etats membres de 1'union 
europeenne les preuves suivantes:
a) les temoignages soit directs, soit presentes a 
1'audience par une liaison audioviduelle lorsque le 
se trouve dans un autre Etat membre, soit recueillis 
par le MPE sous la forme d'un 'proc&s-verbal 
europeen d'audition' impliquant que 1'audition soit 
faite devant un juge; que la defense soit pr€sente 
et que lui soit accordee la possibiite de poser des 
questions; enfin que 1'operation soit enregistree 
par video;
b) Les interrogatires de 1'accuse soit directs, soit 
recueillis par le MPE sous la forme d'un procds 
verbal europeen d'interrogatoire' impliquant que
1'interrogatoire soit fait devant le juge, que 
1'accuse soit assiste d'un defenseur de son choix 
ayant eu communication du dossier en temps utile et 
au plus tard 48 jeures avant 1'interrogatoire et, le 
cas ech€ant, d'un interprete, enfin que 1'operation 
soit enregistree par video;
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c) les declarations de 1'accuse, independamment de 
tout interrogatoire, des lors qu'elles ont ete 
faites devant 1'autorite competente (MPE ou juge), 
que I7accuse a ete prealablement averti de son droit 
k se taire et e beneficier de 1'assistance d'un 
defenseur de son choix et que les declarations ont 
ete enregistres par tout moyen;
d) les documents presentes par un expert-comptable 
designe par la juridiction competente parmi les 
personnes physiques ou morales figurant sur une 
liste europeenne agreee par les Etat membres sur 
proposition du MPE, soit au cours de la phase 
preparatoire, soit au debut de la phase du jugement;
e) les documents que 1'accuse a ete oblige de 
produire dans une enquete preliminaire 
administrative, sauf dans l'hypothese od une telle 
obligation serait assortie de sanctions penales.
2 - Les presentes dispositions n'excluent pas 
l'applicabilite d'autres modes de preuve considerees 
comme recevables au regard du droit national en vigueur 
dans l'Etat dont releve la jurisdiction de jugement.
Art. 33 - L'exclusion des preuves obtenues en violation 
des r£gles de droit
1 - Dans une poursuite pour l'une des infractions 
definies ci-dessus (art. 1 a 8) une preuve doit etre 
ecartee si elle a ete obtenue par les organes 
communautaires ou nationaux soit en violation des droits 
fondamentaux consacres par la CESDH, soit en violation du 
droit national applicable, sans etre justifiee par les 
regies europeennes precipitees. .
2 - Le droit national appicable pour determiner la 
question de savoir si la preuve a ete obtenue legalement 
ou illegalement doit etre le droit du pays oil
la preuve a ete obtenue. Lorsqu'une preuve a ete 
legalement obtenue dans ce sens, on ne doit pas pouvoir 
opposer a 1'utilisation de cette preuve le seul fait que 
l'obtention aurait ete illegale dans le pays 
d'utilisation. Mais on doit toujours pouvoir apposer d 
1'utilisation d'une telle preuve le fait que son 
obtention, bien qu' appar eminent con forme au droit du pays 
oil elle a ete obtenue, a viole les droits consacres par 
le CESDH ou les regies europeennes (art. 31 et 32).
Art. 34 - Publicite et secret
1 - Les investigations menees sous la direction du MPE 
sont secretes et les autorites qui participent a ces 
investigations sont tenues au respect du secret 
professionel.
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2 - Les audiences devant le juge des libert&s peuvent 
etre rendues publiques si 1'ensemble des parties y 
consentent, sauf si la publicity est de nature & nuire au 
bon deroulement de l'enquete, aux int€rets d'un tiers, a 
l'ordre publique ou aux bonnes moeurs. En toute 
hypothese, il est interdit aux medias de publier en cours 
de proces des informations relatives aux Elements de 
preuve.
3 - Le jugement doit etre rendu publiquement, mais 
l'acces de la salle d'audience peut §tre interdit d la 
presse et au public, pendant la totality ou une partie du 
procds, dans les conditions prevues par 1'article 6, 
paragraphe 1 CESDH. Cette publicity peut inclure
1'enregistrement et la diffusion audiovisuelle du proc&s 
si le droit national de l'Etat concerne le prevoit et 
dans les conditions qu'il impose.
Art. 35 La susidiarite du droit national par rapport au 
corpus europeen
Le corpus des rdgles definies ci-dessus en droit 
substantiel (art.l a 17) et en procedure (art. 18 a 34) 
est applicable sur tout le territoire des Etats membres 
de 1'Union europeenne. En cas de lacune du corpus, la loi 
applicable est celle du lieu o& 1'infraction est 
poursuivie, renvoyee en jugement, ou, le cas 6cheant, 
celle du lieu d'execution de la condamnation.
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